A total of 161 persons were indicted; the final indictments were issued in December 2004, the last of which were confirmed and unsealed in the spring of 2005.[1] The final fugitive,Goran Hadžić, was arrested on 20 July 2011.[2] The final judgment was issued on 29 November 2017[3] and the institution formally ceased to exist on 31 December 2017.[4]
Residual functions of the ICTY, including the oversight of sentences and consideration of any appeal proceedings initiated since 1 July 2013, are under the jurisdiction of a successor body, theInternational Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).[5]
Report S/25704 of the UN Secretary-General, including the proposed Statute of the International Tribunal, approved byUN Security Council Resolution 827
United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 decided that an "international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of the formerYugoslavia since 1991", and called on the Secretary-General to "submit for consideration by the Council ... a report on all aspects of this matter, including specific proposals and where appropriate options ... taking into account suggestions put forward in this regard by Member States".[6]
The court was originally proposed by German Foreign MinisterKlaus Kinkel.[7]
Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 approved theS/25704 report of the secretary-general and adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal annexed to it, formally creating the ICTY. It was to have jurisdiction over four clusters of crimes committed on the territory of the formerSFR Yugoslavia since 1991:
In 1993 the internal infrastructure of the ICTY was built. 17 states had signed an agreement with the ICTY to carry out custodial sentences.[8]
1993–1994: In the first year of its existence, the tribunal laid the foundations for its existence as a judicial organ. It established the legal framework for its operations by adopting the rules of procedure and evidence, as well as its rules of detention and directive for the assignment of defence counsel. Together, these rules established a legal aid system for the tribunal. As the ICTY was a part of the United Nations and was the firstinternational court forcriminal justice, the development of a juridical infrastructure was considered quite a challenge. However, after the first year, the first ICTY judges had drafted and adopted all the rules for court proceedings.[9]
1994–1995: The ICTY established its offices within the Aegon Insurance Building in The Hague (which was, at the time, still partially in use by Aegon)[10] and detention facilities inScheveningen in The Hague (the Netherlands). The ICTY hired many staff members and by July 1994, the Office of the Prosecutor had sufficient staff to begin field investigations. By November 1994, the first indictments were presented to the court and confirmed, and in 1995, the staff numbered over 200 persons from all over the world.
In 1994 the first indictment was issued against the Bosnian-Serb concentration camp commanderDragan Nikolić. This was followed on 13 February 1995 by two indictments comprising 21 individuals which were issued against a group of 21 Bosnian-Serbs charged with committing atrocities against Muslim and Croat civilian prisoners. While the war in the former Yugoslavia was still raging, the ICTY prosecutors showed that an international court was viable. However, no accused was arrested.[11]
The court confirmed eight indictments against 46 individuals and issued arrest warrants. Bosnian Serb indicteeDuško Tadić became the subject of the tribunal's first trial. Tadić was arrested by German police inMunich in 1994 for his alleged actions in the Prijedor region in Bosnia-Herzegovina (especially his actions in the Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm detention camps). He made his first appearance before the ICTY Trial Chamber on 26 April 1995, and pleaded not guilty to all of the charges in the indictment.[12]
1995–1996: Between June 1995 and June 1996, 10 public indictments had been confirmed against a total of 33 individuals. Six of the newly indicted persons were transferred in the tribunal's detention unit. In addition to Duško Tadic, by June 1996 the tribunal hadTihomir Blaškić,Dražen Erdemović, Zejnil Delalić,[13] Zdravko Mucić,[14]Esad Landžo andHazim Delić in custody. Erdemović became the first person to enter a guilty plea before the tribunal's court. Between 1995 and 1996, the ICTY dealt with miscellaneous cases involving several detainees, which never reached the trial stage.
