Horses in World War II were used by the belligerent nations, for transportation of troops,artillery,materiel, messages, and, to a lesser extent, in mobilecavalry troops. The role ofhorses for each nation depended on itsmilitary doctrines,strategy, and state of economy. It was most pronounced in theGerman andSoviet Armies. Over the course of the war,Germany (2.75 million) and theSoviet Union (3.5 million) together employed more than six million horses.

Most British regular cavalry regiments were mechanised between 1928 and the outbreak ofWorld War II. TheUnited States retained a singlehorse cavalry regiment stationed in thePhilippines, and the German Army retained a single brigade. TheFrench Army of 1939–1940 blended horse regiments into their mobile divisions, and the Soviet Army of 1941 had thirteen cavalry divisions. TheItalian,Iranian,Japanese,Polish andRomanian armies employed substantial cavalry formations.

Horse-drawn transportation was most important for Germany, as it was relatively lacking in automotive industry^[2] and oil resources. Infantry and horse-drawn artillery formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war; only one fifth of the Army belonged to mobilepanzer and mechanized divisions. Each German infantry division employed thousands of horses and thousands of men taking care of them. Despite losses of horses to enemy action, exposure and disease, Germany maintained a steady supply of work and saddle horses until 1945. Cavalry in theGerman Army and theWaffen-SS gradually increased in size, peaking at six cavalry divisions in February 1945.

The Red Army was substantially motorized from 1939 to 1941 but lost most of its war equipment inOperation Barbarossa. The losses were temporarily remedied by forming masses ofmounted infantry, which were used as strike forces in theBattle of Moscow. Heavy casualties and a shortage of horses soon compelled the Soviets to reduce the number of cavalry divisions. As tank production and Allied supplies made up for the losses of 1941, the cavalry was merged with tank units, forming more effective strike groups. From 1943 to 1944, cavalry gradually became themobile infantry component of thetank armies. By the end of the war, Soviet cavalry had been reduced to its prewar strength. The logistical role of horses in the Red Army was not as high as it was in the German Army because of Sovietdomestic oil reserves andUS truck supplies.

Thetrench warfare of theWestern Front of World War I resulted in a strategic stalemate: defensive weapons and tactics prevailed over the offensive options available.Early tanks, supported by artillery and foot infantry, provided a weapon for breaching the front line but were too slow to turn the breach into a strategic offensive; the railroads of France and Germany provided the defending side with the ability to move troops and counterattack in sufficient time. Postwar armies concentrated on developing more effective offensive tactics through themechanization of ground troops. The mechanization strategy was influenced by the state of economies, anticipated scenarios of war, politics and lobbying within civilian governments and the militaries. The United Kingdom, France and Germany chose three different strategies. A fourth option was chosen by the Soviet Union who, influenced by the mobile warfare experience of theRussian Civil War and thePolish-Soviet War, introduced amechanized corps andairborne troops.^[3] Each strategy closed the gap between the capabilities of cavalry andmechanized infantry.

Another factor prompting motorization was the decline of national horse stocks and the inability to restore them in reasonable time.^[4] Of all the major powers, only the United Kingdom, weakened by theloss of Ireland, was, in part, compelled to motorize for this reason; horse stocks in Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union remained sufficient for at least their peacetime armies.^[4] In 1928, the United Kingdom became the first nation to begin replacing horse cavalry with motorized troops^[5] and by 1939 had become the first to motorize their national army, although someYeomanry regiments plus regular cavalry units serving overseas remained mounted.^[6]British experimental armored units had performed impressively since 1926,^[7] but, facing resistance from the traditional branches of service, remained unpopular among senior officers until theBattle of France.^[8]

The French Army partially motorized their cavalry in 1928, creating divisions ofdragons portés (mobiledragoons) that combined motorized and horse-mounted elements.^[9] In the following decade the French searched for a perfect mix, testing five different divisional configurations.^[10]Bulgaria,Hungary andRomania followed the French mixed pattern;Austrian andCzechoslovak mobile divisions were similar but with a higher share of horses.^[9] ThePolish Army acquired tanks and theLithuanian army acquired trucks but otherwise both remained horse-powered, World War I style armies.^[11] TheUnited States Cavalry commanders approved the French strategy^[9] but made no radical changes until the 1940 reform that completely eliminated horse troops.

