TheKorean People's Army Strategic Force (Korean: 조선인민군 전략군),[3] previously known as theKorean People's Army Strategic Rocket Force (조선인민군 전략로케트군),[4] is amilitary branch of theKorean People's Army (KPA) founded in 2012[5] that operatessurface-to-surface missiles in the nuclear and conventional strike roles.[6] It is mainly armed with ballistic missiles.[6][5] The inventory includes domestic andSoviet designs.[7][8]
North Korea receivedrocket artillery,surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), andanti-ship missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and then fromChina in the 1970s. The decision to develop a domestic missile production capability was likely made by 1965 after the Soviet Union refused to supplyballistic missiles. Military and industrial preparations began shortly afterward.[9] China agreed to assist North Korea develop ballistic missiles. A joint development program for the DF-61 missile began in 1977. It was cancelled in 1978 due to Chinese domestic politics.[10]
In the late-1970s or early-1980s, North Korea receivedR-17 Elbrus (Scud-B) ballistic missiles fromEgypt.[11] TheHwasong-5 was based onreverse engineering the R-17. Flight-testing began in 1984. The Hwasong-5 was supplied toIran in 1985. Its use in theWar of the Cities provided considerable operational data. The missile had suffered a number of launch failures in North Korean testing and in Iranian service. A 1985 cooperative agreement may have provided North Korea with Iranian funds for missile development.[12]
The Hwasong-5 entered serial production in 1987.[12] Development continued by "scaling up Scud technology."[13] North Korea received Soviet and then Russian assistance in the mid-1980s and early-1990s.[14]
TheHwasong-7 (Nodong) began development in 1988 or 1989.[15] In 1995, it began deploying, after one failed and one reduced-range flight test. Iran andPakistan were manufactured missiles based on the Hwasong-7. Flight data from the PakistaniGhauri missile was provided to North Korea.[16]
In the late-1990s, a rocket division was created within theMinistry of the People’s Armed Forces. Both said division and the KPAGF's rocket and ballistic missile units were organized into one force under the Missile Guidance Bureau in 1999, currently July 3 is marked as its service anniversary.[17]
Since Kim Jong Un came to power in December 2011, North Korea has attempted to launch nearly three times as many ballistic missiles as during the entire reign of his father, Kim Jong Il. Between 2011 and the end of 2016, North Korea launched 42 ballistic missiles: 20 short-range Scud- type missiles with a range of 300–1,000 km, 10 medium-range Hwasong-7 (Nodong) missiles that can fly 1,300-1,500 km, eight intermediate-rangeHwasong-10 (Musudan) missiles traditionally assessed to have a range of 3,500-4,000 km, and four submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These tests can be divided into three categories: tests of operational missiles, tests of missiles North Korea considered operational but were untested, such as the Musudan, and those still under development, such as the Pukguksong [Polaris] family of solid-fuelled missiles.[18]
In 2012, theUnited Nations and independent experts said that North Korea did not operate missiles beyond the intermediate range, and that the long-range missiles shown at parades are mock-ups. There were doubts about the authenticity of theHwasong-13 (KN-08) missiles displayed on 16-wheel carrier trucks during a 2012 military parade, and theMusudan missiles shown in 2010.[19][20][21][22]
The testing in 2018 and 2019 of four new road-mobile, solid propellant propulsion,SRBMs marked a qualitative improvement in North Korean missiles. These have a reduced firing preparation signature, making destruction before launch more difficult. Some have a flattened trajectory, making in-flight interception more difficult. Japanese Defence MinisterTakeshi Iwaya stated "I believe that [North Korea’s] development of a missile that flies at a lower altitude than a conventional ballistic missile in an irregular trajectory is aimed at breaking through the [Japanese] missile defence system".[23]
These new missiles such as theHwasong-11A (KN-23) andHwasong-11B (KN-24) are more sophisticated than the previous Hwasong series. They employ flattened trajectories to remain below 50 km in altitude, putting them in between the 40 km maximum engagement altitude ofPatriot missile-defense interceptors and 50 km minimum engagement altitude ofTHAAD andAegis missile defense systems. Flying through this coverage gap and using active steering increases survivability against missile defenses. They have the advantage of being solid-fueled and more accurate than their predecessors, making them more effective weapons.[24][25][26]
Between 2018 and 2020, North Korea expanded its missiles brigades, from 8 to 13.[27]
Musudan-ri (무수단리) is a rocket launching site in North Korea at 40°51′N, 129°40′E. It lies in southernNorth Hamgyong Province, near the northern tip ofEast Korea Bay. The area was formerly known as Taep'o-dong (대포동), from which the Taepodong rockets take their name.
Kittaeryŏng (깃대령) site is inKangwon Province, which bordersSouth Korea. It is used for launches of short to medium-range missiles and has a pad for mobile launchers.
Hodo Peninsula (호도반도) is a rocket and missile testing facility nearWonsan. It was established in the 1960s and was modernized in 2014–2016.[34]
Yusang-ni (유상리) Twenty-eight kilometers east ofSunchon, it is one of the newest operating bases built (c. 2003). It has been reported to house either theHwasong-13,Hwasong-14, orHwasong-15 missiles.[35]
Hoejung-ni(회정리) is North Korea's newest missile base, built c. 2012–13. It is likely capable of deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles as it lies in the country's missile "strategic belt".[36][30]
South Korean government sources are reported to have stated in 2013 that a missile silo complex is located south ofPaektu Mountain near the Chinese border. The silos are reportedly designed for mid- to long-range missiles, but it is not clear if all of them are operational;[44] however, these claims have not been independently verified.
