Born in Germany, Kissinger emigrated to the United States in 1938 as aJewish refugee fleeing Nazi persecution. He served in theU.S. Army during World War II. After the war, he attendedHarvard University, where he excelled academically. He later became a professor of government at the university and earned an international reputation as an expert onnuclear weapons andforeign policy. He acted as a consultant to government agencies,think tanks, and the presidential campaigns ofNelson Rockefeller and Nixon before being appointed as national security advisor and later secretary of state by President Nixon.
Kissinger was bornHeinz Alfred Kissinger[b] on May 27, 1923, inFürth, Bavaria, Germany. He was the son of homemaker Paula (née Stern), fromLeutershausen, andLouis Kissinger [de], a school teacher. He had a younger brother, Walter, who was a businessman. Kissinger's family wasGerman-Jewish.[12] His great-great-grandfather Meyer Löb adopted "Kissinger" as his surname in 1817, taking it from the Bavarianspa town ofBad Kissingen.[13] In his childhood, Kissinger enjoyed playing soccer. He played for the youth team ofSpVgg Fürth, one of the nation's best clubs at the time.[14]
On August 20, 1938, when Kissinger was 15 years old, he and his family fled Germany to avoid further Nazi persecution.[16] The family briefly stopped in London before arriving in New York City on September 5. Kissinger later downplayed the influence his experiences of Nazi persecution had had on his policies and view of the world, writing that the "Germany of my youth had a great deal of order and very little justice; it was not the sort of place likely to inspire devotion to order in the abstract." Nevertheless, many scholars, including Kissinger's biographerWalter Isaacson, have argued that his experiences influenced the formation of his realist approach to foreign policy.[19]
Kissinger spent his high-school years in the German-Jewish community inWashington Heights, Manhattan. Although Kissinger assimilated quickly into American culture, he never lost his pronouncedGerman accent, due to childhood shyness that made him hesitant to speak.[20][21] After his first year atGeorge Washington High School, he completed school at night while working in ashaving brush factory during the day.[20]
Kissinger studied accounting at theCity College of New York, excelling academically as a part-time student while continuing to work. His studies were interrupted in early 1943, when he was drafted into theU.S. Army.[22]
U.S. Army
Kissinger underwent basic training atCamp Croft inSpartanburg, South Carolina. On June 19, 1943, while stationed in South Carolina, he became anaturalizedU.S. citizen. The army sent him to study engineering atLafayette College in Pennsylvania under theArmy Specialized Training Program, but the program was canceled and Kissinger was reassigned to the84th Infantry Division. There, he made the acquaintance ofFritz Kraemer, a fellow immigrant from Germany who noted Kissinger's fluency in German and his intellect and arranged for him to be assigned to the division'smilitary intelligence. According toVernon A. Walters, Kissinger also received training atCamp Ritchie, Maryland, before being shipped to Europe.[23] Kissinger saw combat with the division and volunteered for hazardous intelligence duties during theBattle of the Bulge. On April 10, 1945, he participated in the liberation of the Hannover-Ahlem concentration camp, a subcamp of theNeuengamme concentration camp. At the time, Kissinger wrote in his journal, "I had never seen people degraded to the level that people were in Ahlem. They barely looked human. They were skeletons." After the initial shock, however, Kissinger was relatively silent about his wartime service.[24][25]
During the American advance into Germany, Kissinger, though only aprivate, was put in charge of the administration of the city ofKrefeld because of a lack of German speakers on the division's intelligence staff. Within eight days he had established a civilian administration.[26] Kissinger was then reassigned to theCounter Intelligence Corps (CIC), where he became aCIC Special Agent holding the enlisted rank ofsergeant. He was given charge of a team inHanover assigned to tracking downGestapo officers and other saboteurs, for which he was awarded theBronze Star.[27] Kissinger drew up a comprehensive list of all known Gestapo employees in the Bergstraße region, and had them rounded up. By the end of July, 12 men had been arrested. In March 1947, Fritz Girke, Hans Hellenbroich, Michael Raaf, and Karl Stattmann were subsequently caught and tried by theDachau Military Tribunal for killing two American prisoners of war. The four men were all found guilty and sentenced to death. They were executed by hanging atLandsberg Prison in October 1948.[28]
In June 1945, Kissinger was made commandant of theBensheim metro CIC detachment,Bergstraße district ofHesse, with responsibility fordenazification of the district. Although he possessed absolute authority and powers of arrest, Kissinger took care to avoid abuses against the local population by his command.[29]
