Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Iran–Russia relations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Bilateral relations
Russo-Iranian relations
Map indicating locations of Iran and Russia

Iran

Russia
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Iran, MoscowEmbassy of Russia, Tehran
Envoy
Iranian Ambassador to RussiaKazem JalaliRussian Ambassador to IranAlexey Dedov
Russian PresidentVladimir Putin with Iranian Supreme LeaderAli Khamenei during a visit toTehran, 19 July 2022.

Relations between theGrand Duchy of Moscow and thePersian Empire (Iran) officially commenced in 1521, with theRurikids andSafavids in power respectively.[1] Past and present contact between Russia and Iran have long been complicatedly multi-faceted; often wavering between collaboration and rivalry. The two nations have a long history of geographic, economic, and socio-political interaction. Mutual relations have often been turbulent, and dormant at other times.

Until 1720, on the surface, relations between Iran and Russia were largely friendly and the two operated on a level of equity.[2] After 1720, withPeter the Great'sattack on Iran and the establishment of theRussian Empire, the first of a long series of campaigns was initiated against Iran and theCaucasus.[2] The Russian Empire had an oppressive role in Iran during the 19th and early 20th centuries which harmed Iran's development, and during most of the ensuingSoviet period, the shadow of the "big northern neighbour" continued to impend.[3] Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the two nations have generally enjoyed very close cordial relations. Iran and Russia are strategic allies[4][5][6] and form an axis in the Caucasus alongside Armenia. Iran and Russia are also military allies in the conflicts in Syria andIraq and partners inAfghanistan and post-SovietCentral Asia. TheRussian Federation is also the chief supplier of arms and weaponry to Iran. Due to international economicsanctions on Iran, Russia has become a key trading partner, especially in regard to the former's excess oil reserves. Currently Russia and Iran share a close economic and military alliance, and both countries are subject to heavy sanctions by mostWestern nations.[7][8]

Militarily, Iran is the only country in Western Asia that has been invited (in 2007) to join theCollective Security Treaty Organization, the Russia-based international treaty organization that parallelsNATO.[9] As soon as he became president,Vladimir Putin pursued close friendship with Iran and deepened Russian military cooperation with Iran and Syria. In 2015, Putin ordered amilitary intervention in Syria, supporting theAssad regime and its Iranian allies with anaerial bombing campaign against theSyrian opposition. While much of the Iranian military uses Iranian-manufactured weapons and domestic hardware, Iran still purchases some weapons systems from Russia. In turn, Iran assisted Russia with its drone technology and other military technology during itsinvasion of Ukraine.[10][11] American government officials and some security scholars[12] believe the two countries have formed a "full-fledged defense partnership".[13]

Iran has its embassy inMoscow andconsulates in the cities ofAstrakhan andKazan. Russia has its embassy inTehran, and consulates inRasht andIsfahan.

History

[edit]
Painting ofShah Suleiman I and his courtiers byAliquli Jabbadar, Isfahan, 1670. The painting was acquired byTsar Nicholas II, and is now kept at theInstitute of Oriental Manuscripts inSaint Petersburg.

Pre-Safavid era

[edit]
Derbent is renowned for theSassanid Iranian fortress, aUNESCO World Heritage Site.

Contacts betweenRussians andPersians have a long history, extending back more than a millennium.[14] There were known commercial exchanges as early as the 8th century AD between Persia and Russia.[1] They were interrupted by the Mongol invasions in the 13th and 14th centuries, but started up again in the 15th century with the rise of the state ofMuscovy. In the 9th–11th century AD, there were repetitive raiding parties undertaken bythe Rus' between 864 and 1041 on theCaspian Sea shores of what is today Iran, Azerbaijan, andDagestan as part of theCaspian expeditions of the Rus'.[15] Initially, the Rus' appeared inSerkland during the 9th century, traveling as merchants along theVolga trade route while selling furs, honey, and slaves. The first small-scale raids took place in the late 9th and early 10th century, and the Rus' undertook the first large-scale expedition in 913; having arrived on 500 ships, they pillaged theGorgan region (within present day Iran), as well the areas ofGilan andMazandaran, taking slaves and goods.

Safavid Empire–Russian Empire

[edit]

It was not until the 16th century that formal diplomatic contacts were established between Persia and Russia, with the latter acting as an intermediary in the trade betweenEngland and Persia. Transporting goods across Russian territory meant that the English could avoid the zones under Ottoman andPortuguese control.[1] TheMuscovy Company (also known as the Russian Company) was founded in 1553 to expand the trade routes across the Caspian sea.[1] Moscow's role as an intermediary in exchanges between Britain and Persia led Russian traders to set up business in urban centres across Persia, as far south asKashan.[1] The Russian victories over the Kazan Khanate in 1552 and the Astrakhan Khanate in 1556 by TsarIvan IV (r. 1533–84) revived trade between Iran and Russia via theVolga-Caspian route and marked the first Russian penetration of theCaucasus and the Caspian area.[14] Though these commercial exchanges in the latter half of the 16th century were limited in scope, they nonetheless indicate that the fledgling entente between the two countries emerged as a result of opposition to the neighboringOttoman Empire.

Stepan Razin Sailing in the Caspian Sea byVasily Surikov, 1906

Diplomatic relations between Russia and Iran date back to 1521, when theSafavid ShahIsmail I sent an emissary to visit the CzarVasili III. As the first diplomatic contacts between the two countries was being established, Shah Ismail was also working hard with the aim of joining forces against their mutual enemy, neighboringOttoman Turkey.[1] On several occasions, Iran offered Russia a deal exchanging a part of its territory (for exampleDerbent andBaku in 1586) for its support in its wars against their Ottoman archrivals.[1] In 1552–53, Safavid Iran and the Muscovy state in Russia exchanged ambassadors for the first time, and, starting in 1586, they established a regular diplomatic relationship. In 1650, extensive contact between the two people, culminated in theRusso-Persian War (1651–53), after which Russia had to cede its footholds in theNorth Caucasus to the Safavids. In the 1660s the famous Russian CossackatamanStenka Razin raided, and occasionally wintered at, Persia's north coast, creating diplomatic problems for the Russian Czar in his dealings with the Persian Shah.[16] TheRussian song telling the tragic semi-legendary story of Razin's relationship with a Persian princess remains popular to this day.

Peace reigned for many decades between the two peoples after these conflicts, in which trade and migration of peoples flourished. The decline of the Safavid and Ottoman state saw the rise of Imperial Russia on the other hand. After the fall of ShahSultan Husayn brought the Safavid dynasty to an end in 1722, the greatest threats facing Persia were Russian and Ottoman ambitions for territorial expansion in the Caspian region—north-western Persia specifically. During the Safavid period, Russian and Persian power was relatively evenly balanced.[1] Overall, the common anti-Ottoman struggle served as the main common political interest for Iran and Russia throughout the period of Safavid rule, with several attempts to conclude an anti-Ottoman military treaty.[14] Following Shah Husayn's fall, the relationship lost its symmetry, but it was largely restored underNader Shah.[1]

In his later years of rule,Peter the Great found himself in a strong enough position to increase Russian influence more southwards in the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and theBlack Sea, challenging both the Safavids and the Ottomans. He made the city ofAstrakhan his base for his hostilities against Persia, created a shipyard, and attacked the weakened Safavids in theRusso-Persian War (1722–1723), capturing many of its territories in the Caucasus and northern mainland Iran for several years. After several years of political chaos in Persia following the fall of the Safavids, a new and powerful Persian empire was born under the highly successful military leaderNader Shah. Fearing a costly war which would most likely be lost against Nader and also being flanked by the Turks in the west, the Russians were forced to give back all territories and retreat from the entire Caucasus and northern mainland Iran as according to theTreaty of Resht (1732) andTreaty of Ganja (1735) during the reign ofAnna of Russia. The terms of the treaty also included the first instance of close Russo-Iranian collaboration against a common enemy, in this case the Ottoman Turks.[17][18] Relations sooned soured, however, after Nader Shah accused the Russians of conspiring against him. Theinvasion of Dagestan in 1741 was partially directed against Russia; thus theTerek River was left on a high state of alert until Nader Shah's death.[19][20]

Karim Khan Zand promised the Russians certain territories in the northern frontier if they helped him against enemies like the Ottomans.[21]

Qajar Persia–Russian Empire

[edit]

Irano-Russian relations particularly picked up again following the death of Nader Shah and the dissolution of hisAfsharid dynasty which gave eventually way to theQajarid dynasty in the mid-18th century. The first Qajar Persian Ambassador to Russia wasMirza Abolhassan Khan Ilchi. After the rule ofAgha Mohammad Khan, who stabilized the nation and re-established Iranian suzerainty in the Caucasus,[22] the Qajarid government was quickly absorbed with managing domestic turmoil, while rival colonial powers rapidly sought a stable foothold in the region. While thePortuguese,British, andDutch competed for the south and southeast of Persia in thePersian Gulf, theRussian Empire largely was left unchallenged in the north as it plunged southward to establish dominance in Persia's northern territories. Plagued with internal politics, the Qajarid government found itself incapable of rising to the challenge of facing its northern threat from Russia.

