Thehistory of military logistics goes back toNeolithic times. The most basic requirements of an army are food and water. Early armies were equipped with weapons used for hunting like spears, knives, axes and bows and arrows, and were small due to the practical difficulty of supplying a large number of soldiers. Large armies began to appear in theIron Age. Animals such as horses, oxen, camels and even elephants were used to carry supplies. Food, water and fodder for the animals could usually be found or purchased in the field. TheRoman Empire andMaurya Empire in India built networks of roads, but it was far less expensive to transport by sea than by road. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century there was the shift in Western Europe away from a centrally organised army.
Starting in the late sixteenth century, armies in Europe increased in size, to 100,000 or more in some cases. When operating in enemy territory an army was forced to plunder the local countryside for supplies, which allowed war to be conducted at the enemy's expense. However, with the increase in army sizes this reliance on pillage and plunder became problematic, as decisions regarding where and when an army could move or fight became based not on strategic objectives but on whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs.Sieges in particular were affected by this, both for an army attempting to lay siege to a town and one coming to its relief. Unless a commander was able to arrange a form of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated countryside could become immune to either operation.Napoleon made logistics a major part of his strategy. He dispersed his corps along a broad front to maximise the area from which supplies could be drawn. Each day forage parties brought in supplies. This differed from earlier operations living off the land in the size of the forces involved, and because the primary motivation was the emperor's desire for mobility. Ammunition could not as a rule be obtained locally, but it was still possible to carry sufficient ammunition for an entire campaign.
The nineteenth century saw technological developments that facilitated immense improvements to the storage, handling and transportation of supplies which made it easier to support an army from the rear.Canning simplified storage and distribution of foods, and reduced waste and the incidence of food-related illness. Refrigeration allowed frozen meat and fresh produce to be stored and shipped.Steamships made water transports faster and more reliable.Railways were a more economical form of transport than animal-drawn carts and wagons, although they were limited to tracks, and therefore could not support an advancing army unless its advance was along existing railway lines. At the same time, the advent ofindustrial warfare in the form ofbolt-action rifles,machine guns andquick-firing artillery sent ammunition consumption soaring during theFirst World War.
In the twentieth century the advent of motor vehicles powered byinternal combustion engines offered an alternative to animal transport for moving supplies forward of the railhead, although many armies still used animals. Air transport provided an alternative to land and sea transport, but with limited tonnage and at high cost. An airlift over "the Hump" helped supply theChinese war effort during theSecond World War, and the 1948Berlin Air Lift was successful in supplying half of the city. With the subsequent development of large jets, aircraft became the preferred method of moving personnel over long distances, although it was still more economical to move cargo by sea and rail. In forward areas, the helicopter was well-suited to moving troops and supplies, especially over rugged terrain. The increasing complexity of weapons and equipment saw the proportion of personnel devoted to logistics rise. The diversity of equipment and consequent large number of spare parts saw attempts at standardisation but the adoption of foreign weapons also meant the adoption of foreign tactics, and giving up the advantages of bespoke systems tailored to a nation's own, often unique, strategic environment.
The most basic requirements of an army are food and water.[1]Neolithic armies were equipped with weapons used for hunting — spears, knives, axes and bows and arrows.[2][3] By 1150BCE theOlmecs of Mesoamerica were producingobsidian weapons that were neither hunting weapons nor agricultural tools.[4] Early armies were small due to the practical difficulty of supplying large numbers of people, and their radius of action was likewise limited to 80 to 90 kilometres or so. A ruler or warlord might use an army to extract tax or tribute, but it required a formidable logistical exercise to employ it.[5]
By 700 BCE,Assyria had developed astanding army, with iron replacing bronze in weapons and armour, and cavalry replacing chariots.[6] The Assyrian army may have been able to field as many as 50,000 men, which alone would have required a high degree of logistical acumen,[7] but could operate up to 500 kilometres from its bases.[3] The defences and fortifications of cities had improved to the point where siege warfare had become a complicated technological task, involvingscaling ladders,battering rams,siege towers and tunnelling, and could take months.[8] Supply of a besieging force therefore required the transport or construction of special equipment as well as the provision of food and water.[9][10]
Alexander the Great's father,Philip II of Macedon banned the use of carts on the grounds that they restricted the army's speed and mobility. Alexander continued this practice, with his army relying on horses and mules. He also used camels, many of which were captured along withDarius III's baggage train after theBattle of Issus. Although a cart drawn by a pair of oxen could carry up to 540 kilograms (1,200 lb), compared with about 110 kilograms (250 lb) for pack horses, mules and camels, they could only travel at 3.2 kilometres per hour (2 mph) and be worked for 5 hours per day, whereas pack horses could travel at 6.4 kilometres per hour (4 mph) and be worked for 8 hours per day. Carts were also liable to break down, especially in rough country. Some were necessary, however, for the carriage of heavy siege machinery.[11]
In the imperialRoman army, each eight-mancontubernium (squad) had a mule to carry the leather or goatskin tent large enough to accommodate the squad and a handmill to grind grain – as that part of the ration was issued unground – tools and cooking implements. Together with five days' rations, this weighed about 200 kilograms (440 lb), which was easily within the carrying capacity of eight men and a mule. Adding a second mule would allow thecontuberium to carry an additional 11 to 13 days' rations.[12] TheRoman army ration included bread or biscuit, beef and veal, pork and sucking-pig, mutton and lamb, poutry, lentils, cheese, olive oil, wine or vinegar, and salt.[13][14] This gave them about 3,400 calories (14,000 kJ) per day, which was similar to that of Alexander's men.[15] An army of 60,000 required 95,000 litres (21,000 imp gal) of water for the men and 720,000 litres (158,000 imp gal) for the animals each day.[16] Eachcontuberium had their own fire to cook their meals, so firewood had to be collected;Julius Caesar regarded a shortage of firewood to be as dangerous as one of water or fodder.[17] The Olmecs usedcamales to preparetortillas that could be retoasted and consumed en route,[18] whereas theMaya lacked a good, transportable food, which made long-distance forays difficult.[19]
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The Romans constructed anetwork of roads to permit the rapid movement of wheeled vehicles. A road network was in existence in Italy as early as the third century BCE, and by the time ofDiocletian the Roman Empire had 90,000 kilometres (56,000 mi) of roads. The Roman army had no specialised engineering units, and roads were normally built by local communities, but the army could and did construct roads, especially near the frontiers. Roads were not necessary for the movement of troops, since the soldiers and their pack animals could travel along unimproved dirt tracks, but roads were used by supply trains and a military mail system.[20] The Chinese also built a road network, as did theMaurya Empire in India,[21] the Persians in Asia Minor,[22] and theMoche in South America.[23]
However, it was less expensive to ship a tonne of grain from Egypt to Rome by sea than to move it 80 kilometres (50 mi) by road.[21] The Romans preferred to usesea travel when they could, but it was risky as ships could be lost in storms. In his treatise onThe Art of Commanding Armies,Polybius recommended that a commander have a thorough knowledge of how far ships could travel by day and night, and the optimal time and seasons for sea travel. Most ships were small. Six months' supply of grain for an army of 40,000 would have weighed 6,320 tonnes, and could have been carried in 200 ships.[24]
One of the most significant changes in military organisation in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century was the shift from a centrally organised army to a combination of military forces made up of local troops who often worked within the household during peace time and were provided food and drink from the high officials in the house. The magnates drew upon their own resources for their men, and duringCharlemagne's reign and the reign of theOttonian dynasty in Germany, some heads of house built permanent storages and dwellings to house men or supplies.[25]Feudalism, under which a warrior nobility owed military obligations to theiroverlords, was a form of distributed military logistics system made necessary by poor communications and inadequatemonetisation.[26] In Anglo-Saxon England, KingIne of Wessex established a form oftax in kind known as thefeorm, which allowed troops to be supported without cash purchases.[27]
While on campaign, soldiers in themedieval period (the fifth to fifteenth centuries) in Europe were often responsible for supplying themselves, either through foraging, looting (more common during sieges), or purchases from markets along the campaign route. Even so, military commanders often provided their troops with food and supplies. This might be in lieu of wages if they worked within the king's household, but soldiers would be expected to pay for it from their wages if they did not, at cost or even with a profit.[28]
Some early governments, such as theCarolingians in eighth century, required soldiers to supply their own food for three months, but would feed soldiers thereafter for free if the campaign or siege was ongoing. Later, during theSaxon revolt of 1077–1088, Saxon soldiers were required to bring supplies enough for the entire campaign.[29] Some individual feats of logistics were formidable; after a seven-week campaign English archers shot up to half a million arrows during thebattle of Crécy in 1346.[30][31]
Soldiers were often required to come equipped for campaign with their own armour, shields and weapons. They could often obtain the needed supplies from local craftsmen: smiths, carpenters, and leather workers often supplied the local militia troops with cooking utensils, bows and arrows, and horseshoes and saddles. Archaeologists have found evidence of goods production in excavations of royal houses, suggesting that the Roman infrastructure of central arms and equipment factories was inherited, even if such factories were more decentralised. Estates during Charlemagne's reign were required to have carpenters staffed to produce weapons and armour.[32][33][34]
TheVikings focused on seizing sites like monasteries that had large stores of supplies such as grain, cheese, livestock, beer and wine. They were also often located in the heart of agricultural areas with large surpluses stored in warehouses and granaries. This simplified pillaging and foraging. They were also filled with valuable objects, and housed wealthy persons who could be ransomed for substantial sums. However, they still had to take some supplies with them, and theirlongships were not suited to this, so they also brought merchant ships (knerrir) to carry supplies with them (and to take plunder back).[35] They established bases where supplies could be stored, which allowed them to occasionally field substantial forces and carry out large-scale operations, such as in theSiege of Paris in 885–886.[36]
TheMongols drank horses' blood and milk,[37] and took with them other livestock such as sheep, goats, cattle and sometimes camels. Sheep were the most important of the herd animals, and butter and cheese was produced from their milk, although horse meat was a particular favourite. Livestock could be spared for slaughter only occasionally, but when it was, all parts of the animal were eaten, and the bones were saved to make broth. They supplemented their diet with wild game, and collected various wild vegetables, fruits, berries, fungi and edible seeds. They had collapsible tents that could be quickly erected and struck. They were capable of operating in winter, but depended on their horses, so they needed grasslands where the horses could graze.[38][39]
Beasts of burden were used as vehicular transport for the food and supplies, either by carrying the supplies directly on their backs—the average medieval horse and mule could carry roughly 100 kilograms—or by pulling carts or wagons, depending on the weather conditions. A force with 1,000 pack and draft animals required roughly 9,000 kilograms of food for the animals, of which 4,000 kilograms was grain. Other animals had similar needs; donkeys each required about five kilograms of food each day, of which one kilogram had to be grain, while camels required approximately twelve kilograms of food each day, of which five kilograms needed to be grain.[40] Horses were not usually used as draft animals in China or India. In India, oxen were used to carry supplies purchased from thebanjaras, mobile merchants who often accompanied armies.[41] Oxen required no grain, but need 20 kilograms of fodder per day, which could be found by grazing, should time and conditions permit.[40] In the Middle East and Central Asia, camels were often used, and in South and South East Asia elephants were used where roads and navigable rivers were uncommon, but there was plentiful water and foliage. This was more difficult in sub-Saharan Africa, where the elephants were less amenable.[41] A herd of 1,000 cattle could feed 14,000 or so men for roughly ten days.[40]
Commanders also made use of water transport throughout the medieval period as it was more efficient than ground transport. Ships made transporting supplies, and often soldiers, easier and more reliable, but the ability to use water transport was limited by location, weather, and the availability of ships. Cargo ships were also used, and were most commonly of the Nordic-type, the Utrecht-type, or theproto-cog craft. River boats resembling simple log-boats were also used.[42] InSub-Saharan Africa, where there were many lakes, canoes were used.[41] Supply by sea was more economical, but not necessarily simpler than supply by land, due to complicating factors like loading and unloading, stowage, and moving supplies to an army that may not be on the coast.[43]
InMesoamerica, there were no wheeled vehicles or draft animals that could be used as beasts of burden. The army of theAztec Empire consisted of units of 8,000 men calledxiquipilli. The army was accompanied by porters who carried about 23 kilograms each. It moved slowly, at about 2.4 kilometres per hour or 19 kilometres per day. Since the Aztecs did not build roads outside the major cities, the army moved along tracks used for local trade. Due to the limitations of the tracks, eachxiquipilli departed on a different day, and used a different route if possible. Since the army could carry food for no more than eight days, this gave it a combat radius of about 58 kilometres (36 mi) in hostile territory; moving through its own territory the army drew on supplies from tributary towns along the way.[44]
Between 1530 and 1710, the size of the armed forces deployed by European states increased by an order of magnitude, to 100,000 or more in some cases, resulting in a corresponding increase in the numbers involved in major battles.[45][46] There were technical and tactical components to this, like the shift from expensive armoured knights to cheaper pikemen, who could be mobilised in vast numbers, but the major factor was the growth of the European state. Increases in population and wealth generated more revenue through taxation, which could be utilised more effectively due to a series of administrative reforms in the sixteenth century. States now had the means to fund the upkeep and development of roads, which aided the logistical support of forces.[47]
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This increase in size came not just in the number of actual soldiers but alsocamp followers, ortross, — anywhere from half to one and a half times the size of the army itself — and the size of thebaggage train — averaging one wagon for every fifteen men.[46] However, little state support was provided to these massive armies, the vast majority of which consisted ofmercenaries. Beyond being paid for their service by the state (an act which bankrupted even theSpanish Empire on several occasions), these soldiers and their commanders were forced to provide everything for themselves. If permanently assigned to a town or city with a working marketplace, or travelling along a well-established military route, supplies could be bought locally withintendants overseeing the exchanges. In other cases an army travelling in friendly territory could expect to be followed bysutlers, whose stocks were small and subject toprice gouging, or acommissioner could be sent ahead to a town to make arrangements, includingbilletting if necessary.[48]
Many armies were further restricted to following waterways as supplies they were forced to carry could be more easily transported by water. The Russians made use of theVolga River to support the conquest ofKazan in theRusso-Kazan Wars.[49]Artillery in particular was reliant on this method of transport, since even a modest number ofcannons of the period required hundreds of horses to move them and their ammunition, and they travelled at half the speed of the rest of the army.[50] Troops moving down theSpanish Road between 1567 and 1620 were able to travel from Milan and Brussels, a distance of about 1,100 kilometres (700 mi), in five to seven weeks.[51] If an army marched at a leisurely pace of 10 to 13 kilometres (6 to 8 mi) per day, the heavy guns could keep up with little difficulty.[52] Improvements in metal casting techniques and the use of copper-based alloys likebronze andbrass made cannons lighter and more durable, and therefore more mobile, but their production and maintenance required skilled craftsmen.[53]
TheOttoman Empire developed a formidable logistical system. The network of Roman and Byzantine roads radiating fromConstantinople provided good lines of communication, as did theDanube River, via theBlack Sea and the port ofVarna. Ottoman troops could march 970 kilometres (600 mi) from Constantinople toBuda viaAdrianople andBelgrade in six weeks, drawing provision en route from forty depots. They were fed biscuit, which did not require grinding like grain, and was less likely to spoil in wet weather than flour. This was supplemented by regular issues of mutton. During thesiege of Vienna in 1529, heavy rains caused flooding and rendered the roads impassable to the Turks' heavy cannons, and in theLong Turkish War of 1593 to 1606 the Turkish forces inTransylvania were hampered by attacks on their supply ships on the Danube andTisza Rivers.[54]
By the mid-seventeenth century, the French underSecretary of State for WarMichel Le Tellier began a series of military reforms to address some of the issues which had plagued armies. Besides ensuring that soldiers were more regularly paid and combating the corruption and inefficiencies of private contractors, he devised formulae to calculate the supplies required for a given campaign, created standardised contracts for dealing with commercial suppliers, and formed a permanent vehicle-park manned by specialists whose role was to carry a few days' supplies while accompanying the army during campaigns. With these arrangements there was a gradual increase in the use ofmagazines, which provided a more regular flow of supply viaconvoys. While the concepts of magazines and convoys was not new, prior to the increase in army sizes there had rarely been cause to implement them.[55]
Le Tellier's son,Louvois, continued the reforms after assuming his position. The most important of these reforms was to guarantee free daily rations for the soldiers, amounting to two pounds of bread orhardtack a day. These rations were supplemented as circumstances allowed by a source of protein such as meat or beans; soldiers were still responsible for purchasing these items out-of-pocket but they were often available at below-market prices or even free at the expense of the state. Louvois also made permanent a system of magazines that were overseen by local governors to ensure they were fully stocked. Some of these magazines were dedicated to providing frontier towns and fortresses several months' worth of supplies in the event of a siege, while the rest were supported French armies operating in the field.[56]
When operating in enemy territory an army was forced to plunder the local countryside for supplies, a historical tradition meant to allow war to be conducted at the enemy's expense. However, with the increase in army sizes this reliance on plunder became a major problem, as decisions regarding where and when an army could move or fight were made based not on strategic objectives but whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs.Sieges in particular were affected by this, both for an army attempting to lay siege to a location and for one coming to its relief. Unless a commander was able to implement some sort of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated countryside could be effectively immune to either operation.[48]Mons could not be besieged in 1684 because of a lack of forage in the area. For the later Frenchsiege of Mons in theSpanish Netherlands in 1691, during theNine Years' War, Louvois purchased 900,000 rations of fodder the year before.[57]
Although living off the land theoretically granted armies freedom of movement, it required careful planning, and the need for plunder precluded any sort of sustained, purposeful advance.[50] Bread was a particular problem, as providing it locally was limited by the availability of mills, ovens and bakers. An army of 60,000 might require 90,000 rations once camp followers were included, and at 0.68 kilograms (1.5 lb) of bread per ration that would require 61 tonnes (135,000 lb) of bread per day.[58] Armies normally marched for three days and rested on the fourth. A supply of bread for 60,000 men for four days required at least sixty ovens operated by 240 bakers. To build an oven required 500 two-kilogram bricks, so sixty ovens required sixty cartloads of bricks. In addition, a month's supply of fuel for the sixty ovens needed 1,400 cartloads. Local mills were targets for enemy action, so handmills were often necessary.[59]
Recourse therefore had to be made to bringing up supplies from the bases.[58] Fortresses not only guardedlines of communication they served as supply bases. In 1675, a French army 80,000 strong was supported for two months by the grain stored atMaastricht andLiège.[60] The indecisiveness of campaigns of the period was largely the result of the difficulty involved in supplying large armies.[61] The larger armies of the seventeenth century also saw the advent of military uniforms, which were introduced in Britain with theNew Model Army in theEnglish Civil War. Clothing contracts became centralised but funds were disbursed through regiments, which developed distinctive dress. Government payments were often in arrears, sometimes by years, and stripping the dead for their clothing became a common practice.[62]
In 1704, theDuke of Marlborough marched his army from the Netherlands to the Danube, following theRhine andNeckar rivers. He was able to do so because he was moving through rich country and hisQuartermaster General, ColonelWilliam Cadogan, paid for supplies in gold at fair prices, so that the local population were willing to sell, and brought supplies to collection points. This was arranged through a contract let to SirSolomon de Medina to purchase supplies through local agents. The 400-kilometre (250 mi) march wore out boots but these too were provided. The result was that the army arrived in good condition and ready to fight theBattle of Blenheim.[63][64][65][66]
In contrast, Marlborough's opponent,Marshal Tallard, was placed at a logistical disadvantage, having to advance without prepositioned supplies. Usually a population regarded the presence of an army, whether friendly or not, as a disaster and hoped that it would go away as soon as possible.[63][64][65][66] Europe lacked a network of good roads, and rains or snow melt could turn unmade roads into quagmires. Bridges were infrequent, and wooden bridges were easy to destroy. Most were crossed only by ferry. Rivers could become unnavigable if the water level rose or fell too much.[67]
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The Chinese likewise were able to tap into the rich agricultural resources of eastern China to support campaigns against far-flung adversaries. TheKangxi Emperor drove the Russians from theAmur river region, and besieged the Russian fortress atAlbazin. TheTreaty of Nerchinsk allocated the region to China. In theDzungar–Qing Wars, the emperor was able to mount an expedition across theGobi Desert to defeat the Dzungar in theBattle of Jao Modo, but subsequent expeditions to Tibet in 1717 and 1718 were frustrated by logistical difficulties and ran out of food before a more successfulexpedition in 1720.[68]
In theAmerican Revolutionary War, the Americans had a young population with large numbers of potential soldiers, and an agricultural economy with surplus foodstuffs and no vital centres. Clothing and footwear could be supplied by domestic production, there was widespread ownership of firearms, and a shipping industry experienced in smuggling that could supply other needs. What they lacked was land transportation infrastructure — roads, waterways, wagons, animals and skilled personnel — needed for the distribution of supplies. This hampered the creation and maintenance of forces sufficiently large to drive out the British.[69]
After the war the British created the infrastructure and gained the experience needed to managean empire. They reorganised the management of the supply of military food and transport, which was completed in 1793–1794 when the naval Victualling and Transport Boards undertook those responsibilities. It built upon experience learned from the supply of the very-long-distanceFalkland Islands garrison from 1767 to 1772 to systematise needed shipments to distant places such as Australia, Nova Scotia, and Sierra Leone.[70]
This new infrastructure allowed Britain to launch large expeditions to the continent during theRevolutionary andNapoleonic Wars and to develop a global network of garrisons in the colonies.[70] They were not always successful; British setbacks in theKandyan Wars in Sri Lanka were partly attributable to logistical difficulties, although disease and terrain were also factors, and the British were defeated by theAshanti Empire in theBattle of Nsamankow in 1824 when they ran out of ammunition.[71]
Napoleon made logistical operations a major part of French strategy.[72] He dispersed his corps along a broad front to maximise the area from which supplies could be drawn. Each day forage parties brought in supplies. This differed from earlier operations living off the land in the size of the forces involved, and because the primary motivation was the emperor's desire for mobility. Crucially, the army did not degenerate into an armed mob.[73] Ammunition could not as a rule be obtained locally, so Napoleon allotted 2,500 of his 4,500 wagons to carrying artillery ammunition, with the rest hauling rations. Each man carried 60 to 80 rounds in his pack, and eachdivision carried 97,000 rounds in reserve. Thus, like earlier armies, theGrande Armée took with it sufficient ammunition for the whole campaign.[74] Support troops accompanied each unit. A BritishRoyal Horse Artillery troop in 1813 was authorised to have afarrier, a carriage smith, two shoeing smiths, twocollar makers and awheelwright.[75]
During theUlm Campaign in 1805, the French army of 200,000 men had no need for time-consuming efforts to scour the countryside for supplies and live off the land, as it was well provided for by France's German allies.[72] France's ally, theElectorate of Bavaria, turned the city ofAugsburg into a gigantic supply centre, allowing theGrande Armée, generously replenished with food, shoes and ammunition, to quickly invade Austria after the decisive French victory atUlm.[76]
Napoleon left nothing to chance, requesting the Bavarians to prepare in advance a specified amount of food at certain cities such asWürzburg and Ulm, for which the French reimbursed them.[77] When French demands proved excessive for the German principalities, the French army used a system of vouchers to requisition supplies and keep the rapid advance going.[78] The agreements with allies permitted the French to obtain huge quantities of supplies within a few days' notice.[79] Napoleon built up a major supply magazine atPassau, with barges transporting supplies down the Danube toVienna to maintain the French army prior to theBattle of Austerlitz in combat readiness.[76]
The French system fared poorly in thePeninsular War in the face of Spanishguerrilla warfare that targeted their supply lines and the British blockade of French-occupied ports on theIberian Peninsula. The need to supply a besieged Barcelona made it impossible to control the province and ended French plans to incorporate Catalonia into Napoleon's Empire.[80]Wellington blocked the French advance into Portugal with a series of fortifications, theLines of Torres Vedras, and devastated the area north of the lines to make it difficult for the French to mass forces there to assault or besiege the fortifications.[81]
A more spectacular logistical failure occurred in theRussian campaign in 1812.[82]Carl von Clausewitz noted:
The second crisis most commonly occurs at the end of a victorious campaign when the lines of communication have begun to be overstretched. This is especially true when the war is conducted in an impoverished, thinly populated and possibly hostile country. How vast a difference there is between a supply line stretching from Vilna to Moscow, where every wagon has to be procured by force, and a line from Cologne to Paris, via Liége, Louvain, Brussels, Mons, Valenciennes and Cambrai, where a commercial transaction, a bill of exchange, is enough to produce millions of rations![83]
Disease had been the greatest enemy of the soldier. Invading armies sometimes introduced diseases. Wars often created conditions for diseases to flourish through crowding, social disruption and damage to infrastructure. Crowded army camps were always susceptible to diseases. In the eighteenth century, physicians likeGeorge Cleghorn,Richard Brocklesby andRené-Nicolas Dufriche Desgenettes called for improvements in military hygiene,[84] as didJohn Pringle, who wrote a treatise on military medicine in 1752,Observations on the Diseases of the Army in Camp and Garrison, in which he argued that disease was caused by bad air and overcrowding.[85]
James Lind published aTreatise of the Scurvy in 1753 in which he advocated the consumption of fresh fruit and lemon juice to treatscurvy, a common illness among sailors on long voyages.[86] Of the 175,990 sailors recruited by theRoyal Navy between 1774 and 1780, 18,545 died of disease, mainly scurvy, and 1,243 were killed. Between 1794 and 1813, with the adoption of a lemon juice ration, the navy's sick rate fell from 1 in 4 to 1 in 10.75 and the death rate from 1 in 86 to 1 in 143.[87] Lind also advocated the consumption of the bark ofcinchona trees to preventmalaria, something that had previously been recommended byThomas Sydenham in 1676.[88] The active ingredient was extracted and isolated in 1820 byPierre-Joseph Pelletier andJoseph Bienaimé Caventou, who named it "quinine".[89]
The BritishWalcheren Campaign of 1809 was particularly notable in that less than 800 men died in battle, but forty percent of the force of 40,000 contracted diseases, probably malaria,typhoid ortyphus; 60 officers and 3,900 men died, and some 11,000 men were still ill six months later.[90][91][92] It is estimated that of the 240,000 British soldiers and sailors who died in all theatres in the Napoleonic wars, less than 30,000 died from wounds.[92]
The nineteenth century saw technological developments that facilitated immense improvements to the storage, handling and transportation of supplies. Salting, drying and smoking had long been used to delayfood spoilage,[93] but in 1809Nicolas Appert invented a process of heat sterilisation and airtight bottling forfood preservation on an industrial scale. Why it worked would not be explained untilLouis Pasteur's ground breaking research in 1864, but the process was swiftly and widely adopted. Appert used glass because the quality of Frenchtinplate was poor, but good quality tinplate was widely available in the UK.Philippe de Girard in France suggested its use toPeter Durand in England, who took out a patent on the process in 1810, which he sold to industrialistBryan Donkin in 1812 for £1,000 (equivalent to £84,000 in 2023). TheBritish Admiralty placed substantial orders for meat preserved in tin cans in 1814. Canning remained a manual process for many years until Max Ams invented thedouble seam for cans in 1896, making it possible to use an automated process to fill and close them.[94] The use of cans simplified storage and distribution of foods, and reduced waste and the incidence of food-related illness.[93]
A practical mechanical refrigeration process was developed in Australia byJames Harrison and patented in the UK by him in 1856,[95] and by the 1880sreefer ships were plying the oceans.[96]Richard Trevithick developed the first high-pressuresteam engine in 1801 and the first working railwaysteam locomotive in 1804.[97] Steam power had great advantages for vessels that plied rivers, where twists and turns meant changes of course but the narrow confines of the river made it difficult totack. Wood and coal could be obtained along the river, whereas ocean-going vessels had no such opportunity, and therefore continued to carry sails even when they had engines.[98]
By reducing the dependence on the wind, the steam engine made shipping faster and more reliable. To allow their warships to operate around the world, the British built a global network of coaling stations. To reduce its dependence on British colliers, theUnited States Navy began to move to oil in 1913. For the British, this was a more painful process, as it produced coal but not oil domestically.[99]
The first to realise the potential of rail were the Russians, who moved a force of 14,500 men fromUherské Hradiště toKraków by rail in 1846.[100] During theAmerican Civil War, railways were used extensively for the transport of personnel, supplies, horses and mules, and artillery pieces.[101] While railways were a more economic form of transport than animal-drawn carts and wagons, they were limited to tracks, and therefore could not support an advancing army unless its advance was along existing railway lines.[98] The large armies of the American Civil also made great use of riverboats and coastal shipping, which were not so easy to damage or interdict.[102]
During theAustro-Prussian War of 1866, railways enabled the swift mobilisation of the Prussian Army, but the problem of moving supplies from the end of rail lines to units at the front resulted in nearly 18,000 tons trapped on trains unable to be unloaded to ground transport.[103] During theCrimean War, the British built the firstmilitary railway, one specifically for supporting armies in the field, to support thesiege of Sevastopol.[104] The Prussian use of railways during theFranco-Prussian War is often cited as an example of logistic modernisations, but the advantages of manoeuvre were often gained by abandoning supply lines that became hopelessly congested with rear-area traffic.[105] The Canadian government moved 4,000 troops and their supplies over theCanadian Pacific Railway to suppress theNorth-West Rebellion in 1885, and the Russians moved 370,000 troops along the incompleteTrans-Siberian Railway for theRusso-Japanese War in 1904.[106]
Between 1870 and 1914, the population of Europe grew from 293 million to 490 million. The expansion of armies and navies was even more rapid. With the spread of militaryconscription andreserve systems in the decades leading up to the 20th century, the potential size of armies increased substantially.[107] France mobilised 570,000 troops for the Franco-Prussian War and over three million on the outbreak of theFirst World War. The advent ofindustrial warfare in the form ofbolt-action rifles,machine guns andquick-firing artillery sent ammunition consumption soaring.[108] In the Franco-Prussian War, each German gun fired 199 shells on average but in 1914 the German stock of 1,000 rounds per gun were exhausted in the first month and a half of fighting.[107]
In earlier wars, most artillery pieces lasted for the duration of the campaign, but nowcounter-battery fire was capable of destroying them.[107] Strenuous efforts were made to step up production but constant firing led to wear and tear on the guns. The factories prioritised production of new guns over spare parts, which became scarce. Quality suffered in the haste to produce more and there were serious problems with guns and ammunition.[109] In 1915, as many as 25 per cent of the rounds in a batch might be defective.[110] The shortage of ammunition created a political crisis in the UK, theShell Crisis of 1915, which led to the formation of a new coalition government.[111]
As munitions production increased, transport became the major bottleneck.[112] Military logistical systems continued to rely on nineteenth-century technology. The British shipped 5,337,841 tonnes (5,253,538 long tons) of ammunition to France and 5,525,875 tonnes (5,438,602 long tons) of hay and oats to feed the animals.[113] When the war began, the rail and horse-drawn supply were stretched to their limits. Where the stalemate oftrench warfare took hold,narrow gaugetrench railways were built to extend the rail network to the front lines. The great size of the German Army proved too much for its railways to support except while immobile.[114] From the beginning of theBattle of the Somme on 24 June to 23 July 1916, 150,000 tonnes (148,000 long tons) of ammunition had been fired but only 103,404 tonnes (101,771 long tons) were landed, the difference being made up by depleting stockpiles. The capacity of the sixchannel ports that handled 96 per cent of theBritish Expeditionary Force’s requirements was increased and additional locomotives androlling stock were imported. Between 1914 and 1918, the French laid between 5,000 and 6,000 kilometres of new track.[115]
On theWestern Front, supplies moved from the ports by rail or barge to regulating points where they were sorted before being forwarded. The supply system might be described as "semiautomatic". Certain supplies for which demand was invariant, such as fodder and rations, were sent daily without requisition in division-sized "packs" consisting of two wagons of bread, two of groceries, one of meat, four of hay, five of oats and one of petrol, a total of 15 wagons. Each pack was earmarked for a particular division and would be delivered to its own railhead. Supplies for which there was variable demand, such as reinforcements, remounts, ammunition and engineering stores, had to be indented, and were sent by the railway carload. A typical train would consist of forty wagons, two packs and ten other wagons. Each division drew its supplies from one railhead, although it might share it with other divisions.[116]
The advent of motor vehicles powered byinternal combustion engines offered an alternative to animal transport for moving supplies forward of the railhead. Though they generally require better roads and bridges, they were much faster and more efficient than animal transport. Compared with railways they had limited cargo capacity, and created logistical problems of their own with their need for fuel and spare parts.[117] At one point the French used 11,200 trucks to move 100,000 men over 100 miles (160 km) at short notice.[118] By 1918, the French had 90,000 motor vehicles, while the Germans had 40,000.[119]
The movement of supplies posed greater problems on theEastern Front, where the transportation system was less developed than in the west. The Russian economy was less developed and less efficient than that of Germany, and food and ammunition shortages developed in 1915.[120] In turn, Russia was more developed industrially than Turkey, which nonetheless managed to last longer than Russia. This was partly because after theGallipoli campaign the forces the British brought to bear in theSinai and Palestine campaign andMesopotamian campaign were in relatively remote areas of the Turkish Empire where the well-resourced British forces had to overcome supply and transportation problems to bring their power to bear. The British were able to use motor vehicles in theinvasion of Darfur but in sub-Saharan Africa they were heavily reliant on human porters.[120]
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The Britishblockade of Germany kept a stranglehold on raw materials, goods, and food needed to support the Germany war effort, and is considered one of the key elements in the eventual Allied victory in the war. This form ofeconomic warfare also involved pressure on neutral countries not to export or re-export to Germany and a program of pre-emptive purchasing. The Germans attempted to exploit occupied countries like Romania andUkraine for oil, grain and other resources.[121] Although theAllies controlled most of the world's shipping, Germany'sunrestricted submarine warfare showed the vulnerability of merchant shipping despite Alliednaval superiority.[122] The United Kingdom was particularly vulnerable to economic blockade, as it did not produce enough food to feed itself, importing nearly two-thirds of its food.[121] Coal and food had to be rationed.[120]
In 1912, the biochemist,Casimir Funk, theorised thatberiberi, scurvy andrickets were all diseases caused by nutrient deficiencies, naming the missing nutrient chemicals "vitamines" and over the following decades, biochemists were able to isolate them.[123] During the First World War, the troops in theGallipoli campaign suffered from beriberi and scurvy because the British Army's ration was deficient in these vitamins. Unlike their counterparts on the Western Front, the troops were unable to supplement their diet with local produce.[124] A type of scurvy in the form of septic sores known as "Barcoo rot" appeared among theAustralian Light Horse in theSinai campaign, for the same reason.[125]
Themechanisation of warfare that started in the First World War, added the maintenance needs ofmilitary aircraft,tanks and othercombat vehicles to the burden on military logistics. Many nations, including Germany, continued to rely on horse-drawn transport. Trucks were expensive to produce and their production put additional strain on scarce resources such as rubber, steel and petroleum.[126] Petroleum was a particular problem, as the world's major sources were under the control of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States and theSoviet Union. Efforts were made to step up the production of synthetic fuels and rubber, but the supply of these posed difficulties throughout the war,[127] and they came underAllied air attack.[128] Germany's motor vehicle industry was not well developed either. It therefore made sense to continue to rely on horse-drawn transport. In 1939 a German infantry division had 942 motor vehicles and 1,200 horse-drawn carts.[129] Even this was hard to meet, and large numbers of civilian and captured British and French vehicles were employed. The multiplicity of types created problems with spare parts.[130]
The forces of the United States and United Kingdom were fully mechanised,[131] although the British and Americans used mules in North Africa, Italy and Burma. The British and Japanese also used elephants in Burma. In the South West Pacific, human porters were used.[128] There was little civilian demand forfour-wheel drive vehicles, which were more expensive than regular vehicles, so commercial firms saw little benefit in producing them. All armies entered the war with large numbers of two-wheel drive vehicles. The need for four-wheel drive soon became apparent, especially in the less developed parts of the world, and considerable manpower andmateriel had to be devoted to road making and maintenance.[132] Similarly, the American automotive industry had scant interest in heavy trucks for long-distance hauls; the USInterstate Highway System had not yet been built, and interstate commerce was the province of rail and water transport. The US Army gave a low priority to such vehicles until the need became acute.[133]
The increased technological and administrative complexity was reflected in the proliferation of staff and paperwork. In the United States, theArmy Service Forces inventoried 200,000paper forms and eliminated 125,000 of them. Professional analysis and simplification of common procedures was undertaken usingindustrial engineering techniques developed by industry.[134]
TheGerman invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 faced logistical failure when the Soviet Union did not collapse after the initial frontier battles. The summer invasion meant that fodder was available for the 625,000 horses amassed for the operation, but stocks of food were low, and their seizure alienated the local population. An invasion later in the year would have avoided this, but left less time for operations before the winter set in. The distances involved, the speed of the advance, and the poor road network all contributed to the logistical difficulties, and shortages of spare parts developed for motor vehicles, which were in short supply in the first place. The bridges over theDnieper were demolished by the retreating Soviets, and use of the railway system was hampered by the differenttrack gauge used in the Soviet Union. Transportation difficulties made it difficult to distribute stores like winter clothing.[128][135] In 1942 the German forces in the Soviet Union began to integrate the materiel and manpower resources of the occupied regions into the German war effort.[136]
Motor vehicles ran on tyres, but the supply of rubber to theAllies of World War II was curtailed when the Japanese overran the major sources of natural rubber. Imports to the United States dropped from 910,000 tonnes (900,000 long tons) in 1941 to 11,000 tonnes (11,000 long tons) in 1942. Fuel rationing and recycling measures were introduced to conserve tyres.[137] The synthetic rubber industry in the United States grew from producing 8,400 tonnes (8,300 long tons) in 1939 to 810,000 tonnes (800,000 long tons) in 1944.[138] Germany produced synthetic rubber and oil, much of it with slave labour at theIG Farben plant atAuschwitz.[139]
The Japanese also captured the major sources of quinine.[140] Malaria was a major medical and military problem in many theatres of war. The US Marines in theGuadalcanal campaign had 5,000 hospital admissions for malaria among a force of 16,000 after two months onGuadalcanal, while the Australian force atMilne Bay reported over 5,000 cases of malaria among the force of 12,000 in November 1942.[141]Neil Hamilton Fairley persuaded the UK and US authorities to produceatebrin andplasmoquine,[140][142] antimalarial drugs that had been developed in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s.[143] The development ofpenicillin byHoward Florey and his team was a significant advance in the treatment of wounds withantibiotics. During the campaign in Western Europe in 1944–1945, penicillin was widely used both to treat infected wounds and as a prophylactic to prevent wounds from becoming infected.Gas gangrene had killed 150 out of every 1,000 casualties in the First World War, but the instance of this disease now disappeared almost completely.Open fractures now had a recovery rate of better than 94 per cent, and recovery from burns of one-fifth of the body or less was 100 per cent.[144]
In theNorth African campaign, the Italians struggled to supply their forces through the inadequate ports in Libya, while the British had access to theSuez. In theSiege of Tobruk,destroyers were used to resupply the garrison, as freighters were too vulnerable to air attack. At the same time, retention of the port stretched the German and Italian supply lines, making offensive action into Egypt more difficult.[145] Resupplying the garrison of Malta was even more hazardous, requiringmajor operations,[146] as were theArctic convoys that brought aid to the Soviet Union,[147] so much so that they had to be suspended in July and August 1942. Safer routes were developed through Iran and Siberia, and the Black Sea after it was reopened in 1945.[148][149]
The North African campaign saw the widespread adoption of the 20 litrejerry can, a German invention that was copied by the British and Americans. The jerry can had convenient carrying handles and could be stacked. It did not shift or roll in storage, and floated in water when filled with petrol. The British version was an exact copy of the German model; the American version, called an Ameri-can by the British, was slightly smaller, with a screw cap onto which a nozzle could be fitted. It weighed 4.5 kilograms (10 lb) empty, and 18 kilograms (40 lb) when filled with petrol, so 56 filled cans weighed 1.0 tonne (1 long ton).[150] Some 11.5 million jerry cans were provided forOperation Overlord. Of these, 10.5 million were manufactured in the UK and supplied to the US Army underReverse Lend-Lease, while the rest came from the US.[151]
To facilitateamphibious operations in Europe and the Pacific, the Allies developed an assortment of special vessels. There wereattack transports (APA) andamphibious cargo ships (AKA), and ocean-goinglanding ships, most notably thelanding craft, infantry (LCI),landing ship, tank (LST) that could carry tanks and trucks and land them on a beach, and thelanding ship, dock (LSD), a floatingdry dock that could transportlanding craft and amphibious vehicles. These came in many forms, from the smalllanding craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVP), to the largerlanding craft, mechanised (LCM) andlanding craft, tank (LCT). Amphibious vehicles included theDUKW, an amphibious truck, and theLanding Vehicle Tracked (LVT).[152]
The development of amphibious craft allowed the Allies to land in Normandy without having to quickly seize a heavily defended port.[153][154] After their victory in theBattle of Normandy, the advance came to a halt in September 1944.[155] This was not a result of inadequate supplies or port capacity – there were still some 600,000 long tons (610,000 t) of supplies stockpiled in the Normandy lodgment area in November – nor solely by a shortage of fuel. Rather, the problem was the inability to deliver fuel and supplies to the armies.[156] Railways could not be repaired and pipelines could not be constructed quickly enough.[157] Motor transport was used as a stopgap,[158] but insufficient numbers of heavy trucks compelled the Army to use the smaller general purpose2½-ton 6×6 trucks for long hauls, for which they were unsuited.[159] TheRed Ball Express was a success, but at a cost: overloading, careless driving, lack of proper vehicle maintenance, and wear and tear took their toll on the truck fleet.[160][161] In the long run it was the railways that carried most of the tonnage.[162]
Between September and November 1944, the American forces in theEuropean Theater of Operations (ETO) were beset by severe difficulties with port discharge capacity and inland transportation infrastructure that only eased with the opening of the port ofAntwerp in November.[163] The Germans strongly defended the ports and destroyed their facilities.[164] The shipping crisis in Europe escalated into a global one. The Allied merchant fleet was still growing at a rate of 510,000 deadweight tonnes (500,000 deadweight tons) per month, but the number of ships available for loading at US ports was shrinking due to the retention of vessels by the theatres.[165] This represented 7,100,000 deadweight tonnes (7,000,000 deadweight tons) of shipping, which was about 30 percent of the total Allied-controlled tonnage.[166] When ships failed to return from overseas on time, supplies piled up at the ports, depots and railway sidings in the United States.[167]
Another wartime development was air transport, which provided an alternative to land and sea transport, but with limited tonnage and at high cost.[168] The Germans used air transport to reinforce Tunisia after the Allieslanded in North West Africa. Soon after the Germans attempted to supply the surroundedSixth Army during theBattle of Stalingrad, but failed due to insufficient aircraft to fulfil the mission.[169] The Allies were more successful; in theBurma Campaign, aircraft supplied theChindits and the cut off Allied units in theBattle of Imphal.[170] An airlift over "the Hump" was used to resupply theChinese war effort.[171] After the war the 1948Berlin Air Lift was successful in supplying the whole non-Soviet half of the city.[108]
Long distances dominated thePacific War. For theattack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese usedoilers to refuel the attacking fleet at sea en route. The ability of the Japanese navy to conduct refuelling andreplenishment at sea allowed it to conduct wide-ranging operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the first months of 1942.[172] In 1944, the United States Navy created service squadrons of support ships to enable thePacific Fleet to remain at sea longer and support fast-paced operations against a succession of Japanese-held islands.[173][174]
In November 1943, thePacific Ocean Areas instituted a form of automatic supply, whereby troops and supplies were sent according to a pre-arranged schedule in a series of echelons. Shipping was held at control points to avoid congestion in forward areas, which also minimised the time when ships were most exposed to enemy attack.[175][176] While wasteful in some respects, the procedure allowed for mounting of operations from widely scattered ports, avoided shipping congestion and long turnaround times, and eliminated the duplication of Army and Navy supplies. TheSouth West Pacific Area adopted one of its key features, the block loading of ships for a particular destination.[177]
As in Europe, there was a shipping crisis in the South West Pacific in late 1944, and for the same reason: a lack of port capacity.[165] To ease the strain on shipping resources, the American forces made use of local procurement. While AmericanLend Lease aid to Australia was only 3.3% of aid to all countries, Australian Reverse Lend Lease represented 13.0% of aid to the United States.[178]Bypassed Japanese forces in the South West Pacific Area were expected to "wither on the vine" and starve, but this did not occur; they cultivated gardens using local labour seeds and equipment imported by aircraft and submarines, which also brought in ordnance and medical supplies. They remained strong, well-organised and capable of offensive action. Australian forces conducted a series of offensives against them, which were targeted at their gardens and supplies.[179]
Helicopters were used by the United States in theKorean War to deliver supplies. Although much slower than fixed-wing aircraft, they could move supplies rapidly over terrain that could deliver supplies in minutes to a forward area that could take hours to reach overland. While still affected by the weather, they could fly when other aircraft were grounded. They also became important for the rapid evacuation of casualties.[180] They were used by the French in theFirst Indochina War,[181] and theAlgerian War, where they handled most of the tactical troop movement and casualty evacuation, and much of the logistical support.[182]
In theVietnam War, the U.S. Army operated a fleet of largeBoeing CH-47 Chinook andSikorsky CH-54 Tarhe helicopters. Using a technique whereby supplies in a cargo net were slung under a helicopter, a CH-47 could move a hundred tonnes of supplies within a 16-kilometre (10 mi) radius in a single day. These helicopters were also used to recover 10,000 crashed aircraft.[183] Notably, in these conflicts victory did not always go to the side with the best logistics.[184]
The war in Vietnam also saw the large-scale employment ofcontainerisation. A standard steel container was designed called theConex box that was capable of holding 4,100 kilograms (9,000 lb) and suitable for loading onto a semi-trailer or railwayflat car. Eventually 150,000 of them were sent to Vietnam. The use of containers reduced port congestion and handling time, and saved money on packaging. There was less damage to cargo in transit and reduced loss throughpilferage. The containers could be used in lieu of covered storage. The drawback of using containers was that they required special equipment to handle them.[185] This became less of a problem as containerisation spread through the world, but in 1999 theInternational Force East Timor (INTERFET) found that East Timor had no facilities for handling containers, and special container handling cranes had to be designed and manufactured in New Zealand.[186]
The development of large cargo-carrying aircraft enhanced the ability of airlift to move personnel and supplies over long distances. It remains uneconomical compared with sealift, so sealift is still the preferred means of transport for cargo, particularly heavy and bulky items.[108] Nonetheless, during theYom Kippur War, as part ofOperation Nickel Grass, AmericanLockheed C-141 Starlifter andLockheed C-5 Galaxy aircraft delivered 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) of supplies for Israeli forces including 29 tanks, although only four arrived before the ceasefire on 22 October 1973; just 39 per cent of the Nickel Grass materiel was delivered by then. Another 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) was sent by sea, none of which arrived before the ceasefire.[187][188]
During the initial stage of theGulf War from 7 August to 8 November 1991, some 187,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia, 99.22 per cent of them by air. Airlift also accounted for 15.3 per cent of the cargo, some 161,804 tonnes (178,358 short tons).[189] The second phase of deployment, from 8 November 1991 to 16 January 1992, involved the movement of 391,604 troops by air, the majority of whom travelled on commercial flights, and 326,223 tonnes (359,599 short tons) of cargo, representing 14.5 per cent of the total.[190] The seaports of Saudi Arabia were world class, much better than their counterparts in the United States, with 60 piers, of which the U.S. forces used 15. Sealift carried 85.5 per cent of the dry cargo and 1,869,990 tonnes (2,061,310 short tons) of petroleum products in this phase.[191]
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the increasing complexity of new weapons systems became a concern. While new technologies were intended to make armies more lethal and less reliant on manpower, they did not always live up to their promise.[192] In the 1982Falklands War, the logistical implications of theRapier missile launchers were not initially appreciated. Generally located on hilltops where there were no roads or tracks, they had to be sited by helicopter. If they had to be moved, whether yards or miles, another helicopter sortie was called for.[193] They required fuel to keep their generators running, and their isolated sites required the full-time service of aWestland Sea King helicopter, itself a voracious consumer of fuel, to keep them going.[194][195]
The increasing complexity of weapons and equipment saw the proportion of personnel devoted to logistics in the US Army rise from 39 per cent in theAmerican Expeditionary Forces in the First World War to 45 per cent in the ETO in the Second World War, but declined to 42 per cent in the Korean War, and 35 per cent in the Vietnam War.[196] Concerns about the lowtooth-to-tail ratio saw a mandated ratio put in place,[197] but the widespread use of civilian contractors saw the proportion of people devoted to logistical functions rise to 55 per cent in 2005 during theIraq War.[196]
Complex systems like theM1 Abrams tank require more knowledge and more skilled personnel to operate, maintain and repair, and resist easy modification.[198] The M1 required three times the fuel of the olderM60 tank, and 20 per cent more spare parts.[199] When committed to action in the Gulf War, many Abrams tank crews exhausted their stock of spare parts, which could have become a serious problem had the fighting lasted more than 100 hours.[200] On the other hand, 300,000 rounds of artillery, antiaircraft and tank ammunition were shipped only to be returned, largely owing to the greater lethality of modern weapons lowering ammunition consumption rates.[201] The high fuel usage led to reconsideration of proposals to use a diesel engine instead.[202][203]
The diversity of equipment and consequent large number of spare parts stocked by theNATO saw attempts at standardisation.[204] By the 21st century, there were over 1,000 NATOstandardization agreements, covering everything from ammunition calibres to rail gauges and the terminology that troops use to communicate with each other.[205] The adoption of standardisation as policy promised benefits through reducing inventories, allowing alliance partners to draw on each other's stockpiles and repair services, reducing support overheads, and lower costs through consolidation of research and development and the economies of scale of larger production runs.[206] Most countries had no choice, as they lacked the industry and technology to manufacture complex modern weapons systems.[207] However the adoption of foreign weapons also meant the adoption of foreign tactics, and giving up the advantages of bespoke systems tailored to the nation's own, often unique, strategic environment.[208]
The management of spare parts became a major concern. When items were produced, it was not known how many of each spare part would be needed. Failure to estimate correctly meant inventories of spare parts that were never needed and shortages of others. Keeping old equipment rather than buying new seemed a sensible option, and sometimes the only one, for many armies, but the cost of keeping old vehicles and equipment running could also become uneconomical if not prohibitive.[209]
In the late 20th century, the number ofnatural disasters increased from 50 a year in 1960 to 350 a year in 2010.[210] While not their primary role in most countries, national and international military forces were increasingly engaged in such activities since they possessed the manpower, equipment and organization to deal with them.[211] Up to 80 per cent of the total spent on disaster relief activities involved logistics operations, of which more than 40 per cent was wasted through duplication, lack of time to carry out adequate planning, and other factors.[210]
Although military logistics was an older discipline than its business counterpart, in the twenty-first century the adoption of new tools, techniques and technologies saw the latter overtake the former.[212] Techniques were imported to military logistics that had been developed in the business world, such asjust-in-time manufacturing. This greatly reduced the costs involved in storage and handling of items, but in the combat environment of theIraq War, the drawbacks became all too clear when suppliers and transport resources could not respond to rapidly changing patterns of demand. Shortages developed, and units responded by reverting to traditional just-in-case logistics, stockpiling items that they thought they might need.[213]
TheRussian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 encountered severe logistical difficulties due to poor planning, notably a failure to anticipate the degree of resistance that was actually encountered. The logistical resources required were not on hand even though the capability existed. As equipment broke down through use and battle damage, a shortage of spare parts developed, which was compounded by inadequate numbers of trained maintenance personnel. Although Russia was the world's second largest producer of armaments, its industrial base still struggled to replace materiel losses incurred in high-intensity combat. Even routine sustainment became difficult, with ground transport subject to interdiction bystandoff missiles.[214] Strategic failure then followed from logistical failure.[215]
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