In 1946, Kissinger was reassigned to teach at the European Command Intelligence School atCamp King and, as a civilian employee following his separation from the army, continued to serve in this role.[30][31]
Kissinger recalled that his experience in the army "made me feel like an American".[32]
Academic career
Kissinger earned his Bachelor of Artssumma cum laude,Phi Beta Kappa[33] in political science fromHarvard College in 1950, where he lived inAdams House and studied underWilliam Yandell Elliott.[34] His senior undergraduate thesis, titledThe Meaning of History: Reflections onSpengler,Toynbee andKant, was over 400 pages long, and provoked Harvard's current cap on the length of undergraduate theses (35,000 words).[35][36][37] He earned his Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy atHarvard University in 1951 and 1954, respectively. In 1952, while still a graduate student at Harvard, he served as a consultant to the director of thePsychological Strategy Board,[38] and founded a magazine,Confluence.[39] At that time, he sought to work as a spy for theFBI.[39][40]
Portrait of Kissinger as a Harvard senior in 1950
Kissinger's doctoral dissertation was titledPeace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study of the Statesmanship ofCastlereagh andMetternich).[41] Stephen Graubard, Kissinger's friend, asserted that Kissinger primarily pursued such endeavor to instruct himself on the history of power play between European states in the 19th century.[42] In his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger first introduced the concept of "legitimacy",[43] which he defined as: "Legitimacy as used here should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy".[44] An international order accepted by all of the major powers is "legitimate" whereas an international order not accepted by one or more of the great powers is "revolutionary" and hence dangerous.[44] Thus, when after theCongress of Vienna in 1815, the leaders ofBritain,France,Austria,Prussia, andRussia agreed to co-operate in theConcert of Europe to preserve the peace after Austria, Prussia, and Russia participated in a series of threePartitions of Poland, in Kissinger's viewpoint this international system was "legitimate" because it was accepted by the leaders of all five of the Great Powers of Europe. Notably, Kissinger'sPrimat der Außenpolitik (Primacy of foreign policy) approach to diplomacy took it for granted that as long as the decision-makers in the major states were willing to accept the international order, then it is "legitimate" with questions of public opinion and morality dismissed as irrelevant.[44] His dissertation also won him theSenator Charles Sumner Prize, an award given to the best dissertation "from the legal, political, historical, economic, social, or ethnic approach, dealing with any means or measures tending toward the prevention of war and the establishment of universal peace" by a student under the Harvard Department of Government.[45] It was published in 1957 asA World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822.[45]
Kissinger remained at Harvard as a member of the faculty in the Department of Government where he served as the director of the Harvard International Seminar between 1951 and 1971. In 1955, he was a consultant to theNational Security Council'sOperations Coordinating Board.[38] During 1955 and 1956, he was also study director in nuclear weapons and foreign policy at theCouncil on Foreign Relations. He released his bookNuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy the following year.[46] The book, which criticized theEisenhower administration'smassive retaliation nuclear doctrine, caused much controversy at the time by proposing the use oftactical nuclear weapons on a regular basis to win wars.[47] That same year, he publishedA World Restored, a study of balance-of-power politics in post-Napoleonic Europe.[48]
Keen to have a greater influence onU.S. foreign policy, Kissinger became foreign policy advisor to the presidential campaigns ofNelson Rockefeller, supporting his bids for theRepublican nomination in 1960, 1964, and 1968.[49] Kissinger first metRichard Nixon at a party hosted byClare Boothe Luce in 1967, saying that he found him more "thoughtful" than he expected.[50] During the Republican primaries in 1968, Kissinger again served as the foreign policy adviser to Rockefeller and in July 1968 called Nixon "the most dangerous of all the men running to have as president".[50] Initially upset when Nixon won the Republican nomination, the ambitious Kissinger soon changed his mind about Nixon and contacted a Nixon campaign aide,Richard Allen, to state he was willing to do anything to help Nixon win.[51] After Nixon became president in January 1969, Kissinger was appointed asNational Security Advisor. By this time, he was arguably "one of the most important theorists about foreign policy ever to be produced by the United States", according to his official biographerNiall Ferguson.[52]
Foreign policy
Kissinger being sworn in as Secretary of State by Chief JusticeWarren Burger, September 22, 1973. Kissinger's mother, Paula, holds the Bible as President Nixon looks on.
