Jan Olszewski | |
|---|---|
.jpg) Olszewski in 2006 | |
| Prime Minister of Poland | |
| In office 6 December 1991 – 5 June 1992 | |
| President | Lech Wałęsa |
| Preceded by | Jan Krzysztof Bielecki |
| Succeeded by | Waldemar Pawlak |
| Member of the Sejm | |
| In office 18 June 1991 – 31 March 1993 | |
| Constituency | Warsaw I |
| In office 20 October 1997 – 18 October 2005 | |
| Constituency | Warsaw I |
| Personal details | |
| Born | Jan Ferdynand Olszewski (1930-08-20)20 August 1930 |
| Died | 7 February 2019(2019-02-07) (aged 88) Warsaw, Poland |
| Resting place | Powązki Military Cemetery |
| Party | Solidarity Citizens' Committee (1988–1990) Centre Agreement (1990–1992) Movement for the Republic (1992–1995) Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (1995–2012) |
| Spouse | Marta Miklaszewska |
| Alma mater | University of Warsaw |
| Awards |  Order of the White Eagle Cross of Freedom and Solidarity |
| Signature |  |
Jan Ferdynand Olszewski (Polish:[ˈjanɔlˈʂɛfskʲi]ⓘ; 20 August 1930 – 7 February 2019) was a Polishconservative lawyer and politician who served as thePrime Minister of Poland for five months between December 1991 and early June 1992 and later became a leading figure of theconservativeMovement for the Reconstruction of Poland.
During his premiership, Olszewski's cabinet worked under new international conditions. At the end of December 1991, theSoviet Union was dissolved. This motivated the government to start integration withNATO andEuropean Community. For the first time, in official documents, it was mentioned that membership in NATO is part of Polish defence strategy. Negotiations to withdraw Russian armies from Poland started at the end of October 1990, were accelerated. In March 1992, a period of confusion occurred when presidentLech Wałęsa presented his conception of new economic and military alliance with formerWarsaw Pact during his visit to Germany, which went against the euro Atlantic direction of the government. Olszewski’s government changed the concept of privatization of national corporations. Total stop of privatization led to open conflict with liberal groups in the parliament. On 22 May 1992, Olszewski opposed the signing of a clause in Polish-Russian Treaty of Friendly and Neighbourly Cooperation, which handed over former Russian military bases to international Polish-Russian corporations. Olszewski sent a telegram to Moscow to the president Lech Wałęsa informing of government opposition to the clause. Wałęsa, after a conversation withBoris Yeltsin changed the controversial clause. However, this did not stop further clashes with the president.
Olszewski's cabinet did not hold a permanent parliamentary majority. Attempts to extend the coalition, first toDemocratic Union,Liberal Democratic Congress and Polish Economic Programme, and then toConfederation of Independent Poland, were unsuccessful. On 24 May 1992, the council of the Democratic Union wrote a report calling the government to resign. On 26 May, Wałęsa sent a formal note to theMarshal of the Sejm, informing of withdrawal of support for the government. On 27 May, the four parties prepared for thevote of no confidence against the government. The following day, the Sejm passed a resolution obligating the Minister of Interior (at the timeAntoni Macierewicz), to publish the list of communist secret police collaborators. On 29 May, representative of the Democratic Union,Jan Rokita, presented a vote of no confidence request on the behalf of 65 members of the parliament of the three parties. On 2 June, the final day of coalition negotiations with the Confederation of Independent Poland, Macierewicz met with deputy Marshal of that party, informing him that its leader,Leszek Moczulski, was on the list of collaborators which will be presented to the Sejm the following day.
The cabinet was recalled by the Sejm in voting after the midnight of 5 June 1992, few hours after publishing the list. Olszewski supported the decision of Macierewicz, proposing to establish an independent commission to verify the validity of the published documents. The Sejm did not debate this proposal. Wałęsa pressured on the Sejm to speed up the vote of no confidence, sending his own request. On 5 June 1992, 00:00 AM, after a vote of no confidence was approved, with 273 in favour and 119 against, Olszewski was forced to resign as prime minister and hiscabinet was immediately replaced in an event known asthe nightshift ("Nocna zmiana"). After Olszewski's dismissal, Wałęsa designated Waldemar Pawlak as the new prime minister. Olszewski's premiership was the second shortest in the history of theThird Republic.
