"Jihadist" redirects here. For the Islamic doctrine, seeJihad.
"Revolutionary Islamism" redirects here. For the 2003 book by Carlos the Jackal, seeRevolutionary Islam. For Islam and socialist revolution, seeIslamic socialism.
The Islamist organizations that participated in theSoviet–Afghan War of 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has since propagated during variousarmed conflicts.[14][15] Jihadism rose in prominence after the 1990s; by one estimate, 5 percent of civil wars involved jihadist groups in 1990, but this grew to more than 40 percent by 2014.[16] With the rise of theIslamic State (IS) militant group in 2014—which a large contingent of Jihadist groups have opposed—large numbers offoreign Muslim volunteers came from abroad to join the militant cause in Syria and Iraq.[22]
French political scientist and professorGilles Kepel also identified a specificSalafist version of jihadism in the 1990s.[28] Jihadism with an international,pan-Islamist scope is also known as global jihadism.[31] The term has also been invoked to retroactively characterise the military campaigns of historicIslamic empires,[32][33] and the laterFula jihads in West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries.[34][35]
The concept ofjihad ("exerting"/"striving"/"struggling") is fundamental to Islam and has multiple uses, withgreater jihad (internaljihad), meaninginternal struggle against evil in oneself, andlesser jihad (externaljihad), which is further subdivided intojihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) andjihad of the sword (warfare). The latter form ofjihad has meant conquest and conversion in the classical Islamic interpretation, usually exceptingfollowers of other monotheistic religions,[36][37][38] whilemodernist Islamic scholars generally equate militaryjihad with defensive warfare.[39][40] Much of the contemporary Muslim opinion considers internaljihad to have primacy over externaljihad in the Islamic tradition, while many Western writers favor the opposite view.[37] Today, the wordjihad is often used without religious connotations, like the English termcrusade.
The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the9/11 attacks.[41] It was first used by the Indian and Pakistanimass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist".[Note 1] Historian David A. Charters defines "jihadism" as "a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in theMuslim world... [with] a central role tojihad as an armed political struggle to overthrow "apostate" regimes, to expel theirinfidel allies, and thus to restoreMuslim lands to governance by Islamic principles."[13] According toReuven Firestone, the term "jihadism" as commonly used in theWestern world describes "militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West."[42]
David Romano, researcher of political science at theMcGill University inMontreal, Quebec, has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term ajihad".[43] Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups likeHezbollah, which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy.[43]
According to the Jewish-Americanpolitical scientistBarak Mendelsohn, "the overwhelming majority ofMuslims reject jihadi views of Islam. Furthermore, as the cases ofSaudi andother Gulf regimes show, states may gain domestic legitimacy through economic development and social change, rather than based on religion and piety".[2] Many Muslims do not use the terms "jihadism" or "jihadist", disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants".[41][Note 2]Maajid Nawaz, founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tankQuilliam, defines jihadism as a violent subset ofIslamism: "Islamism [is] the desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."[48]
"Jihad Cool" is a term for the re-branding of militant jihadism as fashionable, or "cool", to younger people throughconsumer culture, social media, magazines,[49]rap videos,[50] toys,propaganda videos,[51] and other means.[52][53] It is asubculture mainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "moreMTV than Mosque", according toNPR, which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010.[52] To justify their acts ofreligious violence, jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (fatwa) developed by Salafi-jihadist legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the Internet.[54]
Territorial presence of jihadist groups and overview of the situation in each regionAfghan mujahideen praying in theKunar Province, Afghanistan (1987)
Islamic extremism dates back to theearly history of Islam with the emergence of theKharijites in the 7th century CE.[55] The original schism betweenKharijites andShīʿas among Muslims was disputed over thepolitical and religious succession to the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of theIslamic prophetMuhammad.[55] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[55] Shīʿas believeʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs considerAbu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[55] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels (kuffār) orfalse Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of death for their perceivedapostasy (ridda).[55][56][57]
Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement ofradical Islam.[8][60][61] Unlike the other Islamic thinkers who have been mentioned above, Qutb was not anapologist.[8] He was a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[8][60] and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opusFī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān (In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifestoMaʿālim fīl-ṭarīq (Milestones), which lead to his execution by theEgyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966.[8][70] OtherSalafi movements in theMENA region and across theMuslim world adopted many of his Islamist principles.[8][60]
According to Qutb, theMuslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and it has also reverted tojahiliyah (the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves "Muslims" have failed to follow theIslamic law (sharīʿa).[8][60] In order to restore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed therejection and shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard which was modeled after theearly Muslim generations (Salaf),preaching Islam, and bracing oneself forpoverty or even bracing oneself for death in preparation forjihad against what he perceived was ajahili government/society, and the overthrow of them.[8][60]Qutbism, the radical Islamist ideology which is derived from the ideas of Qutb,[60] was denounced by many prominentMuslim scholars as well as by other members of the EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood, likeYusuf al-Qaradawi.
