AcrossNigeria, there are a series of disputes overarable landbetweenFulani herders and non-Fulani farmers. The conflicts have been especially prominent in theMiddle Belt (North Central) since the return of democracy in 1999. More recently, they have deteriorated into attacks on farmers by Fulani herders.
Attacks have also taken place in Northwestern Nigeria against farmers who are mainlyHausa, who are almost entirely Muslim. Many Fulani communities, who are usually farmers, have also been attacked and raided by Fulani bandits and other militias.[1] The conflict has taken on religious and ethnic dimensions: many of the farmers are Christians of various ethnicities while most of the herders are Muslim Fulani. Thousands of people have died since the attacks began. Sedentary farming in rural communities are often target of attacks because of their vulnerability. There are fears that the conflict will spread to other West African countries, but that has often been downplayed by governments in the region. Attacks on herders have also led them to retaliating by attacking other communities.[2][3][4]
Herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria have deep roots and date back to pre-colonial times (before the 1900s). However, these conflicts have become far more severe in recent decades due topopulation pressures,climate change, and various other factors. During the British colonial era, herders and farmers would agree on a system calledburti, in which specific migration routes were set up for herders, with mutual agreement from the farmers,herders, and local authorities. However, theburti system collapsed around the 1970s when farmers increasingly claimed ownership of lands along cattle migration paths, increasingly leading to conflicts.[5]
Before, herders frequently exchanged milk for cereal grains with farming communities. However, in recent decades, milk is no longer being widely bartered as packaged beverages became more popular in towns.[5]
Modern medicines have also made it possible for herders to move their livestock further south into the "tsetse fly zone" in the south, whereas before, herders could not keep their cattle on a large scale due totropical diseases inhumid climate zones. Starting from those implemented by the British colonial administration, tsetse control programs have reduced the threat of diseases such astrypanosomiasis. Today, herders also have easy access to drugs fortrypanosomiasis anddermatophilosis in order to keep their livestock alive. In addition, over the past several decades, herders have cross-bredtrypanosome-intolerantzebu cattle withtrypanosome-tolerant humpless breeds, thereby increasing the cattle's tolerance oftropical diseases. All of these factors have enabled the widespread migration of Fulani herders into the southernmost areas of Nigeria, where they could easily sell their livestock for higher prices due to strong demand for beef and other meat products in Nigeria's populous southern towns and cities. However, in the south, they would encounter sedentary communities that have not historically had any experience with peacefully negotiating and co-existing with nomadic herders. Increasing ease of access to weapons and religious polarisation among both Christians and Muslims have added to the potential for violence.[5]
Since theFourth Nigerian Republic's founding in 1999, farmer–herder violence has killed more than 19,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more.[6][7] It followed a trend in the increase of farmer–herder conflicts throughout much of the westernSahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification andsoil degradation;[8]population growth;[2] breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land andwater disputes; and proliferation ofsmall arms and crime in rural areas.[9] Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defence forces and ethnic and tribal militias, which have engaged in further violence. The majority of farmer–herder clashes have occurred between MuslimFulani herdsmen and farmers, exacerbatinghostilities.[10]
There are variouspastoralist tribes in northern Nigeria that include not only Fulani people, but also Kanuri, Kanembu, Arab, and other groups.Blench (2010) lists the following pastoralist tribes in northern Nigeria.[5]
Farmers belong to diverse ethnic groups, primarilyHausa people and the diverse ethnic groups of theMiddle Belt. In more recent years, this has also expanded to include southern Nigerian ethnic groups such as the Yoruba, Igbo, and others.[5] Farmers belonging to various minority ethnic groups in the Middle Belt are represented by partisan advocacy groups such asCONAECDA.[12][13][14]
The farmer/herder conflicts have been taking place in regions which have been unstable since the 2000s. Urban conflicts inJos andKaduna have been particularly violent and, despite violent clashes with the authorities, their causes have never been addressed politically. Conflicts might not have been addressed adequately because traditional authorities have not been fulfilling their role in colonial-era settlements.[15]
Over time the periodic clashes between herders and farmers in Northern and North-Central Nigeria have precipitated a general climate of insecurity. This widespread insecurity both allows for and is perpetuated by acts of broadercriminality, in which gangs of bandits target locations in the area for raids, mass kidnappings, and looting.[16]
Conflicts between farmers and herders can be understood as a problem of access to land. The beginning of the 21st century witnessed an expansion of theagriculturist population and its cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands in theMiddle Belt. In an already politically unstable region, it has never been possible to ascertain a legal title to land for every farmer. As a result,transhumance routes of herders were no longer available, especially in a context of global warming.[17]
Deteriorating environmental conditions,desertification andsoil degradation[8][18][19] have led Fulani herdsmen from Northern Nigeria to change theirtranshumance routes. Access to pastureland and watering points in the Middle Belt became essential for herdsmen travelling from the North of the country. It is often assumed that climate change is the driver of the conflict but a recent study suggests that climate change does not automatically cause the conflict.[20] In actuality, regionsvulnerable to climate change (Northern Regions) experience less farmer-herder conflict and less intense farmer-herder fighting.[20] It is argued that ethnic conflict between farming and herding groups is the primary mechanism behind the farmer-herder conflict nexus.[20]
The Nigerian government has been unwilling to address the causes of the crisis.[21] FightingBoko Haram in the North-East and facing rising levels of violence in different regions of the country, the government has nonetheless tried to implement a few measures, like in creating theAgro Rangers, a force of 10,000 deployed across all states and theFederal Capital Territory to prevent attacks,[22][23][24] though its efficacy has been questioned.[25]
Due to the widely perceived inefficacy of the Nigerian government, armed vigilante groups have sprung up in many farmer communities. This situation would often lead to vicious cycles of bloody feuds among farmers and herders. Local politicians and religious leaders have also exacerbated conflicts by recruiting members and frequently exaggerating claims.[5]
Since 2012, there have been projects to createtranshumance corridors through the Middle Belt. Mostly supported by Northern lawmakers and opposed by their Southern counterparts, these endeavours have been rarely successful.[26]
In 2019, PresidentMuhammadu Buhari tried to create Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) settlements. His proposal was met with fierce criticism.[27] On 17 May 2021, the 17 Southern governors in Nigeria issued theAsaba Declaration, aimed at solving the crisis.[28]
Althoughranching, where cattle are kept in enclosed parcels of land, has frequently been proposed as a solution to the crisis, this has proven to be highly unfeasible in Nigeria due to poor infrastructure (with unstable supplies of electricity, water, and fuel) and difficulties with acquisition and legal ownership of land.[29][30]Land grabbing andcattle rustling are also potential difficulties that ranchers would have to deal with. Ranchers would also be unable to compete with nomadic herders with zero land-related costs.[31]
Since 2022,Genocide Watch has classified the conflicts as a genocide of Christians perpetrated by ethnic Fulani jihadists. The organisation places Nigeria on the stages "Stage 9: Extermination" and "Stage 10: Denial" in theTen Stages of Genocide model developed by American scholarGregory Stanton.[32] In 2025, the American presidentDonald Trump said he would consider military intervention in the form of American troops or airstrikes if Nigeria could not control the situation, saying "they're killing record numbers of Christians in Nigeria".[33] Daniel Bwala, an adviser to the Nigerian presidentBola Tinubu, denied accusations of a Christian genocide,[34] as has theEconomic Community of West African States.[35]The New York Times says that attacks on Christians have received the most attention within Nigeria and internationally.[36] Analysts speaking toReuters note that the majority of attacks from Islamist insurgents were against Muslims.[34] Nigerian officials also said they welcomed assistance on dealing with the insurgency, but insisted Nigeria's territorial integrity must be maintained.[34][37]
Nigerian and foreign newspapers are often unable to provide exact numbers of casualties. Despite the high number of attacks, Nigerian and foreign journalists rarely have access to first-hand testimonies and tend to report inaccurate figures.[38]
In April 2018, Fulani gunmen allegedly killed 19 people during an attack on the church, afterwards they burnt dozens of nearby homes.[42]
In January 2018, about 10 persons were killed in an attack and reprisal involving herders and local farmers in Numan local council of Adamawa State.[43][44][45]
In May 2018 over 400 herdsmen attacked four villages of Lamurde, Bang, Bolk, Zumoso and Gon in Numan and Lamurde local councils ofAdamawa State killing 15 people.[46]
In June 2018, over 200 people were killed and 50 houses were burnt in clashes between farmers andFulani cattle herders inPlateau State, including one devastating attack from the night of the 22nd to the morning of the 23rd which killed 21 villagers in the village of Dowaya, Adamawa state. The casualties were reported to only consist of women and children.[47][48][49][50]
In July 2018, a clash erupted between the Fulani settlers and the Yandang community in Lau Local Government Area of Taraba State. About 73 people were killed and 50 villages were razed.[51]
In October 2018, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 19 people in Bassa.[52]
On 16 December 2018, militants believed to be Fulani herdsmen attacked a village inJema'a, killing 15 people and injuring at least 24 others, the attack occurred at a wedding ceremony.[53][54]
On 11 February 2019, an attack on an Adara settlement named Ungwar Bardi by suspected Fulani gunmen killed 11. Reprisal attack by Adara targeted settlements of the Fulani killing at least 141 people with 65 missing. The attacks took place inKajuru LGA ofKaduna State.[55] According to a governor the motive was to destroy specific communities.[56][55]
The Coalition AgainstKajuru killings stated on 18 March 2019 that 130 people have been killed in a series of revenge attacks since the massacre announced by El-Rufai.[57]
On 26–27 January 2020, 32 villagers were murdered in two different attacks by Muslim Fulani herdsmen inPlateau State.[58]
On 23 January 2024, suspected Fulani herders killed at least 30 people and burned and ransacked schools, places of worship, and houses in Kwahaslalek village,Mangu.[65]
On 7 April 2025, The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reports that at least 52 people have been killed and more than 2,000 others displaced from their homes in Plateau State amid reprisal attacks by rival herders for control of farmland.[66]
On June 14, 2025, at least 100 people were killed, many burned alive, hundreds more injured, and dozens remain missing, in an attack by unidentified gunmen in Gum, Benue State.[67]
Adebanwi, Wale, 'Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern Nigeria', Citizenship Studies, 13.4 (2009), 349–63
Blench, Roger. 1996.Pastoralists and National Borders in Nigeria. In: Nugent, P., and A. I. Asiwaju (eds).African Boundaries: Barriers, conduits and opportunities. 111–128. Edinburgh: Francis Pinter for Centre of African Studies.
Higazi, Adam, 'Farmer-Pastoralist Conflicts on the Jos Plateau, Central Nigeria: Security Responses of Local Vigilantes and the Nigerian State', Conflict, Security and Development, 16.4 (2016), 365–85
Last, Murray, 'Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An Economy of Political Panic', The Round Table : The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 96.392 (2007), 605–16
Last, Murray, 'The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria', Africa, 78.1 (2008), 41–63
Mustapha, Abdul Raufu, and David Ehrhardt, eds., Creed & Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria (Oxford: James Currey, 2018)
Ochonu, Moses E, 'Fulani Expansion and Subcolonial Rule in Early Colonial Adamawa Province', in Colonialism by Proxy Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 129–56
Reynolds, Jonathan, The Time of Politics: Islam and the Politics of Legitimacy in Northern Nigeria 1950-1966 (San Francisco: International Scholar Publications, 1999)
^Last, Murray (2007). "Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An economy of political panic".The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs.96 (392):605–616.doi:10.1080/00358530701626057.ISSN0035-8533.S2CID219627153.
^abcMadu, Ignatius Ani; Nwankwo, Cletus Famous (20 May 2020). "Spatial pattern of climate change and farmer–herder conflict vulnerabilities in Nigeria".GeoJournal.86 (6):2691–2707.doi:10.1007/s10708-020-10223-2.S2CID219475368.