The tribunal indicted 161 individuals between 1997 and 2004 and completed proceedings with them as follows:[15][16]
111 had trials completed by the ICTY:
21 were acquitted by the ICTY:
18 acquittals have stood;
1 was originally acquitted by the ICTY, but convicted on appeal by the IRMCT of one count (and sentenced to time served)
2 were originally acquitted by the ICTY, but following a successful appeal by the prosecution the acquittals were overturned and a retrial is being conducted by the IRMCT; and
90 were convicted and sentenced by the ICTY:
87 were transferred to 14 different states where they served their prison sentences, had sentences that amounted to time spent in detention during trial, or died after conviction:
20 remain imprisoned;
58 completed their sentences;
9 died while completing their sentences or after conviction awaiting transfer
2 were convicted and sentenced, and remain in IRMCT detention awaiting transfer; and
1 was convicted and sentenced, but has filed an appeal to the IRMCT that is being considered
13 had their cases transferred to courts in:
Bosnia and Herzegovina (10);
Croatia (2); and
Serbia (1)
37 had their cases terminated prior to trial completion, because
the indictments were withdrawn (20); or
the indictees died before or after transfer to the Tribunal (17).
The very first hearing at the ICTY was a referral request in the Tadić case on 8 November 1994. Croat Serb General and former president of theRepublic of Serbian KrajinaGoran Hadžić was the last fugitive wanted by the tribunal to be arrested on 20 July 2011.[2]
In 2004, the ICTY published a list of five accomplishments "in justice and law":[19][20]
"Spearheading the shift from impunity to accountability", pointing out that, until very recently, it was the only court judging crimes committed as part of the Yugoslav conflict, since prosecutors in the former Yugoslavia were, as a rule, reluctant to prosecute such crimes;
"Establishing the facts", highlighting the extensive evidence-gathering and lengthy findings of fact that tribunal judgments produced;
"Bringing justice to thousands of victims and giving them a voice", pointing out the large number of witnesses that had been brought before the tribunal;
"The accomplishments in international law", describing the fleshing out of several international criminal law concepts which had not been ruled on since the Nuremberg Trials;
"Strengthening the Rule of Law", referring to the tribunal's role in promoting the use of international standards in war crimes prosecutions by former Yugoslav republics.
The United Nations Security Council passed resolutions1503 in August 2003 and1534 in March 2004, which both called for the completion of all cases at both the ICTY and its sister tribunal, theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by 2010.
In December 2010, the Security Council adoptedResolution 1966, which established theInternational Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), a body intended to gradually assume residual functions from both the ICTY and the ICTR as they wound down their mandate. Resolution 1966 called upon the tribunal to finish its work by 31 December 2014 to prepare for its closure and the transfer of its responsibilities.[5]
In aCompletion Strategy Report issued in May 2011, the ICTY indicated that it aimed to complete all trials by the end of 2012 and complete all appeals by 2015, with the exception ofRadovan Karadžić whose trial was expected to end in 2014 andRatko Mladić andGoran Hadžić, who were still at large at that time and were not arrested until later that year.[21]
The IRMCT's ICTY branch began functioning on 1 July 2013. Per the Transitional Arrangements adopted by the UN Security Council, the ICTY was to conduct and complete all outstanding first-instance trials, including those of Karadžić, Mladić and Hadžić. The ICTY would also conduct and complete all appeal proceedings for which the notice of appeal against the judgement or sentence was filed before 1 July 2013. The IRMCT will handle any appeals for which notice is filed after that date.
The final ICTY trial to be completed in the first instance was that ofRatko Mladić, who was convicted on 22 November 2017.[22] The final case to be considered by the ICTY was an appeal proceeding encompassing six individuals, whose sentences were upheld on 29 November 2017.[23]
While operating, the tribunal employed around 900 staff.[24] Its organizational components were Chambers, Registry and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).
The Prosecutor was responsible for investigating crimes, gathering evidence and prosecutions and was head of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).[25] The Prosecutor was appointed by the UN Security Council upon nomination by the UN secretary-general.[26]
Chambers encompassed thejudges and their aides. The tribunal operated three Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber. The president of the tribunal was also the presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber.
At the time of the court's dissolution, there were seven permanent judges and onead hoc judge who served on the tribunal.[28][29] A total of 86 judges have been appointed to the tribunal from 52 United Nations member states. Of those judges, 51 were permanent judges, 36 weread litem judges, and one was anad hoc judge. Note that one judge served as both a permanent andad litem judge, and another served as both a permanent andad hoc judge.