Launch pads
Launching pads are required for the more sophisticatedTaepodong-1/2, as their liquid propellant is difficult to store and the missiles must be fueled immediately before launch. This launching method poses a great risk, as the sites themselves are extremely vulnerable to airstrikes. Launching pads can be used to test different types ofSRBM,IRBM andICBMs, and to launch space satellites, but they are of little value if any of these missiles is to be deployed as a strategic weapon.
Mobile launcher vehicles
North Korea extensively uses mobile launchers for its missiles, including theRodong-1 and theHwasong-10. These are hard to detect and significantly improve survivability.
Submarine/ship-based launch
TheKorean People's Navy is not known to have ballistic missile submarines in service. However, it has started research and development into a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submarines[45] and has successfully fired a missile from one of itstest submarines.[46]
As of 2016[update],South Korea's military has identified three belts of North Korean missiles. The first are located about 50–90 km north of theKorean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This belt reportedly has 500-600 Scud missiles that have ranges of 300–700 km. It said the North has some 40transporter erector launchers (TELs) in this belt, which makes the missiles harder to detect.[52]
In the second belt, lying 90–120 km north of the DMZ, Pyongyang is known to have placed 200-300 Hwasong-7 (also called Rodong or Nodong) medium-range missiles with a range of around 1,300 km, with 30 TELs. In the third belt, lying deeper inside the country, the North may have 30-50 Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 30 TELs, with the latest reports indicating the deployment of the North'sHwasong-13 (KN-08) long-range missiles.[53]
Some similarities toMGM-140 ATACMS, but larger, with aft-fins to maintain aerodynamic control over entire flight. Tested in August 2019 and March 2020.[86][87]
"Super-large multiple rocket launcher," viewed as an SRBM by U.S. assessment.[92] 30 tracked chassis and another 9 truck chassis are known to have been made for total of 216 guided rockets.[93]
The estimated maximum range of some North Korean missile types. The missiles with a range exceeding that of the Rodong are not known to be operationally deployed.
North Korean missiles can serve to deliver various types of warheads, includingWMD. It is possible that up to three Rodong-1 missiles are fitted with nuclear warheads.[96] In a similar manner to the initial Chinese nuclear doctrine,nuclear weapons are being stored separately, and would only be mounted on missiles after an order of the supreme commander (Kim Jong Un). Despite the claims by numerous media that North Korea has not yet created nuclear warheads small enough to be fit in a missile, reports surfaced in April 2009, according to which North Korea has miniaturized warheads, capable of being mounted on its missiles.[97] The most suitable nuclear weapons delivery system is the Rodong-1, which has been successfully tested many times.
North Korea possesses a largechemical weapons stockpile, including powerful agents such astabun,sarin,soman,VX gas and others. Little is known about thebiological weapons stockpiles. They are probably limited, as North Koreans consider them much more dangerous to handle, therefore posing a threat to their own soldiers.
North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to produce a re-entry vehicle, without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon accurately from an ICBM.[98] However, a crude and highly-inaccurate blunt body reentry vehicle could be used in early missiles.[49]
North Korea has been upgrading warheads for theirScud-derived ballistic missiles, with maneuverable reentry vehicle capability, in order to increase accuracy and evasion of ballistic missile defence systems such asTHAAD.[54]
North Korea also exported numerous type of rockets to Russia. Debris analysis shows North Korean made missile being used to attack Ukraine from late 2023, providing North Korea with an opportunity to test missiles and expanding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, weapon transfer also violate sanctions imposed onPyongyang.[101][102]
^Shim, Elizabeth (October 14, 2020)."North Korea promotes unknown general to oversee missile development".UPI.Kim Jong Gil, a military general with a three-star rank, was mentioned on Pyongyang's Korea Central Television on Wednesday. KCTV said the relatively unknown official is the commander of the Korean People's Army Strategic Force
^Bermudez, Joseph; Cha, Victor; Collins, Lisa (November 12, 2018)."Undeclared North Korea: The Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base".Center for Strategic and International Studies.Although occasionally and incorrectly referred to as an "underground missile storage" facility, it is a forward Hwasong-5/-6 missile operating base subordinate to the Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army (KPA), which is responsible for all ballistic missile units.
^Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat(PDF).National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Report). Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency. April 2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09.Archived(PDF) from the original on February 3, 2013. RetrievedFebruary 20, 2013.
Bermudez, Joseph S. (2001). Shield of the Great Leader. The Armed Forces of North Korea, The Armed Forces of Asia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.ISBN1864485825.
Homer T. Hodge, North Korea's Military Strategy, Parameters (journal), Spring 2003, pp. 68–81
Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: First Ballistic Missiles, 1979-1989".
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Zaloga, Steven; Illustrated by Jim Laurier and Lee Ray (2006). Scud Ballistic Missile Launch Systems 1955–2005. Osprey Publishing.ISBN1-84176-947-9.
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