TheBattle of Ganja (1804) during theRusso-Persian War (1804–1813).

A weakened and bankrupted royal court, underFath Ali Shah, was forced to sign the notoriously unfavourableTreaty of Gulistan (1813) following the outcome of theRusso-Persian War (1804–1813), irrevocably ceding what is modern-dayDagestan,Georgia, and large parts of theRepublic of Azerbaijan. TheTreaty of Turkmenchay (1828) was the outcome of theRusso-Persian War (1826–1828), which resulted in the loss of modern-day Armenia and the remainder of the Azerbaijan Republic, and granted Russia several highly beneficial capitulatory rights, after efforts and initial success byAbbas Mirza failed to ultimately secure Persia's northern front.[23] By these two treaties, Iran lost swaths of its integral territories that had made part of the concept of Iran for centuries.[24] The area to the north of theAras River, which included the territories of the contemporary nations of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and theNorth Caucasian Republic of Dagestan, were Iranian territory until they were occupied by Russia in the course of the 19th century.[25][26][27][28][29][30] Russia more or less openly pursued a policy to free their newly conquered land from Iran's influence. By doing this, the Russian government helped to create and spread a new Turkic identity that, in contrast to the previous one, was founded on secular principles, particularly the shared language. As a result, many Iranian-speaking residents of the future Azerbaijan Republic at the time either started hiding their Iranian ancestry or underwent progressive assimilation. TheTats andKurds underwent these integration processes particularly quickly.[31]

Anti-Russian sentiment was so high in Persia during that time that uprisings in numerous cities were formed. The famous Russian intellectual, ambassador to Persia, andAlexander Pushkin's best friend,Alexander Griboyedov, was killed along with hundreds ofCossacks by angry mobs in Tehran during these uprisings.With the Russian Empire still advancing south in the course of two wars against Persia, and the treaties of Turkmanchay and Golestan in the western frontiers, plus the unexpected death ofAbbas Mirza in 1823, and the murder of Persia's Grand Vizier (Abol-Qasem Qa'em-Maqam), Persia lost its traditional foothold inCentral Asia.[32] TheTreaty of Akhal, in which the Qajarid's were forced to drop all claims on Central Asia and parts ofTurkmenistan, topped off Persian losses to the global emerging power of Imperial Russia.

Painting of theCapture of Erivan during theRusso-Persian War of 1826–28

In the same period, by a proposal of the Shah with the backing of the Tsar, the Russians founded thePersian Cossack Brigade, which and would prove to be crucial in the next few decades of Iranian history and Irano-Russian relations. The Persian Cossacks were organized along Russian lines and controlled by Russian officers.[33] They dominated Tehran and most northern centers of living. The Russians also organized a banking institution in Iran, which they established in 1890.[34]

During the 19th century, Russians dealt with Iran as an inferior "Orient", and held its people in contempt whilst ridiculing all aspects ofIranian culture.[35] The Russian version of contemporaneous Western attitudes of superiority differed however. As Russian national identity was divided between East and West andRussian culture held many Asian elements, Russians consequently felt equivocal and even inferior toWestern Europeans. In order to stem the tide of this particularinferiority complex, they tried to overcompensate to Western European powers by overemphasizing their own Europeanness and Christian faith, and by expressing scornfully their low opinion of Iranians. The historian Elena Andreeva adds that this trend was not only very apparent in over 200 Russian travelogues written about Iran and published in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but also in diplomatic and other official documents.[35]

Alexander II of Russia andNaser al-Din Shah Qajar in Saint Petersburg, 1873

In 1907, Russia and Britain divided Iran into three segments that served their mutual interests, in theAnglo-Russian Convention of 1907.[33] The Russians gained control over the northern areas of Iran, which included the cities ofTabriz, Tehran,Mashad, andIsfahan. The British were given the southeastern region and control of the Persian Gulf, and the territory between the two regions was classified as neutral territory.

Russia's influence in northern Iran was paramount from the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 until the outbreak ofWorld War I in 1914.[35] During this time period, it stationed troops in Iran'sGilan,Azerbaijan andKhorasan provinces, and its diplomatic offices (consulates) in these parts wieleded considerable power. These consulates dominated the local Iranian administration and in some circumstances even collected local taxes. Starting in the same year as the Anglo-Russian Convention, unpremeditated Russian colonization commenced inMazandaran and Astarabad provinces. Then, in 1912, Russian foreign policy officially adopted the plan to colonize northern Iran. At the outbreak of World War I, there were most likely some 4,000 Russian settlers in Astarabad and Mazandaran, whereas in northeastern Iran the Russians had founded a minimum of 15 Russian villages.[35]

During the reign ofNicholas II of Russia, Russian occupational troops played a major role in the attempted Tsarist suppression of theIranian Constitutional Revolution.[3][35] In the dawn of the outbreak of World War I, Russian occupational forces occupiedQajar Iran's Azerbaijan province as well as the entire north and north-east of the country, and amounted to circa twenty thousand.[36] Following the start of thePersian Campaign of World War I, the number of Russian troops in Iran moderately grew to some eighty or ninety thousand.

As a result of the major Anglo-Russian influence in Iran, at a high point, the central government in Tehran was left with no power to even select its own ministers without the approval of the Anglo-Russian consulates.Morgan Shuster, for example, had to resign under British and Russian diplomatic pressure on the Persian government. Shuster's bookThe Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans is an account of this period, criticizing the policies of Russian and Britain in Iran.[37]

ColonelV. Liakhov was notorious for shelling theNational Iranian Assembly in 1911.

These, and a series of climaxing events such as the Russian shelling of Mashad'sGoharshad Mosque in 1911, and the shelling of thePersian National Assembly by the Russian ColonelV. Liakhov, led to a surge in widespread anti-Russian sentiments across the nation.

Pahlavi–Soviet Union

[edit]
Image from 1916 French magazine showing the "Russians atIsfahan".

After the Russian Revolution of March 1917, the imperial army of the Czar collapsed, leading to the emergence of nationalist and socialist movements in Iran's northern regions. The Bolshevik Revolution in November had a comparable effect throughout Iran.[38] One result of the public outcry against the ubiquitous presence of Imperial Russia in Persia was theConstitutionalist movement of Gilan, which followed up the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Many participants of the revolution were Iranians educated in the Caucasus, direct émigrés (also calledCaucasian muhajirs) from the Caucasus, as well as Armenians that at the same period were busy with establishing theDashnaktsutyun party as well as operations directed against the neighboring Ottoman Empire. The rebellion in Gilan, headed byMirza Kuchak Khan led to an eventual confrontation between the Iranian rebels and the Russian army, but was disrupted with theOctober Revolution in 1917.

As a result of the October Revolution, thousands of Russians fled the country, many toPersia. Many of these refugees settled in northern Persia creating their own communities of which many of their descendants still populate the country. Some notable descendants of these Russian refugees in Persia include the political activist and writerMarina Nemat and the former general and deputy chief of theImperial Iranian Air ForceNader Jahanbani, whose mother was aWhite émigré.

