TheJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA;Persian:برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک,romanized: barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak (برجام,BARJAM)),[5][6] also known as theIran nuclear deal orIran deal, was anagreement to limit theIranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement was finalized inVienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and theP5+1 (the fivepermanent members of theUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC)—China, France, Russia, the U.K., U.S.—plus Germany)[a] together with theEuropean Union.
Formal negotiations began with the adoption of theJoint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on anIran nuclear deal framework, which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[9]
Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to constrain itsnuclear program by limiting fuel cycle activities that could lead to the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. The JCPOA restricted the number and type ofcentrifuges in operation, the level ofuranium enrichment, and the size of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. Key facilities atFordow,Natanz andArak were repurposed for civilian uses such as medical and industrial research. Iran agreed to accept more intrusive IAEA monitoring measures of its fuel-cycle related activities. In exchange for complying with these restrictions, Iran received relief from nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the EU, and the United States, but many U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear issue—targeting Iran's missile program, support for militant groups, andhuman rights record—remained in place, limiting the economic effect of sanctions relief. The agreement also set a timetable to lift the UN arms embargo, contingent on Iran's continued compliance with civilian nuclear commitments.
TheUnited States withdrew from the pact in 2018, imposing sanctions under itsmaximum pressure campaign. The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null.[13] On 18 October 2025, in the aftermath of the June 2025Iran–Israel war, Iran officially announced the termination of the agreement after 10 years.[4]
A fission-based "atomic"nuclear weapon uses afissile material to cause anuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials areuranium 235(235 U) andplutonium 239(239 Pu). Bothuranium 233(233 U) andreactor-grade plutonium have also been used.[14][15][16] The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium.[17] Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3%uranium 238(238 U) and only 0.7%235 U.
To make a weapon, either uranium must beenriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required fornuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is adual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes.[18] Key strategies to preventproliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export ofnuclear technology and fissile material.[16][18]
After the 1979Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.[19]
In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance fromChina (which entered into anagreement with Iran in 1990),Pakistan (which did the same in 1992), andRussia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from theA.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment.[19]
In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident groupNational Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, theArak heavy-water production facility and theNatanz enrichment facility.[19][20] In February 2003, Iranian PresidentMohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants.[19] IAEA inspectors visited Natanz.[20] In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples.[20]
In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement.[20] Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N.S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3).[19][20] The U.S. took no part.[20] In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment.[19][20] In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities.[19] This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution".[19]
In August 2005, IranianPresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason.[20][21] Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement".[19][20] Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment atEsfahan.[19][20]
In February 2006, Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C.[19][20] In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons.[20] In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1.[20] That July, the S.C. passed its firstresolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing.[22][20] S.C. resolution1737 was adopted in December; followed by others.[23] The legal authority for IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and theUnited Nations Charter.[23] The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities.[19][20]
In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution.[19]
Four more S.C. resolutions followed:1747 (March 2007),1803 (March 2008),1835 (September 2008), and1929 (June 2010).[23] In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".[23][b]
In 2007, IAEA director-generalMohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations.[29] ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended.[29]
A November 2007 U.S.National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate andU.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons".[30]
In September 2009 U.S. PresidentBarack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, nearQom.[31] Israel threatened military action.[20]
U.S. Secretary of StateJohn Kerry shakes hands with Iranian Foreign MinisterJavad Zarif after the P5+1 and Iran concluded negotiations about Iran's nuclear capabilities on November 24, 2013
In March 2013, the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led byWilliam Burns andJake Sullivan (U.S.) and Ali Asghar Khaji (Iran).[20][32] In June,Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran.[20][33] In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uraniumyellowcake at Isfahan.[34] In August, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1.[35]
In September, Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of StateJohn Kerry met with Foreign MinisterMohammad Javad Zarif.[20][35]
On 24 November, after several rounds of negotiations, the interimJoint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of a short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions.[36] The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement.[35] The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014.[37] That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.[35][37]
A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on theArakIR-40heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational). Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; theBushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachinuranium mine; theFordow Uranium Enrichment Plant; theIsfahan uranium-conversion plant; theNatanz uranium enrichment plant; and theParchin military research and development complex.[38]
Foreign Ministers from the P5+1 nations, the European Union, and Iran inVienna, Austria, on November 24, 2014
JCPOA was the culmination of a 20-month negotiation.[39][40] The parties extended their talks, first to 24 November 2014[41] and then to 1 July 2015.[42]
Aframework was agreed on 2 April 2015 atLausanne. Under this framework Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions, all of which would last a decade or longer, and to submit to increasedinspections. Negotiations continued, ending inVienna at thePalais Coburg.[10] On 14 July 2015, all parties agreed.[43]
The agreement reflects the impact of a June 2015 public letter by a bipartisan group of U.S. diplomats, experts, and others[44][45] that outlined concerns about various provisions and called for strengthening the agreement.[44] After the agreement was reached, one of the negotiators, Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official, said: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."[44]
An analysis by theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace claimed that the final agreement was based upon (and buttressed) "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially theIAEA safeguards system".[46]
In November 2015, U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for Legislative AffairsJulia Frifield said: "The JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1, and the EU."[48]
The physical limits phase out over 10 to 15 years[52]
^According to the JCPOA, "The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA."
Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg,[53][40][54][55][56] and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civiliannuclear power and research, but not for weaponry.[54][55][57] This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium).[54][55][56] Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% was to be fabricated into fuel plates for theTehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to 3.67%. P5+1 agreed to facilitate commercial contracts.