The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger was unusually close, and has been compared to the relationships ofWoodrow Wilson andColonel House, orFranklin D. Roosevelt andHarry Hopkins.[55] In all three cases, the State Department was relegated to a backseat role in developing foreign policy.[56] Kissinger and Nixon shared a penchant for secrecy and conducted numerous "backchannel" negotiations, such as that through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States,Anatoly Dobrynin, that excluded State Department experts. HistorianDavid Rothkopf looked at the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger, saying:
They were a fascinating pair. In a way, they complemented each other perfectly. Kissinger was the charming and worldly Mr. Outside who provided the grace and intellectual-establishment respectability that Nixon lacked, disdained and aspired to. Kissinger was an international citizen. Nixon very much a classic American. Kissinger had a worldview and a facility for adjusting it to meet the times, Nixon had pragmatism and a strategic vision that provided the foundations for their policies. Kissinger would, of course, say that he was not political like Nixon—but in fact he was just as political as Nixon, just as calculating, just as relentlessly ambitious ... these self-made men were driven as much by their need for approval and their neuroses as by their strengths.[57]
A proponent ofRealpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role inUnited States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. In that period, he extended the policy ofdétente. This policy led to a significant relaxation in U.S.–Soviet tensions and played a crucial role in 1971 talks with the People's Republic of China premierZhou Enlai. The talks concluded with arapprochement between the United States and China, and the formation of a new strategic anti-Soviet Sino-American alignment. He was jointly awarded the1973 Nobel Peace Prize withLê Đức Thọ for helping to establish aceasefire and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The ceasefire, however, was not durable.[58] Thọ declined to accept the award[59] and Kissinger appeared deeply ambivalent about it—he donated his prize money to charity, did not attend the award ceremony, and later offered to return his prize medal.[60][61] As National Security Advisor in 1974, Kissinger directed the much-debatedNational Security Study Memorandum 200.[62]
Détente and opening to the People's Republic of China
Kissinger initially had little interest in China when he began his work as National Security Adviser in 1969, and the driving force behind the rapprochement with China was Nixon.[63] Like Nixon, Kissinger believed that relations with China would help the United States exit the Vietnam War and obtain long-term strategic benefits in confrontations with the Soviet Union.[64]: 3
In April 1970, both Nixon and Kissinger promisedChiang Ching-kuo, the son of GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek, that they would never abandonTaiwan or make any compromises withMao Zedong, although Nixon did speak vaguely of his wish to improve relations with the People's Republic.[65]
Kissinger, shown here withZhou Enlai andMao Zedong, negotiated rapprochement with China.