UN member and observer states could each submit up to two nominees of different nationalities to the UN secretary-general.[30] The UN secretary-general submitted this list to the UN Security Council which selected from 28 to 42 nominees and submitted these nominees to the UN General Assembly.[30] The UN General Assembly then elected 14 judges from that list.[30] Judges served for four years and were eligible for re-election. The UN secretary-general appointed replacements in case of vacancy for the remainder of the term of office concerned.[30]
The Registry was responsible for handling the administration of the tribunal; activities included keeping court records, translating court documents, transporting and accommodating those who appear to testify, operating the Public Information Section, and such general duties as payroll administration, personnel management and procurement. It was also responsible for the Detention Unit for indictees being held during their trial and the Legal Aid program for indictees who cannot pay for their own defence. The Registry was headed by the Registrar, a position occupied over the years byTheo van Boven of theNetherlands (February 1994 to December 1994), Dorothée de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh of the Netherlands (1995–2000), Hans Holthuis of the Netherlands (2001–2008), andJohn Hocking ofAustralia (January 2009 to December 2017).[36]
A typical 10 m2[37] single cell at the ICTY detention facilities
Those defendants on trial and those who were denied a provisional release were detained at theUnited Nations Detention Unit on the premises of thePenitentiary Institution Haaglanden, location Scheveningen inBelgisch Park, a suburb ofThe Hague, located some 3 km by road from the courthouse. The indicted were housed in private cells which had a toilet, shower, radio, satellite TV, personal computer (without internet access) and other luxuries. They were allowed to phone family and friends daily and could have conjugal visits. There was also a library, a gym and various rooms used for religious observances. The inmates were allowed to cook for themselves. All of the inmates mixed freely and were not segregated on the basis of nationality. As the cells were more akin to a university residence instead of a jail, some had derisively referred to the ICT as the "Hague Hilton".[38] The reason for this luxury relative to other prisons is that the first president of the court wanted to emphasise that the indictees were innocent until proven guilty.[39]
Some authors have argued, starting from the ICTY's establishment, that the UN Security Council lacked the judicial power to create an ad-hoc tribunal, because the UN Charter does not grant it the right to create judicial institutions at all. The tribunal was established on the basis ofChapter VII of the United Nations Charter; the relevant portion of which reads "the Security Council can take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security".[40]
Some of the defendants, such asSlobodan Milošević, claimed that the court had no legal authority and legitimate legal basis because it was established by theUN Security Council instead of theUN General Assembly, and so, had not been created on an all encompassing international basis.[41]
The legal criticism has been succinctly stated in a memorandum] issued by Austrian ProfessorHans Köchler,[42] which was submitted to the president of the Security Council in 1999. BritishConservative Party MEPDaniel Hannan has called for the court to be abolished, claiming it is anti-democratic and a violation of national sovereignty.[43]
Michael Mandel,William Blum and others accused the court of having a pro-NATO bias due to its refusal to prosecute NATO officials and politicians for war crimes.[45] Bachmann and Fatić have shown how the prosecution blurred existing ICTY procedures to avoid indicting NATO officials despite the existingprima facie evidence on war crimes. It did so under intense pressure from NATO representatives.[46] Bachmann and Fatić have shown how the prosecution failed to indict high ranking politicians and militaries mentioned in other indictments as co-perpetrators, because they agreed to assist the prosecution or agreed to testify against other accused persons.[47] According to Hoare, a former employee at the ICTY, an investigative team worked on indictments of senior members of the "joint criminal enterprise", including not only Milošević but alsoVeljko Kadijević,Blagoje Adžić,Borisav Jović,Branko Kostić,Momir Bulatović and others. However, Hoare claims that, due toCarla del Ponte's intervention, these drafts were rejected, and the indictment limited to Milošević alone.[48] Reducing the indictment charges after the arrest ofRatko Mladić, Croatian officials publicly condemned chief prosecutorSerge Brammertz for his announcement that the former Bosnian Serb General would be tried solely for crimes allegedly committed in Bosnia, not in Croatia.[49][50]
There have also been accusations of bias againstSerbs in the indictment process:
68% of indictees have been Serbs, to the extent that a sizeable portion of the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb political and military leaderships have been indicted. Some authors see this as a reflection of bias and asanti-Serb sentiment (often by the whole tribunal, although the decisions were only made by the prosecution).