German analysts rejected the French concept of mixed horse-and-motor troops as unworkable.^[9] TheWehrmacht had its own opponents of mechanization, but withAdolf Hitler's supportLudwig Beck,^[a]Werner von Fritsch^[a] andHeinz Guderian succeeded in forging a compact but effectivepanzer force that coexisted with masses of traditional foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery throughout World War II.^[b][15]Willis Crittenberger observed that "the French are limited to the armored division, while the Germans have created an armored branch."^[16] By 1939, theWehrmacht disbanded their 18 cavalry regiments, leaving a single active cavalry brigade; the cavalrymen with their war horses were integrated into infantry divisions.^[15]

Motorization of the 1930s raised a number of concerns, starting with the need to secure a continuous fuel supply. The new formations had a significantly larger footprint on the march: the 1932 French motorized division took up 52 km (32 mi) of road space compared to 11.5 km (7.1 mi) for a horse-mounted formation, raising concerns about control and vulnerability.^[5] TheSpanish Civil War and other conflicts of the 1930s did not provide definite solutions and the issues remained unresolved until the onset of World War II. Only the Germanblitzkrieg achieved in theBattle of France finally persuaded the militaries of the world, including the United States, that thetank had replaced the horse on the battlefield.^[17]

German and Soviet armies relied heavily on work horses to pull artillery and supplies.^[18] Horses seemed to be a cheap and reliable transport especially in thespring and fall mud of theEastern Front^[18] but the associated costs of daily feeding, grooming and handling horses were staggering. In theory horse units could feed off the country, but grazing on grass alone rendered horses unfit for work and the troops had no time to spend searching the villages forfodder.^[19] Hard-working horses required up to twelve pounds of grain daily;^[19] fodder carried by the troops made up a major portion of their supply trains.^[19]

Horses needed attendants: hitching a six-horse field artillery team, for example, required six men working for at least an hour.^[1] Horse health deteriorated after only ten days of even moderate load, requiring frequent refits; recuperation took months and the replacement horses, in turn, needed time to get along with their teammates and handlers.^[1] Good stables around the front line were scarce; makeshift lodgings caused premature wear and disease.^[1] Refit of front-line horse units consumed eight to ten days, slowing down operations.^[1]

Movements over 30 kilometres (19 miles) (the daily horse travel limit^[20]) were particularly slow and complex. Longer hauls were relegated to trucks at the first opportunity, while horses persisted at divisional level^[21] and in auxiliary units.^[22] Horse transports were particularly inadequate in deep offensive operations, just like they were in 1914. American trucks supplied to the Soviets allowed operations up to 350 kilometres (220 miles) away from therailhead, a distance impossible for horse-drawn sleighs.^[23] Likewise, replacement of field artillery horses withjeeps allowed towing120 mm mortars in line with advancing troops, another tactic not possible with horses.^[23] Use of trucks was constrained by the lack of fuel and high costs ofsynthetic gasoline on the German side, and the losses of equipment in 1941–1942 on the Soviet side. The Soviets managed their losses with the formation of 76 horse transport battalions of 500 horses each, and employedreindeer in the Arctic andcamels in the South.^[21] But overcoming the shortage of horses themselves was insurmountable: a work horse matures in three to four years;^[19] farm stocks were already depleted of horses as well as tractors.^[19] Western European nations, starting with the United Kingdom, witnessed a shortage of horses since the 1920s and adjusted their armies accordingly.^[4] Germany in the 1920s managed to restore their population of horses, but then it declined again as farm horses were replaced by motor power.^[4]

TheUnited States Army, having ample reserves of fuel and trucks, opted for all-truck logistics from the onset of their military reform of 1940. As GeneralRobert W. Grow wrote, "there was not a single horse in the American Army in Europe, there was lots of cavalry action".^[24] Nevertheless, horses, mules, donkeys and even oxen remained essential in rough, remote areas of the Pacific.

