Hybrid warfare was defined by Frank Hoffman in 2007 as the emerging simultaneous use of multiple types of warfare by flexible and sophisticated adversaries who understand that successful conflict requires a variety of forms designed to fit the goals at the time.[1] While there is no clear, accepted definition, methods includepolitical warfare and blendconventional warfare,irregular warfare, andcyberwarfare[2][3] with other influencing methods, such asfake news,[4]diplomacy,lawfare,regime change, andforeign electoral intervention.[5][6] By combiningkinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution.[7] The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics and practitioners, who say that it is vague and has disputed constitutive elements and historical distortions.[8][9][10]
There is no universally accepted definition of hybrid warfare, with a debate over its utility and whether it simply refers toirregular methods to counter aconventionally superior force. The vagueness of the term means that it is often used as a catch-all term for all non-linear threats.[12][13][14][15]
Hybrid warfare is warfare which includes some, parts, or all of the following aspects:
A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state. For example, in theIsrael–Hezbollah War of 2006 and theSyrian Civil War, the main adversaries were non-state entities within the state system. The non-state actors can act asproxies for countries but have independent agendas as well. For example,Iran is a sponsor ofHezbollah, but it was Hezbollah's, not Iran's, agenda that resulted in the kidnapping of Israeli troops that led to the Israel–Hezbollah War. On the other hand,Russian involvement in Ukraine (pre-2022) can be described as a traditional state actor waging a hybrid war (in addition to using a local hybrid proxy) althoughRussia denied involvement in the 2014 Ukraine conflict.[13][14][16]
Use of combination of conventional and irregular methods. Methods and tactics may includeconventional capabilities, irregular tactics, irregular formations, diplomacy, politics,terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence, and criminal activity. A hybrid adversary may also use clandestine actions to avoid attribution or retribution. The methods are used simultaneously across the spectrum of conflict with a unified strategy. A current example is theIslamic State's transnational aspirations, blended tactics, structured formations, and cruel use ofterrorism as part of its arsenal.[12][13][16][7][17][5]
Flexible and quick response. For example, the Islamic State's response to the US aerial bombing campaign was a quick reduction of the use ofcheckpoints, of large convoys, and of cellphones. Militants also dispersed among the civilian population. Civiliancollateral damage from airstrikes can be used as an effective recruiting tool.[13][18]
Use of advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies. Such weapons can be now bought at bargain prices.[19][20] Moreover, other novel technologies are being adapted to the battlefield, such as cellular networks. In 2006 Hezbollah was armed with high-tech weaponry, such asprecision-guided missiles, whichnation-states typically use. Hezbollah forces shot downIsraeli helicopters, severely damaged a patrol boat with acruise missile, and destroyed heavily armored tanks by firing guided missiles from hidden bunkers. It also usedaerial drones to gather intelligence, communicated with encrypted cellphones, and watched Israeli troop movements with thermalnight-vision equipment.[14][16]
Three distinct battlefields. They are the conventionalbattlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community.[dubious –discuss][7][23]
TheChief of Staff of the US Army defined a hybrid threat as an adversary that incorporates "diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities."[13] TheUS Joint Forces Command defines a hybrid threat as "any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and nonstate actors."[13]
TheUS Army defined a hybrid threat in 2011 as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects."[13]NATO uses the term to describe "adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives."[12]
According to the 2017-inauguratedEuropean Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, "hybrid threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent" where the "range of methods and activities is wide".[24]
The concept ofgrey-zone conflicts or warfare is distinct from the concept of hybrid warfare,[10] although the two are intimately linked, as in the modern era states most often apply unconventional tools and hybrid techniques in the grey-zone.[25] However many of the unconventional tools used by states in the grey-zone such as propaganda campaigns, economic pressure, and the use of non-state entities do not cross over the threshold into formalized state-level aggression.[26]
Traditional militaries find it hard to respond to hybrid warfare since it is hard to agree on the source of the conflict. An article published inGlobal Security Review, "What is Hybrid Warfare?" compares the notion of hybrid warfare to the Russian concept of "non-linear" warfare, which it defines as the deployment of "conventional and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults." The article partially attributes the difficulty to the "rigid" or static military taxonomy used by NATO to define the very concept of warfare.[27][unreliable source?]