According toRudolph F. Peters, contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works onfiqh" in their writings on jihad;Islamic modernists "emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount tobellum justum in modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul A'la Maududi,Sayyid Qutb,Abdullah Azzam, etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals."[71]
The term "jihadism" has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadist movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced todevelopments of Salafism paired with the origins ofal-Qaeda in theSoviet–Afghan War during the 1980s. Forerunners ofSalafi jihadism principally include Egyptian militant scholar and theoreticianSayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings" in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations around the world, includingal-Qaeda andIslamic State.[64][76][77][78][79] Going radically further than his predecessors, Qutb called upon Muslims to form an ideologically committed vanguard that would wage armedjihad against thesecular,democratic states and Western-allied governments in theArab world, until the restoration ofIslamic rule.[80][81]Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-bornpan-Islamist militant and physician who was second in command and co-founder ofal-Qaeda, called Qutb "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".[82]
TheSoviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in theMuslim world."[83] It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership, and organization.Abdullah Yusuf Azzam provided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war, veteran jihadists returned to their home countries, and from there would disperse to other sites of conflict involving Muslim populations, such asAlgeria,Bosnia, andChechnya, creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[84]
An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actuallyapostates (takfīr) is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class ofulama, often highly educatedIslamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (awqāf) that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees' interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably, the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing this.[85]
Into this vacuum of religious authority cameaggressive proselytizing, funded by tens of billions of dollars ofpetroleum-export money fromSaudi Arabia.[86] The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine ofWahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam,[87] not oneschool among many, and not interpretingIslamic law historically or contextually, but as the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam.[87] Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists, who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".[87]
In 2003,CIA officerMarc Sageman describedSalafi jihadism as a "Muslim revivalist social movement" with "roots in Egypt". According to Sageman, Salafi jihadists are influenced by the strategy of prominent Egyptian Islamist ideologues such asSayyid Qutb andMuhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, who advocated the revolutionary overthrow of secular regimes and theestablishment of Islamic states through armedjihad.[93] According to French political scientist and professorGilles Kepel, theSalafist version of jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."[94] Kepel wrote that theSalafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".[95][96] However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violent jihadists created "a volatile mixture".[96]
"The Iraq War proved some of theBush administration's assertions false, and it made others self-fulfilling. One of these was the insistence on an operational link between Iraq and al-Qaeda... after the fall of the regime, the most potent ideological force behind the insurgency was Islam and its hostility to non-Islamic intruders. Some former Baathist officials even stopped drinking and took to prayer. The insurgency was calledmukawama, or resistance, with overtones of religious legitimacy; its fighters becamemujahideen (holy warriors) and proclaimed their mission to bejihad."[99][100]
The group was known for its participation in the2003 Casablanca bombings, in which 12 suicide bombers killed 33 people and injured over 100. Salafia Jihadia has variously been described as a movement or loose network ofSalafi-jhadist groups andcells, or as a generic term applied by Moroccan authorities for militant Salafi activists.[113][114]
Salafia Jihadia is said to function as a network of several loosely affiliatedSalafi-jhadist groups andcells, including groups such as al Hijra Wattakfir, Attakfir Bidum Hijra, Assirat al Mustaqim, Ansar al Islam and Moroccan Afghans.[115][116] The spiritual leader and founder of the group isMohammed Fizazi [fr;de], former imam of theal-Quds Mosque (which was shut down by German authorities in 2010).[115] Fizazi was arrested in 2003 and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for his radical statements and connection to the Casablanca bombings.[117]Salafia Jihadia has since spawned a wider ideological movement out ofSaudi Arabia and theGulf states.[112]