Cavalry provided a major element in the Chinese armies of 1937–1945. Both theNational Army of theKuomintang and theChinese Communist Party Army used cavalry for patrolling, reconnaissance and direct conflict as mounted infantry with the Japanese forces.Mongolian horses provided the bulk of horse-stock in Chinese armies with largerNingxia ponies sometimes used. As late as the 1940s the Chinese People's Liberation Army included approximately 100,000 mounted soldiers, grouped in 14 cavalry divisions and considered as an elite.^[38]

Pre-war permutations of mixed horse-and-truck divisions resulted in the 1939 Light Cavalry Division (DLC). Each DLC retained a horse brigade of 1,200 sabers.^[10] At the onset of World War II France mobilized over half a million horses,^[10] arguably draining the resources that should rather have been invested into true mechanized and tank formations.^[10] TheGerman offensive in May 1940 compelled the French to reconsider the effectiveness of their light cavalry and move it to what seemed to be a more appropriate ground, theArdennes.^[10] But there too they were soon crushed by the decisive German offensive.^[35]

Several mounted regiments of North Africanspahis and Circassian cavalry formed part of the Vichy controlledArmy of the Levant in 1941, where they saw action during the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by British Empire and Free French forces.^[39]

By 1945 the only French mounted troops retaining an operational role were several squadrons of Moroccan and Algerian spahis serving in North Africa and in France itself.

The German Army entered World War II with 514,000 horses,^[15] and over the course of the war employed, in total, 2.75 million horses and mules;^[18] the average number of horses in the Army reached 1.1 million.^[28]

Most of these horses were employed by foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery troops that formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war.^{[1][6][15][40]} Of 264 divisions active in November 1944, only 42 were armored or mechanized (November 1943: 52 of 322).^[28] In addition to work horses each infantry division possessed a reconnaissance battalion with 216 cavalrymen^[40] – the legacy of disbanded cavalry regiments.^[41] They wore cavalry insignia until September 1943.^[42] Over the course of the war these horse elements were reduced, and the 1945 divisions lacked horsemen altogether.^[28] Reconnaissance and antitank battalions were the only mobile elements in a German infantry division.^[28]

The organization of infantry troops and the mindset of their commanders were radically different from those of advance panzer forces.^[40] Mechanization of the German Army substantially lagged behind the Red Army,^[26] although theblitzkrieg of 1941 temporarily reversed the tables: the Germans captured tanks, trucks and tractors but were losing horses: 179,000 died in December 1941 and January 1942 alone.^[1] A German soldier wrote: "A curious odor will stick to this campaign, this mixture of fire, sweat and horse corpses."^[43]

A German division was supposed to be logistically self-sufficient, providing its own men, horses and equipment to haul its own supplies from an Army level railhead.^[44] Soviet divisions, on the contrary, relied on the Army level transports. The supply train of a 1943 German infantry division employed 256 trucks and 2,652 horses attended by 4,047 men,^[44] while other divisional configurations had up to 6,300 horses.^[28] The supply train of a lean 1943 Soviet infantry division, in comparison, had only 91 trucks and 556 horses attended by 879 men.^[44][d]Luftwaffe Field Divisions were designed to be lean and rely on trucks andhalftracks but in real life these were substituted with horses and mules.^[45] Incidentally,psychotherapistErnst Göring, nephew ofLuftwaffe chiefHermann Göring, usedtherapeutic horseback riding to rehabilitate wounded pilots, but in 1942 the program was shut down as too expensive.^[46]

Horse logistics slowed down the German advance. The6th Army, engaged inurban warfare inStalingrad, was unable to feed or graze their horses and sent them to the rear.^[26] When the Soviets enveloped the 6th Army in November 1942, the German troops were cut off from their horse transport and would have been unable to move their artillery had they tried to evacuate the city.^[26] In an earlier envelopment, theDemyansk Pocket, 20,000 horses were trapped together with 95,000 men andairlifting fodder drained precious air transport capacity.^[47] However these horses also provided food for soldiers in an environment where the "axe rebounds as a stone from a frozen horse corpse."^[48]

During the war German cavalry units increased in numbers from a single brigade^[28] to a larger but still limited force of six cavalry divisions and two corps HQ.^[28] All regular cavalry troops served on the Eastern Front^[49] and the Balkans^[28] and a few Cossack battalions served on the Western Front.^[50]

German and Polish mounted troops fought one of the last significant cavalry vs cavalry clashes, during theBattle of Krasnobród in 1939.

