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| Timeline (Territorial evolution) |
Rise(1299–1453) |
Classical Age(1453–1566)
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Transformation(1566–1703)
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Old Regime(1703–1789)
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Decline and Modernization(1789–1908)
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Dissolution(1908–1922)
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| Historiography (Ghaza,Decline) |
TheKöprülü era (Turkish:Köprülüler Devri) (c. 1656–1703) was a period in which theOttoman Empire's politics were frequently dominated by a series ofgrand viziers from theKöprülü family. The Köprülü era is sometimes more narrowly defined as the period from 1656 to 1683, as it was during those years that members of the family held the office of grand vizier uninterruptedly, while for the remainder of the period they occupied it only sporadically.[1]
The Köprülüs were generally skilled administrators and are credited with reviving the empire's fortunes after a period of military defeat and economic instability. Numerous reforms were instituted under their rule, which enabled the empire to resolve its budget crisis and stamp out factional conflict in the empire.[2]
The Köprülü rise to power was precipitated by a political crisis resulting from the government's financial struggles combined with a pressing need to break theVenetian blockade of theDardanelles in the ongoingCretan War.[3][4] Thus, in September 1656Valide SultanTurhan Hatice selectedKöprülü Mehmed Pasha as grand vizier, as well as guaranteeing him absolute security of office. She hoped that a political alliance between the two of them could restore the fortunes of the Ottoman state.[5] Köprülü was ultimately successful; his reforms enabled the empire to break the Venetian blockade and to restore authority to the rebelliousTransylvania. However, these gains came at a heavy cost in life, as the grand vizier carried out multiple massacres of soldiers and officers he perceived to be disloyal. Regarded as unjust by many, these purges triggered a major revolt in 1658, led byAbaza Hasan Pasha. Following the suppression of this rebellion, the Köprülü family remained unchallenged politically until their failure to conquerVienna in 1683. Köprülü Mehmed himself died in 1661, when he was succeeded in office by his sonFazıl Ahmed Pasha.[6]
Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (1661–1676) continued the reforming tradition of his father, and also engaged in numerous military campaigns against the empire's European neighbors. He conqueredNové Zámky (Turkish Uyvar) from theHabsburgs in 1663, concluded theCretan War with the conquest ofHeraklion (Kandiye) in 1669, and annexedKamianets-Podilskyi (Kamaniçe) from thePolish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1672. This policy of aggressive expansion, continued by Fazıl Ahmed's brother-in-law and successorMerzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, expanded the borders of the Ottoman Empire to their greatest extent in Europe.[7] Yet it also facilitated the formation of a large internationalcoalition to oppose the Ottomans, leading to defeats and territorial losses following the disastrousSiege of Vienna in 1683.[8] For his failure, Kara Mustafa Pasha was executed bySultan Mehmed IV, leading to a break in Köprülü rule. During the subsequent period of warfare, members of the Köprülü household occasionally regained the grand vizierate - for instanceFazıl Mustafa Pasha (1689–1691) andAmcazade Hüseyin Pasha (1697–1702), yet they never again achieved as firm a grip on power as they had enjoyed before 1683.
In the subsequent conflict, the Ottomans struggled under the strain of multi-front warfare with theHabsburgs, the princes of theHoly Roman Empire,Venice,Poland–Lithuania, andRussia. After a series of defeats culminating in the loss ofHungary, the Ottomans managed to stabilize their position,reconquering Belgrade in 1690. However, attempts to regain further territory were unsuccessful, and following defeat in theBattle of Zenta in 1697 they were forced to recognize their inability to reconquer the lost Hungarian lands.[9]
In 1699, under the terms of the resultingTreaty of Karlowitz, the Ottomans ceded all ofHungary andTransylvania to theHabsburgs, with the exception of theBanat region.Morea was transferred to Venice, whilePodolia was returned toPoland–Lithuania. These concessions marked a major geopolitical shift in Eastern Europe, namely the end of Ottoman imperial expansion. The Ottomans henceforth adopted a defensive policy on theDanube frontier, and were largely successful in maintaining its integrity throughout the eighteenth century.[10] This period, contrary to the views of earlier generations of historians, is no longer viewed as one ofdecline.[11]
The Köprülü era is also noteworthy for several other developments in the Ottoman Empire. Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's tenure in office coincided with the height of theKadızadeli religious movement in Istanbul. Its leader, Vani Mehmed Efendi, was made court preacher for SultanMehmed IV and played a role in shaping imperial policy and increasing religious conservatism. Based upon the Islamic principle of "enjoining good and forbidding wrong," the Kadızadelis believed it was the duty of all believers to actively enforce religious orthodoxy, and to combat innovations in religious practice (bidʿah). They thus opposed the practice ofSufi worship, as well as other habits such as drinking and smoking. Despite the court's approval of much of the Kadızadeli program, the group was regarded negatively by many of the empire'sMuslim intellectuals, such asKâtib Çelebi andMustafa Naima, who viewed them as backwards-thinking and overly reactionary.[12] Following the Siege of Vienna, Vani Mehmed Efendi fell out of favor and was exiled from court, his movement no longer receiving imperial support.[13]
The Ottoman Empire was profoundly affected by reforms carried out during the 1683-99 War of the Holy League. After the initial shock of the loss ofHungary, the empire's leadership began an enthusiastic process of reform intended to strengthen the state's military and fiscal organization. This included the construction of a fleet of moderngalleons, the legalization and taxation of the sale oftobacco as well as of other luxury goods, a reform ofwaqf finances and tax collection, a purge of defunctjanissary payrolls, reform in the method ofcizye collection, and the sale of life-termtax farms known asmalikâne. These measures meant a more efficient financial administration and finer control. They also led, with the new century, of an Ottoman Treasury surplus, meaning a private sector deficit, as more was taxed away from the population than was spent by the Treasury with the minted currency, with the intent of paying off the Treasury's monetary debt obligations.[14]
historians of the Ottoman Empire have rejected the narrative of decline in favor of one of crisis and adaptation
Ottomanist historians have produced several works in the last decades, revising the traditional understanding of this period from various angles, some of which were not even considered as topics of historical inquiry in the mid-twentieth century. Thanks to these works, the conventional narrative of Ottoman history – that in the late sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire entered a prolonged period of decline marked by steadily increasing military decay and institutional corruption – has been discarded.
Ottomanist historians have largely jettisoned the notion of a post-1600 'decline'
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