Russian involvement however continued on with the establishment of the short-livedPersian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920, supported by Azeri and CaucasianBolshevik leaders. After the fall of this republic, in late 1921, political and economic relations were renewed. In the 1920s, trade between the Soviet Union and Persia reached again important levels.Baku played a particularly significant role as the venue for a trade fair between the USSR and the Middle East, notably Persia.[39]

In 1921, Britain and the new Bolshevik government entered into an agreement that reversed the division of Iran made in 1907. The Bolsheviks returned all the territory back to Iran, and Iran once more had secured navigation rights on the Caspian Sea. This agreement to evacuate from Iran was made in theRusso-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921), but the regaining of Iranian territory did not protect theQajar dynasty from a suddencoup d'état led by ColonelReza Shah.[33]

YoungMohammad Reza Shah (centre), pictured betweenJoseph Stalin andVyacheslav Molotov at theTehran Conference in 1943

In the 1920s-1930s, the Soviet secret service (Cheka-OGPU-NKVD) carried out clandestine operations on Iranian soil as it tried to eliminateWhite émigrées that had moved to Iran.[40] In 1941, as theSecond World War raged, theSoviet Union and theUnited Kingdom launchedan undeclared joint invasion of Iran, ignoring its plea of neutrality.

In a revealing cable sent on July 6, 1945, by theCentral Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, the local Soviet commander in northern Azerbaijan was instructed as such:

"Begin preparatory work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district with broad powers within the Iranian state and simultaneously develop separatist movements in the provinces ofGilan,Mazandaran,Gorgan, andKhorasan".[41]

After the end of the war, the Soviets supported two newly formed puppet states in Iran, theAzerbaijan People's Government and theRepublic of Mahabad, but both collapsed in theIran crisis of 1946. This postwar confrontation brought the United States fully into Iran's political arena and, withCold War starting, the US quickly moved to convert Iran into an anti-communist ally.

1935 USSR stamp marking the 3rd International Congress of Iranian Art, held inLeningrad

Islamic Republic of Iran-Soviet Union

[edit]

The Soviet Union was the first state to recognize theIslamic Republic of Iran, in February 1979.[42] During theIran–Iraq War (1980-1988), however, it supplied Iraqi leaderSaddam Hussein with large amounts of conventional arms, ostensibly standing in opposition to the Iranian regime. As Iran considered attacking Iraq in July 1982, the Soviet Union warned against it. At the UN Security Council, the USSR voted for a resolution calling for a ceasefire and a return to international borders.[43] Supreme LeaderAyatollah Khomeini deemed Islam principally incompatible with thecommunist ideals (such asatheism) of the Soviet Union, calling it the "Lesser Satan" and rejecting alignment with either side in theCold War between the US and the USSR.[44] During the early years of theIran–Iraq War, the USSR supplied Iraq with most of its weaponry, while Iran backed select elements of the Afghanmujahideen in their war against the Soviets.[12][45] However, later the USA imposed anarms embargo on Iran, and the Soviet Union began to supply arms to Iran viaNorth Korea.[46]

After the war, in 1989, Iran made an arms deal with the Soviet Union.[47] The military agreement allowed Iran to acquire advanced Russian aircraft, including MIG-29s and SU-24s. Iran urgently needed such equipment, as its air force had been severely depleted by the eight-year war with Iraq and was unable to obtain spare parts or new aircraft from the United States.[48]

Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini died in 1989 and was succeeded byAli Khamenei.[49]

Islamic Republic of Iran-Russian Federation

[edit]
Russian presidentBoris Yeltsin

Afterthe USSR collapsed in December 1991,Boris Yeltsin—already president of theRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic—became the first president of theRussian Federation, holding the position until 1999.[50]

Under Yeltsin, Russia viewed Iran as a key market for arms and nuclear technology, and as a means to assert foreign policy independence from the United States.[48] Ties deepened after theGulf War in 1990–1991, as Iran, facing a stronger U.S. military presence in the region throughGulf Cooperation Council alliances, increasingly relied on Russian military support.[48] Russia inherited Soviet-era arms deals and agreed by the mid-1990s to developIran's nuclear program with plans to resume work on Iran's long-delayednuclear reactor plant atBushehr.[51] The two countries also cooperated in countering Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and restrainingAzerbaijani nationalism. Meanwhile, Iran benefited from Russian diplomatic support amid U.S.-led efforts to isolate it.[48]

Although Yeltsin initially sought closer ties with the United States, domestic critics pressured him to demonstrate independence. He pointed to Russia's 1993 nuclear reactor deal with Iran as evidence of an autonomous foreign policy. This deal drew U.S. criticism overproliferation risks, which Russia also sought to avoid, leading Yeltsin to cancel a proposed transfer of centrifuge technology.[48]

By 1995, both countries were describing their growing ties as strategic. With theFirst Chechen War and loomingNATO expansion, Russian nationalists saw Iran as a counterweight to Western influence. A cooperative Iran was also seen as a way to prevent support for insurgents in Russia's south. In March 1996, Iranian Foreign MinisterAli Akbar Velayati visited Moscow and declared bilateral ties at a historic high. Both countries opposed NATO enlargement and expanded military and economic cooperation. Reports suggested Russia was ready to sell Iran $4 billion in arms and equipment between 1997 and 2007, pending financial guarantees.[48]

Iran and Russia shared an interest in opposing theTaliban, whosetakeover of Afghanistan in 1996 threatened regional stability. Concerns over extremism anddrug trafficking led to deeper cooperation, including a 1999 agreement to combat narcotics.[48] Their joint efforts during thecivil war in Tajikistan also helped solidify relations.[48]
Both Iran and Russia viewed "Turkey's regional ambitions and the possible spread of some form of pan-Turkic ideology with suspicion".[52]

Iranian presidentMohammad Khatami

In May 1997,Mohammad Khatami was elected president of Iran on a moderate platform of social and democratic reform, and economic change.[53] His election briefly raised hopes of aU.S.–Iran thaw, but the initiative stalled by mid-1998 due domestic opposition in Iran. Russian policymakers feared losing influence if Iran reoriented toward the West. Despite U.S. pressure over missile and nuclear cooperation, Russia prioritized its strategic ties with Iran—most notably through theBushehr reactor—while managing tensions with the U.S.[48]

Russia and Iran deepened their cooperation in 1999 to counter Western-backed energy projects like theBaku-Ceyhan andTrans-Caspian pipelines. Though their long-term Caspian interests diverged, they worked together to block rival projects and assert regional influence.[48]

Despite strong ties, theSecond Chechen War strained the relationship. Iran, then leading theOrganization of the Islamic Conference, faced pressure to denounce Russia's brutal conduct in Chechnya, but it tried to balance Islamic solidarity with its strategic alliance with Russia. Iran criticized Russian actions and sent aid to Chechen refugees, while Russia accused Iran of backing rebels but tolerated limited OIC involvement. Both sides downplayed the tensions, but the war marked the start of a gradual cooling in relations.[48]

Khamenei-Putin era

[edit]

Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia in March 2000 and inaugurated on 7 May that year.[54] The Iranian government's decision to reorient its foreign policy toward the East, combined with the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, has led to increased cooperation between Iran and Russia.[55]

Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin inTehran, 20 November 2015

In March 2001, President Putin hosted Iranian PresidentKhatami in Moscow, where the two leaders signed the Treaty on the Basic Elements of Relations and the Principles of Cooperation.[56] Although the treaty did not redefine the relationship as a strategic partnership, the summit underscored warming ties and coincided with Russia's withdrawal from theGore-Chernomyrdin Commission,[56] a U.S. and Russian agreement to increase cooperation between the two countries in several different areas.[57] This paved the way for future arms deals reportedly worth $7 billion.[56]