After 15 years, all limits on enrichment would be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, and enrichment sites. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".[52][58]
Iran initially possessedcentrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power.[59] Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium.[40][54] Enrichment would be restricted to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there were limited to IR-1 centrifuges, Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran would warehouse its advanced IR-2M centrifuges during this period.[38][55][56] Non-operating centrifuges would be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but could be used to replace failed centrifuges.[60][61] Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years.[54]
Iran could continueresearch and development work on enrichment only at the Natanz facility and had to respect specific limitations for eight years.[38] The intent was to maintain a one-year breakout interval.[54]
With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran was permitted to modernize theArak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design. Arak was to be limited to 20MWt to support allowed research and production, while minimizing plutonium production and avoidingweapons-grade plutonium.[62]Spent fuel was to be sent out of the country.[38] Allheavy water beyond Iran's reactor needs was to be exportable. In exchange, Iran imported 130 tonnes of uranium ore in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to import 130 tonnes in 2017.[63] For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage inspent fuel reprocessing,[64] build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water.[38]
Fordow would stop researching and enriching uranium for at least 15 years. The facility was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow would maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing. Two of the six cascades would be transitioned for stableradioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. The other four would remain idle. Iran agreed to keep nofissile material there.[38][54][56]
A comprehensive inspections regime would monitor and confirm Iranian compliance. The monitoring and inspections regime included provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and additional measures to monitor centrifuge rotor production and stockpiles, and uranium mining.[54][55][c]
The IAEA was to have multilayered[75] oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement ofnuclear-related technologies".[76] For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment).[76][77] The agreement authorized the IAEA to use sophisticated monitoring technology, such asfiber-optic equipment seals that could send the IAEA information; satellite imagery to detect covert sites; sensors to detect minute nuclear specimens; and tamper- and radiation-resistant cameras.[44][78] Other tools included software to gather information and detect anomalies, and datasets on imports.[75] The number of inspectors tripled to 150.[44]
Inspectors could request access, informing Iran of the basis of the request, to verify the absence of prohibited activities and nuclear materials.[77] The inspectors were to come only from countries with which Iran had diplomatic relations.[79] Iran could either allow the inspection or propose alternatives that satisfied the IAEA's concerns.[77] If the inspectors were not satisfied, a 24-day process would ensue.[77] Iran and the IAEA were to have 14 days to reach agreement.[77] For the following week a majority of the commission could require Iran to take specific actions within three more days.[80][81] This allowed the U.S. and its allies to insist on responses that Iran, Russia or China could not veto.[80][82] After three days of non-compliance, sanctions would be automatically reimposed.[81]
After ten years or more, the breakout time would gradually decrease.[40][83] By the 15th year, U.S. officials said the breakout time would return to thestatus quo ante of a few months.[40][83] The Belfer Center report stated: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."[52]
Iran was granted exemptions prior to 16 January 2016. Their reported purpose was to enable sanctions relief and other benefits to start by that date. The exemptions allowed Iran to:[88]
exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit;
exceed the zero kg of near 20% LEU limit;
keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit;
maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceeded the 130-tonne limit by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman.[89]
Iran had to submit a full report on its nuclear history before it could receive any sanctions relief.[90] At the time of the agreement, Iran was subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by an array of organizations. Once IAEA verified compliance with the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions would terminate. Some E.U. sanctions would terminate and some would suspend. That would allow Iran to recover approximately$100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks.[91] No U.N. or E.U. nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures were to be imposed.[92]
Additional E.U. sanctions would be lifted after eight years of compliance, including some on theRevolutionary Guards.[93]
The U.S. agreed to suspend its nuclear-relatedsecondary sanctions.[94][95] This was not tied to a date or compliance but was expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016".[94][96][97] Some sanctions would continue: those onconventional weapon sales for five years; those on ballistic missile technologies for eight.[40][98] But sanctions related to human rights, missiles, and support for terrorism remained in effect.[56][99] Many U.S. sanctions apply worldwide; E.U. sanctions apply only in Europe.[93]
Under the JCPOA, any of the P5+1 countries could invoke a"snapback" mechanism, allowing for the automatic reimposition of UN sanctions if Iran was found to be in significant non-compliance with the deal.[54][55][92] Snapback sanctions would not apply retroactively to contracts that were lawful at the time they were signed.[60]
Any party could refer allegations of non-compliance to the Joint Commission monitoring body.[56][100] Complaints by a non-Iran party that were not resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within 35 days would allow the complainant to cease performing its commitments, notify the S.C., or both.[100] The S.C. would then have 30 days to adopt a resolution to continue the sanctions relief. Absent such a resolution, nuclear-related U.N. sanctions would automatically be reimposed. Iran said it would then cease performing its nuclear obligations.[101][100] This would allow anypermanent S.C. member (U.S., United Kingdom, China, Russia or France) to veto sanctions relief.
This procedure implied that the U.S., U.K., or France could reinstitute sanctions if it concluded that Iran was non-compliant,[100] though since that might cause Iran to withdraw from the agreement, they might be reluctant to do so.[102]
"Transition Day" was to occur either eight years after Adoption Day or earlier if the IAEA reached its broader conclusion on Iran's nuclear program. At that point, the UN would lift restrictions on missiles, Iran was expected to pursue ratification of its Additional Protocol, the EU must end its remaining nuclear-related sanctions, and the United States would remove specific items from its sanctions list and work toward ending certain sanctions through legislative means.[103]
"Termination Day" was set for October 18, 2025—ten years after Adoption Day. It would mark the end of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and the council's formal closure of Iran's nuclear file. With this, the mechanism allowing any participant to unilaterally reimpose prior UN sanctions on Iran's nuclear program without risk of veto, known as the snapback provision, would also expire.[103]
After 15 years, many provisions of the JCPOA would expire, including most enrichment provisions.[104]
The JCPOA received a mixed international reaction. Many countries expressed hope that it could achieve its goals,[106][107][108] while Iranian adversaries in the Middle East, including Israel and Saudi Arabia,[11][12] and some U.S. lawmakers saw it as defective and appeasing Iran.[109][110][111]
During the final negotiations, Kerry stayed in Vienna for 17 days, the longest interval a Cabinet official had devoted to a single international negotiation in more than four decades.[124] Zarif broke the record for anIranian Foreign Minister staying far from home with an 18-day stay in Vienna,[117] and set the record of 106 days of negotiations over 687 days, more than any otherchief nuclear negotiator in 12 years.[125] The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all five foreign ministers of thepermanent S.C. members.[117]
Speaking immediately after the vote, Power told the S.C. that sanctions relief would start only when Iran "verifiably" met its obligations. She also called upon Iran "to immediately release all unjustly detained Americans", specifically namingAmir Hekmati,Saeed Abedini, andJason Rezaian, who were detained at the time, andRobert A. Levinson, who had been missing in the country.[132][135] Hekmati, Abedini, and Rezaian were released in a January 2016 prisoner exchange, which Kerry said the nuclear agreement had accelerated.[136]
In televised remarks on 23 July 2015, Rouhani rejected domestic criticism by Iranian hardliners, such as theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[140] He claimed a popular mandate to make an agreement based onhis election in 2013 and said the alternative was suffering under continued sanctions.[140] A two-page, top-secret directive from Iran'sSupreme National Security Council instructed newspapers to avoid criticism or giving any impression of disagreement at the highest levels of government.[141]
The anti-agreement coalition included former presidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad, former head of AEOIFereydoon Abbasi, ex-nuclear negotiatorSaeed Jalili, and various conservative clerics and IRGC commanders. This group claimed that Iranian negotiators caved on many key issues and were outmaneuvered.[144]
Anti-JCPOA representatives of Islamic Consultative Assembly protested Ali Akbar Saheli and made death threats toward him.[145]
The leading reformist newspapers,Etemad andShargh, supported the deal.[150] The leading conservative papers,Ettelaat andKayhan, criticized its terms.[150]
On 13 October the Iranian Parliament approved the JCPOA supplemented by text unilaterally added by Iran and not agreed to by the P5+1, with 161 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions.[152][153][154][155]
Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, and Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew defending the JCPOA at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July 2015
The agreement's legal status in the U.S. was disputed.[e] Under U.S. law, the JCPOA is a non-binding political commitment.[162][163] According to the State Department, it is neither anexecutive agreement nor atreaty (as defined in U.S. law). In contrast to treaties, which require two-thirds of the Senate to consent to ratification, executive commitments require no congressional approval and are not legally binding under domestic law, though they may carry weight under international law.[164][f]
In May 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA),[g][173] which gave Congress a defined period to review any nuclear agreement with Iran. Under the Act, once the JCPOA was submitted, Congress had 60 days to pass a resolution of approval or disapproval or take no action.[174] Additional time was allotted to allow for potential presidential vetoes and override votes.[175][174][176]
On 19 July 2015, the State Department formally transmitted the JCPOA to Congress,[177] along with an unclassified verification report and a classified annex from theIntelligence Community.[177] The 60-day review period began on 20 July[177][178][174] and ended on 17 September.[179] A resolution of disapproval failed in the Senate, as did a resolution of approval in the House. As a result, the agreement went into effect after the congressional review period expired.[180]
Obama repeatedly urged Congress to support the agreement, noting the inspections regime's vigor and criticizing opponents for failing to offer a viable alternative.[181] Vice PresidentJoe Biden met with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats, seeking their support.[182]
Republicans generally rejected the deal. Cruz said that under the agreement "the Obama administration will become the financier of terrorism against America in the world."[183] Former GovernorMike Huckabee of Arkansas, a candidate for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, called Obama "naive".[184] Obama cited the support of Democrats typically associated with strong defense backgrounds, saying, "This is a deal that has been endorsed by people likeBrent Scowcroft andSam Nunn... historic Democratic and Republican leaders on arms control and on keeping America safe".[185]
Senate Majority LeaderMitch McConnell promised that Republicans would discuss the agreement respectfully in September.[186][187] Democrat Senate Minority LeaderChuck Schumer distinguished the nuclear and non-nuclear aspects. His conclusion was: "when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be better off without it."[188]
ASenate Foreign Relations Committee hearing took place on 23 July. Kerry,Treasury SecretaryJack Lew, and Moniz testified.[190][191] ChairBob Corker said the agreement codified rather than dismantled the Iranian program.[192][193] Ranking memberBenjamin Cardin remained neutral.[194] Other Democrats, led byBarbara Boxer, expressed support. Corker and Cardin requested to review the IAEA-Iran document.[195] Kerry, Lew, and Moniz said that without JCPOA, international sanctions would collapse.[190] Republican senators gave vociferous speeches denouncing the deal.[195]
Senators John McCain (Republican of Arizona), the committee chair, and Jack Reed (Democrat of Rhode Island), the committee ranking member, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the JCPOA, 29 July 2015.
Carter assured the committee that the U.S. could employ military force if needed and that he did not expect other Iranian misbehavior to stop,[204] another reason to limit its nuclear program.[205][206] Dempsey testified that the agreement reduced the chances of a near-term military conflict.[200]
IAEA has confidential technical arrangements with many countries.[90][207][208] Some Republican lawmakers called such agreements "secret side deals" that restructured the deal.[207] Cruz introduced an unsuccessful resolution seeking a delay in the review period, arguing that the review period should begin upon receipt of all relevant documents.[209][210]
State Department spokesmanJohn Kirby responded the P5+1 had been fully briefed and that related questions could be addressed in a classified setting.[208] Various experts lined up on both sides of the controversy.[90][72][211][212]
The Washington Post listed 12 issues raised by U.S. senators including Corker,Bob Menendez,Jim Risch,Marco Rubio, andRon Johnson, including the efficacy of inspections at undeclared sites; the effectiveness of the snapback sanctions; the significance of limits on enrichment; the significance of IAEA side agreements; the effectiveness of inspections of military sites; the consequences of walking away from an agreement; and the effects of lifting sanctions.[213][h]
Republican leaders vowed to kill the agreement.[221][222]
One area of disagreement was the consequences of walking away, and whether renegotiation was a realistic option.[213] Schumer, an opponent, called for retaining and strengthening sanctions, and to continue negotiating.[188] President Obama argued that renegotiation was unrealistic, that the Iranian people would see further concessions as "total surrender of their sovereignty",[223] and that other countries would not continue to support the existing sanctions regime.[223] SenatorAl Franken accepted the claim that no better deal was feasible.[224][i] RepresentativeSander M. Levin announced his support.[228] Senator Cardin said that if the agreement were implemented, the U.S. should increase military aid to Israel and friendly Gulf states.[176] SenatorBill Nelson and Foreign Relations Committee membersTim Kaine and Barbara Boxer announced their support.[229]
The Associated Press reported that the classifiedU.S. Intelligence Community assessment concluded the agreed inspection regime would diminish Iran's ability to conceal a covert weapons program.[230][231] Ten active and former Democratic members of theHouse Select Committee on Intelligence (including Minority LeaderNancy Pelosi and Intelligence Committee ranking memberAdam Schiff) cited this assessment, which was available for members of Congress to read, as a reason to support the agreement.[231][232]
A resolution of disapproval was initially expected to pass both the House and Senate.[234][235]
Two-thirds of both houses are required to override a presidential veto.[236][237] On 20 August 2015, Pelosi claimed that House Democrats had the votes to sustain a veto of a resolution of disapproval.[238] By 20 August, about 60 House Democrats had announced their support,[239] versus about 12 opponents.[238]
By early September 2015, 34 senators had confirmed their support, ensuring that the Senate could sustain a veto.[240] This proved to be moot, since by 8 September, all senators had announced their commitments, with 42 in support (40 Democrats and two independents) and 58 opposed (54 Republicans and four Democrats).[240] Without 60 votes on either side, the other couldfilibuster any resolution.[240] A key part of obtaining even limited support came during an August 2015 meeting at which top diplomats from the UK, Russia, China, Germany, and France told 10 undecided Democratic senators they had no intention of returning to negotiations.[241]
Initially, the House leadership planned to vote on a resolution of disapproval.[242][j]SpeakerJohn Boehner instead chose to advance a resolution of approval to force Democratic supporters to formally register their views.[245] On 11 September 2015 the resolution of approval failed on a 162–269 vote; 244 Republicans and 25 Democrats voted no, while 162 Democrats and no Republicans voted yes.[245][246] The same day, Congress passed resolutions claiming that the requirements of a congressional review period were not met (byparty-line vote) and that that would prevent the U.S. from lifting any sanctions[245][247] (all Republicans and two Democrats in favor).[245][247][248]
U.S. pro-Israel lobby groups were divided.[272]American Israel Public Affairs Committee spent millions opposing it.[273][272][274][275]J Street came out in support, and planned a $5 million advertising effort.[276][277] In the first week of August J Street launched a $2 million, three-week ad campaign in support of the agreement, with TV ads in Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.[278][279]
Leaders of the Reform Jewish movement stayed neutral.[280][281]
Michael Mandelbaum claimed that nonproliferation ultimately depended on deterrence, not agreements.[296]Alan Dershowitz claimed that the involvement of Russia and China made the deal irrelevant.[297]
On the same day that the S.C. approved its resolution, the E.U. formally approved the JCPOA via a vote of the E.U.Foreign Affairs Council (the group of E.U. foreign ministers) meeting inBrussels. This set into motion the lifting of certain E.U. sanctions, including those prohibiting the purchase of Iranian oil.[132][298] The E.U. continued its sanctions relating to human rights andprohibiting the export of ballistic missile technology.[132]
On 18 October 2015 E.U. High Representative Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif jointly announced "Adoption Day".[299]
On 20 September 2015, Director-GeneralYukiya Amano of the IAEA went to theParchin missile production facility, along with Director of SafeguardsTero Varjoranta, to obtain clarifications on the site's nuclear activities.[300][301][302] The next day, Amano professed satisfaction with the samples submitted by the Iranians to the IAEA. IAEA experts were not physically present during the sampling, but Amano said the procedure met "strict agency criteria".[303] In June 2016, IAEA investigators reported that they had reported traces ofuranium found at the Parchin facility in December 2015.[304]
Last meeting between diplomatic teams of Iran and the U.S., at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna
After the IAEA certified that Iran had met the relevant JCPOA requirements, all nuclear sanctions were lifted by the UN, the E.U. and the U.S. on 16 January 2016, "Implementation Day".[305]
That day Washington imposed sanctions on 11 companies and individuals for supplying Iran's ballistic missile program.[306][307] According to Kerry, $1.7 billion in debt with interest was to be paid toTehran. But some Iranian financial institutions, including Ansar Bank,Bank Saderat, Bank Saderat PLC, and Mehr Bank, remained on the SDN List[308] and U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran, including existing terrorism, human rights and ballistic missiles-related sanctions, remained in effect.[309]
In a letter sent to then RepresentativeMike Pompeo, the State Department said that the JCPOA "is not atreaty or anexecutive agreement, and is not a signed document".[310]
According to theCongressional Research Service, different definitions of "treaty" are used in international and U.S. law. According to theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "The term 'treaty' has a broader meaning under international law than under domestic law. Under international law, 'treaty' refers to any binding international agreement.[311] Under domestic U.S. law, 'treaty' signifies only those binding international agreements that have received theadvice and consent of theSenate."[312]
Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at theWashington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that deterrence must remain the "core imperative" for U.S. policy.[313] Einhorn wrote that maintaining a credible deterrent was essential.[314]
Obama stated that the U.S. would continue its policy of deterring any Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including via military force.[315] Flexibility meant that Obama rejected specifying "the penalties for smaller violations of the accord" in advance.[316]
Dennis Ross andDavid Petraeus claimed that deterrence including military force was essential to preventing Iran from nuclear weapons and called on Obama to clearly state that policy.[317][318]
Khamenei claimed that hisfatwa and not JCPOA was the reason Iran would not acquire nuclear weapons.[319]
The U.S. certified in April 2017 and in July 2017 that Iran was complying with the deal.[320][321]
On 13 October 2017, President Trump announced that he would not make the certification required under theIran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, accusing Iran of violating the spirit of the deal and calling on Congress and international partners to "address the deal's many serious flaws", though he stopped short of terminating the agreement.[322][323]
Trump left Congress to decide whether to reimpose sanctions. His aides sought to enact rules indicating how the U.S. could reimpose sanctions. Trump listed three items that could provoke the U.S. to reject the deal: intercontinental ballistic missile development, Iranian refusal to extend the constraint period, and evidence that Iran had reduced the time needed to manufacture a bomb to fewer than 12 months.[324]
In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA DirectorYukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments.[326] On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a pastcovert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required.[327][328]
Project Cassandra was a U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) initiative launched in 2008 to disruptHezbollah's funding networks by targeting its involvement in international drug trafficking and money laundering.[329] The operation uncovered significant links between Hezbollah and organized crime, but its later years were marked by controversy over allegations that enforcement efforts were slowed to protect the JCPOA negotiations—a claim former officials disputed.[330]
On 8 May 2018, the U.S. officially withdrew from the JPCOA after Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum ordering reinstatement of sanctions.[331][332][333][334] The IAEA continued to certify Iranian compliance.[335] Other signatories said they would comply with the deal even absent the U.S.[336]
I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. In a few moments, I will sign a presidential memorandum to begin reinstating U.S. nuclear sanctions on the Iranian regime. We will be instituting the highest level of economic sanction. Any nation that helps Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons could also be strongly sanctioned by the United States.
The U.S. adopted a policy of "maximum pressure", led by global sanctions.[13][338][339]
TheIranian rial fell by 20%,[340] from 35,000 to the dollar to 42,000 in 2021.[341] International banks that traded with Iran paid heavy fines.[342] The U.S. flag was set on fire in Iran's Parliament.[343] According toIsrael Defense Forces sources, IRGCQuds Forces based in Syria launched rockets at Israeli military targets the next evening, the first time Iran had directly targeted Israel.[344] All major European companies abandoned doing business with Iran out of fear of U.S. punishment.[345]
Khamenei presented seven conditions for Europe to sustain JCPOA. Among them was that European powers must take steps to preserve business relations with Iranian banks and purchase Iranian oil. He rejected holding discussions about Iran'sballistic missile program and regional activities.[346]
On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted ablocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran.[347] In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development ofballistic missiles.[348]
One year after the U.S. withdrawal, Iran took countermeasures. Iran halted its required sales of excess enriched uranium and heavy water to other countries. Rouhani said that Iran would resume enrichment beyond 3.67% if other parties could not let Iran benefit from JCPOA's economic provisions.[345]
In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the deal's main terms, but raised questions about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, which was only loosely specified in the deal.[349]
On 8 May, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of parts of JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days absent exemption from U.S. sanctions.[350]
On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium,[351] which the IAEA confirmed.[352] On 7 July, Iran announced that it had started to increaseuranium enrichment beyond the agreed 3.67% limit. IAEA said its inspectors would verify Iran's actions. Zarif sent a letter to Mogherini notifying her about Iran's noncompliance.[353]
On 4 November, Iran doubled the number of advanced centrifuges it operated. It began enriching uranium to 4.5%. On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chiefAli Akbar Salehi announced that Iran would enrich uranium to 5% at Fordow, adding that it already had the capability to enrich uranium to 20%.[354]
On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA.[355]
In 2020, Trump and Pompeo asserted that the U.S. remained a "participant" in the agreement, despite having formally withdrawn, in an effort to persuade the S.C. to reimpose pre-agreement sanctions on Iran for its breaches.[356]
New U.S. PresidentJoe Biden stated his intention to reinstate the deal.[357] Israeli Prime MinisterNaftali Bennett advised against this, saying that stopping Iran's aggression and preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons should be the priority.[358]
In April, talks between the original parties started inVienna. Biden put the meetings on hold in June.Enrique Mora, E.U. coordinator for reviving negotiations with Iran, attended PresidentEbrahim Raisi's inauguration. Iran sought E.U. assurances that the U.S. withdrawal would not repeat. On 14 October, Iran and the E.U. agreed to further negotiations. Iranian deputy foreign ministerAli Bagheri reiterated Mora's statement that "the E.U. was ready to collaborate with Iran and the other parties".[359]
A joint statement by French, German, U.K., and U.S. leaders on 30 October welcomed Biden's interest in reestablishing JCPOA.[360] Talks resumed on 29 November, with representatives from Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.K.[361]
Bagheri presented Iran's draft.[362] Western negotiators rejected it. Iranian negotiators insisted that the U.S. lift all sanctions before Iran would scale back its nuclear program.[363] On 9 December, negotiations continued, with Russia and China pushing Iran to revise its stance.[364]
On 20 February, 250 members of the 290-member Iranian parliament, which had been controlled by hardliners since 2020, issued a statement urging Raisi to comply with their requirements for reestablishing JCPOA.[365]
The U.S. engaged in indirect talks with Iran, mediated by China, Russia and E.U. JCPOA revival became a priority for theBiden administration when theRussian invasion of Ukraine spiked global energy prices. JCPOA would add about a million barrels/day of Iranian oil to the international market, which would lowercrude oil prices.[366]
Throughout the year, leaders on both sides made statements assessing the state of talks.[367][368][369][370][371][372] Points of contention included:
theIAEA investigation about undeclared materials from three nuclear sites;[373][374]
the presence of IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations;[375][376][377]
Russian demands to explicitly protect its economic relations with Iran[378] (eventually Russia received U.S. guarantees to protect its trade with Iran frominternational sanctions);
By May, talks had stalled.[381] On 7 May, Mora visited Iran to restart them.[382]
In June, Tehran said it was removing 27 U.N. surveillance cameras.[383]
On 16 June, the Biden administration announced sanctions against Iran's petrochemical industry.[384] On 6 July, the U.S. initiated legal proceedings against entities based inSingapore,Vietnam, and theUnited Arab Emirates for evading sanctions.[385]
In July, indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran failed.[386]
In August European negotiators presented a "final" text, after another round.[387] The draft did not include removal of the IRGC's terrorism designation.[388]
In September, Iran increased its oil exports to China, circumventing sanctions.[389]
A delegation visited Tehran on 18 December to discuss the nuclear material discovered at three sites. Earlier Iran reported it had enriched uranium to its highest level of 60%, one step away from weapons grade.[390]
An IAEA report on theFordow Uranium Enrichment Plant found that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges were configured in a way "substantially different" from what Iran had previously declared. Iran claimed the difference was due to a human error. On 31 January, theU.S. State Department authorized a sanctions waiver, which allowed Russia to develop the enrichment site, a move that some criticized[who?] because it allowed Iran to develop itsnuclear program withRussian-state controlled firms.
On 4 March, Grossi met with Raisi and other top Iranian officials. Earlier, IAEA had detected uranium particles enriched up to 83.7% at Fordo. In the meantime, Iran gave assurances that it would reinstall monitoring equipment at sensitive locations.
In early June, European powers resumed internal talks. Preliminary negotiations with France, Germany, the U.K., andAli Bagheri Kani again took place inOslo. A U.S. State Department official acknowledged that direct connections had been under way, the first since 2018.[393] Both sides had released prisoners accused of espionage and terrorism.[394]
On 18 June, indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. began inOman after the U.S. allowed the release of blocked Iraqi payments to Iran.[395] On 4 July,Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce chairmanYahya Ale Eshaq confirmed the release of $10 billion, to be used for unsanctioned goods. This allowed Iran to double its trade with Iraq.[396] As a consequence, IAEA imposed no additional punitive measures on Iran, as European allies saw no benefit. Israel said it opposed "mini-agreements" with Iran, as well as the original agreement.[397]
In late August, after months of negotiations, first in Oman and then with Qatari officials in New York, agreements between the U.S. and Iran led to a gradual easing of sanctions on Iranian oil sales, particularly for eastern markets such as China. Iranian oil sales reached their highest since 2018, allowing prices to drop below $85 a barrel. Skeptical analysts claimed this was simply to keep U.S. gasoline prices in check for the 2024 election. The U.S. State Department insisted on continued sanctions enforcement, while some reports indicated that Iran was slowing its uranium enrichment. Iranian oil production reached 3 million barrels per day in July, with a further increase to at least 3.4 million barrels in August.[398]
In late August, IAEA confirmed that Iran had slowed its program to enrich uranium to 60%. Concurrently, the sale of Iranian crude increased. Some oil sanctions were lifted.[399]
In the first week of September, the U.S. State Department officially released $6 billion in frozen assets and finalized an exchange of five prisoners each. The funds could be used only for unsanctioned goods.[400]
A September IAEA report confirmed an enrichment slowdown, but claimed that no reporting progress had been made and that the camera equipment at the enrichment site remained inaccessible.[401][402]
In mid-September, the IAEA/Iran relationship further deteriorated when Iran rejected IAEA nuclear inspectors. This was formally permitted by Iran's safeguards agreement.[403]
On 18 September, Raisi spoke at theU.N. General Assembly and said that Iran would never give up its right to peaceful nuclear energy. He urged Western powers to return to the nuclear deal. Israel left the assembly hall in protest.[404][405]
In October, Qatar and the U.S. put Iran's access to blocked funds on hold due to theGaza war, although Iran denied any involvement in the attack.[406][407][408]
Additional sanctions were imposed on the Iranian aviation sector due to its involvement with exports of missile components to Russia. Iran denied any deliveries. An IAEA report confirmed the expansion of Iran's enrichment program. Fordow was routinely enriching uranium to 60%. The report said that Iran informed the agency that eight clusters of advanced IR-6 centrifuges had been installed at the site but not brought online. The larger site atNatanz added 15 cascades, allowing an enrichment purity of 5%. IAEA board resolutions required Iran to cooperate with its investigations into uranium traces and called for inspectors to enter nuclear sites.[409][410]
On November 13, IAEA directorRafael Grossi visited Tehran where he was welcomed by Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Grossi, holding talks with Foreign MinisterAbbas Araghchi and AEOI ChiefMohammad Eslami, had earlier said the JCPOA was an "empty shell" but that IAEA inspectors had no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear bomb. During the COP29 climate summit inBaku, he warned that "the international situation is becoming increasingly tense".[412][413]
In February 2025, Khamenei criticized the JCPOA, saying the Iranian team had been too generous and the U.S. had failed to uphold its commitments and ultimatelywithdrew from the deal. He said the JCPOA left a constant threat hanging over Iran (thesnapback mechanism). He concluded that negotiating with such a government "is neither wise, nor intelligent, nor honorable".[414][415]
In September 2025, theUN security council rejected a resolution byChina andRussia to delay "snapback sanctions" triggered by France, the UK, and Germany. European powers still adhere to agreements set forth by the JCPOA, and demand direct negotiations between Iran and the U.S. At the same time, Iran has welcomed IAEA inspectors to control the remaining undamaged nuclear sites. Iran has called the snapback sanctions "procedurally flawed" because they rely on terms of the 2015 agreement long abandoned by the U.S.[416] Russia called the reimposition of sanctions "clumsy blackmail" and dismissed it as "null and void".[417]
Also in September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four nuclear power reactors inSirik, Iran. TheGeneration III reactors are expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. Iran, which suffers power shortages at times of high demand, currently has one operating nuclear power plant, inBushehr. Also built by Russia, it has a capacity of 1 GW.[418] On 28 September, UN sanctions were officially reimposed on Iran.[419]
On June 13, 2025, the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement became acutely evident whenIsrael attacked Iran. According to theIAEA, Iran did not disclose "traces of uranium", which led to the conclusion that Iran might have developed nuclear weapons. The lack of support for the initial resolution complicated enforcement agreements. TheTrump administration's inability to craft a new agreement with Iran has been viewed as a major setback forU.S. foreign policy. According to the UN, Iran's nuclear programme was "exclusively peaceful", per the terms of the JCPOA, but inspectors later said they had been "unable to determine whether Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful". According to a June 2025 IAEA report, there had been no indication of a physical attack on the underground cascade hall containing part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Fordow and the main Fuel Enrichment Plant, but a power loss due to the attack might have caused the centrifuges there to malfunction.[420][421]
On June 21, 2025, the U.S. bombed three Iranian nuclear sites,Fordow,Natanz, andIsfahan, and claimed it had totally destroyed them, but according to Iranian news agencies, all three locations had been abandoned and equipment moved elsewhere. Damage to the deep underground Fordow site could not be confirmed, and no release of radioactive materials was reported. Iranian nuclear facilities are underIAEA routine inspection, and the atomic agency strongly discouraged military attacks on these facilities.[422]
Iran's detention of foreign and dual nationals during negotiations
During the negotiations, Iran escalated its practice of detaining Western citizens and dual nationals on unsubstantiated and vague charges like "collusion against national security" or "espionage", a strategy widely characterized ashostage diplomacy. This involved imprisoning people to use them as bargaining chips for diplomatic and financial leverage. The number of people Iran arrested spiked around 2014, with at least 30 detained in four years. Analysts say that some people were deliberately taken by hard-line elements who wanted to sabotage the deal's potential to generate warmer relations.[423][424][425][426][427][428][429]
^The P5+1 are also sometimes referred to as the "E3+3", for the "EU three" countries (France, the UK, and Germany) plus the three non-EU countries (the U.S., Russia, and China). The terms are interchangeable; this article uses the "P5+1" phrase.[7][8]