To counter a hybrid threat,hard power is often insufficient. Often, the conflict evolves under the radar, and even a "rapid" response turns out to be too late. Overwhelming force is an insufficient deterrent. Many traditional militaries lack the flexibility to shift tactics, priorities, and objectives constantly.[16][7]
When going through the work of philosophers who dealt with propaganda and governance in the last 3,000 years, one can find that hybrid war is not a new concept as many social anthropologists believe today.[28][better source needed] The combination of conventional and irregular methods is not new and has been used throughout history. A few examples of that type of combat are found in theAmerican Revolutionary War (a combination ofGeorge Washington'sContinental Army with militia forces) and theNapoleonic Wars (British regulars co-operated with Spanish guerrillas).[29]
There are examples of hybrid warfare in smaller conflicts during the 19th century. For instance, between 1837 and 1840,Rafael Carrera, a Conservative peasant rebel leader inGuatemala, waged a successful military campaign against the Liberals and the federal government of Central America by using a strategy that combined classical guerrilla tactics with conventional operations. Carrera's hybrid approach to warfare gave him the edge over his numerically-superior and better-armed enemies.[30]TheSoviet Union engaged in an early case of hybrid warfare in 1944. When theTuvan Army was away in Europe, fighting along theRed Army against theThird Reich, Moscow annexed theTuvan People's Republic by successfully pressing theTuvan government to ask for membership in the Soviet Union.[31]
The end of theCold War created a unipolar system with a preponderant American military power. Though that tempered traditional conflicts, regional conflicts and threats that leverage the weaknesses of conventional military structures became more frequent.[16][34]
At the same time, the sophistication and the lethality of non-state actors increased. They are well armed with technologically advanced weapons, now available at low prices. Commercial technologies such as drones, cellphones and digital networks were also adapted to the battlefield.[12][14] Another new element is the ability of non-state actors to persist within the modern system.[16]
One of the most often quoted examples[dubious –discuss] of a hybrid war is the2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.Hezbollah is a sophisticated non-state actor that is sponsored byIran. While the group often acts as a proxy for Iran, it has its own agenda. It was Hezbollah's policy, rather than Iran's, that led to the kidnapping of Israeli troops, which was the impetus for the war.[16] The war featured about 3,000 Hezbollah fighters embedded in the local population attacked by about 30,000 Israeli regular troops.[14]
The group used decentralized cells composed of guerrillas and regular troops, armed with weaponry that nation-states use, such asanti-tank missiles, rockets, armedunmanned aerial vehicles, and advancedimprovised explosive devices.[35] Hezbollah cells downed Israeli helicopters, damagedMerkava IV tanks, communicated with encrypted cell phones, and monitored Israeli troops movements with night vision and thermal imaging devices. IranianQuds Force operatives acted as mentors and suppliers of advanced systems.[14]
Hezbollah leveraged mass communication immediately distributing battlefield photos and videos dominating the perception battle throughout the conflict.Israel did not lose the war on the battlefield but lost the information battle, as the overwhelming perception was of Israeli defeat.[36]
TheIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a non-state actor which used hybrid tactics against the conventional Iraqi military. ISIL has transitional aspirations and uses irregular and regular tactics and terrorism.[12] In response,Iraq turned to hybrid tactics itself by using non-state and international actors tocounter the ISIL advance. The United States was a hybrid participant and used a combination of traditional air power, advisers to Iraqi government troops, Kurdishpeshmerga, sectarian militias; it also trained opposition forces withinSyria. The hybrid war was a conflict with an interconnected group of state and non-state actors pursuing overlapping goals and a weak local state.[37]
The Russian government's wide use in conflicts theSyrian Civil War and theRusso-Ukrainian War, of private military contractors such as those of theWagner Group was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance its interests and obfuscating its involvement and role.[38] Specifically, Russia employed a combination of traditional combat warfare, economic influence, cyber strategies, and disinformation attacks against Ukraine.[39]