Research published in 2024 by Barry Hashimoto and Kevin W. Gray has shown that precise statistical analysis proves imbalances among prosecutions and convictions against certain ethnic groups, mainly the findings suggest that Serbs were more likely to be convicted and received longer sentences on average. When accounting for possible biases, the results were not entirely conclusive. Though, Hashimoto and Gray state that under reasonable assumptions, harsher outcomes cannot be explained by legal factors alone and, instead, that the possibility that the tribunal has shown favoritism towards non-Serbs and bias against Serbs is still a valid conjecture.[51]
The distribution of crimes among the ethnic communities could also depend on the concept of identity one applies to it. "Serbs" committed most of the crimes during the conflict if one puts all Serbs, holding different citizenships and living in the different parts of the former Yugoslavia (Republic of Serbia, Republika Srpska, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro), into one "Serb" basket. They cease to be the main collective culprits if one regards them as members of different communities (Bosnian Serbs, Serbs from Croatia, Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro etc). The same is true for Croats, depending if they are regarded as one nation across national boundaries or members of different communities (Croats from Croatia, Croats from Bosnia or Croats from Montenegro).[52]
Some researchers have also argued while the ICTY was biased, it realistically could not avoid bias due to the highly political and ethnically polarised environment in which it had to work.[53] Usually, as Mirko Klarin has set out, the ethnic or national community, which sided with an accused, regarded their trial as unfair, assuming the accused to be innocent, while it regarded trials against its former enemies as a priori as justified.[54] Under such circumstances, Bachmann and Fatić argue that accusations of bias would be inevitable in the ICTY.[53]
For a long time (until the 2010s) neither prosecution nor chambers regarded it as the ICTY's job to prosecute contempt of court andperjury committed by witnesses.[55] Their hesitance created incentives for the creation and expansion of perjurer networks and the creation of false evidence by either people, who wanted to see an accused sentenced (if he or she came from an opposing group) or acquitted (if he or she stemmed from their own ethnic background). Chambers regarded the prosecution of false testimony in court as being outside their core mandate and made contradictory decisions about who should prevent false testimony (the prosecution or the chambers) and how.[56] Instead of initiating sanctions against perjurers, judges were eager to "explain false testimony away" as examples of cultural exceptions or trauma (Combs and Bachmann[46]).
Treatment of the defense:
In the ICTY, trial chambers often divided the anticipated time of trial into equal parts for the prosecution and the defense, though there were some structural deficits which played out to the detriment of the defense, despite this apparent system of equality.[57] First of all, the defense was no formal part of the tribunal; the ICTY statute did not mention the defense as an organ of the tribunal and defense lawyers did not have access to the securitized part of the ICTY building, but instead had to work outside, having only a small room in the lobby at their disposal. The prosecution on the other hand, could draw from the tribunal resources when conducting investigations and invoke the authority of the tribunal in contacts with national jurisdictions (demanding access to documents and witnesses and the surrender of suspects), the defense could only rely on other states' goodwill and informal contacts.[46]
On 6 December 2006, the Tribunal at The Hague approved the use offorce-feeding ofSerbian politicianVojislav Šešelj. They decided it was not "torture,inhuman or degrading treatment if there is a medical necessity to do so ... and if the manner in which the detainee is force-fed is not inhuman or degrading".[58]
Regarding the final case on 29 November 2017 proceeding encompassing six Bosnian-Croat individuals, one of whom,Slobodan Praljak, in protest in court drank poison and subsequently died,[59][60] thePrime Minister of Croatia,Andrej Plenković, claimed the verdict was "unjust" and Praljak's suicide "speaks of deep moral injustice to the six Croats, from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croat people". He criticized the verdict because it did not recognize the assistance and support provided by Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the collaboration of both armies at a time when the neighbouring state was faced with the "Greater-Serbian aggression" and when its territorial integrity was compromised, as well it alludes[clarification needed] to the link between the then leadership of the Republic of Croatia, while in the previous verdict on Bosnian-SerbRatko Mladić does not recognize the connection with Serbia's state officials at that time.[61][62]
Some sentences have been considered too mild. Even within the tribunal there was criticism of comparatively small sentences of convicted war criminals as opposed to their crimes.[56]
In 2010,Veselin Šljivančanin's sentence for his involvement in theVukovar massacre was cut from 17 to 10 years, which caused outrage in Croatia. Upon hearing that news, Vesna Bosanac, who had been in charge of the Vukovar hospital during the fall of the city, said that the "ICTY is dead" for her: "For crimes that he [Šljivančanin], had committed in Vukovar, notably atOvčara, he should have been jailed for life. I'm outraged. ... The Hague(-based) tribunal has showed again that it is not a just tribunal."[63] Danijel Rehak, the head ofCroatian Association of Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps, said, "The shock of families whose beloved ones were killed atOvčara is unimaginable. The court made a crucial mistake by accepting a statement of a JNA officer to whom Šljivančanin was a commander. I cannot understand that".[63]Pavle Strugar's 8-year sentence for shelling ofDubrovnik, aUNESCO World Heritage Site, also caused outrage in Croatia.[52] Judge Kevin Parker (ofAustralia) was named in a Croatian journal (Nacional) as a main cause of the system's failure for having dismissed the testimonies of numerous witnesses.[52]