Kissinger made two trips to the People's Republic in July and October 1971 (the first of which was made in secret) to confer with PremierZhou Enlai, then in charge ofChinese foreign policy.[66] During his visit to Beijing, the main issue turned out to be Taiwan, as Zhou demanded the United States recognize that Taiwan was a legitimate part of the People's Republic, pullU.S. forces out of Taiwan, and end military support for theKuomintang regime.[67] Kissinger gave way by promising to pull U.S. forces out of Taiwan, saying two-thirds would be pulled out when the Vietnam war ended and the rest to be pulled out asSino-American relations improved.[68]
In October 1971, as Kissinger was making his second trip to the People's Republic, the issue of which Chinese government deserved to be represented in the United Nations came up again.[69] Out of concern to not be seen abandoning an ally, the United States tried to promote a compromise under which both Chinese regimes would beUnited Nations members, although Kissinger called it "an essentially doomed rearguard action".[70] While American ambassador to the United NationsGeorge H. W. Bush was lobbying for the "two Chinas" formula, Kissinger was removing favorable references to Taiwan from a speech that then Secretary of StateWilliam P. Rogers was preparing, as he expected the country to be expelled from the United Nations.[71] During his second visit to Beijing, Kissinger told Zhou that according to a public opinion poll 62% of Americans wanted Taiwan to remain a United Nations member and asked him to consider the "two Chinas" compromise to avoid offending American public opinion.[72] Zhou responded with his claim that the People's Republic was the legitimate government of all China, and no compromise was possible.[68] Kissinger said that the United States could not totally sever ties with Chiang, who had been an ally in World War II. Kissinger told Nixon that Bush was "too soft and not sophisticated" enough to properly represent the United States at the United Nations and expressed no anger when theUnited Nations General Assembly voted to expel Taiwan and give China's seat on theUnited Nations Security Council to the People's Republic.[68]
Kissinger's trips paved the way for the groundbreaking1972 summit between Nixon, Zhou, andChinese Communist Party ChairmanMao Zedong, as well as theformalization of relations between the two countries, ending 23 years of diplomatic isolation and mutual hostility. The result was the formation of a tacit strategic anti-Soviet alliance between China and the United States. Kissinger's diplomacy led to economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides and the establishment of "liaison offices" in the Chinese and American capitals, though full normalization of relations with China would not occur until 1979.[73]
Kissinger discussed being involved inIndochina prior to his appointment as National Security Adviser to Nixon.[74] According to Kissinger, his friendHenry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Ambassador to Saigon, employed Kissinger as a consultant, leading to Kissinger visiting Vietnam once in 1965 and twice in 1966, where Kissinger realized that the United States "knew neither how to win or how to conclude" the Vietnam War.[74] Kissinger also stated that in 1967, he served as anintermediary for negotiations between the United States andNorth Vietnam, with Kissinger providing the American position, while two Frenchmen provided the North Vietnamese position.[74]
When he came into office in 1969, Kissinger favored a negotiating strategy under which the United States and North Vietnam would sign anarmistice and agreed to pull their troops out ofSouth Vietnam while the South Vietnamese government and theViet Cong were to agree to a coalition government.[75] Kissinger had doubts about Nixon's theory of "linkage", believing that this would give the Soviet Union leverage over the United States and unlike Nixon was less concerned about the ultimate fate of South Vietnam.[76] Though Kissinger did not regard South Vietnam as important in its own right, he believed it was necessary to support South Vietnam to maintain the United States as a global power, believing that none of America's allies would trust the United States if South Vietnam were abandoned too quickly.[77]
In early 1969, Kissinger was opposed to the plans forOperation Menu, the bombing of Cambodia, fearing that Nixon was acting rashly with no plans for the diplomatic fall-out, but on March 16, 1969, Nixon announced the bombing would start the next day.[78] As he saw the president was committed, he became more supportive.[79] Kissinger played a key role in bombing Cambodia to disrupt raids into South Vietnam from Cambodia, as well as the 1970Cambodian campaign and subsequent widespread bombing ofKhmer Rouge targets inCambodia.[80] For his role in planning the U.S. bombing of Cambodia, scholars have stated that Kissinger bears substantial responsibility for the killing of between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian civilians and also the destabilization of Cambodia that the U.S. bombing campaign caused, which contributed to the Khmer Rouge's ascendance to power.[81][82] The Paris peace talks had become stalemated by late 1969 owing to the obstructionism of the South Vietnamese delegation.[83] The South Vietnamese presidentNguyễn Văn Thiệu did not want the United States to withdraw from Vietnam, and out of frustration with him, Kissinger began secret peace talks with Le Duc Thọ inParis parallel to the official talks that the South Vietnamese were unaware of.[84] In June 1971, Kissinger supported Nixon's effort to ban thePentagon Papers saying the "hemorrhage of state secrets" to the media was making diplomacy impossible.[85]