The German Army of 1941 had a single cavalry division assigned toHeinz Guderian's panzer group. Continuously engaged against Soviet troops, it increased in size to six regiments^[28] and in the beginning of 1942 was reformed into the24th Panzer Division that later perished in theBattle of Stalingrad.^[28] In April–June 1943^[51] the Germans set up three separate cavalry regiments (Nord,Mitte,Süd)^[51] – horse units reinforced with tanks and halftrack-mounted infantry. In August 1944 these regiments were reformed into two brigades and a division^[52] forming, together with the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division,Gustav Harteneck's Cavalry Corps that operated inBelorussia.^[28][53] In February 1945 the brigades were reformed into cavalry divisions (Germanstud farms inEast Prussia were not affected by the Allied air raids that crippled German industry^[28]).

TheSS operated both paramilitary horse units (23 cavalry regiments in 1941^[28]) and militaryWaffen SS cavalry. TheSS Cavalry Brigade, formed in 1940, was engaged against civilians and partisans in the occupied territories and then severely checked by the SovietRzhev-Sychevka offensive. In 1942 the SS reformed the brigade into the8th SS Cavalry Division manned byvolksdeutsche, which operated on the Eastern Front until October 1943. In December 1943 the 8th Cavalry spun off the22nd SS Cavalry Division^[28] manned with Hungarian Germans. These divisions were properly augmented with heavy, field and anti-aircraft artillery.^[28] Another SS cavalry division, the33rd Cavalry, was formed in 1944 but never deployed to full strength.

The Germans recruited anti-Sovietcossacks since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, although Hitler did not approve the practice until April 1942.^[54] Army Cossacks of 1942 formed four regiments^[55] and in August 1943 were merged into the1st Cossack Cavalry Division (six regiments,^[36] up to 13,000 men) trained in Poland^[55] and deployed inYugoslavia.^[28] In November 1944 the division was split in two^[28] and reformed into theXV SS Cossack Cavalry Corps.^[36][56] TheKalmyks formed theKalmykian Cavalry Corps, employed in rear guard duties.^[57]

In February 1945 German and Hungarian cavalry divisions were thrown into theLake Balaton offensive; after a limited success, German forces were ground down by the Soviet counteroffensive. Remnants of Army cavalry fell back intoAustria; 22,000 men surrendered to the Western allies, bringing with them 16,000 horses.^[58] Remnants of SS cavalry, merged into the37th SS Division, followed the same route.^[28]

Two Greek horse mounted regiments, plus one that had been partially motorized, saw service during theItalian invasion of Greece of October 1940. These units proved effective in the rough terrain of the Greco-Albanian border region^[59]

Hungary entered the war with two traditional horse-mounted cavalry brigades.^[29] Its war efforts were split between supporting Germany in the east and guarding the border with its hostile "ally"Romania.^[29] In 1941 the 1st Cavalry Brigade, part of the Mobile Corps, performed a 600-mile dash fromGalicia to theDonetz Basin that ended in the loss of most of its motor vehicles.^[29] In October 1942 the Hungarian cavalry was reorganized into the 1st Cavalry Division, which in 1944 ended up defendingWarsaw from the Soviets^[29] as part of Von Harteneck's Cavalry Corps.^[58] A second, reserve cavalry division was hastily formed in August 1944.^[29]

TheItalian Colonial Empire inherited by thefascist regime maintained diverse colonial troops, including regular and irregular cavalry. Of 256,000 colonial troops available in 1940, 182,000 were recruited from indigenous North and East Africans.^[60][61] The mounted cavalry element amongst these comprised seven squadrons ofsavari and four groups ofspahis from Libya plus 16 squadrons ofCavalleria Coloniale fromItalian East Africa.^[62] On July 4, 1940, four East-African cavalry regiments and two colonial brigades capturedKassala at a cost of over one hundred men;.^[61]

Benito Mussolini's Italy entered the Russian Campaign in July–August 1941 by sending theCSIR, a mobile force of 60,900 men and 4,600 horses, toUkraine.^[63] The CSIR retained traditional saber-wielding cavalry (TheSavoia Cavalleria andLancieri di Novara^[54] regiments of the3rd Cavalry Division) and relied on horse transport and a motley assortment of civilian trucks. Despite high casualties, in 1942 Mussolini sent reinforcements – the 227,000-strong Eighth Army, renamedArmata Italiana in Russia ( ARMIR), primarily an infantry force.^[63] On August 24, 1942, when the Italian front was crumbling,Savoia Cavalleriacharged the Red Army near Izbushensky and managed to repel two Soviet battalions.^[54][63] In December 1942 the Italians, outnumbered 9 to 1, were overrun and destroyed by the SovietOperation Saturn.^[64]