ICTY's own publications usually measure efficiency in terms of the number of indicted persons who were put on trial. From that perspective, the ICTY was very efficient, because it managed to get hold on all the persons for which it had issued indictments. However, trials used to be very long and cumbersome, with some trials re-tried from scratch pursuant to appeals chamber decisions. Critics have argued some of the trials were longer than the benchmarks set by the relevant European Court of Human Rights verdicts (which are legally not binding for the ICTY).[64] This was partly due to the need to provide the accused (and the witnesses) with translations in languages they understood (some accused, like Voislav Sesel, tried to sabotage their trials by claiming not to understand the translation, for example when the translator spoke Croatian rather than Serbian), but – as Boas has pointed out – it was also a consequence of the chamber's inconsistent approach to self-representation, the use ofamici curiae and imposed defense counseling for accused persons who refused to accept duty counseling without having their own defense lawyers. In some cases – the Milošević trial[ambiguous] is one example – the health conditions of an accused forced the judges to lower the workload for the accused and prolonged the trial beyond the anticipated amount of time.[65]
6. Assessments of the Tribunal’s impact and legacy
Critics have questioned whether the tribunal exacerbates tensions rather than promoting reconciliation, which had been one of the main postulates of the Tribunal.[45][47][48]
Polls show a generally negative reaction to the tribunal among both Serbs and Croats.[48] A majority of Serbs and Croats have expressed doubts regarding the ICTY's integrity and question the tenability of its legal procedures.[48]
In the Muslim part of Bosnia and Kosovo support for the ICTY and its mission was usually much higher than in Croatia and Serbia. In the latter, respondents tended to associate the ICTY with NATO (and used to take sides with the suspects from their own ethnic community) while in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, they saw the ICTY as an instrument of Europeanisation. As Bachmann has shown, support for the ICTY in polls was usually strongly negatively correlated with the number of community members sentenced by the ICTY.[52]
Part and parcel of the problems to establish, if the ICTY has contributed to reconciliation, are the underlying concepts of reconciliation which are not yet settled by scholarship:
Some authors equate reconciliation with impartial justice, assuming tribunal decision will be endorsed by victims, perpetrators and the broader public if they are issued in accordance with generally accepted rules, while others rely on empirically tested concepts of public legitimacy and then usually find that ICTY decisions only were accepted by the members of a community if they fulfilled their expectations (that is: exonerated community members and sentenced leaders of the enemy group).
A research project conducted at SWPS University in Poland between 2012 and 2018 discovered some originally unintended consequences of ICTY decisions:
In some cases (Croatia and the Serb community of Bosnia) trial verdicts (concerning the Gotovina and the Visegrad cases) triggered more emphasis on victims from beyond the own ethnic community in these communities' media frames.[66] The project also showed how the ICTY had inclined judicial and administrative reform in some countries under its jurisdiction, either in order to curb the ICTY's principle of primacy (the ICTY could take over any suspect it wanted from a country under its jurisdiction, but governments usually tried to convince the ICTY they could try their suspects themselves) or to adopt to the ICTY completion strategy, under which domestic judiciaries could take over cases from the ICTY but needed to prove they could cope with them. While some of these policy changes (triggered by the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC) remained ambiguous in other parts of the world, they usually led to lasting change in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, because they were bolstered by pressure and support from the European Union and the US (Kemp, Ristić).[67]
Allegations of censorship:
In July 2011, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY confirmed the judgment of the Trial Chamber which found journalist and former tribunal's OTP spokespersonFlorence Hartmann guilty of contempt of court and fined her €7,000. She disclosed documents of FR Yugoslavia's Supreme Defense Council meetings and criticized the tribunal for granting confidentiality of some information in them to protect Serbia's "vital national interests" duringBosnia's lawsuit against the country for genocide in front of theInternational Court of Justice. Hartmann argued that Serbia was freed of the charge of genocide because ICTY redacted certain information in the council meetings. Since these documents have in the meantime been made public by the ICTY itself, a group of organizations and individuals, who supported her, said that the tribunal in this appellate proceedings "imposed a form of censorship aimed to protect the international judges from any form of criticism".[57] (France refused to extradite Hartmann to serve the prison sentence issued against her by the ICTY after she refused to pay the €7,000 fine.)