Born inWarsaw on 20 August 1930,[1] Olszewski originated from a working-class family employed in the railway industry who were strongly connected to thePolish Socialist Party.[2] Olszewski was related toStefan Aleksander Okrzeja, a Polish socialist nationalist from the turn of the 20th century who was executed by Russian authorities in 1905 for leading insurgent activities.[3] Despite Olszewski's active preference toright-wing politics later in life, he considered himself sympathetic to socialist causes during his early formative years.[4]
DuringWorld War II, Olszewski was active in theSzare Szeregi (Grey Ranks), an underground part of thePolish Scouting Association. According to biographical information published at footnote five, Olszewski participated in theWarsaw Uprising in 1944.[5][6]
In the immediate post-war years, Olszewski graduated from secondary school in 1949, later going on to study law at theUniversity of Warsaw, where he graduated in 1953. Afterwards, he became an employee of theMinistry of Justice and later worked at thePolish Academy of Sciences.[5] In 1956, Olszewski joined the writing staff of the weeklyPo prostu (Plain Speaking) magazine.[5] As a journalist during the relatively openPolish October, Olszewski came into contact withPZPR First Secretary andde facto head of stateWładysław Gomułka, whom he spent many hours interviewing and described having a trustful relationship with after many frank discussions regarding the state of affairs ofPoland and theEastern Bloc.[4] In an article titled "Na spotkanie ludziom z AK" ("Reaching out to the Men of the Home Army") published in March 1956, Olszewski, along with journalists Jerzy Ambroziewicz and Walery Namiotkiewicz, called for the rehabilitation of formerArmia Krajowa soldiers who faced persecution from communist authorities for anti-state activities.[7]
One of the first openly published articles of its kind to break the official silence on the Armia Krajowa, Olszewski argued that its veterans deserved a positive historical assessment in the struggle againstNazi Germany, describing all subsequent prosecutions of its ranks as being politically motivated.[8] Despite the government's initial toleration ofPo prostu's critiques, authorities moved in to forcibly close down the publication's offices in October 1956, citing it of presenting a false view of political and economic realities, spreading "disbeliefs" about socialism and proclaiming "bourgeois concepts".[9] For his part, Olszewski faced a publication ban beginning in 1957.[5] The forcible closure and censoring ofPo prostu led Olszewski to become quickly disillusioned with the communist order. As a response, from 1956 to 1962, Olszewski was a member of theCrooked Circle Club, aWarsaw-based underground discussion group composed of intellectuals critical of the regime.[10] During the 1960s, Olszewski became a leading defence attorney in political trials. Among others, he defended writer and journalistMelchior Wańkowicz, activistJacek Kuroń, historianKarol Modzelewski and poetJanusz Szpotański.[11] His professional activity was banned again in 1968 after theMarch student protests.[5]
However, Olszewski returned to practice law in 1970 asEdward Gierek assumed power. Grateful for Olszewski's legal defence at his trial, the writer Melchior Wańkowicz kept a close relationship with Olszewski for the rest of his life, bequeathing funds to the lawyer and fellow dissidentJan Józef Lipski to help future defendants of political crimes shortly before his death in 1974.[12] Olszewski later became a signatory of theLetter of 59 in 1975, an open protest to changes to the republic'scommunist constitution.[13] In 1984, Olszewski served as an auxiliary prosecutor representing the family of murdered pro-Solidarity priestJerzy Popiełuszko, whose statements during the trial of laying blame for the priest's murder on outside influences created international headlines.[14] Joining theSolidarity movement in the early 1980s, Olszewski quickly rose to become a major figure in the opposition movement, playing a key role in drafting its founding charter.[15] He would go on to become one of Solidarity's most active lawyers and legal experts.[16] Olszewski, along with Solidarity leaderLech Wałęsa and other anti-government dissidents, participated in theRound Table Talks in early 1989 with the rulingPZPR, where he served as the opposition's legal expert.[5] The talks successfully paved the way towards the partially free1989 parliamentary elections.
With the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Olszewski was appointed as a member of theState Tribunal that year, a position he would hold until 1991. In 1990, Olszewski joined the conservativeCentre Agreement, whose party membership composed primarily of Wałęsa supporters inthat year's presidential election.[15] Following the resignation of Prime MinisterTadeusz Mazowiecki in November 1990 after his first-round defeat in the presidential election, newly elected president Wałęsa sought a new prime minister.[17] Initially, the president turned to Olszewski to take the position, though Olszewski quickly refused the post after numerous disagreements with Wałęsa over conditions the president placed on the prime minister's cabinet.[17] Instead, Wałęsa turned toJan Krzysztof Bielecki of theLiberal Democratic Congress to form a government.[18] Bielecki's government lasted for the rest of 1991, collapsing in the aftermath of the inconclusive1991 parliamentary elections.
While Wałęsa appointedBronisław Geremek as prime minister, an accord was signed by five centrist and rightist parties in theSejm, including the Liberal Democratic Congress, theChristian National Union, thePeasants' Agreement, theConfederation of Independent Poland and theCenter Civic Alliance list (whose Olszewski's Centre Agreement belonged to) to select the next premier.[19] The parties supported Olszewski, a parliamentary outsider and respected lawyer from the Solidarity movement, to unite the various clubs.[20] Grudgingly, Wałęsa, who no longer had a stable working relationship with Olszewski, honoured the coalition agreement and appointed the lawyer as premier on 6 December. Three weeks of selecting the cabinet followed.[21] In the meantime, the original accord behind Olszewski's appointment immediately began to fall apart, as both the Liberal Democratic Congress and the Confederation of Independent Poland withdrew their support from Olszewski over economic and cabinet disagreements.[20] Similarly, theDemocratic Union refused to support an administration not committed to rapid economic reform, a concern shared with the Liberal Democrats.[22] Despite the weakened alliance, Olszewski'sminority government was accepted by parliament on 23 December 1991.[21]
Following the oath of office, Olszewski's government faced difficulties on many fronts. Previously, Olszewski had placed deep criticism on Finance MinisterLeszek Balcerowicz from the previous two administrations and his controversialBalcerowicz Plan, vigorously opposing the minister'sshock therapy program. Removing Balcerowicz from the cabinet, Olszewski selected Karol Lutowski, a known critic of shock therapy, as his replacement. With unemployment rising to 11.4 percent and the nation's gross domestic product declining by ten percent over the course of one year, the Olszewski government faced pressure to amend the unpopular economic plan.[21] Despite his professedmonetarist beliefs, Olszewski pushed for a package of reforms to loosencredit, ease earlier anti-inflation policies, reintroduceprice supports for a number of agricultural products, and release more subsidies to the state sector of thePolish economy.[21]
Included in his industrial interventionist policy, the premier also proposed the unification of the nation's economic ministries to coordinate ongoing privatizations, as well as for all industrial and trade policies.[23] When put to a vote, however, the deeply fragmentedSejm rejected Olszewski's reform packages, due to objections that the proposals were overly domineering or were too weak. Over the course of his government, the Sejm proved to be a barrier to any strong reforms.[21] Olszewski explained his views on economic reforms in an interview with Anthony Murawski in the summer of 1992, published in September 1992 in Multinational Monitor magazine (founded by Ralph Nader).[24] In particular, the prime minister's plans to reverse theBalcerowicz Plan proved impossible due to his fragileminority government.[22] Without majority support, Olszewski relied on the conditional support ofTadeusz Mazowiecki's Democratic Union andJan Krzysztof Bielecki's Liberal Democratic Congress, yet both men and their respective parties insisted on prioritizing economic reforms.[25] Within the government itself, the relationship between the seven parties composing the coalition was fragile at best, teetering on collapse by March 1992.[26] Under pressure from the president to expand the coalition, Olszewski turned to the Democratic Union and theConfederation of Independent Poland, though the Union insisted on a conservative budget before it could join thecabinet.[26]
As with the two previous administrations, the Olszewski government's foreign policy continued to steer towards theWest, with the stated desire of joiningNATO.[27] The prime minister's selection ofJan Parys asdefense minister indicated a policy hostile to Russia while Foreign MinisterKrzysztof Skubiszewski, a veteran of the previous Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments, pursued efforts of moderation and compromise, balancing relations between the West and Moscow.[28] President Wałęsa, however, sharply disagreed with the prime minister, arguing that foreign policy efforts instead should drive towards building an alternative military alliance with fellow ex-Warsaw Pact states.[29] Wałęsa's proposals coincided with his own security uncertainties over the recent violentcollapse of Yugoslavia, thedissolution of the Soviet Union, and from a fear that joining NATO would put Poland in an opposing position to Russia.[29] In response, Olszewski accused Skubiszewski, and by extension Wałęsa, who both advocated cooperation with Russia in regards to troop withdrawals, of "Finlandizing" foreign policy.[29]
