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Jihadism is aneologism for modern, armedmilitantIslamic movements that seek toestablish states based on Islamic principles.[1][2] In a narrower sense, it refers to the belief that armed confrontation is a theologically legitimate method of socio-political change towards anIslamic system of governance.[3][4] The term "jihadism" has been applied to variousIslamic extremist orIslamist individuals and organizations withmilitant ideologies based on the classicalIslamic notion oflesser jihad.[9]
Jihadism has its roots in the late 19th- and early 20th-century ideological developments ofIslamic revivalism, which further developed intoQutbism andSalafi jihadism related ideologies during the 20th and 21st centuries.[6][10][11][12] Jihadist ideologues envisionjihad as a "revolutionary struggle" against theinternational order to unite theMuslim world underIslamic law.[13]
The Islamist organizations that participated in theSoviet–Afghan War of 1979 to 1989 reinforced the rise of jihadism, which has since propagated during variousarmed conflicts.[14][15] Jihadism rose in prominence after the 1990s; by one estimate, 5 percent of civil wars involved jihadist groups in 1990, but this grew to more than 40 percent by 2014.[16] With the rise of the terror groupISIS in 2014—which a large contingent of Jihadist groups have opposed—large numbers offoreign Muslim volunteers came from abroad to join the militant cause in Syria and Iraq.[22]
French political scientist and professorGilles Kepel also identified a specificSalafist version of jihadism in the 1990s.[28] Jihadism with an international,pan-Islamist scope is also known as global jihadism.[31] The term has also been invoked to retroactively characterise the military campaigns of historicIslamic empires,[32][33] and later theFula jihads in West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries.[34][35] The largest Salafi-jihadist terrorist operation is considered to be theSeptember 11 attacks against the United States perpetrated byal-Qaeda in 2001.[36]
The concept ofjihad ("exerting"/"striving"/"struggling") is fundamental to Islam and has multiple uses, withgreater jihad (internaljihad), meaninginternal struggle against evil in oneself, andlesser jihad (externaljihad), which is further subdivided intojihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) andjihad of the sword (warfare). The latter form ofjihad has meant conquest and conversion in the classical Islamic interpretation, usually exceptingfollowers of other monotheistic religions,[37][38][39] whilemodernist Islamic scholars generally equate militaryjihad with defensive warfare.[40][41] Much of the contemporary Muslim opinion considers internaljihad to have primacy over externaljihad in the Islamic tradition, while many Western writers favor the opposite view.[38] Today, the wordjihad is often used without religious connotations, like the English termcrusade.
The term "jihadism" has been in use since the 1990s, more widely in the aftermath of the9/11 attacks.[42] It was first used by the Indian and Pakistanimass media, and by French academics who used the more exact term "jihadist-Salafist".[Note 1] Historian David A. Charters defines "jihadism" as "a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in theMuslim world... [with] a central role tojihad as an armed political struggle to overthrow "apostate" regimes, to expel theirinfidel allies, and thus to restoreMuslim lands to governance by Islamic principles."[13] According toReuven Firestone, the term "jihadism" as commonly used in theWestern world describes "militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West."[43]
David Romano, researcher of political science at theMcGill University inMontreal, Quebec, has defined his use of the term as referring to "an individual or political movement that primarily focuses its attention, discourse, and activities on the conduct of a violent, uncompromising campaign that they term ajihad".[44] Following Daniel Kimmage, he distinguishes the jihadist discourse of jihad as a global project to remake the world from the resistance discourse of groups likeHezbollah, which is framed as a regional project against a specific enemy.[44]
"Jihadism" has been defined otherwise as aneologism formilitant, predominantlySunnīIslamic movements that useideologically motivated violence to defend theUmmah (the collectiveMuslim world) from foreignNon-Muslims and those that they perceive asdomestic infidels.[2][45] The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation toIslamic terrorism as aglobalist ideology, and more broadly to theWar on Terror.[46] The Austrian-American academicManfred B. Steger, Professor ofSociology at theUniversity of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, proposed an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies; these includeal-Qaeda,Jemaah Islamiyah,Hamas, andHezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism".[47]