Japan's environment, historically, did not foster horse breeding practices,^[65] thus after theRusso-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the government established a breeding bureau that imported Australian and English stallions, establishing a new local stock.^[65] After World War I the Japanese Army blended the majority of its cavalry regiments into 32 existing infantry divisions to provide mounted reconnaissance battalions.^[66] This wholesale integration created a perceived weakness in the Japanese order of battle which persisted into the late 1930s, although by 1938 four cavalry brigades had been set aside from the infantry for independent service in the wide Chinese hinterland.^[30] Contemporary observers wrote that by 1940 these brigades were obsolete, not fitting the role of a proper shock army.^[30] One Japanese cavalry unit saw active service outside China, in the Malayan campaign of 1941.^[67]

The Japanese also made use of Mongolian mounted auxiliaries, recruited in Japanese-held territory, to patrol the Soviet and Mongolian borders.^[67]

In the early stages of World War II, mounted units of the Mongolian People's Army were involved in theBattle of Khalkhin Gol against invading Japanese forces. Soviet forces under the command ofGeorgy Zhukov, together with Mongolian forces, defeated the Japanese Sixth army and effectively ended the Soviet–Japanese Border Wars. After theSoviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941, Mongolia remained neutral throughout most of the war, but its geographical situation meant that the country served as a buffer between Japanese forces and the Soviet Union. In addition to keeping around 10% of the population under arms, Mongolia provided half a million trained horses for use by the Soviet Army. In addition, some mounted units of the Mongolian People's Army supported a Soviet Army on the western flank of theManchurian Strategic Offensive Operation in 1945. They formed part of the Soviet MongolianCavalry Mechanized Group under the command of I. A. Pliyev

The Polish Army and its tactics were influenced by the mobilePolish-Soviet War where cavalry was the decisive force.^[68] At the onset of war Poland fielded 38 cavalry regiments organized into 11 cavalry and 2 mechanized brigades^[31] (though only one, the10th Motorized, was actually deployed^[68]). Cavalry accounted for around 10%^[68] of the whole Polish Army that remained, largely, an army of World War I.^[68] The government took the military threats seriously and counted on requisitioning privately owned horses.^[69] The stock of horses was regularly reviewed at local fairs, and best breeders rewarded.^[69]

The Polish campaign of September 1939 counted fifteen significant cavalry actions.^[31] Two were classic cavalry charges on horseback with sabres, others were fought on foot.^[31][70] The Poles claimed twelve victories, including successful breakout attempts.^[31] The most strikingBattle of Mokra pitted theWołyńska Cavalry Brigade headlong against the4th Panzer Division with 295 tanks.^[71] The Poles repelled waves of tank and infantry attacks for two days, giving the Germans "a bloody drubbing".^[72]

The legendary charge of Polish cavalry against German panzers, however, was a propaganda myth influenced by theCharge at Krojanty. In this battle fought on September 1, 1939, the Polish 18th Cavalry Regiment charged and dispersed a German infantry unit.^[73] Soon afterwards the Poles themselves were gunned down by German armored vehicles and retreated with heavy casualties; the aftermath of the beating was fictitiously presented as a cavalry charge against tanks.^[73]

After the collapse of Poland the remains of its cavalry reemerged in France as the10th Armoured Brigade^[74] and in the United Kingdom as the1st Armoured Division. New Polish cavalry brigades were formed in the Soviet Union for thePolish Armed Forces in the East. The last action by Polish cavalry occurred on March 1, 1945 nearSchoenfeld, when the Independent Warsaw Brigade overran German anti-tank positions.^[75]

The Romanian cavalry was the largest mounted force amongst Germany's allies.^[32] Romania began the war with six brigades and reformed them into divisions in 1942.^[32] A half-hearted modernisation introduced one motorised regiment in each division; prior to deployment in Southern Russia the 7th Cavalry Division was fully motorized.^[76] Four divisions were destroyed in the Battle of Stalingrad. Two divisions were trapped inCrimea and escaped theCrimean Offensive of 1944 with a loss of all hardware.^[76]

Collectivization of agriculture reduced Soviet horse stocks from an estimated 34 million^[19] in 1929 to 21 million in 1940.^[26] Of these, 11 million were lost to advancing German armies in 1941–1942.^[26] Unlike Germany, the Soviets had sufficient oil supplies but suffered from a shortage of horses throughout the war.^[26] Red Army logistics, aided withdomestic oil and American truck supplies, were mechanized to a greater extent than the Wehrmacht, but the Soviets employed far more combat cavalry troops than the Germans.^[26] In total the Red Army employed 3.5 million horses.^[18]

TheFirst Cavalry Army's experience and elevation of its commanders to the top of the military significantly influenced development of Soviet war doctrine in theinterwar period.^[77] Although the cavalry armies were disbanded after theRussian Civil War, Red Cavalry reached 14 divisions and 7 independent brigades in 1929 and peaked at 32 divisions and two brigades in 1938,^[26][77] although few of them actually deployed to nominal strength. 1939 and 1940 were spent in massive reorganizations of the troops into mechanized and tank corps, their formation influenced by theSpanish Civil War^[26] and theBattle of France^[78] and their disbandment forced by the inability to properly supply and manage large formations.^[79] The role of cavalry was unexpectedly boosted by the setbacks suffered by mechanized forces in1939 in Poland and in1939–1940 in Finland.^[80]

A standard Soviet 1941 rifle division of 14,483 men relied on horse logistics and had a supply train of 3,039 horses, half of the complement of the 1941 German infantry division.^[81] Various reorganizations made Soviet units smaller and leaner; the last divisional standard (December 1944), beefed up against the 1943 minimum, provided for only 1,196 horses for a regular division and 1,155 horses for aGuards division.^[82] By this time few divisions ever had more than half of their standard human complement, and their logistic capacities were downgraded accordingly.^[82]

In June 1941 theRed Army had four Cavalry Corps commands and thirteen Cavalry Divisions^[83] (seven of them in western military districts^[84]), as opposed to sixty-two Infantry Corps and twenty-nine Mechanized Corps.^[83] By the 1941 standard, each division counted 9,240^[d] men – four cavalry regiments, one mechanized regiment ofBT tanks and two artillery battalions;^[85] a 1941 cavalry corps had two divisions reinforced with more armor and artillery.^[85] In real life cavalry and infantry units were stripped of their tanks^[86] and trucks,^[87] being purely horse and foot troops with reduced mobility and firepower.^[86][87] Even the stripped-down divisions were too large to be effectively handled by their inexperienced commanders and were easily disorganized and destroyed by the Germans (for example, 60 to 80 percent of the 6th Cavalry Corps were destroyed on June 22 as they struggled to assemble in formation).^[88] Other cavalry units such as the Belov's1st Guards Cavalry Corps and Dovator's2nd Guards Cavalry Corps proved how under the leadership of a great commander cavalry could not only perform its given tasks but outperform many of the best mobile units.

By the end of 1941 organizational problems were solved by further reducing units into "light cavalry" divisions with a strength of roughly half of a "normal" cavalry division^[89] (3,447^[d] men in three regiments).^[33][90] Losses of tanks and trucks in the summer of 1941 made these eighty^[33] divisions, combined into Cavalry Corps, "about the only mobile units left intact to the Soviets".^[85] These were used to attack en masse at critical points, ideally in cooperation with tanks but rarely with foot infantry.^[91] In defense, cavalry was useful in checking enemy advances at an early stage, attacking German flanks and quickly evading enemy reaction.^[91]

Cavalry actions of 1941 were poorly led and executed, with high casualties; the tactics improved when cavalry divisions were reinforced with mechanized infantry units and anti-aircraft artillery.^[91] These attachments, made permanent, elevated cavalry divisions to Cavalry Corps, first deployed en masse during the 1941–1942 winter offensive.^[91] Again, incompetent or indifferent commanders regularly threw their cavalry against fortified targets with heavy casualties.^[91] Combat losses and a severe winter reduced horse stocks to a point where 41 cavalry divisions were disbanded for the lack of horses.^[92] Horse stocks did not and could not recover and the remaining cavalry divisions, even when refit, never had a full complement of horses.^[37]

Joseph Stalin favored the idea of a reformed Cavalry Army which the military initially opposed, fearing its vulnerability to enemy tanks.^[37] The concept of integrating cavalry, infantry and tank divisions (the futureTank Army) emerged as theCavalry mechanized group (CMG) in the fall of 1942.^[33][37] The 1942 CMG functioned like a true tank army, but its infantry rode on horses, not trucks.^[37] The number of cavalry divisions was further reduced to match the number of CMGs (later Tank Armies) and the available horse stock, to 26 divisions by the end of 1943.^[93] These divisions acquired their own light tanks and increased to 5,700 men each.^[d][93] Their horse elements, although vulnerable to enemy fire, were indispensable in being able to keep pace with a tank breakthrough before the enemy could restore their defences.^[93] Normally on the night before the offensive they concentrated in a jump-off area 12–15 kilometres (7.5–9.3 miles) from the front line, and charged past it together with the tanks as soon as the first wave had breached the enemy lines.^[93][94]

In 1943 the Red Army gained sufficient experience and materiel to deploy numerous Tank Armies. They became the main strike weapon and cavalry was relegated to auxiliary offensive tasks requiring all-terrain mobility – usually involving encirclement and mopping up of an enemy already shattered and split by tank forces. During theVoronezh Front operations in the Upper Don area underGolikov, Soviet cavalry struck out very successfully for Valuiki and under the pale winter sun on 19 January the horsemen in black capes and flying hoods charged down the hapless Italians, killing and wounding more than a thousand before the brief resistance by the fleeing, hungry and frostbitten men of the5th Italian Infantry Division ended.^[95]

The 1944 Cavalry Corps, in turn, had up to 103 tanks andtank destroyers in addition to three Cavalry Divisions^[96] that once again were made lean and light and dependent on horse alone (4,700^[d] men with 76 mm field guns and no armor).^[96] By the end of the war with Germany, Soviet cavalry returned to its pre-war nominal strength of seven cavalry corps, or one cavalry corps per each tank army. This made the cavalry the only military unit in the Red army to achieve 100% Guards status among all of its units. The CMGs of the period (one Tank Corps and one Cavalry Corps) were regularly weapons of choice in operations where terrain prohibited the use of fully deployed Tank Armies.^[97]

The last CMG action in the war took place in August 1945 during theinvasion of Manchuria. GeneralIssa Pliyev's CMG, marching toPeking across theGobi Desert, was actually manned byMongolian cavalrymen – four Mongolian cavalry divisions in addition to one Soviet cavalry division, plus five mechanized brigades withheavy tanks.^[98] They were opposed by the horsemen ofInner Mongolia who fell back without fighting.^[99]

Replacement of horses witharmored cars in British cavalry began in 1928. Over the following eleven years all regular mounted regiments stationed in the United Kingdom, other than the Household Cavalry, were motorized,^[5] and their horses sold or allocated to other units. Mechanised cavalry regiments retained their traditional titles but were grouped with theRoyal Tank Regiment as part of theRoyal Armoured Corps established in April 1939.^[100]

British troops in theMediterranean theatre of war continued the use of horses for transport and other support purposes. The horses used were from local as well as imported sources. As an example theSherwood Foresters infantry regiment, relocated toPalestine in 1939, brought with them a thousand English horses.^[101] Two mounted cavalry regiments were already present in this region. Lack of vehicles delayed planned motorization of these troops well into 1941.^[101] In 1942 the British still employed 6,500 horses, 10,000 mules and 1,700 camels, and used local mules inSicily and mainlandItaly.^[102]

Empire troops, notably theTransjordan Frontier Force and theArab Legion, remained horse-mounted.^[103] All 20 Indian cavalry regiments were mechanised between 1938 and November 1940.^[104] The last British mounted cavalry charge occurred on March 21, 1942, when a patrol ofsowars of theBurma Frontier Force encountered Japanese infantry – initially mistaking them for Chinese troops – atToungoo in centralBurma. Led by Captain Arthur Sandeman ofThe Central India Horse (21st King George V's Own Horse), the BFF detachment charged and most were killed.^[105]

The United States economy of the interwar period quickly got rid of the obsolete horse; national horse stocks were reduced from 25 million in 1920 to 14 million in 1940.^[4]