Individuals close to the Olszewski government, likeJarosław Kaczyński, referred to Wałęsa'sBelweder residence as a den of Russian interests, which was determined to "maintain and protect the communist set-up" and control Russian influence in Polish internal affairs.[30] Additionally, both men stood at odds overPolish-Ukrainian relations, with Olszewski arguing that the relationship withKyiv needed equal footing withPolish-Russian relations.[29] At the same time, relations with the West financially soured under Olszewski's tenureship. In the face of the premier's attempts to stimulate the economy by proposing to raise the budget deficit, theInternational Monetary Fund demanded instead a restrictive budget in order to resume lending.[26] Particularly, Western donor states pressured Olszewski to replace Lutowski as finance minister. When Olszewski reshuffled ministers, placingAndrzej Olechowski at theMinistry of Finance, observers believed that the premier had reverted to a hard-line economic reform posture.[26] Yet when theSejm passed a bill authorizing salary and pension increases, raising the budget deficit by fifty percent, Olechowski fiercely objected and resigned from the cabinet, claiming he did not have "the slightest idea" of how to explain the government's economic reasoning to the IMF.[31]
The conflict between Olszewski and Wałęsa continued to escalate throughout 1992, culminating in a major political crisis by that summer. As premier, Olszewski portrayed himself and his government as staunchly anti-communist, arguing that in the year 1992, Poland continued to remain a communist country. Claiming that communist agents remained in all corridors of economic and political power, Olszewski argued for a purge, particularly of those in the economic sector, whom Olszewski believed were holding back Poland's new capitalist free market and kept workers bound.[15] "The invisible hand [of the market]", Olszewski said, was "simply the hand of the swindler plundering funds from the state treasury".[15] As such, Olszewski argued for increased democratization and de-communinization at all levels of Polish society. Olszewski's drive towards de-communization was also reflected in his cabinet. Jan Parys, Olszewski's defense minister, actively pursued efforts to de-communize thePolish Armed Forces and establish civilian ministerial control.[32] These plans ran in conjunction with Wałęsa's efforts to stake executive control over the defense establishment.[32] Parys and Wałęsa repeatedly clashed over plans to reorganize national security commands, with Parys effectively challenging Wałęsa's role as commander in chief by claiming ministerial rights over the armed forces.[33]
The clash between both men came to a head in April 1992, when, upon learning of a meeting betweenNational Security Bureau Director Jerzy Milewski, a close Wałęsa ally, withPolish Army General Tadeusz Wilecki, promising the general's promotion to thehigh command, Parys accused the presidency of interfering with the defense ministry's portfolio.[34] Parys stated that "certain politicians" promised promotions to army officers in exchange "for a kind of army support for political maneuvers".[35] Parys further elaborated that "politicians who undertake such moves behind my back are simply involved in intrigue", believing that "they are working to the detriment of the army and Poland; they simply are political schemers. To put it briefly: the Polish Army will help no one striving to abolish democracy in Poland".[35] Parys's implication of a possiblecoup d'etat on the behalf of Wałęsa and his allies with bribed high-ranking military officials rocked the entire Polish political establishment. To quiet the political storm, Olszewski responded by placing Parys on administrative leave.[36] In response, a parliamentary commission was quickly created in theSejm to investigate Parys's claims.[37] The commission's findings cleared Wałęsa of wrongdoing and declared Parys's claims as baseless and "unfounded", forcing the defense minister to resign.[37] In the aftermath of the Parys affair, Wałęsa bitterly complained of the Olszewski government's handling of the controversy, declaring the government's civilian leaders of endangering both national security and the professionalism of the military. The relationship between Olszewski and Wałęsa further soured with Olszewski's appointment ofRadosław Sikorski as deputy defense minister without presidential consultation, a move interpreted as the premier vying for influence within the armed forces.[38]
The deepening chasm between both men began to interrupt foreign policy. As both men sought to assert control over the economy, the military, and international relations, particularly over-sensitive negotiations to withdrawRussian Army units from the country, Foreign MinisterKrzysztof Skubiszewski admitted that by May 1992, "[i]t was difficult to conduct the foreign policy of an internally unstable country".[39] The overlying reason for the clash between both men emanated from the fact that both the prime minister and the president believed their respective offices carried the prerogative to direct government policy, particularly in the defence, interior, and foreign ministries.[40] As premier, Olszewski believed that his position, along with the collectiveCouncil of Ministers, held precedence in conducting the affairs of state. On the other side, President Wałęsa believed that as the chief executive and head of state he was ultimately responsible for the direction of the republic's affairs. The clash between both offices created a highly charged and disruptive political environment. Despite this instability, Skubiszewski continued to negotiate with his Russian counterparts on financial and business settlements in regards to the pullout of Russian Army units from the country.[41] Skubiszewski's diplomatic efforts to reach a compromise with his Russian colleagues were met with vehement criticism from Olszewski, with many close to the premier believing that any monetary or trade settlements constituted a renewed occupation.[42] Despite the premier's strong objections to theForeign Ministry's negotiations with their Russian counterparts, President Wałęsa strongly supported such moves for a final agreement. Meetings between Olszewski and Wałęsa in May 1992 displayed the divide between both men, with the premier insisting on removing any article on joint Polish-Russian financial and business deals from the treaty while Wałęsa responded that he intended to visit Russia not "to negotiate any agreement, but to sign it".[43]
By late May, Olszewski's fragile coalition faced collapse. Shortly after returning fromMoscow from signing the cooperation treaty on 26 May 1992, Wałęsa formally asked theSejm to withdraw its support from Olszewski's premiership, stating he had no faith in the government.[44] The president cited the government's "irresponsible steps in foreign affairs" as part of his decision.[45] Two days later on 28 May, with half of parliament's members absent, Sejm memberJanusz Korwin-Mikke of the small conservative-libertarianReal Politics Union successfully pressed for and passed a motion requiring theMinistry of Interior to identify all of the republic's leading politicians who collaborated previously in the communist secret services. Despite the resolution, opposition parties, including theDemocratic Union, theLiberal Democratic Congress and the Polish Economic Program (a split faction of thePolish Beer-Lovers' Party), moved to file avote of no confidence. Responding to thelustration resolution six days later on 4 June, Interior MinisterAntoni Macierewicz released to all parliamentary faction heads a secret list of 64 names of communist-era collaborators drawn from his ministry's archives.[33]
Known as the Macierewicz List, which was quickly leaked to the public, the roster includedWiesław Chrzanowski, theMarshal of the Sejm and a member of Olszewski's coalition as well asLeszek Moczulski, the head of the oppositionConfederation of Independent Poland. A second list published shortly afterwards included President Wałęsa himself.[33] In response, Wałęsa immediately demanded for the government's dismissal, yet in private, the president confessed to opposition legislators his worries that Olszewski was orchestrating a last minutecoup against him.[46] Late on the night of 4 June, on the eve of his vote of confidence, Olszewski made an unplanned televised address on public broadcastersTVP1 and2, defending his administration'slustration list and appealing for the public to rally behind the government:[47]
My government was the first to want to reveal old, secret relationships of individuals who recently volunteered to enter into the state's new administration. I believe that the Polish people should know those who govern them, including those who helped theUB andSB to keep Poles enslaved. I believe the collaborators of the former communist political police constitute a threat to the security of the free Polish people. The people should know that not coincidentally, just at the moment when we can finally break away from communist ties, there is a sudden move for the government's dismissal.[47]
In the early hours after midnight on 5 June, in an event known as thenocna zmiana ("the nightshift"), the Sejm convened for avote of no confidence. Despite Olszewski's public appeals both on television and within the debating chamber, parliament's majority opinion became readily apparent of supporting his dismissal. Aside from the opposition post-communistDemocratic Left Alliance, members of theTadeusz Mazowiecki-oriented Democratic Union, theLiberal Democrats, and other centrist and liberal parties remained unfazed with their loss of confidence with the prime minister. The opposition was joined from the right by the Confederation of Independent Poland, whose members derided the Olszewski government's attempt at radical lustration just before a vote of confidence as outrightblackmail.[48] Facing certain defeat, an emotional Olszewski addressed the Sejm, stating:
"I would like to get out of this place with just one achievement. And as of this moment, I have the belief that I will go out with it. I would like to say when this period finishes when time runs out for me—I admit—a terribly painful time, when in my hometown's streets, I can only move about by car or in the company of guards protecting me from human contact—when my time does finally finish—I can take to the streets of my city freely again, to move about and look people in the eye. And that for you, honourable members is what I wish for after this vote."
The vote of no confidence was approved, with 273 in favour and 119 against. Olszewski was immediately replaced by Wałęsa allyWaldemar Pawlak of thePolish People's Party.[36] Pawlak's government failed to gain support from Sejm majority and failed in a vote of confidence. Pawlak later resigned and Wałęsa replaced him byHanna Suchocka, who won support from the majority. Two weeks following the government's no-confidence vote, theConstitutional Tribunal ruled 11–1 the Sejm's 28 May lustration resolution singling out alleged communist collaborators as illegal due to it not being a statutory enactment, as well as violating both the dignity of citizens and democratic values.[49] The list produced by former Interior Minister Macierewicz was similarly found to be filled with inaccuracies, forcing the ministry to later apologize to several of those falsely implicated.[49]
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Following his dismissal, Olszewski resumed his career as a member of the Sejm. Olszewski departed from theCentre Agreement in the summer of 1992 with a number of other rebel MPs, creating the Movement for the Republic.[50] The new party was joined by other anti-Wałęsa and former Solidarity supporters, carrying a quasi-nationalist and ultra-Catholic platform.[50][51] As a parliamentarian, Olszewski led his club's opposition to theSmall Constitution, believing it did not offer a clear break from the Stalinist constitution of 1956.[52] Olszewski led his party to support thevote of no confidence against Prime MinisterHanna Suchocka in 1993, believing her economic policies had harmed the state.[53] In the subsequentelections that year, Olszewski lost his seat as the electorate swung to theDemocratic Left Alliance (led byAleksander Kwaśniewski), despite a failed attempt to reunite rightist forces with the Centre Agreement, now headed byJarosław Kaczyński.[54]
In 1995, Olszewski launched a bid for the presidency inthat year's presidential election in order to replace his rival Wałęsa. Campaigning on an anti-communist and patriotic platform, Olszewski garnered 1,225,453 votes, with nearly seven percent of the vote and earned fourth place.[55] However, both he and Wałęsa lost to winning left-wing candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski fromSocial Democracy.[56] Later in the same year, in an attempt to consolidate the former premier's relatively strong performance in the presidential ballot, Olszewski and his supporters established theMovement for the Reconstruction of Poland.[57]
Under the new party banner, poll numbers initially gave Olszewski's block a sixteen percent approval rating by the middle of 1996, yet this period was cut short with the creation ofSolidarity Electoral Action, a rival conservative alliance led byMarian Krzaklewski.[58] The results of the1997 parliamentary election garnered Olszewski's party with 5.6 percent of the vote, returning the former premier to theSejm with six seats.[59] During this period, Olszewski supported Prime MinisterJerzy Buzek's 1997 concordant with theHoly See, reasoning that theCatholic Church was "one of the most important, if not the most important, and certainly the most durable, longest-running and most rooted institution in Polish national life and culture".[60] At the same time, Olszewski also generally supported European integration and the government's efforts for Poland's accession into theEuropean Union, though stressed reservations on the economic conditions of integration, particularly insisting that the national banking sector must remain within domestic hands.[61] However, the Movement became increasingly marginalized due to numerous party splits.[62]
During the2000 presidential election, Olszewski stood again as a candidate, but withdrew from the race shortly before the vote[63] and later supported the Solidarity Electoral Action candidate Marian Krzaklewski.[64] Olszewski was reelected to the Sejm in2001, with his party allied with the populist far-rightLeague of Polish Families.[65] However, Olszewski broke with the League shortly after his reelection over policy differences.[66] Prior to Poland's admission into the EU in 2004, Olszewski expressed worry that Poland'saccession to the European Union would pave the way for Germans to make property claims regarding land seized during thepopulation expulsions at the end ofWorld War II.[67] The former premier also expressed in 2005 his support for strong security and political relations with the United States within a transatlantic framework, though expressed reservations to stronger ties with Germany until property claims were dealt with.[68]
In 2005, Olszewski, along with his former cabinet ministersAntoni Macierewicz andGabriel Janowski, created the Patriotic Movement, a right-wing nationalist political block combining the forces of his own party with those of theNational-Catholic Movement and thePolish Alliance, where he became the head of the new organization.[69] In that year'sparliamentary election, Olszewski ran for aSenate seat in theWarsaw constituency for theLaw and Justice list, but was defeated, coming sixth.[70] Following his exit from parliament after his failed Senat bid, Olszewski was appointed as deputy chairman of theState Tribunal between 2005 and 2006.[71] PresidentLech Kaczyński later appointed Olszewski as a presidential adviser in April 2006, a position he held until Kaczyński's death in the2010 Smolensk air disaster.[5]
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Olszewski was married to Marta Olszewska, a former activist, editor and journalist ofTygodnik Solidarność.[72] On the night of 16 August 2000, Olszewski was involved in a deadly car crash onnational road 8 near the village ofMarków-Towarzystwo inMasovian Voivodeship, when the car Olszewski was a passenger in collided with a truck. The driver of the car (Olszewski's party treasurer) was killed in the crash, while Olszewski escaped with only minor injuries.[73] In July 2014, Olszewski was made an honorary citizen ofWarsaw by MayorHanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz for his participation in theWarsaw Uprising as well as citing his moral and social authority in service of the city.[2] Olszewski died after a long illness on 7 February 2019 in a Warsaw hospital.
Olszewski remains a controversial figure within Polish politics. Members of the right-wing, particularlyLaw and Justice leaderJarosław Kaczyński, have praised the former premier for his anti-communist stances and legal principles. On the twentieth anniversary of the Olszewski government's vote of no confidence in 2012, Kaczyński praised Olszewski for attempting to stop the rapid privatizations of the early 1990s, and having helped steer Poland towards its eventual integration intoNATO.[74]
Former Interior MinisterAntoni Macierewicz also affirmed his personal belief in 2012 that had the Olszewski government not fallen, "theSmolensk disaster would never have transpired".[75]
Politicians on the centre-right have viewed Olszewski more critically.Christian National Union politicianStefan Niesiołowski strongly defended Olszewski during his vote of no confidence in 1992, declaring to the premier's detractors that "you're making a political mistake and Poland won't forget this error".[76] In an interview in 2007, Niesiołowski (now aCivic Platform parliamentarian) regretted his defense of the former prime minister in hindsight, describing Olszewski as "being a poor man who supported a moral lie" with the Macierewicz List, "and was still silent".[77]
Prime MinisterDonald Tusk similarly accused Olszewski of misleading information in 2008 during a non-governmental investigation into communist era archives conducted by the former premier, declaring: "I know that in Poland there are politicians who have genuinely strange archives and cannot get used to the idea that they're no longer prime ministers or heads of committees anymore, spending instead a lifetime in these archives, poisoning our public space with their own interpretations of what they have found".[78]
In an opinion poll conducted byCBOS in 2014, asking respondents to evaluate who was the best prime minister of theThird Republic, Olszewski was placed at seventh place.[79] A similar poll conducted by Millward Brown later that year positioned Olszewski at sixth place.[80]
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