According to the Jewish-Americanpolitical scientist Barak Mendelsohn, "the overwhelming majority ofMuslims reject jihadi views of Islam. Furthermore, as the cases ofSaudi andother Gulf regimes show, states may gain domestic legitimacy through economic development and social change, rather than based on religion and piety".[2] Many Muslims do not use the terms "jihadism" or "jihadist", disliking the association of illegitimate violence with a noble religious concept, and instead prefer the use of delegitimising terms like "deviants".[42][Note 2]Maajid Nawaz, founder and chairman of the anti-extremism think tankQuilliam, defines jihadism as a violent subset ofIslamism: "Islamism [is] the desire to impose any version of Islam over any society. Jihadism is the attempt to do so by force."[49]
"Jihad Cool" is a term for the re-branding of militant jihadism as fashionable, or "cool", to younger people throughconsumer culture, social media, magazines,[50]rap videos,[51] toys,propaganda videos,[52] and other means.[53][54] It is asubculture mainly applied to individuals in developed nations who are recruited to travel to conflict zones on jihad. For example, jihadi rap videos make participants look "moreMTV than Mosque", according toNPR, which was the first to report on the phenomenon in 2010.[53] To justify their acts ofreligious violence, jihadist individuals and networks resort to the nonbinding genre of Islamic legal literature (fatwa) developed by Salafi-jihadist legal authorities, whose legal writings are shared and spread via the Internet.[55]
Islamic extremism dates back to theearly history of Islam with the emergence of theKharijites in the 7th century CE.[56] The original schism betweenKharijites andShīʿas among Muslims was disputed over thepolitical and religious succession to the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of theIslamic prophetMuhammad.[56] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[56] Shīʿas believeʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs considerAbu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[56] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels (kuffār) orfalse Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of death for their perceivedapostasy (ridda).[56][57][58]
Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and a prominent leader of theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was an influential promoter of thePan-Islamistideology during the 1960s.[62] When he was executed by theEgyptian government under theregime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,Ayman al-Zawahiri formedEgyptian Islamic Jihad, an organization which seeks to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas about theIslamic revival that he yearned for.[63] TheQutbist ideology has been influential among jihadist movements andIslamic terrorists who seek to overthrow secular governments, most notablyOsama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda,[59][60][61] as well as theSalafi-jihadist terrorist groupISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[64] Moreover, Qutb's books have been frequently been cited by Osama bin Laden andAnwar al-Awlaki.[65][66][67][68][69][70]
Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement ofradical Islam.[8][61][62] Unlike the other Islamic thinkers who have been mentioned above, Qutb was not anapologist.[8] He was a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[8][61] and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opusFī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān (In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifestoMaʿālim fīl-ṭarīq (Milestones), which lead to his execution by theEgyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966.[8][71] OtherSalafi movements in theMENA region and across theMuslim world adopted many of his Islamist principles.[8][61]
According to Qutb, theMuslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and it has also reverted tojahiliyah (the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves "Muslims" have failed to follow theIslamic law (sharīʿa).[8][61] In order to restore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed therejection and shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard which was modeled after theearly Muslim generations (Salaf),preaching Islam, and bracing oneself forpoverty or even bracing oneself for death in preparation forjihad against what he perceived was ajahili government/society, and the overthrow of them.[8][61]Qutbism, the radical Islamist ideology which is derived from the ideas of Qutb,[61] was denounced by many prominentMuslim scholars as well as by other members of the EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood, likeYusuf al-Qaradawi.
According to French political scientist and professorGilles Kepel, theSalafist version of jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."[72] TheEgyptian Islamist movements of the 1950s are generally considered to be the precursors of contemporarySalafi-jihadist groups.[73] The theological doctrines of the Syrian-Egyptian Islamic scholarRashid Rida (1865–1935) greatly influenced these movements. Amongst his notable ideas included reviving the traditions of theearly Muslim generations (Salaf), as well ridding theMuslim world of Western influences andjahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) by specifically looking up to the model ofKhulafa Rashidun. Rida's ideas would set the foundations of future Salafi-Jihadist movements and greatly influence Islamists likeHassan al-Banna,Sayyid Qutb, and otherMuslim fundamentalist figures.[74][75][76][77] Rida's treatises laid the theological framework of future militants who would eventually establish theSalafi-jihadist movement.[78][79]
According toRudolph F. Peters, scholar ofIslamic studies and thehistory of Islam, contemporary traditionalist Muslims "copy phrases of the classical works onfiqh" in their writings on jihad;Islamic modernists "emphasize the defensive aspect of jihad, regarding it as tantamount tobellum justum in modern international law; and the contemporary fundamentalists (Abul A'la Maududi,Sayyid Qutb,Abdullah Azzam, etc.) view it as a struggle for the expansion of Islam and the realization of Islamic ideals."[80]
Some of the earlierMuslim scholars andtheologians who had profound influence onIslamic fundamentalism and the ideology of contemporary jihadism include the medieval Muslim thinkersIbn Taymiyyah,Ibn Kathir, andMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, alongside the modern Islamist ideologuesMuhammad Rashid Rida, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Maududi.[7][11][29][81][82] Jihad has been propagated in modern fundamentalism beginning in the late 19th century, an ideology that arose in the context of struggles againstcolonial powers in North Africa at that time, as in theMahdist War in Sudan, and notably in the mid-20th century byIslamic revivalist authors such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.[83]
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The term "jihadism" has arisen in the 2000s to refer to the contemporary jihadist movements, the development of which was in retrospect traced todevelopments of Salafism paired with the origins ofal-Qaeda in theSoviet–Afghan War during the 1980s. Forerunners ofSalafi jihadism principally include Egyptian militant scholar and theoreticianSayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings" in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations around the world, includingal-Qaeda andISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[65][85][86][87][88] Going radically further than his predecessors, Qutb called upon Muslims to form an ideologically committed vanguard that would wage armedjihad against thesecular,democratic states and Western-allied governments in theArab world, until the restoration ofIslamic rule.[78][79]Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-bornpan-Islamist militant and physician who was second in command and co-founder ofal-Qaeda, called Qutb "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".[89]
TheSoviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in theMuslim world."[90] It served to produce foot soldiers, leadership, and organization.Abdullah Yusuf Azzam provided propaganda for the Afghan cause. After the war, veteran jihadists returned to their home countries, and from there would disperse to other sites of conflict involving Muslim populations, such asAlgeria,Bosnia, andChechnya, creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[91]
An explanation for jihadist willingness to kill civilians and self-professed Muslims on the grounds that they were actuallyapostates (takfīr) is the vastly reduced influence of the traditional diverse class ofulama, often highly educatedIslamic jurists. In "the vast majority" of Muslim countries during the post-colonial world of the 1950s and 1960s, the private religious endowments (awqāf) that had supported the independence of Islamic scholars and jurists for centuries were taken over by the state. The jurists were made salaried employees and the nationalist rulers naturally encouraged their employees (and their employees' interpretations of Islam) to serve the rulers' interests. Inevitably, the jurists came to be seen by the Muslim public as doing this.[92]
Into this vacuum of religious authority cameaggressive proselytizing, funded by tens of billions of dollars ofpetroleum-export money fromSaudi Arabia.[93] The version of Islam being propagated (Saudi doctrine ofWahhabism) billed itself as a return to pristine, simple, straightforward Islam,[94] not oneschool among many, and not interpretingIslamic law historically or contextually, but as the one, orthodox "straight path" of Islam.[94] Unlike the traditional teachings of the jurists, who tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought and kept extremism marginalized, Wahhabism had "extreme hostility" to "any sectarian divisions within Islam".[94]
Gilles Kepel writes that theSalafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".[95][96] However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violent jihadists created "a volatile mixture".[96] "When you're in the state of such alienation you become easy prey to the jihadi guys who will feed you more savory propaganda than the old propaganda of the Salafists who tell you to pray, fast and who are not taking action".[96]
In the 1990s, militant Islamists of theal-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in theterrorist attacks on police, government officials, and foreign tourists in Egypt, while theArmed Islamic Group of Algeria was one of the prominentIslamic extremist groups active during theAlgerian Civil War.[95] InAfghanistan, theTaliban are adherents of theDeobandi movement, not the Salafi school of Islam, but they closely co-operated with bin Laden and various Salafi-jihadist leaders.[95] The largest Salafi-jihadist terrorist operation is considered to be theSeptember 11 attacks against the United States perpetrated byal-Qaeda in 2001.[36]
In Iraq, resentment amongst Sunnis over their marginalization after thefall of the Ba'athist regime in 2003 led to the rise of jihadist networks in the region, which resulted in theal-Qaeda led insurgency in Iraq.[97]De-Ba'athification policy initiated by thenew government led to rise in support of jihadists and remnants ofIraqi Ba'athists started allying with al-Qaeda in their common fight against the United States.[98] Iraq War journalistGeorge Packer writes inThe Assassins' Gate:
"The Iraq War proved some of theBush administration's assertions false, and it made others self-fulfilling. One of these was the insistence on an operational link between Iraq and al-Qaeda... after the fall of the regime, the most potent ideological force behind the insurgency was Islam and its hostility to non-Islamic intruders. Some former Baathist officials even stopped drinking and took to prayer. The insurgency was calledmukawama, or resistance, with overtones of religious legitimacy; its fighters becamemujahideen (holy warriors) and proclaimed their mission to bejihad."[99][100]
The2021 re-establishment of theIslamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the 2024 establishment of thepost-Assad Syrian Arab Republic grew out of the Salafi-jihadist groupsTaliban andHay'at Tahrir al-Sham, respectively.[101][102]
"Theoreticians" of Salafi jihadism include Afghan jihadist veterans such as the PalestinianAbu Qatada, the SyrianMustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known asAbu Hamza al-Masri.[103]Al-Qaeda's second leader and co-founderAyman al-Zawahiri would praiseSayyid Qutb and his writings, stating that Qutb's call formed the ideological inspiration for the contemporary Salafi-jihadist movement.[104] Other leading figures in the movement includeAnwar al-Awlaki, former leader ofAl-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP);[105]Abu Bakar Bashir, leader of the banned Indonesian militant Islamist groupJema'ah Islamiyah;Nasir al-Fahd, Saudi Arabian Salafi-jihadist scholar who opposes theKingdom of Saudi Arabia and reportedly pledged allegiance toISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh;[106]Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the Islamic terrorist organizationBoko Haram;[107]Omar Bakri Muhammad,[108]Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, first leader of the Islamic terrorist organizationISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh;[109][110] etc.
Salafist jihadist groups includeal-Qaeda,[111]Salafia Jihadia,[112] the now defunct AlgerianArmed Islamic Group (GIA),[72] and the Egyptian groupAl-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.
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Salafia Jihadia is aSalafi-jhadist terrorist organization based inMorocco andSpain.[112] The group was allied withal-Qaeda andMoroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).
The group was known for its participation in the2003 Casablanca bombings, in which 12 suicide bombers killed 33 people and injured over 100. Salafia Jihadia has variously been described as a movement or loose network ofSalafi-jhadist groups andcells, or as a generic term applied by Moroccan authorities for militant Salafi activists.[113][114]
Salafia Jihadia is said to function as a network of several loosely affiliatedSalafi-jhadist groups andcells, including groups such as al Hijra Wattakfir, Attakfir Bidum Hijra, Assirat al Mustaqim, Ansar al Islam and Moroccan Afghans.[115][116] The spiritual leader and founder of the group isMohammed Fizazi [fr;de], former imam of theal-Quds Mosque (which was shut down by German authorities in 2010).[115] Fizazi was arrested in 2003 and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for his radical statements and connection to the Casablanca bombings.[117]Salafia Jihadia has since spawned a wider ideological movement out ofSaudi Arabia and theGulf states.[112]
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, another Salafi-jihadist movement,[118] fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for aNovember 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut inLuxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999,[119] although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against theBa'athist Syrian regime.[118]
Perhaps the most famous and effectiveSalafi-jihadist group isal-Qaeda.[120] Al-Qaeda evolved from theMaktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreignmujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established inPeshawar, Pakistan, byOsama bin Laden andAbdullah Yusuf Azzam.
Al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya in the Sinai was established in 2012 byMohammed al-Zawahiri,[121] it was created in order to fightEgyptian Security Forces andIsrael Defense Forces in theSinai Peninsula andGaza Strip.[122]
The group, and many other groups in the Sinai Peninsula, has ties withal-Qaeda,[123] and was one of the many groups who committed terrorist attacks on civilians and Egyptian Armed Forces during many periods of terrorist attacks in the Sinai in 2012 through 2013.[124]
In Syria and Iraq, bothJabhat al-Nusra andISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh have been described asSalafi-jihadist terrorist organizations.[125] Originating in theJaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah founded byAbu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2004, the organization (primarily under theIslamic State of Iraq name) affiliated itself withal-Qaeda in Iraq and fought alongside them during the2003–2006 phase of the Iraqi insurgency. The group later changed their name to Islamic State of Iraq and Levant for about a year,[126][127] before declaring itself to be aworldwidecaliphate,[128][129] called simply the "Islamic State".[130] They are a transnationalSalafi jihadist group and anunrecognisedquasi-state. IS gained global prominence in 2014, when their militants conquered large territories in northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, taking advantage of the ongoingcivil war in Syria and the disintegrating local military forces of Iraq. By the end of 2015, their self-declaredcaliphate ruled an area with a population of about 12 million,[131][132] where they enforced their extremist interpretation ofIslamic law, managed an annual budget exceedingUS$1 billion, and commanded more than 30,000 fighters.[133] After a grinding conflict with American, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces, IS lost control of all their Middle Eastern territories by 2019, subsequently reverting to insurgency from remote hideouts while continuing theirpropaganda efforts. These efforts have garnered a significant following in northern andSahelian Africa,[134][135] where IS still controls a significant territory, and thewar against the Islamic State continues.[136][137]
Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime.[138] Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.[125]
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization[139] that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes.[140]
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafi-jihadist organization based in theGaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, SheikhAbdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, theIslamist groupHamas, for failing to enforceSharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding hisIbn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself) were killed and over 130 were wounded.[141]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were theMujahidin Shura Council and theAnsar al Sunna.[142] There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups inAzerbaijan.[143]
The group leading theIslamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations,[144]BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictlyclandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.[145][146]
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests againstKing Abdullah II of Jordan,[147] and the kidnapping and killing of Italianpeace activistVittorio Arrigoni inHamas-controlledGaza Strip.[148][149]
In 2017,Swedish Security Police reported that the number of jihadists in Sweden had risen to thousands from about 200 in 2010.[150] Based on social media analysis, an increase was noted in 2013.[151] According to police in Sweden, Salafist-Jihadists affect the communities where they are active.[152]
According to Swedish researcherMagnus Ranstorp, Salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy.[152]
The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of Salafi-Jihadist materials which expoused "an illiberal, bigoted" ideology.[153][154]
According toDeutsche Welle, Salafism is a growing movement inGermany whose aim of aCaliphate is incompatible with aWestern democracy.[155] According to the GermanFederal Agency for Civic Education, nearly all jihadist terrorists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are terrorists. The dualistic view on "true believers" and "false believers" in practice means people being treated unequally on religious grounds. The call for a religious state in the form of a caliphate means that Salafists reject therule of law and thesovereignty of the people's rule. The Salafist view on gender and society leads to discrimination and the subjugation of women.[156]
Estimates by Germaninterior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015.[157] In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets,[157] a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth.[157] There are two ideological camps, one advocatesSalafi-Activism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society.[157] The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.[157]
In December 2017, a Salafi-Jihadist mosque inMarseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad.[158] In August 2018, after theEuropean Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported theSalafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home countryAlgeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.[159]
Deobandi jihadism is a militant interpretation of Islam that draws upon the teachings of theSunniDeobandi movement, which originated in theIndian subcontinent in the 19th century. TheDeobandism underwent 3 waves of armed jihad. The first wave involved the establishment of an Islamic territory centered on Thana Bhawan by the movement's elders during the Indian Rebellion of 1857, before the founding ofDarul Uloom Deoband.Imdadullah Muhajir Makki was the Amir al-Mu'minin of this Islamic territory; however, after the British defeated the Deobandi forces in the Battle of Shamli, the territory fell. Following the establishment of Darul Uloom Deoband,Mahmud Hasan Deobandi led the initiation of the second wave. He mobilized an armed resistance against the British through various initiatives, including the formation of the Samratut Tarbiat. When the British uncovered hisSilk Letter Movement, they arrestedHasan Deobandi and held him captive inMalta. After his release, he and his disciples entered into mainstream politics and actively participated in the democratic process. In the late 1979, thePakistan–Afghan border became the center of the Deobandi jihadist movement's third wave, which was fueled by theSoviet–Afghan War. Under the patronage of PresidentZia-ul-Haq, its expansion took place through various madrasas such asDarul Uloom Haqqania andJamia Uloom-ul-Islamia.Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S) provided political support for it. Trained militants from the Pakistan–Afghan border participated in theAfghan jihad, and later went on to form various organizations, including theTaliban. The most successful example of Deobandi jihadism is the Taliban, who establishedIslamic rule in Afghanistan. The head of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (S),Sami-ul-Haq, is referred to as the "father of the Taliban".TheDeobandi jihadist groupTaliban was formed in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, the founder of the Taliban wasMullah Omar, a former mujahideen fighter who had lost an eye during the war against the Soviet Union. In 1994, he gathered a group of students and religious scholars, many of whom had received their education inDeobandi madrasahs located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and established theTaliban as a political and military movement.[160]
According to theIranian-American academicVali Nasr, which serves as Majid Khaddouri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at theJohns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), political tendencies ofShīʿa andSunnī Islamic ideologies differ, withSunnī fundamentalism "inPakistan and much of theArab world" being "far from politically revolutionary", primarily focused on attempting toIslamicize the political establishment rather than trying to change it through revolutionary struggle, whereas the Shīʿīte conception ofpolitical Islam is strongly influenced byRuhollah Khomeini and his talk of the oppression of the poor and class war, which characterized the success of theIslamic Revolution inIran (1978–1979):[161]
With theShia awakening of Iran, the years of sectarian tolerance were over. What followed was a Sunni-versus-Shia contest for dominance, and it grew intense. [...] The revolution even moved leftists inMuslim-majority countries such asIndonesia,Turkey, andLebanon to look at Islam with renewed interest. After all, in Iran, Islam had succeeded where leftist ideologies had failed. [...] But admiration for what had happened in Iran did not equal acceptance of Iranian leadership. Indeed, Islamic activists outside of Iran quickly found Iranian revolutionaries to be arrogant, offputting, and drunk on their own success. Moreover,Sunni fundamentalism inPakistan and much of theArab world was far from politically revolutionary. It was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values. As the French scholar of contemporary IslamGilles Kepel puts it, it was less to tear down the existing system than to give it a fresh, thick coat of "Islamic green" paint.Khomeini'sfundamentalism, by contrast, was "red"—that is, genuinely revolutionary.[161]
The term "jihadism" is almost exclusively used to describeSunnīextremist groups.[162] One example isSyria, where there have been thousands ofMuslim foreign fighters engaged in theSyrian civil war, for example, non-SyrianShīʿa Islamist groups are often referred to as "militia", while Sunnī foreign fighters are referred to as "jihadists" (or "would-be jihadists").[Note 3][Note 4] One who does use the term "Shia jihad" is Danny Postel, who complains that "this Shia jihad is largely left out of the dominant narrative."[165][166] Other authors see the ideology of "resistance" (muqawama) as more dominant, even amongShīʿa Islamist groups. For clarity, they suggest use of the termmuqawamist instead.[167]Houthi rebels have often called forjihad to resistSaudi Arabia's intervention inYemen, even though theHouthi movement stems fromZaydī Shīʿism, asubsect of Shīʿa Islam which is closer to Sunnī theology in comparison to other Shīʿa denominations.[168][169]
According to Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, jihadism is driven by the idea thatjihad is an "individual obligation" (fard ‘ayn) incumbent upon allMuslims. This is in contrast with the belief of Muslims up until now (and by contemporary non-jihadists) thatjihad is a "collective obligation" (farḍ al-kifāya) carried out according to orders of legitimate representatives of theMuslim community (Ummah). Jihadists insist that all Muslims should participate because (they believe) today's Muslim leaders in the world are illegitimate and do not command theauthority to ordain justified violence.[170]
Some observers[6][171][172] have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st-centurySalafi jihadism.[173] According to thelegal historian Sadarat Kadri,[171] during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn anybid‘ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[171] "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[171]
The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the "jihad of the sword" (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[174] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both theQuran and theHadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ‘ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[175] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[176] and it could only be directed by thecaliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[176] (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like theKharijia's jihad against and killing ofCaliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim).[6]Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place inHell.[177] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[178]
Scholars likeAbul Ala Maududi,Abdullah Azzam,Ruhollah Khomeini, leaders of al-Qaeda and others, believe that defensive global jihad is a personal obligation, which means that no caliph or Muslim head of state needs to declare it. Killing yourself in the process of killing the enemy is an act ofShuhada (martyrdom) and it brings you a special place inHeaven, not a special place inHell; and the killing of Muslim bystanders (nevermindNon-Muslims), should not impede acts of jihad. Military and intelligent analystSebastian Gorka described the new interpretation of jihad as the "willful targeting of civilians by a non-state actor through unconventional means."[179][172] Al-Qaeda's splinter groups and competitors,Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria, are thought to have been heavily influenced[173][180][181][182][183] by a 2004 work on jihad entitledManagement of Savagery (Idarat at-Tawahhush),[173] written by Abu Bakr Naji[173] and intended to provide a strategy to create a new Islamiccaliphate by first destroying "vital economic and strategic targets" and terrifying the enemy with cruelty to break its will.[184]
Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as one of the key theorists andideologues behind modern jihadist violence.[173][185][186][187] His theological and legal justifications influencedAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda member and former leader ofal-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as several other jihadi terrorist groups, includingISIL andBoko Haram.[173][185][186][187] Zarqawi used a 579-page manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIL, known in Arabic asFiqh al-Dima and referred to in English asThe Jurisprudence of Jihad orThe Jurisprudence of Blood.[173][185][186][187][188] The book has been described by counter-terrorism scholar Orwa Ajjoub as rationalizing and justifying "suicide operations, the mutilation of corpses, beheading, and the killing of children and non-combatants".[173]The Guardian's journalist Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari ofQuilliam, notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".[187] Charlie Winter ofThe Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[186] He states:
Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of theliterary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir,committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[186]
Clinical psychologistChris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his essay,Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism (2017). He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that rendersIslamic terrorism a valid means of solution.[188]
resistance of Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet invasion..
French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism – an historical reference to the precursor of these movements – will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage.
Jihadism is a term that has been applied in Western languages to describemilitantIslamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening tothe West. Western media have tended to refer to Jihadism as a military movement which is rooted inpolitical Islam. [...]Jihadism, like the wordjihad from which it is constructed, is a difficult term to precisely define. The meaning of Jihadism is a virtual moving target because it remains a recentneologism and no single, generally accepted meaning has been developed for it.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
Well before the full emergence of Islamism in the 1970s, a growing constituency nicknamed 'petro-Islam' included Wahhabi ulemas and Islamist intellectuals and promoted strict implementation of the sharia in the political, moral and cultural spheres; this proto-movement had few social concerns and even fewer revolutionary ones.
The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)Salafi Jihadist preachers such as Abu Hamza al-Masri and Omar Bakri Muhammad help inspire thousands of Muslim youth to develop a cultlike relationship to martyrdom in mosques
Salafisten sind Anhänger einer fundamentalistischen Strömung des Islam, die einen mit der westlichen Demokratie unvereinbaren Gottesstaat anstreben.
[Unlike the five pillars of Islam, jihad was to be enforced by the state.] ... 'unless the Muslim community is subjected to a sudden attack and therefore all believers, including women and children are under the obligation to fight—[jihad of the sword] is regarded by all jurists, with almost no exception, as a collective obligation of the whole Muslim community,' meaning that 'if the duty is fulfilled by a part of the community it ceases to be obligatory on others'.
