Joseph Simon Gallieni (24 April 1849 – 27 May 1916) was a French military officer, active for most of his career as a military commander and administrator in theFrench colonies where he wrote several books on colonial affairs.[1]
He was recalled from retirement at the beginning of theFirst World War. As military governor of Paris he played an important role in theFirst Battle of the Marne, whenMaunoury'sSixth Army, which was under his command, attacked the German west flank. A small portion of its strength was rushed to the front in commandeered Paris taxicabs.
From October 1915 he served as Minister of War, resigning from that post in March 1916 after criticizing the performance of the French Commander-in-Chief,Joseph Joffre (formerly his subordinate, earlier in their careers), during theGerman attack on Verdun. He died later that year and was madeMarshal of France posthumously in 1921.
Gallieni was born in 1849 atSaint-Béat, in the department ofHaute-Garonne, in the central Pyrenees.[2] He was of Corsican[3] and Italian descent.[4] His father, born inPogliano Milanese, had risen from the ranks to be a captain.[5][6]
As a student, he was educated, hard-working, and studious at thePrytanée Militaire inLa Flèche, and then theÉcole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr.[7][8][9] He was also gifted and outstanding inmathematics and languages.[10][11] He later became asecond lieutenant in the3rd Marine Infantry Regiment before serving in theFranco-Prussian War.[12]
Gallieni fought atSedan[13] and was taken prisoner atBazeilles, scene of the stand of the colonial marines.[14] He learned German while a prisoner there, and later kept a notebook in German, English and Italian called "Erinnerungen of my life di ragazzo" ("Memories of my life from boyhood [onwards]").[15]
He was promoted tolieutenant in 1873. His colonial career began in 1876 in Senegal. He was promoted tocaptain in 1878. He led an expedition to the upper Niger. He also served in Reunion andMartinique.[16] In 1886, he had risen to the rank oflieutenant-colonel,[17] and was later appointed governor of theFrench Sudan, during which time he successfully quelled arebellion by Sudanese insurgents underMahmadu Lamine. He was outstanding at colonial penetration without open hostilities in West Africa in 1880 and 1886–8.[18]
In 1888 he was appointed to the War College. In 1892-6 he served as a colonel inFrench Indochina commanding the secondmilitary division of the territory inTonkin. In 1894 he led successful French action against the nationalist leaderĐề Thám, but further military action was overruled by colonial administrators after Đề Thám was accorded a local fiefdom.[19]
In 1896 he was promoted to General and made Governor of Madagascar, then a new French possession. He stayed in Madagascar with one brief interruption until 1905; his future commanderJoseph Joffre served under him there.[20] In August 1896 Gallieni reorganised French forces, captured and executed severalrebel leaders. Early in 1897 he abolished the Malagasy monarchy and exiled QueenRanavalona III to Reunion.[21][22] Gallieni practised thetache d’huile (the "oil spot" method, which continues to influence counterinsurgency theory to this day[23]) andpolitique des races (literally, racial policy; i.e., eliminating the racial hierarchy that had prevailed and suppressing tribes that resisted French rule).[24] Initially military, his role became more administrative, building roads, a railway, markets, medical services and schools.[25]
In 1905 Gallieni defended thecode de l’indigenat (the right of French officials to mete out summary punishment, including corporal punishment and confiscation of property, to individuals and to entire villages), as it administered punishment more arbitrarily and swiftly than would be possible under due legal process.[26]
In 1905 Gallieni was appointed Military Governor of Lyon and commandant of the Army of the Alps (XIV Corps). Also in 1906 he became a member of theConseil Superieur de la Guerre (the Superior War Council, a body of senior generals chaired by thePresident).[27][28]
GeneralVictor-Constant Michel (Generalissimo, i.e. Commander-in-Chief designate of the northeast front, and vice-president of the Superior War Council), was critical of the tactical doctrine ofoffensive à outrance (taking the offense to the limit). He also wanted to thrust into Belgium in the event of war, and to increase the size of the army by attaching a regiment of reservists to each regular regiment to form demi-brigades. Along withYvon Dubail and Pol Durand, Gallieni was one of those who told War MinisterMessimy that Michel must be removed.[29]
Following Michel's removal Gallieni, who was the preferred choice ofPrime MinisterCaillaux, declined the job of Army Chief of Staff.[30] This was partly because of scruples after having forced Michel out, partly because of age—he was two and a half years away from retirement—and partly because the Metropolitan Army might resent a colonial soldier getting the job ("une question de bouton"). His former subordinate Joffre was appointed instead.[31][32]
Gallieni commandedFifth Army until his retirement, and protested that it was not strong enough to advance into Belgium, and that Maubeuge should be fortified more strongly. His successorLanrezac shared his concerns.[33] After tours of the area Gallieni had failed to persuade the authorities to modernise Maubeuge.[34]