Regarding Russia, Jānis Bērziņš, the director of the Center for Security and Strategic Research, has widely published to argue that using the term "hybrid" to characterize the Russian strategy is misleading since Russia has its own definitions and concepts: "the word 'hybrid' is catchy since it can represent a mix of anything. However, its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians due to the former being a military concept and the result of American military thought. Moreover, the concept ofNew Generation Warfare includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define it."[9]
Michael Kofman, a senior research scientist atCNA and a fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, noted in March 2018 that the West′s frequent references to hybrid warfare were in effect "an unintelligible Western reaction, after decades of wars of choice against paltry adversaries, to confrontation with another power that is capable across the full spectrum of conflict."[8]
Russia's activities in the former Soviet states have been described as Hobbesian and redolent of Cold War thinking.[40]
GeneralPhilip Breedlove, in aUS Senate hearing in February 2016, said that Russia is usingrefugees to weaken Europe and is directing the influx of refugees to destabilize areas and regions in terms of economy and to create social unrest. On 10 February 2016, Finnish Defence MinisterJussi Niinistö told a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers that Finland expects Russia to open a second front, with as many as 1 million migrants possibly arriving over the Finnish-Russian border. A similar statement was made byIlkka Kanerva, Finland's former foreign minister and now the chairman of the country's parliamentary Defense Committee.[41]
Moscow has accused Washington of conducting hybrid warfare against Russia during thecolour revolutions. Its perception of being at war or in apermanent state of conflict with the US and its allies was furthered by the 2014Maidan uprising in Ukraine.
It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy – it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war?
Iran's foreign policy exhibits characteristics associated with hybrid warfare.[44][45][46] According to theBBC, "Iran, along with its Houthi allies [in Yemen], is conducting a classic war of the weak against the strong; a "hybrid conflict" as it is known in the strategic textbooks. It is borrowing many of the tactics from the Russian play-book – the use of deniability; proxies; cyber-operations and information warfare."[47]
China has been accused of conducting hybrid warfare againstTaiwan[50] and in theSouth China Sea.[51][52] Bankov (2023) suggests that "China has its own signature and traditions in waging hybrid warfare, which deserve special attention."[53] Subsequently, Pietrzak (2025) suggests that China is persistent in its use of "effective hybrid and sharp strategies, such as the use of sophisticated underwater submarine drones and killing flying objects deployed for reconnaissance and to secure areas soon to be officially claimed by China."[54]
Poland and the Baltic states have accusedBelarus of conducting hybrid warfare against theEuropean Union by organizing illegal border crossings with migrants intoLatvia,Lithuania andPoland with the aim of destabilizing the 27-nation bloc.[55][56][57] Gizicki (2025) suggests that "Russia is undertaking many aggressive actions related to its superpower and neo-imperialism policies. Of key importance for Russia is to take control of Eastern Europe and parts of Central Europe, the so-called near abroad that was once part of the Soviet Union or strongly influenced by it during the Cold War."[58]
^abcStandish, Reid (2018-01-18)."Inside a European Center to Combat Russia's Hybrid Warfare".Foreign Policy.Archived from the original on 2018-01-18. Retrieved2018-01-31.[...] hybrid warfare: the blending of diplomacy, politics, media, cyberspace, and military force to destabilize and undermine an opponent's government.
^abBerzins, J. (2019). "Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare". in Howard, G. and Czekaj, M. (Eds.)Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation.
^Volodymyr, Kutsaiev (2023). "Systems and Technologies of Communication, Informatization and Cyber Security: Current Issues and Development Trends".International Scientific and Technical Conference.doi:10.61929/viti.mntk.3.2023.