Military and security cooperation

[edit]
See also:Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition

Prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran's air fleet was entirely Western-made, but by the early 2000s, itsAir Force and civilian air fleet were increasingly becoming domestically and Russian-built, as the U.S. and Europe continued to maintain sanctions on Iran.[58][59][60] Between 2000 and 2007, Russia became Iran's primary arms supplier, accounting for approximately 85% of the country's total military imports. During this period, Iran ranked as the third-largest recipient of Russian weapons, with deliveries valued at $1.96 billion—equivalent to 5.4% of Russia's total military exports.[45]

In May 2007 Iran was invited to join theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-based international treaty organization that parallelsNATO.[9][61] The invitation came from the desk of then CSTO Secretary-GeneralNikolai Bordyuzha, who said that "the CSTO is an open organization. If Iran applies in accordance with our charter, we will consider the application." It was stated by a Western observer that the accession failed "basically due to the ayatollahs’ opposition to join a military bloc clearly dominated by a traditionally rival power of Iran such as Russia."[61] Another Western observer points out that, like NATO, CSTO has a mutual defense treaty clause whereby attack against one is considered an attack against all and was concerned about the difficulty posed by a possible conflagration of the Iran-Israel variety.[9] Iran never joined.[12] In November 2014Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki headSergey Naryshkin floated the idea of admitting Iran as an observer to the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly.[9][62]

Russian delegation viewing Iranian drones, including theShahed 129 and theShahed Saegheh, at Kashan Airfield in June 2022 during theRusso-Ukrainian War

In 2010, Iran's refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program led theUN to passUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed a new round of sanctions banning the sale of all types of heavy weaponry to Iran, including missiles. Russia voted in favour of the resolution.[63] This resulted in the cancellation of the planned sale of theS-300 system to Iran in September 2010, and Russian presidentDmitry Medvedev subsequently signed a decree banning the further delivery of armored vehicles, warplanes, helicopters, and ships to Iran.[64] In response to the cancellation, Iran filed a lawsuit against Russia in a Swiss court in 2012.[65]

Since the outbreak of theSyrian Civil War in 2011,Iran andRussia became the principal allies of presidentBashar al-Assad's government, openly providing it with military support. Following the 2015JCPOA agreement, Russian president Vladimir Putin lifted the ban on the S-300, reviving Iran's missile defense system.[66][67] Russia completed delivery of the four S-300 batteries to Iran in November 2016. This sale was reported to be followed by a $10 billion deal that included helicopters, planes and artillery systems.[68] However, an editorial analysis from 2022 found such a deal highly unlikely, citing the implausibility of key elements such as Iran paying oil-rich Russia in crude, inflated cost estimates, and the alleged reassignment of Su-35s originally intended for Egypt. The analysis also questioned Iran's financial and logistical capacity to integrate such advanced hardware, noting its past difficulties with cheaper alternatives.[69]

Meanwhile, Russia's own relations with the West plummeted due to theRusso-Ukrainian War, the2018 Skripal poisoning incident in Great Britain, and alleged Russian interference with Western politics, prompting the U.S. and Europe to retaliate with sanctions against Russia. As a result, Russia has shown a degree of willingness to deepen its military ties with Iran.

In January 2021 Iran, China and Russia held their third joint naval exercise, the third joint exercise of the three countries, in the northernIndian Ocean and theSea of Oman area. The joint exercise of the three countries began in 2019 in the Indian Ocean.[70]

In early 2024, amid concerns of vastly increased military engagement between the two partners, rumours abounded that Russia had sold to Iran theirSu-35 platform.[71][72][73] This followed a 2023 report that the partners had finalized a deal for Su-35,Mi-28 andYak-130.[74]

Russian invasion of Ukraine

[edit]
See also:Iran and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) meeting with Iranian Supreme LeaderAli Khamenei (left) and former Iranian PresidentEbrahim Raisi (far right) in Tehran, 19 July 2022
Residential building inSumy, Ukraine after a Russian attack with Iranian drones on 13 March 2024

According to the United States, Russia sought to acquire drones from Iran duringits invasion of Ukraine, with a Russian delegation visiting Kashan Airfield south of Tehran during June and July 2022 to observe drones manufactured by Iran.[75] Iran criticized the assessment by the United States, saying that it would not supply Russia or Ukraine with military equipment during the war, instead demanding that both nations seek a peaceful resolution.[76] In September 2022, the Ukrainian military claimed that it encountered an Iranian-supplied suicide drone used by Russia, publishing images of the wreckage of the drone.[77] On October 6, 2022, Iran agreed to provide "additional" surface to air missiles and drones to Russia.[78] On October 24, 2022, Iranian Foreign MinisterHossein Amirabdollahian said that Iran would "not remain indifferent" if it is "proven that Iranian drones are being used in the Ukraine war against people," but claimed defense cooperation between Iran and Russia would continue nonetheless.[79]

According to various media outlets, as of 2023, American intelligence has claimed that Iran has been assisting Moscow in building a drone factory within its borders to maintain its war machine in Ukraine.[80][81]

In August 2023, theWhite House reportedly urged Iran to cease selling armed drones to Russia as part of broader discussions inQatar andOman, aimed at de-escalating the nuclear crisis. This effort ran alongside negotiations for a prisoner exchange deal, which had led to the transfer of Iranian-US citizens from prison to house arrest. The US seeks to prevent Iran from supplying drones, spare parts, and other wares to Russia, which it uses inits invasion of Ukraine.[82]

Ten days after theCrocus City Hall attack in Moscow it was reported that Iran had warned Russia that a major "terrorist operation" was being planned, based on information gathered fromISIS–K militants arrested after the2024 Kerman bombings.[83]

Russia supported the Turkish and AzerbaijaniZangezur corridor plan, drawing a diplomatic rebuke from Iran in 2024.[84]

In 2023, Iran began supplying Russia withShahed-136 loitering munitions, which Russia has employed extensively in theRusso–Ukrainian War. Under a reported US$1.75 billion agreement,Tehran provided both drones and technical assistance for domestic production in Russia. By 2025, a large manufacturing facility in theAlabuga Special Economic Zone inTatarstan had localized the vast majority of production, reducing reliance on Iranian components and lowering unit costs.[85][86]

Iran-Israel war

[edit]
See also:Iran-Israel war

On 17 January 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian PresidentMasoud Pezeshkian signed theIranian–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to strengthen bilateral ties.[87] The treaty was ratified between April and June,[88] shortly before the outbreak of the Iran–Israel war on June 13, 2025. This treaty is not a military alliance and does not commit Russia to defend Iran.[89] Before the war, Russia also denied any military assistance to Iran in the event of a U.S. military invasion, while asserting that such an invasion would ultimately fail.[90][91]

Following the Iran–Israel war that started on 13 June 2025, Russian officials described the Middle East escalation as “alarming” and “dangerous,” though Russian media highlighted potential benefits for Moscow, such as rising oil prices, diminished global focus on Ukraine, and a possible diplomatic role for the Kremlin.[89] However, analysts noted that a prolonged conflict could also carry significant risks for Russia, including the potential overthrow of Iran's current leadership and the loss of a key regional partner, after already having lost Syria.[89]

During the war, after both Israel and the US had bombed Iran, Iranian Foreign MinisterAbbas Araghchi met with Putin in Moscow on 23 June 2025.[92] In televised remarks, Putin condemned the U.S. bombing as “absolutely unprovoked aggression” and reaffirmed Russia's intent to support the Iranian people.[92] Araghchi, in turn, defended Iran's response as legitimate self-defense and thanked Russia for its condemnation of the attacks, praising Moscow for standing on the “right side of history and international law.” While Putin expressed a desire to work together on resolving the crisis,[92] he refrained from pledging any specific assistance to his main ally in the region.[93] Kremlin spokesmanDmitry Peskov noted that Moscow had offered to mediate but emphasized that further action would depend on Iran's needs.[92] The visit underscored the strength, but also the boundaries, of Iran's partnerships, as Russia's backing appeared confined to diplomacy.[94]

