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Interservice rivalry isrivalry between differentbranches of a country'sarmed forces. This may include competition betweenland,marine,naval,coastal,air, orspace forces.[1]
Interservice rivalry can occur over such topics as the appropriation of themilitary budget, prestige, or the possession of certain types ofequipment orunits.[1] The latter case can arise, for example, when a navy operatesnaval aviation units, which can be viewed by the air force as an infringement of its traditional responsibilities.
For the most part, interservice rivalries may only be limited to administrative or internal functions, and the branches may otherwise have warm relations and a willingness to work together when necessary, with the rivalries usually only manifesting asin-jokes and light-heartedstereotypes (such as, in theUnited States Armed Forces, the stereotype thatmarines eat crayons) or, in more serious contexts,organisational politics disputes that are usually resolved over time. However, in rare instances, interservice rivalries may be so severe that the branches will outright refuse to cooperate or may evensabotage each other, even during an ongoingwar or when lives are at stake (such as the rivalry between theImperial Japanese Army andImperial Japanese Navy).
The term also applies to rivalries between a country’sintelligence services andlaw enforcement agencies (e.g. theFBI andCIA in theUnited States[2]), theemergency services of a jurisdiction (e.g. theNYPD andFDNY inNew York City[3]) or separate services in the same field (e.g. theLAPD andLASD inLos Angeles County, California[4]).
Many military analysts consider theWehrmacht,Nazi Germany's armed forces, as the pioneers of "jointness" (German:integrierter Kriegführung), pointing out thatblitzkrieg, the war-fighting style that brought theWehrmacht stunning victories between 1939 and 1941, depended upon the close integration of ground and air (and sometimes naval) forces and that even after theblitzkrieg campaigns gave way to a drawn-outwar of attrition, theWehrmacht routinely conducted operations in a way that would today be called "joint". That is, elements of two or more services participated in close cooperation with mutually agreed goals, relatively little interservice rivalry, and acommand structure that, at least at the "sharp end" of operations, promoted, rather than inhibited, a spirit of jointness. Consequently, analysts assert, theWehrmacht enhanced its capabilities and improved itscombat effectiveness.[5]
Adolf Hitler understood the value of integrating his land, sea, and air forces and placing them under a unified command, theOberkommando der Wehrmacht (first under Field MarshalWerner von Blomberg's command; later his own). He also saw the benefit of placing them under operational commanders who possessed at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities, and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zone.[6] Hitler was thus innovative and several years ahead of his peers inthe West,Italy, and theSoviet Union. Yet, largely because of Hitler's unusual and autocratic command style and difficulties with delegation, theWehrmacht lacked elements that today's theorists consider essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness (a single joint commander or Joint Chief of Staff, a proper joint staff, a joint planning process, and an absence of inter-service rivalry) and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.[6]
The rivalries shaped between security organisations inIran are as follows:
Infighting occurred between theIndian Army andIndian Air Force over the use ofattack helicopters came to light during theKargil War in 1999.[14] This dispute erupted again in 2012 when both the two branches fought over the allocation ofAH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters.[15]
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The long-term discord between theImperial Japanese Army andImperial Japanese Navy was one of the most notorious examples of interservice rivalry. The situation, with its origin traced back to theMeiji period, came with bothgeopolitical and military consequences leading to Japan's involvement inWorld War II. The IJA/IJN rivalry expressed itself in the early 1930s as the "strike north" (Hokushin-ron) and "strike south" (Nanshin-ron) factions. The goal of both factions was to seize territories which possessed the raw materials, especiallypetroleum, which Japan needed to sustain its growth and economy, but which it did not possess itself. The strike north faction advocated the taking of thenatural resources of Siberia, by way ofManchuria, a scenario in which the prime role would be taken by the Army, while the strike south faction advocated the taking of the oil-richDutch East Indies, a scenario in which the Navy would predominate.
In order to further their own faction, relatively junior officers resorted to the assassinations of members of the rival faction and their supporters in government. With both factions being opposed to the peace faction, this period has become known as the era of "government by assassination".Insubordination by theKwantung Army led first to theoccupation of Manchuria, and later theSecond Sino-Japanese War following theMarco Polo Bridge incident. However, at theBattles of Khalkhin Gol, any farther expansion northwards into Siberia was shown to be impossible given the Soviet superiority in numbers and armour.
With the loss of Army prestige that followed the failure of theSoviet–Japanese border conflicts, the Navy faction gained the ascendency, supported by a number of the powerful industrialzaibatsu, that were convinced that their interests would be best served fulfilling the needs of the Navy, thus paving the way to thePacific War.
The rivalry between the IJA and IJN also saw both services developing air arms; the Army creating its own amphibious infantry units and running ships and submarines, includingsubmarine chasers and aircraft carriers; and the Navy creating itsown infantry andmarine paratroopers.
Significant examples of this rivalry include the Navy taking several weeks to inform the Army of the disastrous results of theBattle of Midway, and dysfunction between the IJA and IJN during theGuadalcanal campaign.