^The meaning of Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and its application to Iran, is a matter of dispute.[24][25]Gary Samore writes, "Whether the NPT guarantees signatories a right to enrichment is a long-standing dispute among the parties to the treaty."[26] Iran and other countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa) assert that signatories to the NPT have a right to enrich uranium under Article IV of the NPT.[27][28] ProfessorWilliam O. Beeman of the University of Minnesota, as well asHenry D. Sokolski, executive director of theNonproliferation Policy Education Center, agree with this interpretation of the NPT.[27] The U.S. position was unclear before 2006, but after that time the U.S. has taken the position that Iran does not have the right to uranium enrichment because this activity is not specifically cited in the NPT.[25][27] In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2013, Sherman stated, "the U.S. position that that article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty does not speak about the right of enrichment at all [and] doesn't speak to enrichment, period. It simply says that you have the right to research and development. And many countries such as Japan and Germany have taken that [uranium enrichment] to be a right. But the United States does not take that position. ... We do not believe there is an inherent right by anyone to enrichment."[27] The U.S. officials has also made the additional argument that whatever Iran's rights under the NPT might be, they were superseded by a series of UN Security Council resolutions demanding "that Iran suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities until 'confidence is restored in the purely peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.'"[25][26][27] U.S. Secretary of State Kerry has said: "We do not recognize a right to enrich. It is clear ... in the nonproliferation treaty, it's very, very (clear) that there is no right to enrich. [The Iranians] have the ability to negotiate it, but they could only gain that capacity to have some enrichment as some countries do, if they live up to the whole set of terms necessary to prove it's a peaceful program."[24] In March 2011 testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-U.S. Secretary of StateHillary Clinton expressed a similar position, indicating that Iran should be permitted to enrich uranium under IAEA supervision once the international concerns over its nuclear program are resolved.[28]
^At the same time that the JCPOA was agreed to, Iran and the IAEA signed a separate document, the Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.[65] The roadmap includes "the provision by Iran of explanations regarding outstanding issues" and provides "for technical expert meetings, technical measures and discussions, as well as a separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin", an Iranian military research and development site.[65] "The specific measures that Iran is committed to take with respect to technical expert meetings and discussions and access to Parchin are contained in two separate documents between Iran and the IAEA that are not public."[65]On 19 August 2015, the Associated Press reported that ananonymous official had given the AP an unsigned, preliminary draft of one of the confidential bilateral IAEA-Iran agreements. This draft indicated that Iran would be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate the Parchin site.[66] (The AP reported that two anonymous officials had told it that the draft does not differ from the final, confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran).[67] The AP said that the draft "diverges from normal procedures".[66] Several hours after posting the article, the AP removed several details of the story (without issuing a formalretraction), and published another article that noted, "IAEA staff will monitor Iranian personnel as they inspect the Parchin nuclear site."[68] The AP restored the contentious details the next morning and said it was standing by its entire story. It further published the full document it had transcribed.[69]The following day, IAEA Director-GeneralYukiya Amano issued a statement stating: "I am disturbed by statements suggesting that the IAEA has given responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. Such statements misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important verification work ... the arrangements are technically sound and consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise oursafeguards standards in any way. The Road-map between Iran and the IAEA is a very robust agreement, with strict timelines, which will help us to clarify past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme."[70] The IAEA did not elaborate on the provisions of the confidential agreement, but theArms Control Association has noted, "under managed access procedures that may be employed the IAEA, the inspected party may take environmental swipe samples at a particular site in the presence of the IAEA inspectors using swabs and containment bags provided by the IAEA to prevent cross contamination. According to former IAEA officials, this is an established procedure. Such swipe samples collected at suspect sites under managed access would likely be divided into six packages: three are taken by the IAEA for analysis at its Seibersdorf Analytical Lab and two to be sent to the IAEA's Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL), which comprises some 16 labs in different countries, and another package to be kept under joint IAEA and Iran seal at the IAEA office in Iran a backup and control sample if re-analysis might be required at a later stage. The process ensures the integrity of the inspection operation and the samples for all parties."[71] Mark Hibbs of the Nuclear Policy Program at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace and Thomas Shea, a former IAEA safeguards official and head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs at thePacific Northwest National Laboratory described a similar protocol in an article titled "No, Iran is not allowed to inspect itself."[72] Hibbs and Shea wrote that the claims that Iran would be in charge of inspections at Parchin were "wholly specious" and "unfounded".[72]Arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis of theMonterey Institute of International Studies stated that the procedures referred to in the AP report were consistent with expert practice: "There are precedents for just providing photos and videos. Whenthe South Africans disabled their nuclear test shaft, they video-recorded it and sent the IAEA their video. I don't care who takes a swipe sample or who takes a photograph, so long as I know where and when it was taken, with very high confidence, and I know that it hasn't been tampered with."[68] Lewis expressed the opinion that "the point of the leak was to make the IAEA agreement on Parchin sound as bad as possible, and to generate political attention in Washington."[68] On 21 September 2015, both theAssociated Press andReuters noted that under the arrangement between Iran and the IAEA, Iranian technicians, instead of the IAEA's experts, would take environmental samples. Reuters also reported that a spokesman for Iran's atomic energy agency said Iranian nuclear experts have "taken environmental samples from Parchin without U.N. inspectors present".[73][74]
^Ali Vaez, the senior analyst on Iran at theInternational Crisis Group, notes that breakout time is not precisely measurable and is "estimated rather than calculated", depending on various assumptions and factors. Vaez notes, "Breakout estimates ... usually assume that an Iranian dash for the bomb would face none of the technical challenges that have plagued the program over the past decade."[84]
^The extent to which the JCPOA is legally binding on the United States—i.e., whether a future president could lawfully repudiate the JCPOA once it goes into effect—is a matter of dispute. Legal scholarsBruce Ackerman ofYale Law School and David Golove of theNew York University School of Law argue that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 had the effect of making the agreement (once implemented) into acongressional-executive agreement.[156] Golove states that the president cannot "ignore commitments [made by him or by a past president] in congressional-executive agreements without congressional authority to do so", and believes that the agreement is binding under international law, irrespective of any White House declaration, because it contains no provision saying otherwise.[156][157] Ackerman agrees, arguing, "Presidents do not have the power to repudiate congressional-executive agreements without strictly following the procedures laid out by Congress in its original authorizing legislation."[156] Others, such as Michael Ramsey of theUniversity of San Diego School of Law, argue that unless Congress expressly approves of the agreement via a resolution of approval (which is unlikely), the agreement is nonbinding under domestic law, so that "this president can implement to the extent of his statutory and constitutional authority [and] future presidents can refuse to follow."[156] Ramsey points out, however, that even if the agreement is a nonbinding executive agreement under domestic law, it may still be binding under international law, since domestic invalidity is not a defense to failure to follow an international agreement.[156] The position of the U.S. government is different. Secretary of State Kerry stated in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, "with respect to the talks, we've been clear from the beginning. We're not negotiating a, quote, 'legally binding plan.' We're negotiating a plan that will have in it a capacity for enforcement."[158] (Kerry also said that a future president is, as a practical matter, unlikely to "turn around and just nullify it" given the international agreement from the other P5+1 powers.[159]) Several legal scholars support this argument.John B. Bellinger III argues: "The next president will have the legal right under both domestic and international law to scrap the JCPOA and reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions on Iran."[160] Bellinger states that "such an action would be inconsistent with political commitments made by the Obama administration and would likely cause a major rift with U.S. allies and Iran to resume its nuclear activities," but that "would not constitute a violation of international law, because the JCPOA is not legally binding".[160]Orde Kittrie ofArizona State University similarly writes that the JCPOA is a kind of "nonbinding, unsigned political" agreement considered "more flexible than treaties or other legally binding international agreements".[161]