In August 2025, it was confirmed that Russia had provided Iran with advancedKrasukhaEW systems, which employ "a broadband multifunctional electronic attack system"[95] which interfere with radar and satellite signals as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, such as those used byAWACS airborne radar systems, and surveillance platforms installed on theE-8 aircraft.[95]

On 24 August 2025, Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran'sExpediency Discernment Council, accused Russia of disclosing the locations of Iranian air defence systems, adding further that the strategic alliance with Moscow was "worthless".[96]

Trade

[edit]
Iran is aCSTO candidate

Russia and Iran also share a common interest in limiting the political influence of the United States in Central Asia. This common interest has led theShanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to extend to Iran as observer status in 2005, and offer full membership in 2006. The Iranians attained full membership status on 17 September 2021.[97] Moscow and Beijing supported Tehran's successful bid for full membership in the SCO.[98]

Iran and Russia have co-founded theGas Exporting Countries Forum along withQatar.[citation needed]

In addition to their trade and cooperation in hydrocarbons, Iran and Russia have also expanded trade ties in many non-energy sectors of the economy, including a large agriculture agreement in January 2009 and a telecommunications contract in December 2008.[99] In July 2010, Iran and Russia signed an agreement to increase their cooperation in developing their energy sectors. Features of the agreement include the establishment of a joint oil exchange, which with a combined production of up to 15 million barrels of oil per day has the potential to become a leading market globally.[100]Gazprom andLukoil have become increasingly involved in the development ofIranian oil and gas projects.

In 2005, Russia was the seventh largest trading partner of Iran, with 5.33% of all exports to Iran originating from Russia.[101] Trade relations between the two increased from US$1 billion in 2005 to $3.7 billion in 2008.[99] Motor vehicles, fruits, vegetables, glass, textiles, plastics, chemicals, hand-woven carpet, stone and plaster products were among the main Iranian non-oil goods exported to Russia.[102]

In 2014, relations between Russia and Iran increased as both countries are under U.S. sanctions and were seeking new trade partners. The two countries signed a historic US$20 billionoil for goods deal in August 2014.[103][104][105]

In 2021, trade between the nations rose 81% to a record $3.3 billion.[106]

Former Iranian presidentEbrahim Raisi, who was elected in 2021, seemed to prioritize trade with Russia.[98] In early 2022, Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Russia at the invitation of his Russian counterpart. He handed over Iran's proposed draft for a 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia during his trip.[98]

With the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by Russia, the U.S. and other nations have imposed sanctions on Russia.[107] In the opinion of at least one Western writer, in order to evade sanctions, Iran and Russia could be working together to create a "clandestine banking and finance system to handle tens of billions of dollars in annual trade banned under U.S. led sanctions."[108]

On 20 March 2022 it was reported that Iran, in the person of Agriculture MinisterJavad Sadatinejad, had signed a deal in Moscow with Russia to import 20 million tons of basic goods including vegetable oil, wheat, barley and corn.[109] The available trade data shows a balance of trade in favor of Russia, but does not include military gear totals.[110]

In May 2022 Deputy Prime MinisterAlexander Novak and Iranian Oil MinisterJavad Owji, joint co-chairs of the Russian-Iranian Intergovernmental Commission had a meeting in Tehran at which they discussed such items as oil swaps, increasing joint investments, a possible free trade zone, adding to the Russian-builtBushehr Nuclear Power Plant, and developing the long-delayedNorth-South Transport Corridor, a rail cargo route from all the way from Russia to India, among other items.[106]

Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Tehran on 19 July 2022 to meet with his Iranian counterpartEbrahim Raisi and Turkey'sRecep Tayyip Erdogan. TheTurkish president was previously involved to mediate in the2022 Ukraine conflict. The three nations have been holding talks in recent years as part of the "Astana peace process" to end more than 11 years ofcivil war in Syria. Iran and theRussian Federation attempt to boost economic ties after being hit byinternational sanctions.[111]

In December 2022, Russia and Iran announced a new transcontinental trade route from the eastern edge of Europe to theIndian Ocean. The passage spans 3,000-kilometers and could be established beyond the reach of international sanctions. Russia and Iran share similar economic pressures amid sanctions – and both look east to integrate their growing economies.[112]

In early February 2023, Tehran and Moscow announced they fully linked the Russian Financial Messaging System of theBank of Russia (SPFS) with Iran's SEPAM national financial messaging service; both countries had been excluded fromSWIFT. Bilateral economic ties had intensified since sanctions were placed on Russia after theRussian invasion of Ukraine, and chances for the revival of theJCPOA with Iran faded in late 2022. In 2022/23, Russia with US$2.7 billion is by far the largest investor in the sanctioned Iranian economy. As both countries face dramatically devalued currencies, Russia and Iran aim to link their payment system to larger economies such asIndia andChina.[113]

In May 2023, the US said that Iran and Russia are working to build more drones which will be used against Ukraine.[80]

In June 2023, Iran's Transport Minister, Mehrdad Bazrpash, announced plans to create a joint shipping company with the Russian Federation. Iran places great emphasis on the importance of the Volga and Caspian Seas for trade with Russia. Both countries have reached a quadrilateral agreement with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan regarding the transit of oil products and grain.[114]

In September 2025, Iran signed a $25 billion agreement with Russia to build four small nuclear power plants inSirik in Iran. TheGeneration III reactors are expected to produce 5 GW of electricity. Iran, which suffers power shortages at times of high demand, currently has one operating nuclear power plant, inBushehr. Also built by Russia, it has a capacity of 1 GW.[115]

Eurasian Economic Union

[edit]
Main article:Enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union § Iran

As Iran and Russia economic and geo-political relations have improved over the years, Russia and theEurasian Economic Union (EEU) have opted for Iran to join the EEU as well. Currently, only one EEU country, Armenia, shares a land border with Iran, but the Caspian Sea provides a direct link between Iran and Russia.

Iran has expressed interest in joining the EEU.[citation needed] A meeting betweenKazakhstan PresidentNursultan Nazarbayev and Iranian PresidentHassan Rouhani was held in 2015 to discuss the prospect of cooperation between the customs union and Iran. According to the Iranian Ambassador to Russia,Mehdi Sanaei, Iran is focusing on signing an agreement with the EEU in 2015 regarding mutual trade and reduction of import tariffs to central Asian countries and trading in national currencies as part of the agreement rather than in US dollars.[116]

In May 2015, the Union gave the initial go-ahead to signing a free trade agreement with Iran.Andrey Slepnev, the Russian representative on the Eurasian Economic Commission board, described Iran as the EEU's "key partner in the Middle East" in an expert-level EEU meeting inYerevan.[citation needed]Viktor Khristenko furthermore noted that Iran is an important partner for all the EEU member states. He stated that "Cooperation between the EEU and Iran is an important area of our work in strengthening the economic stability of the region".[117]

In February 2023, an agreement was signed to connect the national messaging systems of Iranian and Russian banks. According to this agreement, 700 Russian banks can exchange financial messages with Iranian banks. Additionally, 106 non-Russian banks from 13 other countries have also connected to this messaging system and can exchange financial messages with Iranian banks.[118]

Islands in the Strait of Hormuz

[edit]

On 14 July 2023, the Russian Minister of Foreign Relations supported the UAE claim on islands in theStrait of Hormuz and used the term 'Arabian gulf' instead ofPersian Gulf.[119][120]

In December 2023, Iran condemned further Russian statements in support of the UAE's claim.[121]

Sanctions

[edit]

Both Russia and Iran are subject to international sanctions, and each extended period of sanctions seems to improve the relationship between them. This, however, has changed somewhat following the imposition of sanctions against both Russia and Iran. Improving the countries’ respective ties with the United States proved more difficult than forging closer ties between Moscow and Tehran. Since March 2014, In response to Russia'sannexation of Crimea and the purposefuldestabilization of Ukraine, theEuropean Union, the U.S., and a number of other Western nations have gradually adopted restrictive sanctions against Russia. In retaliation, Russia imposed its own restrictions on Western nations, prohibiting the import of some food items. In November 2018, sanctions against Iran lifted by theJCPOA were entirely reinstated by theTrump administration, which hadpulled out of the deal earlier that year.[122] On January 17, 2025, both countries signed astrategic partnership treaty covering areas including politics, security, trade, transport and energy,[123] however, the treaty does not include any mutual defense provisions.[124]