The ICTY presidentTheodor Meron announced that all three Hague war crimes courts turned down the invitation ofUNGA president to participate in the debate about their work.[70][unreliable source?] ThePresident of the General Assembly, Jeremić, described Meron's refusal to participate in this debate as scandalous.[71] He emphasized that he does not shy away from criticizing the ICTY, which has "convicted nobody for inciting crimes committed against Serbs in Croatia."[72]Tomislav Nikolić, the president ofSerbia, criticized the ICTY, claiming it did not contribute but hindered reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. He added that although there is no significant ethnic disproportion among the number of casualties in theYugoslav wars, the ICTY sentenced Serbs and ethnic Serbs to a combined total of 1150 years in prison while claiming that members of other ethnic groups have been sentenced to a total of 55 years for crimes against Serbs.[73]Vitaly Churkin, the ambassador ofRussia to the UN, criticized the work of the ICTY, especially the overturned convictions of Gotovina andRamush Haradinaj.[74]
Dutch filmmaker Jos de Putter made a trilogy,The Milosevic Case – Glosses at Trial, for Tegenlicht investigative slot at the VPRO. The main hypothesis of the film is that ICTY prosecution has been struggling and failing to prove any link between Milošević[ambiguous] and the media version of the truth of the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. The legitimacy of the prosecution methodology in securing the witness accounts and evidence, in general, has been examined by the filmmaker.[citation needed]
The political embedding of the ICTY in international politics and the compromises with the interest of justice this embeddedness requires from prosecutors and judges is the topic of the German filmStorm which uses anecdotes from the Gotovina case (but presents them as if the case's main culprit were a Serbian general and constantly mixes Republika Srpska with the Republic of Serbia).[75]
^Officially the "International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991"
^Hazan, Pierre. 2004.Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. College Station: Texas A & M University Press
^abcdBachmann, K., ed. (2016).The Legacy of Crimes and Crises. Transitional Justice, Domestic Change and the Role of the International Community. Peter Lang. pp. 113–134.
^abFatic, Aleksandar; Bachmann, Klaus (June 2019). "Accepting the political face of international criminal justice".International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice.57:25–35.
^Klarin, Mirko (March 2009). "The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia".Journal of International Criminal Justice.7 (1):89–96.doi:10.1093/jicj/mqp009.
^abZahar, A. (2008). "Witness memory and the manufacture of evidence at the international criminal tribunals". In Stahn, Carsten; van den Herik, Larissa (eds.).Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 600–610.
^abCombs, N. A. (2010).Fact-finding without facts: The uncertain evidentiary foundations of international criminal convictions. Cambridge University Press.
^abTolbert, David (2002). "The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship".New England Law Review.37: 975.
^Swaak-Goldman, O. Q. (1997). "The ICTY and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Critique of the Critics".Leiden Journal of International Law.10 (2):215–221.doi:10.1017/S0922156597000198.
^Boas, G. (2007).The Milošević trial: lessons for the conduct of complex international criminal proceedings. Cambridge University Press.
^Bachmann, K.; Kemp, G.; Ristić, I.; Trbovc, J. M.; et al. (2025). "International Criminal Tribunals as Triggers of Institutional Change? Evidence from Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC's Referral andProprio Motu Cases".International Criminal Law Review:1–30.doi:10.1163/15718123-bja10227.
^"Jeremić: Odbijeni pritisci, debate će biti".RTV Vojvodine (in Bosnian). 7 April 2013. Retrieved9 April 2013.On je kao skandalozno ocenio to što se predsednik Haškog tribunala Teodor Meron nije odazvao pozivu da se pojavi u UN, pod čijim patronatom sud funkcioniše.
