Gilford John Ikenberry | |
|---|---|
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| Born | (1954-10-05)October 5, 1954 (age 71) |
| Alma mater | Manchester University (B.A.),University of Chicago (Ph.D.) |
| Scientific career | |
| Fields | International relations |
| Institutions | Georgetown University,Princeton University,University of Pennsylvania |
Gilford John Ikenberry (October 5, 1954) is an Americanpolitical scientist. He is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs atPrinceton University.[1] Known for his work on international relations theories, such as booksAfter Victory (2001) andLiberal Leviathan (2011), he has been described as "the world's leading scholar of the liberal international order."[2]
After receiving his BA fromManchester University, Indiana, and his PhD from theUniversity of Chicago in 1985, Ikenberry became an assistant professor at Princeton, where he remained until 1992. He then moved to theUniversity of Pennsylvania, where he taught from 1993 to 1999, serving as co-director of the Lauder Institute from 1994 to 1998, while since 1996 he has been Visiting Professor at theCatholic University of Milan in Italy. In 2001, he joinedGeorgetown University as the Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice in theEdmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.[1] He returned to Princeton in 2004, at the invitation of then-DeanAnne-Marie Slaughter, as the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs in theWoodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.[2] Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar atKyung Hee University inSeoul,Korea. In 2013-2014 he was the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor atBalliol College,University of Oxford.[3]
Ikenberry served on theU.S. State Department'sPolicy Planning Staff from 1991 to 1992. He was a Senior Associate at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace from 1992 to 1993, a Fellow at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from 1998 to 1999, and a non-resident Senior Fellow at theBrookings Institution from 1997 to 2002. He has also worked for several projects of theCouncil on Foreign Relations[3] and is the Political and Legal book reviewer forForeign Affairs.[4]
Ikenberrry was elected as a member of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2016.[5]
Ikenberry is known for vehement criticism of what he described as the "neoimperialgrand strategy" of theUnited States under theBush administration. His critique is primarily a pragmatic one, arguing not that the U.S. should eschewimperialism as a matter of principle, but rather, that it is not in a position to succeed at an imperial project.[4] He contends that such a strategy, rather than enabling a successfulWar on Terrorism and preservinginternational peace, will end up alienating American allies, weakening international institutions, and provoking violentblowback, includingterrorism, internationally, as well as being politically unsustainable domestically.[5]
In aForeign Affairs article titled"The Rise of China and the Future of the West", Ikenberry suggests strengthening and re-investing in the existing institutions and rules of U.S.-led western order. He argues that the first thing that U.S. must do is to reestablish itself as a foremost supporter of the global system that underpins the Western order. In this view, when other countries see the U.S. using its power to strengthen the existing rules and institutions, US authority will be strengthened because they will become more inclined to work in collaboration with U.S. power. Secondly, the U.S. should update the key post-war security pacts, such asNATO and Washington's East Asian alliances. When the U.S. provides security, the U.S. allies, in return, will operate within the western order. Thirdly, the U.S. should renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. Economically speaking, building on the agreements of theWTO, concluding the currentDoha Round of trade talks that seek to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries are possible examples. Fourthly, the U.S. should make sure that the order is all-encompassing, meaning there shouldn't be any space left for other rising countries to build up their own “minilateral” order. Lastly, U.S. must support efforts to integrate rising developing countries into key global institutions. Less formal bodies, likeG-20 and various other intergovernmental networks, can provide alternative avenues for voice and representation.[6]
InAfter Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Ikenberry explores how the United States utilized its hegemony after both World Wars to shape future world order. In both cases, the U.S. attempted to institutionalize its power through the creation of a constitutional order, by which political order was organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power. In the process, the United States agreed to "tame" itspower by placing it within institutions and the set of rules and rights with which this came.[7] One of the advantages for the United States in doing so was locking itself into a guaranteed position for years to come. In the event that its power waned in the future, the institutional framework it created would nonetheless remain intact.[8]
Following World War I, the distribution of power was greatly skewed towards the United States. PresidentWoodrow Wilson possessed the power to set the terms of peace, and the manner in which the post-war order was constructed. He sought to do so through a model based on upholding collective security and sparking a democratic revolution across the European continent based on American ideals. Great Britain and France were worried about America's preponderance of power, and sought to tie the United States to the continent. Both sides attempted to meet at a middle ground, with European nations gaining security and financial considerations while the United States would institutionalize its power through theLeague of Nations and maintain its presence on the continent for decades to come. Ultimately, Woodrow Wilson's envisioned order encountered major obstacles, including the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations. Furthermore, the imposition of war guilt and stiff penalties on Germany through the terms set by theTreaty of Versailles set in place conditions favorable forHitler to rise to power.[citation needed]
Compared to the end of the First World War, the United States was even more powerful in 1945 following the conclusion of theSecond World War. The nation possessed a preponderance of military power and close to half of the world's wealth.[9] Once again, leaders from the United States attempted to leverage this powerful position and create a stable order that would serve to benefit their nation for decades to come. Political and economic openness was the centerpiece of this envisioned framework. It was believed that the closed economic regions which had existed before the war had led to worldwide depression and at least in part contributed to the start of the conflict. Reconstructing a stable Europe was also a priority, as safeguarding American interests was seen as being rooted in European stability. The region also became a staging ground for theCold War, and building a strongWest Germany was seen as an important step in balancing against theSoviet Union. In the end, the United States created its desired order through a series of security, economic, and financialmultilateral institutions, includingNATO and theMarshall Plan. West Germany was bound to its democratic Western European neighbors through the European Coal and Steel Community (later, theEuropean Communities) and to the United States through Atlantic security pact; Japan was bound to the United States through an alliance partnership and expanding economic ties. TheBretton Woods system meeting in 1944 laid down the monetary and trade rules that facilitated the opening and subsequent flourishing of the world economy.[6] In institutionalizing its power, the United States was willing to act as a "reluctant superpower," making concessions to weaker states in order to ensure their participation in their desired framework.[10]
Ikenberry asserts that the dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions, which are rooted in and also reinforced bydemocracy andcapitalism, laid a basis of cooperation and shared authority over the current U.S.-led global system. He says that system with the institutions that were built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, provides low barrier of economic participation and high potential benefits. However, the key point is that while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status, the country should work within the order, rather than the outside of it. Thus, no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalizedcapitalist system.[6]
A 2018 special issue ofThe British Journal of Politics and International Relations was devoted toAfter Victory.[11]
Ikenberry is the author of:
He has also co-authored or edited:
Ikenberry has published in a number of foreign policy and international relationsjournals, and writes regularly forForeign Affairs:[6]
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) Vol. 7, No. 3 (2018), pp. 494-515, for critics on Ikenberry's main arguments in what relates to unipolarity after the Cold War.