Polls

[edit]

According to 2015 data fromPew Research Center, 54% of Russians have a negative opinion of Iran, with 34% expressing a positive opinion.[125] According to a 2013BBC World Service poll, 86% of Russians view Iran's influence positively, with 10% expressing a negative view.[126] AGallup poll from the end of 2013 showed Iran ranked as sixth greatest threat to peace in the world according to Russian view (3%), after United States (54%), China (6%), Iraq (5%), and Syria (5%).[127]According to a December 2018 survey by IranPoll, 63.8% of Iranians have a favorable view of Russia, with 34.5% expressing an unfavorable view.[128]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^abcdefghi"Relations between Tehran and Moscow, 1979–2014".Academia.edu. Retrieved22 December 2014.
  2. ^abMatthee, Rudi (2013). "Rudeness and Revilement: Russian–Iranian Relations in the Mid-Seventeenth Century".Iranian Studies.46 (3): 333.doi:10.1080/00210862.2012.758500.S2CID 145596080.
  3. ^abVolkov, Denis V. (2022). "Bringing democracy into Iran: a Russian project for the separation of Azerbaijan".Middle Eastern Studies.58 (6): 1.doi:10.1080/00263206.2022.2029423.S2CID 246923610.
  4. ^Aras, Bulent; Ozbay, Fatih (March 2008). "The limits of the Russian–Iranian strategic alliance: its history and geopolitics, and the nuclear issue".Korean Journal of Defense Analysis.20 (1):47–62.doi:10.1080/10163270802006321.hdl:11729/299.
  5. ^"The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran".Strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. Archived fromthe original on 24 April 2014. Retrieved24 April 2014.
  6. ^"Russia and Iran: Strategic Partners or Competing Regional Hegemons? A Critical Analysis of Russian-Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Space".Studentpulse.com. Retrieved24 April 2014.
  7. ^MacFarquhar, Neil (13 April 2015)."Putin Lifts Ban on Russian Missile Sales to Iran".The New York Times. Retrieved14 April 2016.
  8. ^Borshchevskaya, Anna (2022).Putin's War in Syria. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: I. B. Tauris. pp. 53–58.ISBN 978-0-7556-3463-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  9. ^abcdLin, Christina (February 2015)."Iran UN Sanctions Relief – The Road Towards S-400 and Deterring US/Israeli Airstrikes?"(PDF).321. ISPSW Strategy Series.
  10. ^"White House: Iran preparing to supply Russia with drones".Reuters. Reuters. 11 July 2022. Retrieved12 July 2022.
  11. ^Borshchevskaya, Anna (2022).Putin's War in Syria. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: I. B. Tauris. pp. 2, 53, 55, 132, 149, 156.ISBN 978-0-7556-3463-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  12. ^abcJulian G. Waller, Elizabeth Wishnick, Margaret Sparling,and Michael Connell. (January 2025). The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship : Political, Military, and Economic Dimensions of an Improving Partnership.Center for Naval Analyses website 2025. Retrieved 14 April 2025.
  13. ^Shine, Sima, et al. Deepening Cooperation between Iran and Russia. Institute for National Security Studies, 2023. JSTOR,http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47005. Retrieved 14 Apr. 2025.
  14. ^abc"RUSSIA i. Russo-Iranian Relations up to the Bolshevik Revolution".Iranicaonline.org. Retrieved24 September 2015.
  15. ^Logan (1992), p. 201
  16. ^O'Rourke, Shane (2000).Warriors and Peasants. Palgrave Macmillan.
  17. ^Mikaberidze, Alexander (2011). "Treaty of Ganja (1735)". In Mikaberidze, Alexander (ed.).Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 329.ISBN 978-1598843361.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  18. ^Tucker, Ernest (2006)."Nāder Shah".Encyclopædia Iranica Online. Retrieved5 January 2014.
  19. ^Axworthy, Michael (24 March 2010).The sword of Persia : Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant. Bloomsbury.ISBN 978-0-85773-347-4.OCLC 1129683122.
  20. ^Volkov, Sergey.Concise History of Imperial Russia.
  21. ^Fisher, William Bayne; Avery, P.; Gershevitch, Ilya; Yarshater, Ehsan; Hambly, G. R. G.; Melville, C.; Boyle, John Andrew; Frye, Richard Nelson; Jackson, Peter (1968).The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0.
  22. ^Kazemzadeh 1991, pp. 328–330.
  23. ^Cronin, Stephanie (2012).The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941. Routledge. p. 90.ISBN 978-1136026942.
  24. ^Fisher et al. 1991, p. 329.
  25. ^Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1995).Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition.Columbia University Press. pp. 69, 133.ISBN 978-0-231-07068-3.
  26. ^L. Batalden, Sandra (1997).The newly independent states of Eurasia: handbook of former Soviet republics. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 98.ISBN 978-0-89774-940-4.
  27. ^E. Ebel, Robert, Menon, Rajan (2000).Energy and conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 181.ISBN 978-0-7425-0063-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  28. ^Andreeva, Elena (2010).Russia and Iran in the great game: travelogues and orientalism (reprint ed.). Taylor & Francis. p. 6.ISBN 978-0-415-78153-4.
  29. ^Çiçek, Kemal, Kuran, Ercüment (2000).The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation. University of Michigan.ISBN 978-975-6782-18-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  30. ^Ernest Meyer, Karl, Blair Brysac, Shareen (2006).Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Basic Books. p. 66.ISBN 978-0-465-04576-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)[permanent dead link]
  31. ^Ter-Abrahamian 2005, p. 121.
  32. ^Nasser Takmil Homayoun.Kharazm: What do I know about Iran?. 2004.ISBN 964-379-023-1 p.78.
  33. ^abcZiring, Lawrence (1981).Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, A Political Chronology. United States: Praeger Publishers.ISBN 0-03-058651-8.
  34. ^Basseer, Clawson & Floor 1988, pp. 698–709.
  35. ^abcdeAndreeva, Elena (2014)."RUSSIA i. Russo-Iranian Relations up to the Bolshevik Revolution". InYarshater, Ehsan (ed.).Encyclopædia Iranica (Online ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation.
  36. ^Volkov, Denis V. (2022). "Bringing democracy into Iran: a Russian project for the separation of Azerbaijan".Middle Eastern Studies.58 (6): 4.doi:10.1080/00263206.2022.2029423.S2CID 246923610.
  37. ^Morgan Shuster,The Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans.ISBN 0-934211-06-X
  38. ^Hiro, Dilip (2013).Iran Under the Ayatollahs (Routledge Revivals). Routledge. p. 273.
  39. ^Forestier-Peyrat, Etienne (2013)."Red Passage to Iran: The Baku Trade Fair and the Unmaking of the Azerbaijani Borderland, 1922–1930"(PDF).Ab Imperio.2013 (4):79–112.doi:10.1353/imp.2013.0094.S2CID 140676760.Project MUSE 539829.
  40. ^Volkov, Denis V. (2022). "Bringing democracy into Iran: a Russian project for the separation of Azerbaijan".Middle Eastern Studies.58 (6): 7.doi:10.1080/00263206.2022.2029423.S2CID 246923610.
  41. ^Decree of the CC CPSU Politburo to Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, on "measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran". Translation provided by The Cold War International History Project at TheWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
  42. ^Goodarzi, Jubin M. (January 2013)."Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment"(PDF).Middle East Studies.4 (2):31–59. Retrieved6 August 2013.
  43. ^Hiro, Dilip (2013).Iran Under the Ayatollahs (Routledge Revivals). Routledge. p. 290.
  44. ^Katz, Mark N. (2010)."Iran and Russia". In Wright, Robin B. (ed.).The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy. United States Institute of Peace. p. 186.ISBN 978-1-60127-084-9.Archived from the original on 4 September 2024. Retrieved28 November 2020.
  45. ^abAliyev, Nurlan (21 January 2025)."Iran-Russia partnership: Friends forever? – Riddle Russia".Riddle Russia. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  46. ^Szalontai, Balázs; Jinil, Yoo (2023). "Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran: North Korea's Relations with Iraq and Iran during the Cold War".Journal of Cold War Studies.25 (2):179–247.doi:10.1162/jcws_a_01119.Project MUSE 900752.
  47. ^"Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran:Policy Challenges for the United States | Arms Control Association".armscontrol.org. Retrieved9 September 2020.
  48. ^abcdefghijkFreedman, Robert O. (1 January 2000)."MERIA: Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s".CIAO. Retrieved19 June 2025.
  49. ^Wastnidge, Edward (17 April 2024)."Who is Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei".Middle East Eye. Retrieved19 June 2025.
  50. ^"Boris Yeltsin: History, Political Career & Legacy".study.com. Retrieved19 June 2025.
  51. ^Nikdel, Mohammad Ranjbar (2013).Analyzing the (non) alignment with the UN, EU and US Sanctions against Iran in the foreign policies of the CIS states (Thesis). p. 41.hdl:1822/26023.
  52. ^Herzig Edmund,Iran and the former Soviet South,Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995,ISBN 1-899658-04-1, p.9
  53. ^Fetini, Alyssa (10 February 2009)."Mohammed Khatami".TIME. Retrieved19 June 2025.
  54. ^Savranskaya, Svetlana; Blanton, Tom; Sherman, with Natalie (21 March 2024)."Putin's First Election, March 2000".National Security Archive. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  55. ^Therme, Clément (21 October 2024)."RUSSIA iii. Russo-Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (1991-present)".Encyclopaedia Iranica. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  56. ^abc"The Crisis of Cooperation: A Critical Analysis of Russian-Iranian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era". Retrieved24 June 2025.
