Howard Raiffa | |
|---|---|
| Born | (1924-01-24)January 24, 1924 New York City, US[1] |
| Died | July 8, 2016(2016-07-08) (aged 92) |
| Alma mater | University of Michigan |
| Scientific career | |
| Institutions | Columbia University Harvard University |
| Thesis | Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-Person Games (1952) |
| Doctoral advisor | Arthur Herbert Copeland |
| Doctoral students | Gordon M. Kaufman Robert B. Wilson Bernt P. Stigum Richard Zeckhauser |
Howard Raiffa (/ˈreɪfə/RAY-fə; January 24, 1924 – July 8, 2016) was an American academic who was theFrank P. RamseyProfessor (Emeritus) of ManagerialEconomics, a joint chair held by theBusiness School andHarvard Kennedy School atHarvard University.[2] He was an influentialBayesiandecision theorist and pioneer in the field ofdecision analysis, with works in statistical decision theory,game theory, behavioral decision theory, risk analysis, andnegotiation analysis.[3] He helped found and was the first director of theInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.[4][5]
Raiffa was born on Jan. 24, 1924 and attendedEvander Childs High School. He first attended theCity College of New York, before enlisting as a radar specialist in theUnited States Army Air Corps.[6]
After serving for four years duringWorld War II,[7] Raiffa received a bachelor's degree in mathematics in 1946, a master's degree in statistics in 1947 and a PhD in mathematics in 1951, all from theUniversity of Michigan.[6]
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Consider a situation in which you are required to gamble and are given two possible gambles.
Gamble A, in which you bet on the outcome of a fight between the world's greatest boxer and the world's greatest wrestler in a ring fight. (Assume you are fairly ignorant about martial arts and would have great difficulty making a choice of whom to bet on.) If your chosen champion wins you win $500 otherwise you get nothing. You place your choice in a sealed envelope, which is opened after the game.
Gamble B. Draw a ball from an opaque urn known to contain 50 orange and 50 blue balls. You will receive $500 if you draw an orange ball and nothing for a blue ball. The balls have been thoroughly mixed and you should assume that all balls are equally likely to be drawn. The draw takes place after the ring match is over.
Many people would feel more unsure about taking Gamble A in which the probabilities are unknown, rather than Gamble B, in which the probabilities are easily seen to be one half for each outcome.
Raiffa argues that a decision-maker should in fact assign a subjective probability of one-half to each outcome of Gamble A, provided that no information was available that makes one outcome more likely than the other.
Raiffa argues as follows. Suppose someone has the following preferences. If forced to take Gamble A they would bet on the boxer, but if given a free choice between the gambles they would prefer Gamble B. Presumably, such a person when allowed to choose Gamble A would prefer to simply bet on the boxer rather than toss a coin to decide the matter of whether they should bet on the boxer or the wrestler. But this randomised approach is equivalent to Gamble B. So, by theaxioms ofsubstitutability andtransitivity forutilities, they should also prefer to bet on the boxer than on Gamble B. A similar argument can be used to show that when the player has no preference between the boxer and the wrestler he should also have no preference between Gamble A and Gamble B.
(The axiom of substitutability says that if someone is indifferent between outcomes A and B and indifferent between outcomes A and C, they should be indifferent between B and C. Theaxiom of transitivity says that if someone prefers outcome A to B and also prefers B to C, then they should prefer A to C.)
Others, such asDaniel Ellsberg disagree with Raiffa's reasoning and have devised alternative interpretations of decision theory. One of the most radical departures isDempster-Shafer theory, which rejects the use ofprobability theory completely, in favour of a theory ofbelief functions, which do not satisfy theaxioms of probability.
I think of myself as a decision analyst who believes in using subjective probabilities. I would prefer being called a "subjectivist" than a "Bayesian."
I got an idea: call it applied systems analysis, because nobody will know what it means. We had a clean slate.