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, another Salafi-jihadist movement,[118] fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for aNovember 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut inLuxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999,[119] although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against theBa'athist Syrian regime.[118]
The group, and many other groups in the Sinai Peninsula, has ties withal-Qaeda,[123] and was one of the many groups who committed terrorist attacks on civilians and Egyptian Armed Forces during many periods of terrorist attacks in the Sinai in 2012 through 2013.[124]
In Syria and Iraq, bothJabhat al-Nusra andIslamic State have been described asSalafi-jihadist terrorist organizations.[125] Originating in theJaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah founded byAbu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2004, the organization (primarily under theIslamic State of Iraq name) affiliated itself withal-Qaeda in Iraq and fought alongside them during the2003–2006 phase of the Iraqi insurgency. The group later changed their name to Islamic State of Iraq and Levant for about a year,[126][127] before declaring itself to be aworldwidecaliphate,[128][129] called simply the "Islamic State".[130] They are a transnationalSalafi jihadist group and anunrecognisedquasi-state. IS gained global prominence in 2014, when their militants conquered large territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, taking advantage of the ongoingcivil war in Syria and the disintegrating local military forces of Iraq. By the end of 2015, their self-declaredcaliphate ruled an area with a population of about 12 million,[131][132] where they enforced their extremist interpretation ofIslamic law, managed an annual budget exceedingUS$1billion, and commanded more than 30,000 fighters.[133] After a grinding conflict with American, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces, IS lost control of all their Middle Eastern territories by 2019, subsequently reverting to insurgency from remote hideouts while continuing theirpropaganda efforts. These efforts have garnered a significant following in northern andSahelian Africa,[134][135] where IS still controls a significant territory, and thewar against the Islamic State continues.[136][137]
Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime.[138] Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.[125]
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization[139] that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes.[140]
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafi-jihadist organization based in theGaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, SheikhAbdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, theIslamist groupHamas, for failing to enforceSharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding hisIbn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself) were killed and over 130 were wounded.[141]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were theMujahidin Shura Council and theAnsar al Sunna.[142] There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups inAzerbaijan.[143]
In 2017,Swedish Security Police reported that the number of jihadists in Sweden had risen to thousands from about 200 in 2010.[150] Based on social media analysis, an increase was noted in 2013.[151] According to police in Sweden, Salafist-Jihadists affect the communities where they are active.[152]
According to Swedish researcherMagnus Ranstorp, Salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy.[152]
The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of Salafi-Jihadist materials which expoused "an illiberal, bigoted" ideology.[153][154]
According toDeutsche Welle, Salafism is a growing movement inGermany whose aim of aCaliphate is incompatible with aWestern democracy.[155] According to the GermanFederal Agency for Civic Education, nearly all jihadist terrorists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are terrorists. The dualistic view on "true believers" and "false believers" in practice means people being treated unequally on religious grounds. The call for a religious state in the form of a caliphate means that Salafists reject therule of law and thesovereignty of the people's rule. The Salafist view on gender and society leads to discrimination and the subjugation of women.[156]
Estimates by Germaninterior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015.[157] In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets,[157] a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth.[157] There are two ideological camps, one advocatesSalafi-Activism and danects its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society.[157] The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.[157]
In December 2017, a Salafi-Jihadist mosque inMarseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad.[158] In August 2018, after theEuropean Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported theSalafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home countryAlgeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.[159]
