Internal Security Operations Command (Thai:กองอำนวยการรักษาความมั่นคงภายในราชอาณาจักร;RTGS: kong amnuaikan raksa khwam mankhong phainai ratcha-anachak ) orISOC (Thai:กอ.รมน.;RTGS: ko o ro mo no) is the internal security agency and political arm of theRoyal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).[3] It was responsible for counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, internal security, and the suppression of leftist groups from the 1960s to the 1980s. During this period it was implicated in atrocities against activists and civilians. ISOC was implicated in a plot to assassinate Prime MinisterThaksin Shinawatra.[4]
In June 2007, the junta approved a draft national security bill which gave ISOC sweeping powers to handle "new forms of threats" to the country. The ISOC revamp modelled it after theUnited States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave ISOC sweeping new powers to allow the ISOC chief to implement security measures, such as searches without seeking prime ministerial approval.[6]
ISOC's mission is to counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, defend the monarchy, information and psychological warfare, internal security, promote unity, protect the public from harm, suppress threats to national security, and supporting assistance for victims of natural disasters.[7] Nominally a civilian agency, ISOC operates under the aegis of theOffice of the Prime Minister (OPM).[8] Prime Minister GeneralPrayut Chan-o-cha is director of ISOC. Deputy director is army chief GeneralNarongpan Jitkaewthae.[7][9]
ISOC'sFY2019 budget is 10,240.1 millionbaht.[10]: 84 ISOC has about 5,000-6,000 staff nationwide, excluding those working in the south, and there are 500,000-600,000 internal security volunteers, as well as tens of thousands of people in its information network.[11]
The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was established in 1964[12] with the assistance of the United States, with the aim of coordinating counterinsurgency and counterintelligence operations.[13][14]
Following the 17 November 1971 coup by military dictatorsThanom Kittikachorn andPraphas Charusathien, Praphas appointed himself interior minister, chief of police, and head of CSOC.
The CSOC was implicated in several atrocities in its 1970s war against leftist groups. This included theRed Drum Massacre, the mass murder of southern Thai activists by burning them alive in gasoline drums.[15]
ISOC conducted operations in cities and the Thai countryside to subvert leftist groups through propaganda and violence.[17] In 1973, the ISOC commenced a bombing campaign againsthill tribe villages in northern Thailand.[citation needed] To prevent guerrillas from using their forest bases, the ISOC destroyed nearly 6 million rai (9,600 km2) of forest annually between 1973 and 1978.[12]
ISOC's role declined starting in the early-1980s after the downfall of the CPT. However, it still had great influence. On 1 April 1987, after Prime MinisterKukrit Pramoj claimed that ISOC had been brainwashed by communists, over 200 Thai Army Rangers attacked the prime minister's residence.[18][failed verification]
ISOC Deputy DirectorPallop Pinmanee was sacked[19] after Lieutenant Thawatchai Klinchana,[20] his driver, was found driving a car containing 67 kilograms of explosives near the residence of Prime MinisterThaksin Shinawatra. Pallop denied all involvement, noting that "If I was behind it, I would not have missed."[21] A government spokesperson stated that the explosives in the car were completely assembled, equipped with a remote sensor ready to be detonated, and would have had a blast radius of around one kilometre.[4]
In a parliament debate in February 2020,Future Forward MP Viroj Lakkana-adisorn presented a document revealing the percentage of the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) budget dedicated to counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, emergency management especially support for disaster mitigations,human development, humanitarian aid, and information and psychological warfare operations in Thailand's three southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwas, and Yala where are facing theSouth Thailand insurgency troubles.
Three additional documents detailed Defense Ministry orders to conduct information warfare against opposition parties and politicians, including specific budget details for the internet and mobile phones and the internet. As ISOC reports directly to the prime minister's office, General Prayut denied all the allegations and promised to investigate.[22]
In October 2020, Twitter took down a "low-intensity"Royal Thai Army (RTA) information warfare operations apparently designed to stifle and influence democratic opinion on social media regarding Army scandals and democratic processes in the country, as part of a major wider investigation by Facebook and Twitter into attempts to influence the2020 US Presidential Election.[23]
ISOC received a boost when the2006 coup installed the government of GeneralSurayud Chulanont. His government passed the Internal Security Act, 2008, granting ISOC the status of a state organization reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister.[24]
Thaksin planned a major restructuring of the ISOC prior to the coup which overthrew him in September 2006. Soon after the coup, the junta released three army suspects in the car bomb plot.[25]Junta leader and Army Commander-in-Chief GeneralSonthi Boonyaratglin appointed himself head of ISOC (its previous head had been the prime minister) and transformed ISOC into a "government within a government". The new ISOC was criticized as being a shadowy puppet master pulling the strings of existing agencies, answerable to no one but its leader.[26][failed verification]
To protect people in south Thailand from South Thailand insurgency situations, ISOC producedJatukham Rammathep amulets for distribution to the Buddhist minority. The renowned animist amulets were believed to have magical powers to protect their wearers from violence and large sums are paid for them. The plan was developed by Colonel Manas Khongpan, deputy director of ISOC inYala Province.[27][failed verification]
The cabinet of General Surayud Chulanont gave 732 ISOC staff members an 84.3 million baht "reward" in mid-2007. ISOC explained that police and soldiers were temporarily transferred to support ISOC's operation. ISOC wanted to reward them for their hard work and sacrifice. ISOC had originally requested the reward in 2003, but was turned down by the Thaksin government.[28]
Following the2014 coup, junta leaderPrayut Chan-o-cha used ISOC to handle not just military matters, but also political and social issues. In 2017, Prayut issuedNational Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 51/2017 to bolster ISOC's powers. A key provision was the inclusion of public prosecutors under ISOC's ageis, marking ISOC's first involvement in the Thai justice system. The order also gave ISOC the power to summon citizens to provide "information", a function formerly seen as a police responsibility. ISOC, under the order, is also responsible for "social order", a task previously shared by the police and ministries.[24]
In October 2019, ISOC filed sedition charges against 12 opposition politicians and academics, including leaders ofFuture Forward andPheu Thai parties. They were accused of inciting insurrection against the state for discussing amendments to the junta-drafted 2017 constitution on 28 September inPattani Province. Their choice of venue is unfortunate as Pattani operates under a "state of emergency" enacted by the army to combat local separatists. This means that the defendants may be tried in a military tribunal. A leading Thai political scientist warned that giving a militarized surveillance agency free rein in internal security issues risked turning Thailand into a totalitarian state.[7]
^abBaker, Chris; Phongpaichit, Pasuk (2022).A History of Thailand (4th ed.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 205–206.ISBN978-1-009-01483-0.
^Damrongviteetham, Jularat (2013), "Narratives of the "Red Barrel" Incident: Collective and Individual Memories in Lamsin, Southern Thailand",Oral History in Southeast Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 101–117,doi:10.1057/9781137311672_6,ISBN978-1-349-45703-8
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