ThePakistani Armed Forces used to fight over a number of issues. One in particular was predominantly between theNavy and theArmy over budget distribution. A key point of friction was the induction of the cruiserPNSBabur. This was resolved when Pakistani think tanks realised the need for interservice harmony and established the Joint Services Headquarters, which reduces friction between the services.[citation needed] ThePNSZulfiqar (K265), aRiver-classfrigate, was damaged beyond repair after a PakistaniF-86 mistook it for an Indian ship due an interservice conflict between thePakistan Navy andPakistan Air Force.[16][17]
TheU.S. Department of Defense was originally created to provide overall coordination for the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, whose infighting, particularly between theArmy andNavy, was seen as detrimental to military effectiveness during World War II.[citation needed]
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The rivalries are also based on services' individual philosophies for rules and behavior. An author wrote in 2012 about the differing cultures of theUS Air Force's pilots and theUS Navy'saviators:[18]
There was some truth in the old saying that the Air Force had a book for all the things you were allowed to do in the air, and anything not specifically written down was prohibited; whereas the Navy's rule book contained all the things you were not allowed to do, and anything not written down was perfectly legal.[18]
Various mechanisms are used to manage or curb interservice rivalry. In the U.S. Armed Forces, for example, an officer must complete at least one joint tour[19] in another service to reach the level offlag orgeneral officer.[20] Such officers may be described as being "purple,"[21] a reference to the combination of the symbolic colors of each branch: red (Marines), green (Army), and blue (Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard).[22]
One well-known encounter, theRevolt of the Admirals, took place after the end of World War II. The newly-created U.S. Air Force sought to create a doctrine which relied heavily onstrategic long-range bombing and the Army a large number ofreservist troops. Both the Air Force and the Army claimed that the future of warfare depended on the issue ofnuclear deterrence, and as such the use ofnaval gunfire support, as well as theamphibious assault doctrine of theU.S. Marine Corps, was outdated and would never be used again. Secretary of DefenseLouis A. Johnson proceeded to strip the Navy of funds on its firstsupercarrier, theUnited States. This cancellation caused multiple high ranking Navy personnel to resign. The aftermath backfired against the Navy, and causedCongress to review, and after investigation enabled the implementation of the creation of a Strategic Air Force supporting a nuclear mission.
Previously, during the presidencies ofHarry S. Truman andDwight D. Eisenhower, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position rotated between different service branches. However, in 1962, when PresidentJohn F. Kennedy appointed GeneralMaxwell Taylor to replace the incumbent, GeneralLyman Lemnitzer who had been the Chairman since 1960, the rotation between the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army was broken as both Taylor and Lemnitzer served in the Army. When GeneralEarle Wheeler was appointed as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman by PresidentLyndon Johnson in 1964, it resulted in Army generals holding the Chairman position for three consecutive terms, from 1960 to 1970.[23][24][25] Army generals again served as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman for three consecutive terms from 1989 to 2001, when PresidentGeorge H.W. Bush appointed Army generalColin Powell as Chairman in 1989, and when Powell retired in 1993 he was replaced by another Army general,John Shalikashvili, who was appointed by PresidentBill Clinton, and when Shalikashvili retired in 1997 he was again replaced by an Army general,Hugh Shelton, until finally, when Shelton retired in 2001, he was replaced by non-army officer, Air Force generalRichard B. Myers, who succeeded Shelton as Chairman in October 2001.[26]
In December 2018, with the incumbent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GeneralJoseph Dunford scheduled to retire the following year, Secretary of DefenseJames Mattis recommended to PresidentDonald Trump that he pick incumbent Air Force Chief of Staff GeneralDavid L. Goldfein to be Dunford's successor. Dunford agreed with the choice of Mattis as his successor, especially since no Air Force Generals had been Chairman since General Myers retired in 2005.[27][28][29][30] However due to Trump's recent conflict with Dunford and Mattis, instead of taking their recommendation, Trump selectedArmy Chief of Staff GeneralMark Milley to be Dunford's successor. The nomination sparked controversy due to previous Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman before Dunford. GeneralMartin Dempsey was from the Army and if Goldfein had been selected, he would have been the Air Force's first chairman since 2005.[31][32] Many believed that Trump picked Milley due to a close and personal friendship between the two since early in Trump's presidency.[33][34] By the time Milley assumed the position in October 2019, exactly half of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman—10 out of 20—had been filled by Army generals.[35]
TheUnited States unified combatant command was also dominated by Army officers. One combatant command,Indo-Pacific Command (previously known as Pacific Command), was historically led by Navy officers and has never been led by officers from any other branch. There was an attempt to place other than Navy officers to lead the Indo-Pacific Command, but the attempt eventually failed.[25][26][24][36] Air Force officers rarely get the position as combatant command commanders and other important specific commands.[37]
Interservice rivalries are often played out at divisional or regimental level or betweenspecial forces that are part of different services. The rivalry between special-forces units led to the creation ofUnited Kingdom Special Forces in the United Kingdom, andSOCOM in the United States, to put them all under a unified command, putting an end to the "rice-bowl" doctrine which created absurd situations inIran,Grenada, andPanama in the 1980s. In the UK, it has put an end to members of theSpecial Boat Service being recruited solely from theRoyal Marines, and it is now a tri-service branch.[citation needed]
Special forces can also have rivalries with regular military units. For example, British special forces have rivalries with regular infantry units due to the latter being taughtclose-quarters combat, which the former was historically responsible for; this rivalry also relates to budgets, as infantry units requiring CQC training also require costly equipment and training facilities, thus using up money that could otherwise be spent on special forces or other purposes.[38]
During the descent, they reported seeing many firefighters who were resting and did not seem to be in the process of evacuating. They further reported advising these firefighters to evacuate, but said that at times they were not acknowledged. In the opinion of one of the ESU officers, some of these firefighters essentially refused to take orders from cops. At least one firefighter who was in the North Tower has supported that assessment, stating that he was not going to take an evacuation instruction from a cop that morning.
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