Deobandi jihadism is a militant interpretation of Islam that draws upon the teachings of theSunniDeobandi movement, which originated in theIndian subcontinent in the 19th century. TheDeobandism underwent 3 waves of armed jihad. The first wave involved the establishment of an Islamic territory centered on Thana Bhawan by the movement's elders during the Indian Rebellion of 1857, before the founding ofDarul Uloom Deoband.Imdadullah Muhajir Makki was the Amir al-Mu'minin of this Islamic territory; however, after the British defeated the Deobandi forces in the Battle of Shamli, the territory fell. Following the establishment of Darul Uloom Deoband,Mahmud Hasan Deobandi led the initiation of the second wave. He mobilized an armed resistance against the British through various initiatives, including the formation of the Samratut Tarbiat. When the British uncovered hisSilk Letter Movement, they arrestedHasan Deobandi and held him captive inMalta. After his release, he and his disciples entered into mainstream politics and actively participated in the democratic process. In the late 1979, thePakistan–Afghan border became the center of the Deobandi jihadist movement's third wave, which was fueled by theSoviet–Afghan War. Under the patronage of PresidentZia-ul-Haq, its expansion took place through various madrasas such asDarul Uloom Haqqania andJamia Uloom-ul-Islamia.Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S) provided political support for it. Trained militants from the Pakistan–Afghan border participated in theAfghan jihad, and later went on to form various organizations, including theTaliban. The most successful example of Deobandi jihadism is the Taliban, who establishedIslamic rule in Afghanistan. The head of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S),Sami-ul-Haq, is referred to as the "father of the Taliban".TheDeobandi jihadist groupTaliban was formed in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, the founder of the Taliban wasMullah Omar, a former mujahideen fighter who had lost an eye during the war against the Soviet Union. In 1994, he gathered a group of students and religious scholars, many of whom had received their education inDeobandi madrasahs located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and established theTaliban as a political and military movement.[160]
With theShia awakening of Iran, the years of sectarian tolerance were over. What followed was a Sunni-versus-Shia contest for dominance, and it grew intense. [...] The revolution even moved leftists inMuslim-majority countries such asIndonesia,Turkey, andLebanon to look at Islam with renewed interest. After all, in Iran, Islam had succeeded where leftist ideologies had failed. [...] But admiration for what had happened in Iran did not equal acceptance of Iranian leadership. Indeed, Islamic activists outside of Iran quickly found Iranian revolutionaries to be arrogant, offputting, and drunk on their own success. Moreover,Sunni fundamentalism inPakistan and much of theArab world was far from politically revolutionary. It was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values. As the French scholar of contemporary IslamGilles Kepel puts it, it was less to tear down the existing system than to give it a fresh, thick coat of "Islamic green" paint.Khomeini'sfundamentalism, by contrast, was "red"—that is, genuinely revolutionary.[161]
According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea thatjihad is an "individual obligation" (fard ‘ayn) incumbent upon allMuslims. This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) thatjihad is a "collective obligation" (farḍ al-kifāya) carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of theMuslim community (Ummah). Jihadists insist that all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders in the world are illegitimate and do not command theauthority to ordain justified violence.[170]
Some observers[6][171][172] have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-centurySalafi jihadism.[173] According to thelegal historian Sadarat Kadri,[171] during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn anybid‘ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[171] "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[171]
The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[174] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both theQuran and theHadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ‘ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[175] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[176] and it could only be directed by thecaliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[176] (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like theKharijia's jihad against and killing ofCaliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim).[6]Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place inHell.[177] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[178]
Scholars likeAbul Ala Maududi,Abdullah Azzam,Ruhollah Khomeini, leaders of al-Qaeda and others, believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act ofShuhada (martyrdom) and it brings you a special place inHeaven, not a special place inHell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermindNon-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analystSebastian Gorka described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[179][172] Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors,Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria, are thought to have been heavily influenced[173][180][181][182][183] by a 2004 work on jihad entitledManagement of Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahhush),[173] written by Abu Bakr Naji[173] and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamiccaliphate by first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[184]
Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists andideologues behind modern jihadist violence.[173][185][186][187] His theological and legal justifications influencedAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda member and former leader ofal-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, includingISIL andBoko Haram.[173][185][186][187] Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic asFiqh al-Dima and referred to in English asThe Jurisprudence of Jihad orThe Jurisprudence of Blood.[173][185][186][187][188] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[173]The Guardian's journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari ofQuilliam, notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".[187] Charlie Winter ofThe Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[186] He states:
Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of theliterary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir,committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[186]
Clinical psychologistChris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay,Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism (2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that rendersIslamic terrorism a valid means of solution.[188]
^Gilles Kepel used the variantsjihadist-salafist (p. 220),jihadism-salafism (p. 276),salafist-jihadism (p. 403) in his bookJihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002)
^Use of "jihadism" has been criticized by at least one academic (Brachman): "'Jihadism' is a clumsy and controversial term. It refers to the peripheral current of extremist Islamic thought whose adherents demand the use of violence in order to oust non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or God's law. The expression's most significant limitation is that it contains the word Jihad, which is an important religious concept in Islam. For much of the Islamic world, Jihad simply refers to the internal spiritual campaign that one wages with oneself."[47]
^For example: "The battle has drawn Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan on the side of Assad, even as Sunni would-be jihadists from around the world have filled the ranks of the many Islamist groups fighting his rule, including the Islamic State extremist group."[163]
^Kramer, Martin (Spring 2003)."Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?".Middle East Quarterly.X (2):65–77.Archived from the original on 1 January 2015. Retrieved1 January 2015.French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism – an historical reference to the precursor of these movements – will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage.
^Gibril Haddad, “Quietism and End-Time Reclusion in the Qurʾān and Hadith: Al-Nābulusī and His Book Takmīl Al-Nuʿūt within the ʿuzla Genre,”Islamic Sciences 15, no. 2 (2017): pp. 108-109)
^R. Habeck, Mary (2006).Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. London: Yale University Press. pp. 17–18.ISBN0-300-11306-4.
^Haniff Hassan, Muhammad (2014).The Father of Jihad. 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE: Imperial College Press. p. 77.ISBN978-1-78326-287-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^Rudolph Peters,Jihad in Modern Terms: A Reader 2005, p. 107 and note p. 197. John Ralph Willis, "Jihad Fi Sabil Allah", in:In the Path of Allah: The Passion of al-Hajj ʻUmar: an essay into the nature of charisma in Islam, Routledge, 1989,ISBN978-0-7146-3252-0, 29–57. "Gibb [Mohammedanism, 2nd ed. 1953] rightly could conclude that one effect of the renewed emphasis in the nineteenth century on the Qur'an andSunnah in Muslim fundamentalism was to restore tojihad fi sabilillah much of the prominence it held in the early days of Islam. Yet Gibb, for all his perception, did not consider jihad within the context of its alliance to ascetic and revivalist sentiments, nor from the perspectives which left it open to diverse interpretations." (p. 31)
^abR. Farmer, Brian (2007). "4: Islamism and Terrorism".Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideology in the Twenty-first Century. New York, 29 Broadway, NY 10006, USA: Peter Land Publishing Inc. p. 80.ISBN978-0-8204-8843-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
^Kepel, Gilles (2006).Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. p. 51.ISBN9781845112578.Archived from the original on 14 May 2016. Retrieved23 March 2016.Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed 'petro-Islam' included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.
^"Muhammad Rashid Rida".Encyclopedia of the Middle East. 23 April 2019.Archived from the original on 14 December 2021. Retrieved22 September 2021.
^C. Martin, Richard (2016). "State and Government".Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Second Edition. 27500 Drake Rd. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Publishers. p. 1088.ISBN978-0-02-866269-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
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