  57. ^1996. "U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission)." Department of State of the United States of America. Retrieved October 19, 2011.
  58. ^"Middle East | Iran air safety hit by sanctions".BBC News. 6 December 2005. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  59. ^"Iran to buy five TU 100-204 planes from Russia". Payvand.com. Archived fromthe original on 23 October 2006. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  60. ^Johnson, Reuben (November 2005)."Iran is captive market for Tu-204". Aviation International News. Archived fromthe original on 14 June 2006. Retrieved15 July 2006.
  61. ^abValvo, Giovanni (14 December 2012)."Syria, Iran And The Future Of The CSTO – Analysis". Eurasia Review.
  62. ^"Iran, other states might become observers at CSTO parliamentary assembly — Naryshkin". TASS. 6 November 2014.
  63. ^"UN votes for new sanctions on Iran over nuclear issue".BBC News. 9 June 2010. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  64. ^"Kremlin Bans Sale of S-300 Missile Systems to Iran".bbc.com. 22 September 2010. Retrieved4 August 2024.
  65. ^"Pro-Iranian Lobby Attempts to Revive Russia's Sale of S-300 Missiles to Iran".Jamestown. 26 July 2012. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  66. ^Shahidsaless, Shahir (27 April 2015)."New politics behind Russia's supply of S-300 missile system to Iran".Middle East Eye. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  67. ^"Russia Ban On S-300s To Iran Lifted".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 13 April 2015. Retrieved18 November 2021.
  68. ^"Russia Completes S-300 Delivery to Iran | Arms Control Association".www.armscontrol.org. Retrieved18 November 2021.
  69. ^"How Realistic Are Western Press Reports of a $10 Billion Russian-Iranian Su-35 and S-400 Arms Deal?".Military Watch Magazine. 15 January 2022. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  70. ^"India Iran, China and Russia hold naval drills in north Indian Ocean".Reuters. 21 January 2022.
  71. ^"Iran and Russia Enter a New Level of Military Cooperation • Stimson Center". 6 March 2024.
  72. ^"Iran Could Soon be Flying Russia's Su-35 Flanker-E Fighter Jet". 13 February 2024.
  73. ^"Iran once had air inferiority. After its attack on Israel, it flies high". 19 April 2024.
  74. ^"Signal: Iran finalises receipt of Sukhoi Su-35 jets from Russia".
  75. ^Bertrand, Natasha (15 July 2022)."Exclusive: Russians have visited Iran at least twice in last month to examine weapons-capable drones".CNN. Retrieved16 July 2022.
  76. ^Frantzman, Seth J. (16 July 2022)."Iran tries to downplay potential drone transfers to Russia - analysis".The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved16 July 2022.
  77. ^Gambrell, Jon (14 September 2022)."Ukraine's military claims downing Iran drone used by Russia".AP News. Retrieved14 September 2022.
  78. ^"Iran agrees to ship missiles, more drones to Russia".Reuters. 18 October 2022. Retrieved19 October 2022.
  79. ^"Iran will not remain indifferent if proven Russia using its drones in Ukraine - official".Reuters. 24 October 2022. Retrieved25 October 2022.
  80. ^ab"US says Iran is helping Russia build drone manufacturing facility".www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved5 July 2023.
  81. ^Shoaib, Alia."Iran's attack drones have become a key weapon in Russia's war arsenal. Now Tehran is helping Putin to build his own factory to produce them, says the White House".Business Insider. Retrieved5 July 2023.
  82. ^Smith, Gordon (16 August 2023)."FirstFT: US presses Iran to stop selling drones to Russia".Financial Times. Retrieved22 August 2023.
  83. ^"Exclusive: Iran alerted Russia to security threat before Moscow attack".Reuters. 1 April 2024.
  84. ^"Iran rebukes Russia over its policy shift on Zangezur corridor".Iran International. 2 September 2024.
  85. ^Ilyushina, Mary (29 May 2025)."Russia's deadly drone industry upgraded with Iran's help, report says".The Washington Post. Retrieved12 August 2025.
  86. ^Cotovio, Vasco (8 August 2025)."Russia built a massive drone factory to pump out Iranian-designed drones. Now it's leaving Tehran out in the cold".CNN. Retrieved10 August 2025.
  87. ^"Inside the strategic partnership treaty between Iran and Russia".Middle East Eye. 14 January 2025. Retrieved18 June 2025.
  88. ^"Guardian Council approves strategic partnership treaty with Russia".Tehran Times. 11 June 2025. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  89. ^abcRosenberg, Steve (17 June 2025)."Russia fears another loss in Middle East from Iran's conflict with Israel".BBC Home. Retrieved18 June 2025.
  90. ^"Russia signals response to possible US attack on Iran".Newsweek. 8 April 2025.
  91. ^"Russia says bombing Iran will fail after Trump issues threats".www.ynetnews.com. 9 April 2025.
  92. ^abcdDmitry Antonov, Marina Bobrova (23 June 2025)."Putin tells Iranian foreign minister there was no justification for US attack".Reuters. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  93. ^Fabian, Emanuel; Magid, Jacob; Magid, Jacob; Berman, Lazar; Freiberg, Nava; Berman, Lazar; Berman, Lazar; Magid, Jacob; Freiberg, Nava (23 June 2025)."Putin slams attacks on Iran, but offers no support to key ally".The Times of Israel. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  94. ^"Iran's top diplomat visits Russia as Israel hits Iranian domestic security institutions".Amwaj.media. 17 June 2025. Retrieved24 June 2025.
  95. ^abadmin (14 August 2025)."Confirmed: Russia's Krasukha Electronic Warfare Systems Spotted in Iran".Defence Security Asia. Retrieved17 August 2025.
  96. ^"Iranian official accuses Russia of providing intel on air defense sites to Israel".Al Arabiya English. 25 August 2025. Retrieved25 August 2025.
  97. ^"CSTO, SCO summits presage policy of wary tolerance of Taliban regime in Afghanistan". Eurasianet. 17 September 2021.
  98. ^abc"What next for Iran and Russia ties after Raisi-Putin meeting?".Al Jazeera. 21 January 2022. Retrieved3 March 2022.
  99. ^ab"Tehran Times". 3 February 2010. Retrieved20 April 2016.
  100. ^"Iran Investment Monthly Aug 2010.pdf"(PDF).Turquoisepartners.com. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 23 January 2012. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  101. ^"The Cost of Economic Sanctions on Major Exporters to Iran".Payvand.com. Archived fromthe original on 9 July 2011. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  102. ^"Economy". Archived fromthe original on 15 January 2021. Retrieved7 June 2009.
  103. ^Trotman, Andrew (6 August 2014)."Vladimir Putin signs historic $20bn oil deal with Iran to bypass Western sanctions".The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved7 August 2014.
  104. ^"Russia and Iran strike oil agreement".CNBC.com. 6 August 2014. Retrieved7 August 2014.
  105. ^Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi (2 April 2014)."Iran, Russia working to seal $20 billion oil-for-goods deal: sources".Reuters. Retrieved20 April 2016.
  106. ^ab"Russia, Iran Tighten Trade Ties Amid US Sanctions". Bloomberg News. 25 May 2022.
  107. ^"What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy?".BBC News. 30 September 2022. Retrieved20 October 2022.
  108. ^Zweig, Mark Dubowitz and Matthew (5 April 2022)."Opinion | Iran's Master Class in Evading Sanctions".The Wall Street Journal.ISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved11 April 2022.
  109. ^"Iran Signs Deal With Russia To Import 20 Million Tons Of Basic Goods". Volant Media UK Limited. 20 March 2022.
  110. ^Bazoobandi, Sara, and Olena Osypenkova. Expansion of the Russo–Iranian Nexus. German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2024.JSTOR website Retrieved 14 Apr. 2025.
  111. ^"Putin and Erdogan will visit Iran for summit on Syria". lemonde. Retrieved 14 July 2022.
  112. ^"Russia and Iran Are Building a Trade Route That Defies Sanctions".bloomberg.
  113. ^"What’s behind Iran and Russia’s efforts to link banking systems?"aljazeera. Accessed 9 February 2023.
  114. ^"Iran and Russia want to unite the fleet".UKRAINIAN SHIPPING MAGAZINE. 19 June 2023. Retrieved27 June 2023.
  115. ^"Iran and Russia sign $25bn nuclear plant deal".Al Jazeera. 26 September 2025. Retrieved27 September 2025.
  116. ^"Iran Seeks Trade Agreement with Eurasian Union".Asbarez.com. 6 February 2015. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  117. ^"Tehran Times". 14 April 2015. Retrieved20 April 2016.
  118. ^"سامانه‌های ارتباطی بانکی ایران و روسیه برای دور زدن سوئیفت" [Iran and Russia's banking communication systems to bypass SWIFT].Deutsche Welle (in Persian). Retrieved17 May 2025.
  119. ^"Iran at odds with allied Russia after Moscow backs UAE in island dispute".CNBC. 12 July 2023.
  120. ^"حرکت جنجالی اکانت وزارت خارجه روسیه به زبان عربی درباره خلیج فارس+عکس".روزنامه دنیای اقتصاد. 7 August 2023. Retrieved7 August 2023.
  121. ^"Iran Irked by Russia Siding with UAE on Persian Gulf Islands". 21 December 2023.
  122. ^"The Russia-Iran Relationship in a Sanctions Era".www.ui.se. Retrieved20 October 2022.
  123. ^"Russia and Iran presidents sign partnership treaty in Moscow".Al Jazeera. Retrieved19 January 2025.
  124. ^"Russia signals response to possible US attack on Iran".Newsweek. 8 April 2025. Retrieved16 April 2025.
  125. ^"Global Indicators Database".Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. 21 November 2011. Retrieved31 January 2022.
  126. ^2013 World Service PollArchived 2015-10-10 at theWayback MachineBBC
  127. ^"End of year 2013 : Russia"(PDF).Wingia.com. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved22 October 2016.
  128. ^"State of Iran Survey Series". IranPoll. 8 February 2019.