On August 1, 1972, Kissinger met Thọ again in Paris, and for first time, he seemed willing to compromise, saying that political and military terms of an armistice could be treated separately and hinted that his government was no longer willing to make the overthrow of Thiệu a precondition.[86] On the evening of October 8, 1972, at a secret meeting of Kissinger and Thọ in Paris came the decisive breakthrough in the talks.[87] Thọ began with "a very realistic and very simple proposal" for a ceasefire that would see the Americans pull all their forces out of Vietnam in exchange for the release of all thePOWs in North Vietnam.[88] Kissinger accepted Thọ's offer as the best deal possible, saying that the "mutual withdrawal formula" had to be abandoned as it had been "unobtainable through ten years of war ... We could not make it a condition for a final settlement. We had long passed that threshold".[88] In the fall of 1972, both Kissinger and Nixon were frustrated with Thiệu's refusal to accept any sort of peace deal calling for withdrawal of American forces.[89] On October 21 Kissinger and the American ambassadorEllsworth Bunker arrived in Saigon to show Thiệu the peace agreement.[89] Thiệu refused to sign the peace agreement and demanded very extensive amendments that Kissinger reported to Nixon "verge on insanity".[89]
Though Nixon had initially supported Kissinger against Thiệu,H.R. Haldeman andJohn Ehrlichman urged him to reconsider, arguing that Thiệu's objections had merit.[90] Nixon wanted 69 amendments to the draft peace agreement included in the final treaty and ordered Kissinger back to Paris to force Thọ to accept them.[90] Kissinger regarded Nixon's 69 amendments as "preposterous" as he knew Thọ would never accept them.[90] As expected, Thọ refused to consider any of the 69 amendments, and on December 13, 1972, left Paris for Hanoi.[91] Kissinger by this stage was worked up into a state of fury after Thọ walked out of the Paris talks and told Nixon: "They're just a bunch of shits. Tawdry, filthy shits".[91]
On January 8, 1973, Kissinger and Thọ met again in Paris and the next day reached an agreement, which in main points was essentially the same as the one Nixon had rejected in October with only cosmetic concessions to the Americans.[92] Thiệu once again rejected the peace agreement, only to receive an ultimatum from Nixon which caused Thiệu to reluctantly accept the peace agreement.[93] On January 27, 1973, Kissinger and Thọ signed a peace agreement that called for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam by March in exchange for North Vietnam freeing all the U.S. POWs.[93] Along with Thọ, Kissinger was awarded theNobel Peace Prize on December 10, 1973, for their work in negotiating the ceasefires contained in theParis Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam", signed the previous January.[58] According toIrwin Abrams in 2001, this prize was the most controversial to date. For the first time in the history of the Peace Prize, two members left theNobel Committee in protest.[94][95] Thọ rejected the award, telling Kissinger that peace had not been restored in South Vietnam.[96] Kissinger wrote to the Nobel Committee that he accepted the award "with humility",[97][98] and "donated the entire proceeds to the children of American service members killed or missing in action in Indochina".[60] After theFall of Saigon in 1975, Kissinger attempted to return the award.[60][61]
By the summer of 1974, the U.S. embassy reported that morale in theARVN had fallen to dangerously low levels and it was uncertain how much longer South Vietnam would last.[99] In August 1974, the U.S. Congress passed a bill limiting American aid to South Vietnam to $700 million annually.[100] By November 1974, Kissinger lobbiedLeonid Brezhnev to end Soviet military aid to North Vietnam.[101] The same month, he also lobbied Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to end Chinese military aid to North Vietnam.[101] On April 15, 1975, Kissinger testified before theSenate Appropriations Committee, urging Congress to increase the military aid budget to South Vietnam by another $700 million to save the ARVN as thePAVN was rapidly advancing onSaigon, which was refused.[102] Kissinger maintained at the time, and until his death, that if only Congress had approved of his request for another $700 million South Vietnam would have been able to resist.[103]
In November 1975, seven months after theKhmer Rouge took power, Kissinger told the Thai foreign minister: "You should tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs but we won't let that stand in our way."[104] In a 1998 interview, Kissinger said: "some countries, the Chinese in particular supportedPol Pot as a counterweight to the Vietnamese supported people andWe at least tolerated it." Kissinger said he did not approve of this due tothe genocide and said he "would not have dealt with Pol Pot for any purpose whatsoever." He further said: "The Thais and the Chinese did not want a Vietnamese-dominatedIndochina.We didn't want the Vietnamese to dominate. I don't believe we did anything for Pol Pot. But I suspect we closed our eyes when some others did something for Pol Pot."[105]
Interview with Oriana Fallaci
On November 4, 1972,[106] Kissinger agreed to an interview with Italian journalistOriana Fallaci. Kissinger, who rarely engaged in one-on-one interviews with the press and knew very little about Fallaci, accepted her request after reportedly being impressed with her 1969 interview withVõ Nguyên Giáp.[107] The interview turned out to be a political and public relations disaster for Kissinger as he agreed that Vietnam was a "useless war", implied that he preferred to have dinner withLê Đức Thọ overNguyễn Văn Thiệu (in her 1976 bookInterview with History, Fallaci recalled that Kissinger agreed with many of her negative sentiments towards Thiệu in a private discussion before the interview), and engaged in a now infamous exchange with the hard-pressing Fallaci, with Kissinger comparing himself to acowboy leading the Nixon administration:
Fallaci:I suppose that at the root of everything there's your success. I mean, like achess player, you've made two or three good moves. China, first of all. People like chess players whocheckmate the king. Kissinger:Yes, China has been a very important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet that's not the main point. The main point. ... Well, yes, I'll tell you. What do I care? The main point arises from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans like that immensely. Americans like the cowboy who leads thewagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse, the cowboy who rides all alone into the town, the village, with his horse and nothing else. Maybe even without a pistol, since he doesn't shoot. He acts, that's all, by being in the right place at the right time. In short, a Western. Fallaci:I see. You see yourself as a kind ofHenry Fonda, unarmed and ready to fight with his fists for honest ideals. Alone, courageous ... Kissinger:Not necessarily courageous. In fact, this cowboy doesn't have to be courageous. All he needs is to be alone, to show others that he rides into the town and does everything by himself. This amazing, romantic character suits me precisely because to be alone has always been part of my style or, if you like, my technique. Together with independence. Oh, that's very important in me and for me. And finally, conviction. I've always been convinced that I had to do whatever I've done. And people feel it, and believe in it. And I care about the fact that they believe in me when you sway or convince somebody, you shouldn't confuse them. Nor can you even simply calculate. Some people think that I carefully plan what are to be the consequences, for the public, of any of my initiatives or efforts. They think this preoccupation is always on my mind. Instead the consequences of what I do, I mean the public's judgment, have never bothered me. I don't ask for popularity, I'm not looking for popularity. On the contrary, if you really want to know, I care nothing about popularity. I'm not at all afraid of losing my public; I can allow myself to say what I think. I'm referring to what's genuine in me. If I were to let myself be disturbed by the reactions of the public, if I were to act solely on the basis of a calculated technique, I would accomplish nothing.[108]
Nixon was enraged by the interview, in particular the comedic "cowboy" comparison which infuriated Nixon. For several weeks afterwards, he refused to see Kissinger and even contemplated firing him. At one point, Kissinger, in desperation, drove up unannounced to Nixon'sSan Clemente residence but was rejected bySecret Service personnel at the gates.[108] Kissinger later claimed that it was "the single most disastrous conversation I have ever had with any member of the press".[109] Fallaci described the interview with the evasive, monotonous, non-expressive Kissinger as the most uncomfortable and most difficult she ever did, criticizing Kissinger as a "intellectual adventurer" and a self-styledMetternich.[107]
Kissinger in the West Wing as National Security Adviser in April 1975
Nixon supported Pakistani dictatorYahya Khan in theBangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Kissinger sneered at people who "bleed" for "the dyingBengalis" and ignored the firsttelegram from the U.S. consul general inEast Pakistan,Archer K. Blood, and 20 members of his staff, which informed the U.S. that their alliesWest Pakistan were undertaking, in Blood's words, "a selective genocide" targeting the Bengali intelligentsia, supporters of independence for East Pakistan, and theHindu minority.[110] In the second, more famous,Blood Telegram the word 'genocide' was again used to describe the events, and further that with its continuing support for West Pakistan the U.S. government had "evidenced ...moral bankruptcy".[111] As a direct response to the dissent against U.S. policy, Kissinger and Nixon ended Archer Blood's tenure as United States consul general in East Pakistan and put him to work in the State Department's Personnel Office.[112][113] Christopher Clary argues that Nixon and Kissinger were unconsciously biased, leading them to overestimate the likelihood of Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels.[114]
Kissinger was particularly concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in theIndian subcontinent as a result ofa treaty of friendship recently signed by India and the Soviet Union, and sought to demonstrate to China (Pakistan's ally and an enemy of both India and the Soviet Union) the value of a tacit alliance with the United States.[115][116][117][118][119]
Kissinger had also come under fire for private comments he made to Nixon during the Bangladesh–Pakistan War in which he described Indian prime ministerIndira Gandhi as a "bitch" and a "witch". He also said "the Indians are bastards", shortly before the war.[120] Kissinger later expressed his regret over the comments.[121][122]
Nixon felt his administration had neglected relations with the Western European states in his first term and in September 1972 decided that if he was reelected that 1973 would be the "Year of Europe" as the United States would focus on relations with the states of theEuropean Economic Community (EEC) which had emerged as a serious economic rival by 1970.[124] Applying his favorite "linkage" concept, Nixon intended henceforward economic relations with Europe would not be severed from security relations, and if the EEC states wanted changes in American tariff and monetary policies, the price would be defense spending on their part.[124] Kissinger in particular as part of the "Year of Europe" wanted to "revitalize" NATO, which he called a "decaying" alliance as he believed that there was nothing at present to stop theRed Army from overrunning Western Europe in a conventional forces conflict.[124] The "linkage" concept more applied to the question of security as Kissinger noted that the United States was going to sacrifice NATO for the sake of "citrus fruits".[125]
Israeli policy and Soviet Jewry
Kissinger sits in the Oval Office with President Nixon and Israeli prime ministerGolda Meir, 1973.Kissinger (right) during a 1961 visit to Israel
According to notes taken byH. R. Haldeman, Nixon "ordered his aides to exclude allJewish-Americans from policy-making on Israel", including Kissinger.[126] One note quotes Nixon as saying "get K. [Kissinger] out of the play—Haig handle it".[126]
In 1973, Kissinger did not feel that pressing the Soviet Union concerning the plight ofJews being persecuted there was in the interest of U.S. foreign policy. In a conversation with Nixon shortly after a meeting with Israeli prime ministerGolda Meir on March 1, 1973, Kissinger stated, "The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy, and if they put Jews intogas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern."[127] He had a negative view of American Jews who lobbied for aid to Soviet Jews, calling them "bastards" and "self-serving".[128] He went on to state that, "If it were not for the accident of my birth, I would beantisemitic" and "any people who has been persecuted for two thousand years must be doing something wrong."[129]
In September 1973, Nixon firedWilliam P. Rogers as Secretary of State and replaced him with Kissinger. He would later state he had not been given enough time to know the Middle East as he settled into the State Department.[130] Kissinger later admitted that he was so engrossed with the Paris peace talks to end the Vietnam war that he and others in Washington missed the significance of theEgyptian-Saudi alliance. Egyptian presidentAnwar Sadat expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt in May 1972, attempting to signal to the U.S. that he was open to disentangling Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence; Kissinger offered secret talks on a settlement for the Middle East, though nothing came of the offer. By March 1973, Sadat had moved back towards the Soviets, closing the largest arms package between Egypt and the Soviet Union and allowing for the return of Soviet military personnel and advisors to Egypt.[131]
On October 6, 1973, at 6:15 am, assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairsJoseph Sisco, informed Kissinger that Egypt and Syria were about to go to war with Israel. Sisco had been warned by U.S. ambassador to Israel,Kenneth Keating, who two hours previously had been urgently summoned by Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir who believed conflict was imminent.[132] Prioritisingdétente, Kissinger's first phone call (at 6:40 am) was to Soviet ambassador and good friendAnatoly Dobrynin. He would later make calls to British ambassadorRowland Baring and the U.N. secretary-generalKurt Waldheim. Kissinger did not inform President Richard Nixon orWhite House chief of staffAlexander Haig about the start of theYom Kippur War until either 8:35[133] or 9:25 am.[134] as both were spending the weekend at Key Biscayne discussingSpiro Agnew's imminent resignation.[135] According to Kissinger his urgent calls to the Soviets and Egyptians were ineffective.