Like a number of officers with colonial experience, Gallieni wanted the French army to give up thepantalon rouge (red trousers worn by French soldiers, allegedly as a boost to morale) and adopt a less conspicuous uniform. This was vetoed on the grounds that dull uniforms might be confused with those of the enemy and might turn the army into a citizen militia like the Boers.[35]
At the 1911 manoeuvres Gallieni used air reconnaissance to capture a colonel of the Supreme War Council and his staff.[36] He expressed reservations about the limited offensive strategy. His views on fortifications, artillery, and use of information obtained from aviation and intelligence were seen as unusual views for a colonial soldier.[37]
In the same year, Gallieni was considered the logical choice for supreme commander of the French Army, but because of advanced age and poor health, he declined in favour of Joffre.[38]
His date of retirement is given as February[39] or April 1914.[40] His wife died in early summer 1914.[41]
Before the war he wrote of Joffre in his diary, "When I was riding I passed him in thebois [woods] today—on foot as usual—how fat and heavy he is; he will hardly last out his three years."[42] He warned Joffre, correctly as it would turn out, that the Germans would come west of the Meuse in strength (i.e. make an enveloping move deep into Belgium, rather than a shallow incursion through the south-east corner of Belgium and down through the Ardennes).[43]
Gallieni was designated as Joffre's successor "in case of emergency" on 31 July.[44] Joffre refused to have him at his headquarters, saying "He is difficult to place. I have always been under his orders.Il m’a toujours fait mousser [He always riled me]."[45] On 14 August, as theLorraine offensive was beginning, Gallieni visited Joffre at the insistence of War MinisterAdolphe Messimy, who felt intimidated by Joffre. Messimy imagined that Joffre would be more likely to listen to his former superior, but he was quickly palmed off onto the staff officer General Belin and his deputyBerthelot.[46][47]
As a condition of becomingMilitary governor of Paris, Gallieni demanded three active corps to defend the city. War MinisterMessimy ordered Joffre to provide them on 25 August but Joffre, regarding this as interference with strategy, ignored the order. Gallieni learned from Messimy that 61st and 62nd Infantry Divisions, formerly the Paris Garrison, were being ordered north forMaunoury’s planned offensive against the German west flank near Amiens, leaving Gallieni with only territorial troops. Already in poor health, Gallieni was appointed on 26 August, not yet knowing that he did not have the resources he had demanded. However, on that dayViviani formed a new government (Union sacrée), and on 27 August the new War MinisterMillerand (who had replaced Messimy largely because of the poor state of the Paris defences) visited Joffre, who promised to provide the three corps if Maunoury's attack should fail.[48][49][50]
On 28 August the "Zone of Armies" was extended to cover the Paris suburbs. From 10 am to 10:15 am Gallieni held his one and only Council of Defence, at which his military and civil cabinets, standing up and without discussion, were made to sign the order placing Paris in a state of defence. He sacked two generals in his first two days.[51]
On 2 September, the anniversary of theBattle of Sedan, the government left Paris for Bordeaux, with the evacuation continuing through the night of 2/3 September.[52] Paris was made a"camp militaire retranché".[53] Before departing, Millerand ordered Gallieni to defend Paris"à outrance," repeating the order when Gallieni explained that it meant destroying buildings and bridges. Gallieni later recorded that he had been certain that he was remaining behind to die.[54] That day Gallieni told Joffre that without the three corps it would be "absolutely impossible to resist." Joffre placed Maunoury'sSixth Army, which was retreating down from the Amiens area, under Gallieni's direct command as the "Armies of Paris." Gallieni at once drove out to inspect his new command—he was horrified by the sight of the refugees—and to visit Maunoury. Gallieni had four territorial divisions and the 185th Territorial Brigade. He soon received a Marine Artillery Brigade (mostly Breton reservist sailors) and the 84th Territorial Division. Sixth Army was soon augmented by IV Corps from Third Army. Maunoury had an active division of VII Corps, a 5,000 strong native Moroccan brigade, and four reserve divisions: 61st and 62nd under Ebener, and 55th and 56th which had fought in Lorraine. Joffre also added Drude's 45th Division of Zouaves from Algeria, who made a huge impression marching through Paris, and IV Corps from Third Army. The Prefect of Police had resigned "on grounds of health" on being ordered to remain at his post. Gallieni stayed up with his staff all night drawing up plans for Sixth Army to give battle between the Oise and Pontoise. Joffre had Millerand place Gallieni under his own command on 2 September.[55][56][57][58]
The members of the Government
of the Republic have left Paris to give
a new impulse to the national defense.
I have received the mandate to defend Paris
against the invader.
This mandate, I shall carry out to the end.
Paris, 3 September 1914
Gallieni believed that Joffre's strategy of retreating behind the Seine was "divorced from reality" as the Germans would not allow his forces enough time to rally. He spent the night of 2/3 September at his new HQ at Lycee Victor-Duruy, expecting a German attack the next day. On the morning of 3 September he learned thatvon Kluck was marching southeast across Paris, offering his flank to a French counterattack.[59][60] The first public proclamation on the morning of 3 September promised to defend Paris "to the last extremity." That morning Gallieni set engineers and civilian labourers to work cutting down woods and trees, and preparing bridges and buildings for demolition to clear lines of sight for guns. For three days concrete was poured and barbed wire strung up. Even theEiffel Tower was prepared for demolition. Paris had 2,924 guns, ranging from 155mm to 75mm. Hospitals and fire departments put on alert. Gas for three months of electricity was stockpiled, along with bread for 43 days, salt for 20 days and meat for 12 days. Pigeons were brought under state control for carrying messages. Lt-ColDreyfus rejoined the artillery. Civilianpaniquards were encouraged to leave and reconnaissance patrols were set up.[61][62][63]
On the night of 3–4 September Joffre sent a handwritten note to Gallieni, wanting Maunoury's Sixth Army to push east along the north bank of the Marne, although not specifying a date. This was in line with his modification ofInstruction General No 4 (2 September), envisaging a giant pocket from Paris to Verdun, of which he enclosed copies to Gallieni.[64]
Gallieni decided that it was "vital to act quickly" so as not to leave Paris uncovered. At 09:10 on 4 September, based on the previous day's reports of Paris aviators, which he had passed on to Joffre, and on his own authority, he sent orders to Maunoury to be ready to move his army that afternoon (now reinforced with Drude's 45th Infantry Division) and to be ready to come to Paris for a conference. Having first informedPresidentPoincaré in Bordeaux—in Tuchman's view, to force Joffre's hand—at 9:45 am he had the first of a series of telephone calls, conducted through aides, as Joffre would not come to the phone, and Gallieni refused to speak to anyone else. Gallieni would later write that "the real Battle of the Marne was fought on the telephone." He proposed, depending on how much further the Germans were to be allowed to advance, to attack north of the Marne on 6 September or south of the Marne on 7 September.[65][66][67]
Joffre's reply, saying he preferred the southern option (which would take a day longer as it forcedSixth Army to cross to south of the Marne, but would allow Sixth Army and the BEF to not be separated by the river), arrived too late to reach Gallieni. To ensure British cooperation Gallieni, accompanied by Maunoury, left Paris at 1 pm to drive to BEF GHQ at Melun, driving past lines of southbound cars leaving Paris. He had already received advice from the liaison officer Victor Huguet that BEF Commander-in-ChiefSir John French, influenced by BEF Chief of StaffMurray and concerned about his supply lines along the lower Seine, was unlikely to join in any offensive. They arrived at 3 pm and with some difficulty located Murray, who had no idea when Sir John, who was out visitingBritish I Corps, was to return and was unwilling to make any decision in his absence. In a three-hour meeting, the French generals proposed that Sixth Army was to move that afternoon, then on 5 September was to strikeGerman IV Reserve Corps on the west flank. A provisional agreement was drawn up, with copies kept by Maunoury, Gallieni, and Lt-Col Brecard to take to GQG for Joffre's approval. The French came away with the impression that the British would not cooperate and that Murray had"une grande repugnance" for them, but he did in fact pass the plans along to Sir John. While this was going on,Wilson (BEF Sub Chief of Staff) was negotiating separate plans withFranchet d’Esperey (Fifth Army, on the British right), which envisaged Sixth Army attackingnorth of the Marne.[68][69][70][71]
In the absence of news from Franchet d'Esperey, Joffre orderedMajor Gamelin to draft orders for Maunoury to attack south of the Marne on 7 September. That evening Gallieni, who returned to Paris to find Joffre's message from earlier in the day and a message from Wilson, insisted on speaking to Joffre personally on the telephone, informing him that it was too late to cancel the movement of Maunoury's Army. Joffre agreed to bring forward the Allied offensive to 6 September and to have Sixth Army attack north of the Marne instead, later writing that he had done so reluctantly as Maunoury would probably make contact with the Germans on 5 September, but that an extra day would have left the Germans in a more "disadvantageous" position. Tuchman argues that he may simply have been swayed by the dominant personality of Gallieni, his former superior. At 8:30 pm Gallieni ordered the attack by Maunoury's Army, which was in fact already under way. At 10 pm Joffre issuedGeneral Order No 6, ordering a General Allied Offensive.[72][73][74][75]
On 5 September Gallieni informed Maunoury that there was to be no retreat and issued secret orders for the destruction of important parts of Paris, including thePont Neuf and thePont Alexandre III.[76]
On 7 September Gallieni, concerned that with Maunoury's Sixth Army fighting out in the open, Paris was now vulnerable, telegraphed the government in Bordeaux to discuss the possible evacuation of the civilian population from the Paris suburbs, and orderedprefects and the police to find "emergency locations" for them.[77] That day Gallieni was ordered not to communicate directly with the government. This left Joffre "all-powerful" (in Gallieni's description), as he had sacked so many generals and Gallieni was his only serious rival.[78] The same day, frustrated at the slowness at which the British were advancing into the gap between the German First and Second Armies, Gallieni sent Lartigue's 8th Infantry Division to the BEF'sright flank to keep contact between the BEF and Franchet d’Esperey's Fifth Army (the French and British generals of 1914 were extremely concerned at the prospect of armies being encircled and besieged, after what had happened to the French Armies atSedan andMetz in 1870). Joffre, concerned that Gallieni might arouse Sir John's "touchiness," sent a telegram toLord Kitchener (British War Secretary) thanking him for Sir John's efforts.[79]
It was Gallieni's decision to send 103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments (5 battalions, part of Trentinian's 7th Infantry Division, itself part of IV Corps; most of 7th Infantry Division, including artillery, had been sent to the front by rail and truck the previous night) to the front on the night of 7/8 September, in taxicabs commandeered the previous evening. The division's attack failed completely so the taxicab troops had even less impact than sometimes supposed. Although "great publicity for Gallieni; militarily it was insignificant" in Herwig's view. Upon seeing the "taxicab army" ferrying troops to the front, Gallieni made one of the most oft-quoted remarks of the First World War: "Eh bien, voilà au moins qui n'est pas banal!" ("Well, here at least is something out of the ordinary!").[80][81][82]
Learning of Gallieni's contingency plans to evacuate Paris the previous day, Joffre telegraphed Millerand (8 September) demanding that he cancel Gallieni's "dangerous" message, and insisting that Gallieni was under his orders and had no business communicating directly with the government.[83] On 8 September Gallieni ordered Maunoury, under heavy pressure from von Kluck, to hold his ground. Joffre gave permission for Maunoury to pull back his left if necessary. The Germans, concerned at the gap between their First and Second Armies, began to pull back on 9 September, giving the Allies a strategic victory in the Battle of the Marne.[84]
When the German warshipsGoeben andBreslau went to Constantinople, Gallieni proposed attacking the Turkish straits.[85]
By early December 1914 some of Gallieni's supporters were suggesting that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief in Joffre's place, or be made Minister of War, or both.[86]
Gallieni was an early supporter of some kind of expeditionary force to the Balkans.[87] Early in 1915 Gallieni supported the proposal of Franchet d’Esperey andAristide Briand (Justice Minister) for an expedition to Salonika, which he hoped would detach first Turkey then Austria-Hungary, leaving Germany "doomed". President Poincaré came out in favour of such a scheme, over Joffre's opposition, on 7 January 1915.[88]
WithViviani’s government in trouble following the resignation ofDelcasse as Foreign Minister, theunsuccessful autumn offensive and theentry of Bulgaria into the war, he asked Joffre, who had told him that nine out of ten generals would make poor ministers of war, whether Gallieni would be a good replacement forMillerand asMinister of War. Joffre replied "perhaps," then after a pause for thought "maybe." Although Gallieni agreed, in the event other French leaders refused to join Viviani's government soBriand formed a new government on 29 October 1915, with Viviani as vice-president of the Council of Ministers (Deputy PM) and Gallieni as War Minister.[89]
Since July 1915 Joffre had been demanding that he be appointed commander-in-chief overall French forces, including those at the Dardanelles and Salonika. By November 1915 President Poincaré was persuaded, and Briand, initially reluctant because of the difficulty of defending Gallieni's inclusion in his new ministry, agreed and on his first day in office asked Poincaré to help him persuade Gallieni to accept Joffre's enhanced role. Gallieni agreed and wrote to Joffre—having first shown the letter to Briand—assuring him that "you can count on me." Briand had the two men meet and shake hands.[90][91]
At the meeting of the Superior Council of Defence (24 November 1915) Joffre had Briand address the demarcation of his own and Gallieni's authority, and objected to the Council discussing operational matters, threatening to resign if they attempted to interfere with his "liberty." Joffre met with Poincaré and Briand both before and after the meeting to discuss the issue. Gallieni complained bitterly in his diary about the politicians’ unwillingness to stand up to Joffre. On 1 December Poincaré and Briand met with Gallieni. They rejected the proposal prepared by his staff to vest authority in the Minister of War, Briand objecting that he would be obliged to answer questions in the Chamber about operational matters. Gallieni agreed that Joffre be commander-in-chief, with de Castelnau—who was soon sidelined—as his chief of staff, and under the War Minister's orders. A Presidential Decree of 2 December 1915 made Joffre "Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies" (generalissimo) over all theatres apart from North Africa. After considerable discussion this was approved by the Chamber of Deputies by 406–67 on 9 December.[92][93]
Gallieni cleared out soldiers from cushy jobs—three Paris theatres had been directed by Army officers. He authorised the renewed use of black African troops—50,000 in total—on the Western Front.[94] He introducedfoyers du soldat—waiting rooms for soldiers in transit at railway stations.[95]
Although Gallieni supported theSalonika expedition, he shared Joffre's low opinion ofSarrail’s military abilities. On 12 November Gallieni ordered Sarrail to retreat to Salonika with as much of the Serb Army as he could gather. After Sarrail lobbied politicians for reinforcements Gallieni wrote back to 19 November telling him that he was not going to receive the four corps he wanted, although on 20 November he sent Sarrail (whom he thought "indecisive and not up to the task") a telegram giving him a free choice as to whether to assist the latest Serb attack and when to fall back on Salonika.[96][97][98]
With evacuation of the Gallipoli bridgeheads under discussion, Gallieni was willing to divert troops there from Salonika for one last attempt.[99] On 9–11 December Gallieni took part in the Anglo-French talks in Paris (along withGrey (BritishForeign Secretary), Kitchener (British War Secretary), Joffre and Briand) at which it was decided to maintain an Allied presence in Salonika, although it was unclear for how long. He later ordered Joffre to send an extra French division, although not the two Sarrail demanded.[100]
Gallieni made an effort to unite soldiers and politicians, and to establish a working relationship in which he concentrated on supplying resources (not dissimilar to the role to which Kitchener was restricted in the UK from the end of 1915).[101] However, Gallieni hadprostate cancer, with pain making him less tolerant of criticism at a time when political disquiet was growing after the failure of theSecond Battle of Champagne, especially the failed attack onHartmannswillerkopf and its subsequent total loss.[102][103]
In Clayton's view, Gallieni may well have been sceptical of Joffre's plans for amassive Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, to be accompanied by Italian and Russian offensives, as floated at the Chantilly meeting in 6–8 December 1915.[104] There was also friction over Gallieni's assertion of his right to appoint generals, Joffre's practice of communicating directly with the British generals rather than going through the War Ministry, and Gallieni's maintaining contacts with generals whom Joffre had replaced.[105]