Sources and further reading

[edit]
  • Atkin, Muriel.Russia and Iran 1780 - 1828 (U of Minnesota Press, 1980)
  • Basseer, P.; Clawson, P.; Floor, W. (1988). "Banking".Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. III, Fasc. 7. pp. 698–709.
  • Blake, Kristen.The U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: a case in the annals of the Cold War (University Press of America, 2009).
  • Cronin, Stephanie.Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions Since 1800. Routledge, 2013.ISBN 978-0415624336.
  • Deutschmann, Moritz (2013). "'All Rulers are Brothers': Russian Relations with the Iranian Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century".Iranian Studies.46 (3):383–413.doi:10.1080/00210862.2012.759334.S2CID 143785614.
  • Deutschmann, Moritz.Iran and Russian Imperialism: The Ideal Anarchists, 1800-1914. Routledge, 2015.ISBN 978-1138937017.
  • Esfandiary, Dina, and Ariane Tabatabai, eds.Triple Axis: Iran's Relations with Russia and China (I. B. Tauris, 2018). 256 pages.
  • Fisher, William Bayne; Avery, P.; Hambly, G. R. G; Melville, C. (1991).The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 7. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.ISBN 0521200954.
  • Geranmayeh, Ellie. "The Newest Power Couple: Iran and Russia Band Together to Support Assad" World Policy Journal (2016) 33#4 pp 84–88.
  • Kazemzadeh, Firuz (1991). "Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921". In Peter, Avery; Hambly, Gavin; Melville, Charles (eds.).The Cambridge History of Iran (Vol. 7). Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0521200950.
  • Kazemzadeh, Firuz,Russia and Britain in Persia, A study in Imperialism, (1968)online
  • Nejad, Kayhan A. (2021). "To break the feudal bonds: the Soviets, Reza Khan, and the Iranian left, 1921-25".Middle Eastern Studies.57 (5):758–776.doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897578.S2CID 233524659.
  • Raine, Fernande. "Stalin and the creation of the Azerbaijan democratic party in Iran, 1945."Cold war history 2.1 (2001): 1-38.
  • Sefat Gol, Mansour, and Seyed Mehdi Hosseini Taghiabad. "From Attempts to Form a Coalition to Worsened Relations; Transformation in Iran and Russia Relations in the Seventeenth Century."Central Eurasia Studies 13.1 (2020): 91–116.online
  • Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "Russian elite image of Iran: From the late Soviet era to the present" (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009)online.
  • Sicker, Martin.The Bear and the Lion: Soviet Imperialism and Iran (Praeger, 1988).
  • Ter-Abrahamian, Hrant (2005). "On the Formation of the National Identity of the Talishis in Azerbaijan Republic".Iran and the Caucasus.9 (1). Brill:121–144.doi:10.1163/1573384054068132.
  • Therme, Clément (2012).Les relations entre Téhéran et Moscou depuis 1979 (Thesis).doi:10.4000/books.iheid.902.ISBN 978-2-940415-94-6.
  • ولی زاده, اکبر; صالحی, محمد رضا (March 2020). "مؤلفه‌‌‌‌های تأثیرگذار بر همکاری امنیتی ایران و روسیه در آسیای مرکزی" [Effective Components within Iran-Russia Security Cooperation in Central Asia].مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی (in Arabic).13 (1).doi:10.22059/JCEP.2020.295455.449889.
  • Volkov, Denis V.Russia’s Turn to Persia: Orientalism in Diplomacy and Intelligence (Cambridge UP, 2018)
  • Whigham, Henry James.The Persian problem: an examination of the rival positions of Russia and Great Britain in Persia with some account of the Persian Gulf and the Bagdad Railway (1903)online.
  • Zubok, Vladislav M. "Stalin, Soviet Intelligence, and the Struggle for Iran, 1945–53."Diplomatic History 44#1 (2020) pp. 22–46

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

[edit]

External links

[edit]
Diplomatic posts
Diplomacy
Conflicts
Incidents
Individuals
Related
Africa
Emblem of Iran
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Former
Multilateral relations
Disputes
Related
Bilateral relations
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Multilateral relations
Diplomacy
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Iran–Russia_relations&oldid=1323183037"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp