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Historic Compromise

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1970s political accommodation in Italy
ProminentDC memberAldo Moro(pictured left) and leader of thePCIEnrico Berlinguer, the main architects of the Historic Compromise.
This article is part ofa series on
Communism in Italy

TheHistoric Compromise (Italian:Compromesso storico), also known as theThird Phase (Italian:Terza Fase) or theDemocratic Alternative (Italian:Alternativa Democratica), was a historical political accommodation betweenChristian Democracy (DC) and theItalian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1970s.

History

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In 1973,Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary of theItalian Communist Party (PCI), launched a three-article proposal in the communist magazineRinascita calling for a "democratic alliance" withChristian Democracy (DC), embraced byAldo Moro. One factor that inspired this proposal wasthe recent overthrow of theAllende Government inChile. For Berlinguer, the events in Chile proved that the Marxist left could not aspire to govern in democratic countries without establishing alliances with more moderate forces.[1][2][3]

Another major reason for the change in PCI policy was the advent of the1973 oil crisis that challenged the Westernwelfare states and would ultimately provide the pretext forneoliberalism. Not only could the crisis endanger welfare spending, but the PCI feared it could even threaten the fragileliberal democracy as a whole, in the same way that the1929 crisis had given way toNazism and ultimately to theSecond World War.Stephen Gundle has remarked that the party had legitimate reasons to fear a resurgence offascist authoritarianism due to the terroriststrategy of tension employed during theYears of Lead, along with the increasing electoral strength of both thecentre-right andfar-right.[4] Hence the PCI aimed to participate in government to at least consolidate the gains of the previous decades and structurally entrench theItalian road to socialism.[5] This could even "be seen as orthodoxy" because it was in line with the post-war coalition governments that followedTogliatti's so-calledSalerno Turn in 1944.[6]

The cooperation between the PCI and DC grew into an ambivalent political alliance in 1976, with Prime Minister Moro including Berlinguer in an emergency meeting with Italy's political party leaders on March 17, 1976, to discuss averting the collapse of the economy.[7] This replaced a governing alliance between Christian Democracy and the other center-left parties known as theOrganic Centre-left. Berlinguer's PCI attempted to distance itself from theUSSR, with the launching of "Eurocommunism" along with theCommunist Party of Spain and theFrench Communist Party.

The compromise was unpopular among the othercentre-left groups like theItalian Republican Party (PRI) andItalian Socialist Party (PSI), led respectively byUgo La Malfa andBettino Craxi. The rightist Christian DemocratGiulio Andreotti also had doubts about the accommodation.[8] Some communist sympathizers or PCI members were estranged by the PCI's "refusal to consider the possibility of the exclusion of the DC from power", which seemed to indicate the PCI had moved beyond mere tactics and had entirely committed itself to collaboration with the DC.[9][10] Even inside the PCI leadership, there was uncertainty about what the compromise would entail due to its overall vagueness and lack of a clear programme. Former party secretaryLuigi Longo criticized it while discussing the1975 election, stating that the proposed alliance was "enigmatic and ambiguous, and this ambiguity probably contributed to our electoral success, but the proposal remains impracticable and will lead us into passivity."[11][12] However,Lucio Magri also notes that Berlinguer "enjoyed unlimited trust" in the ranks of his party, and was not rebuked when he moved to the right on such sensitive topics as ItalianNATO membership.[13]

Finally, in the aftermath of the1976 election, the PCI started to provide external support to a Christian Democratic one-party government led by Andreotti. Thisminority government – the DC had achieved a score of 38,8% – derived its legitimacy simply from the promise of the PCI and PSI to refrain fromdeclaring no confidence in it.[14][15] Despite official PCI support, several radicalcommunists in the PCIboycotted the DC government.[clarification needed] There was an increase infar-left terrorism, mainly committed by theRed Brigades (Italian:Brigate Rosse, BR). In response to this, the PCI started supporting repressive police measures. Criminologist Phil Edwards notes that this further damaged its anti-establishment credentials: "Rather than a principled loyalty to the constitution on which the Italian state had been founded, the party now appeared to stand for unconditional loyalty to the state as it was."[16]The BRkidnapped Aldo Moro, the then Party President of DC, on 16 March 1978. After several consultations in theItalian Parliament, the government refused the terrorists' conditions, and Moro was killed on 9 May 1978. Nevertheless, the Compromise continued but it was in decline.

At the DC's Fourteenth Congress in 1980, the DC's moderate wing (the "Democratic Initiative", "Dorothean" and "New Force" factions) won with an anti-communist programme, obtaining 57.7% of the vote, while the DC's conservative wing andGiulio Andreotti's faction "Spring", obtained 42.3% with a pro-Compromise program. The new DC Secretary becameFlaminio Piccoli, a Dorothean, and the Compromise was discontinued. It was replaced with Christian Democracy's political alliance with the other center-left parties known as thePentapartito.

The PCI also started distancing itself from the Historic Compromise on its Fifteenth Congress in 1979. On November 28, 1980, inSalerno, Berlinguer officially announced the policy's demise.[17]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^Berlinguer, Enrico (28 September 1973)."Imperialismo e coesistenza alla luce dei fatti cileni – Necessaria una riflessione attenta sul quadro mondiale".Rinascita (38). Archived fromthe original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved1 November 2024.
  2. ^Berlinguer, Enrico (5 October 1973)."Via democratica e violenza reazionaria – Riflessione sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile".Rinascita (39). Archived fromthe original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved1 November 2024.
  3. ^Berlinguer, Enrico (12 October 1973)."Alleanze sociali e schieramenti politici – Riflessioni sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile".Rinascita (40). Archived fromthe original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved1 November 2024.
  4. ^Gundle, Stephen (1 June 1987)."The PCI and the Historic Compromise"(PDF).New Left Review (I/163):27–35. Retrieved1 November 2024.
  5. ^Magri, Lucio (2018).The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 251–252 and 261–262.ISBN 9781786635549.
  6. ^Edwards, Phil (2009).'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester:Manchester University Press. p. 50.ISBN 9780719078736.
  7. ^"Italian Communists Consulted by premier First Time Since '47",The New York Times, March 18, 1976, p.4
  8. ^Fallaci, Oriana (1974).Intervista con la storia. Rizzoli.
  9. ^Edwards, Phil (2009).'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester:Manchester University Press. p. 52–53.ISBN 9780719078736.
  10. ^Hellman, Stephen (1988).Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin, 1975-1980. Oxford:Oxford University Press. p. 31–32.ISBN 9780195053357.
  11. ^Magri, Lucio (2018).The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 270.ISBN 9781786635549.
  12. ^Luigi Longo at theEncyclopædia Britannica
  13. ^Magri, Lucio (2018).The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 273.ISBN 9781786635549.
  14. ^Magri, Lucio (2018).The Tailor of Ulm: A History of Communism. London: Verso. p. 271–272.ISBN 9781786635549.
  15. ^Edwards, Phil (2009).'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester:Manchester University Press. p. 53.ISBN 9780719078736.
  16. ^Edwards, Phil (2009).'More work! Less pay!' Rebellion and repression in Italy, 1972–77. Manchester:Manchester University Press. p. 55.ISBN 9780719078736.
  17. ^Balampanidis, Ioannis (2019).Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical European Left. London and New York:Routledge. p. 63.ISBN 9780815373322.
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