In December 1939, theUnited States Cavalry consisted of two mechanized and twelve horse regiments of 790 horses each.^[106] Chief of CavalryJohn K. Herr, a proponent of horse troops ("conservative and downright mossback" according to Allan Millett^[107] yet "noble and tragic in his loyalty to horse" according to Roman Jarymowycz^[108]), intended to increase them to 1275 horses each.^[106] A cavalry division included two brigades of two horse regiments each, eighteen light tanks and a field artillery regiment;^[34] the Chief of Artillery leaned to horse and truck traction and dismissedself-propelled artillery to avoid cross-coordination with other branches of service.^[109] Cavalry had been the preferred force for the defense of the Mexican border and thePanama Canal Zone from Mexican raiders^[110] and enemy landings,^[34] a threat that was becoming obsolete in the 1930s, if not for Japan's rising influence.^[111] A fleet ofhorse trailers calledportees assisted cavalry in traversing the roads.^[34][112] Once mounted, cavalrymen would reach the battlefield on horseback, dismount and then fight on foot,^[34] essentially acting as mobile light infantry.^[34]

After the1940 Louisiana Maneuvers cavalry units were gradually reformed into Armored Corps, starting withAdna R. Chaffee's 1st Armored Corps in July 1940.^[113] Another novelty introduced after the maneuvers, theBantam 4×4 car, soon became known as thejeep and replaced the horse itself.^[34] Debates over the integration of armor and horse units continued through 1941^[114] but the failure of these attempts "to marry horse with armor" was evident even to casual civilian observers.^[115] The office of Chief of Cavalry was eliminated in March 1942, and the newly formed ground forces began mechanization of the remaining horse units.^[116] The1st Cavalry Division was reorganized as an infantry unit but retained its designation.^[117]

The only significant engagement of American horsemen in World War II was the defensive action of thePhilippine Scouts (26th Cavalry Regiment).^[118] The Scouts challenged the Japanese invaders ofLuzon, holding off two armoured and two infantry regiments during theinvasion of the Philippines. They repelled a unit of tanks inBinalonan and successfully held ground for the Allied armies' retreat toBataan.^[119] What would become, at that time, the very last combat horse cavalry charge in U.S. Army history occurred atMorong on the west side ofBataan, on January 16, 1942, when mostly Filipino troopers of 'G' Troop,26th Cavalry (PS), led by Southern Illinois native 1st Lt.Edwin Ramsey, successfully charged their mounts at a far superior Japanese force of armor-supported infantry, surprising and scattering them. This lightly armed, 27-man force of U.S. Horse Cavalry, under heavy fire, held off the Japanese for several crucial hours.Ramsey earned aSilver Star andPurple Heart for this action, and the26th was immortalized in U.S. Cavalry history.

In Europe, the American forces fielded only a few cavalry and supply units during the war.George S. Patton lamented their lack inNorth Africa and wrote that "had we possessed an American cavalry division with pack artillery inTunisia and inSicily, not a German would have escaped".^[120]

• Paul Louis Johnson (2006).Horses of the German Army in World War II. Schiffer Publishing.ISBN 0-7643-2421-7,ISBN 978-0-7643-2421-5.
• R. L. DiNardo, Austin Bay (1988).Horse-Drawn Transport in the German Army. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No. 1, 129–143 (1988).doi:10.1177/002200948802300108.
• Janusz Piekalkiewicz (1979).The cavalry of World War II. Orbis Publishing.ISBN 0-85613-022-2,ISBN 978-0-85613-022-9.
• German military regulation H.Dv. 465/1 – Fahrvorschrift (Fahrv.) Heft 1 Allgemeine Grundsätze der Fahrausbildung – 1941,ISBN 978-3734782022
• German military regulation H.Dv. 465/2 – Fahrvorschrift (Fahrv.) Heft 2 Ausbildung des Zugpferdes – 1943,ISBN 978-3732290956
• German military regulation H.Dv. 465/3 – Fahrvorschrift (Fahrv.) Heft 3 Fahren vom Bock – 1943,ISBN 978-3741265938
• German military regulation H.Dv. 465/4 – Fahrvorschrift (Fahrv.) Heft 4 Fahren vom Sattel – 1942,ISBN 978-3738607093

Wikimedia Commons has media related toHorses in World War II.

• "WWII Museum Exhibit to Honor Hooved Heroes"The Horse online edition, July 23, 2010
• The Society of the Military Horse
• Australian Merchant Navy:Transporting horsesArchived 2009-09-01 at theWayback Machine
• 抗战时期精锐的中国骑兵 (Chinese cavalry during WWII)Archived 2021-02-28 at theWayback Machine

• Cavalry
• Warhorses
• Military animals of World War II
• Working horses
• Horse history and evolution

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