In autumn 1915Lt-Colonel Driant, a member of the Chamber of Deputies and commander of achasseurs brigade, complained to Gallieni of how Joffre had been removing guns and garrisons from Verdun and even preparing some forts for demolition. Joffre was furious and disputed Gallieni's right to comment.[106][107] Driant, who had served at Verdun, was a member of the Army Commission of theChamber of Deputies. The Council of Ministers discussed his reports and President Poincaré asked Gallieni to investigate. Gallieni wrote to Joffre (16 or 18 December 1915) expressing concern at the state of trenches at Verdun and elsewhere on the front—in fact matters were already being taken in hand at Verdun.[108]
The political atmosphere was poisonous after the opening of theGerman attack at Verdun (21 February). Rumours circulated in Paris that Joffre had ordered the abandonment of Verdun at the end of February 1916 when the Germans first attacked. Gallieni demanded to see all paperwork from the period, but Joffre had made no such order in writing, merely despatching de Castelnau to assess the situation. Gallieni launched an angry report at the Council of Ministers on 7 March—read in his usual precise way—criticising Joffre's conduct of operations over the last eighteen months and demanding ministerial control, then resigned. Gallieni was falsely suspected of wanting to launch a military takeover of the government. Poincaré wrote that Gallieni was trying to force Joffre's resignation, although it is unclear whether he was specifically trying to do so. Briand knew that publication of the report would damage morale and might bring down the government. Gallieni was persuaded to remain in office until a replacement had been designated and approved.[109][110]
Rocques was appointed as his successor after it had been ensured that Joffre had no objections.[111] This would be the last attempt to assert ministerial control over the army untilClemenceau became Prime Minister late in 1917.[112]
The strain of high office had broken Gallieni's already fragile health. Suffering from prostate cancer, he underwent two surgeries at the Versailles clinic and died on May 27, 1916.[citation needed]
Gallieni'sMemoirs were published posthumously in 1920.[113]
He was posthumously madeMarshal of France, in 1921. He was buried inSaint-Raphaël. Camp Gallieni inKati was named after him.[114]There is also a Camp Galieni in Abidjan that serves as the Ivorian Arms forces Headquarters[115]
Clayton describes him as a dry precise man, a secular republican (views which influenced his colonial policy) but one who kept aloof from politics.[116] Herwig describes him as "formidable" and "France’s most distinguished soldier" whose "physical appearance alone commanded respect": he was of straight bearing and always wore full dress uniform.[117]
By the time Gallieni complained about Joffre's handling of Verdun, there was already public debate, much of it politically motivated, about which of them had "won" theFirst Battle of the Marne in 1914.[118]Churchill commends him for seeing the opportunity to outflank the German Army, using Manoury's Sixth Army, and for persuading the defeatist Joffre. "He is not thinking only of the local situation around Paris. He thinks for France and he behaves with the spontaneous confidence of genius in action.".[119] In his memoirs Gallieni claimed credit for that victory, and historians such asGeorges Blond,Basil Liddell Hart, and Henri Isselin credited him with being the guiding intelligence, a claim disputed by Captain Lyet in his book"Joffre et Gallieni a la Marne" in 1938. Ian Senior describes "Gallieni's claims" as "absolute nonsense" and Lyet's book as "an excellent analysis which convincingly refutes" them.[120] Joffre himself once remarked:"Je ne sais pas qui l'a gagnée, mais je sais bien qui l'aurait perdue." (I do not know who won it [the battle], but I know well who would have lost it.").[121] Doughty writes of the Marne: "Gallieni’s role was important, but the key concept and decisions lay with Joffre".[122] At the end of the war Clemenenceau said, "Without Galliéni, victory would have been impossible."[123]
From the beginning of his colonial career he became interested in ethnology. He amassed a large collection of objects fromFrench Sudan andMadagascar, which he donated to theMuseum de Toulouse.
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