^The "vast majority of international agreements" negotiated by the United States, especially in recent decades, have been executive agreements, rather than treaties.[164][165] In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held inAmerican Insurance Association v. Garamendi, "our cases have recognized that the President has authority to make 'executive agreements' with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic."[166][167] Various opponents of the JCPOA, includingDavid B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Michael Ramsey have criticized the form of the agreement, arguing that it should be considered a treaty rather than an executive agreement.[168][169] Other commentators disagree; the constitutionality of the executive agreement form of the JCPOA has been defended byJack Goldsmith, who called arguments for the illegality of the agreement "weak",[170] and byJohn Yoo, who wrote that the executive agreement form of the JCPOA is consistent with theTreaty Clause of the Constitution.[171]
^"Much of the criticism of the deal" from opponents in the U.S. Congress and from the Israeli government "derives from the fact that slowing and shrinking Iran's nuclear program this way falls well short of the original diplomatic goal, which was to end entirely Iran's ability to enrich uranium—the 'zero enrichment' goal".[214] Before the JCPOA, there was "a preference on the part of the United States and many of its allies for zero enrichment in Iran (indeed, opposition to the spread of any uranium enrichment capability to any additional countries has been long-standing U.S. policy and an important nonproliferation principle)", although "the potential to discuss with Iran the conditions under which it could continue enrichment is not new" and was "built into the proposals that the P5+1 have offered Iran since 2006, spanning the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations".[215] Some commentators, such as Michael Singh of theWashington Institute for Near East Policy (writing in 2013), argued for a "zero enrichment" approach: i.e., that no agreement contemplating any enrichment by Iran should be made.[216] This was also the position of Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who introduced the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, a proposed bill (not enacted) which would require that Iran reduce its uranium enrichment to zero before an agreement is made.[217] Other commentators have said that "zero enrichment" has long been an implausible goal, includingR. Nicholas Burns of Harvard's Belfer Center, theUnder Secretary of State for Political Affairs and leading figure on Iranian nuclear matters during the second Bush administration, said that this was implausible given that Iran has 19,000 centrifuges, stating: "If I could get an ideal solution, or you could, where the Iranians submitted to every demand we had, I would take that. In a real world, you have to make real-world decisions."[214] Similarly, Michael A. Levi of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at theCouncil on Foreign Relations argued in the August–September 2011 edition of the journalSurvival, "it is far from clear that zero enrichment is a realistic goal" and stated, "the goal of current U.S. policy, even if it is not typically articulated this way", is "limited enrichment, in which Iran has some non-trivial enrichment capability, but is unable to produce a bomb (or small arsenal) without risking strong international retaliation, including military destruction of its enrichment infrastructure".[218] Similar arguments have been advanced by Mark Jansson, adjunct fellow at theFederation of American Scientists (who wrote in October 2013 inThe National Interest, "there is nothing clear-eyed or realistic about the demand for zero enrichment" and "nor is it technically necessary" to prevent proliferation)[219] and George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace (who argued in January 2014 inForeign Affairs, "the complete elimination of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program" is not "an achievable goal" and what is needed is "not the cessation of Iran's nuclear enrichment but its capacity to create a nuclear weapon quickly").[220]
^Scholars differ on whether a "better deal" from the American point of view is realistic.Stephen M. Walt of Harvard, writing an article titled "The Myth of the Better Deal" inForeign Policy magazine, argued that the idea of an achievable better deal is "magical thinking" that is at odds with the facts and "ignores Diplomacy 101".[225]Albert Carnesale of Harvard's Belfer Center wrote, "there is no real alternative that would serve the interests of the United States and our allies and friends as well as the deal that is now before Congress. A 'better deal' is unachievable; a military solution is unrealistic (and probably would be counterproductive); and an international agreement without U.S. participation is less attractive than an agreement in which the United States has a strong voice in resolving of issues that might arise."[226] Conversely,Robert Satloff of theWashington Institute for Near East Policy argues, "a better deal with Iran is possible," and that congressional rejection of the agreement would not immediately result in the collapse of the JCPOA or military action,[227] and law professorOrde Kittrie ofArizona State University argued that Congress could send the JCPOA back for renegotiation.[161]
^A similar resolution of disapproval was introduced on 16 July by RepresentativePeter Roskam, Republican of Illinois, who announced on 3 August that he had obtained 218 cosponsors (a majority of the House).[234][243][244] But Roskam's resolution "is not the formal disapproval measure that the House is expected to take up in September";[234] and it was expected that it is the resolution by Royce, as the relevant committee chair, will be the one ultimately voted upon.[243] Ultimately, neither resolution was voted upon.[245]
^Daniel, Joyner (2016).Iran's nuclear program and international law : from confrontation to accord (First ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.ISBN9780190635718.OCLC945169931.
^Perkovich, George; Hibbs, Mark; Acton, James M.; Dalton, Toby (8 August 2015)."Parsing the Iran Deal". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived fromthe original on 7 September 2015. Retrieved23 August 2015.
^George Jahn."AP Exclusive: Diplomats: Iran to Get Natural Uranium Batch".The Associated Press. Archived fromthe original on 9 January 2017. Retrieved9 January 2017.the transfer recently approved by the U.S. and five other world powers that negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran foresees delivery of 116 metric tons (nearly 130 tons) of natural uranium ... Tehran already got a similar amount of natural uranium in 2015 as part of negotiations leading up to the nuclear deal
^Katzman, Kenneth (4 August 2015)."Iran Sanctions"(PDF). Congressional Research Service.Archived(PDF) from the original on 5 September 2015. Retrieved5 September 2015.The Administration asserts that it would implement the relief using waiver authority (for relevant U.S. statutory sanctions) and administrative action (for those sanctions in force only by executive order).
^"Nuclear Deal with Iran Establishes Plan for Sanctions ReliefArchived 7 April 2016 at theWayback Machine, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (11 August 2015), p. 5 ("According to the JCPOA's 'Implementation Plan' annex, Implementation Day occurs when two things happen 'simultaneously': (i) the 'IAEA-verified implementation by Iran' of certain nuclear-related measures; and (ii) the P5+1's implementation of specified forms of sanctions relief, including the termination of previous UNSC sanctions on Iran pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2231.22 Implementation Day, the crucial starting point for sanctions relief, is expected to occur in the first half of 2016, although the JCPOA sets no specific date on which, or by which, it will necessarily take place.")
^Jones, Sam; Barker, Alex; Secastopulo, Demetri; Bozorgmehr, Najmeh (14 July 2015)."Iran agrees breakthrough nuclear deal".Financial Times.Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved19 April 2016.
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