On October 12, under Nixon's direction, and against Kissinger's initial advice,[136] while Kissinger was on his way to Moscow to discuss conditions for a cease-fire, Nixon sent a message to Brezhnev giving Kissinger full negotiating authority.[137] Kissinger wanted to stall a ceasefire to gain more time for Israel to push across theSuez Canal to the African side, and wanted to be perceived as a mere presidential emissary who needed to consult the White House all the time as a stalling tactic.[137]
On October 31, 1973, Egyptian foreign ministerIsmail Fahmi (left) meets withRichard Nixon (middle) and Henry Kissinger (right), about a week after the end of fighting in theYom Kippur War.
Kissinger promised the Israeli prime ministerGolda Meir that the United States would replace its losses in equipment after the war, but sought initially to delay arms shipments to Israel, as he believed it would improve the odds of making peace along the lines ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 242.[138] In 1973, Meir requested $850 million worth of American arms and equipment to replace itsmateriel losses.[139] Nixon instead sent some $2 billion worth.[140] Thearms lift enraged KingFaisal of Saudi Arabia, and he retaliated on October 20, 1973, by placing atotal embargo on oil shipments to the United States, to be joined by all of the other oil-producing Arab states exceptIraq andLibya.[141]
On November 7, 1973, Kissinger flew toRiyadh to meet King Faisal and to ask him to end the oil embargo in exchange for promising to be "even handed" in the Arab-Israeli dispute.[142] Despite Kissinger's efforts to charm him, Faisal refused to lift the oil embargo.[143] Only on March 19, 1974, did the King end the oil embargo, after Sadat reported to him that the United States was being more "even handed" and after Kissinger had promised to sell Saudi Arabia weapons that it had previously denied under the grounds that they might be used against Israel.[144]
Kissinger pressured the Israelis tocede some of the newly captured land back to its Arab neighbors, contributing to the first phases of Israeli–Egyptian non-aggression. In 1973–1974, Kissinger engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" flying betweenTel Aviv,Cairo, andDamascus in a bid to make the armistice the basis of a permanent peace. Kissinger's first meeting withHafez al-Assad lasted 6 hours and 30 minutes, causing the press to believe for a moment that he had been kidnapped by the Syrians.[145] In his memoirs, Kissinger described how, during the course of his 28 meetings in Damascus in 1973–74, Assad "negotiated tenaciously and daringly like ariverboat gambler to make sure he had exacted the last sliver of available concessions".[145] As for the others Kissinger negotiated with, Kissinger viewed the Israeli politicians as rigid, while he had a good relationship and was able to develop a sense of assurance with Sadat.[146] Kissinger's efforts resulted in two ceasefires between Egypt and Israel,Sinai I in January 1974, andSinai II in September 1975.[146]
Kissinger had avoided involving France and the United Kingdom, the former European colonial powers of the Middle East, in the peace negotiations that followed the Yom Kippur War, being primarily focused on minimizing the Soviet Union's sway over the peace negotiations and on moderating the international influences on the Arab-Israeli conflict.President Pompidou of France was concerned and perturbed by this development, viewing it as an indication of the United States' ambitions of hegemonically domineering the region.[147]
Persian Gulf
Kissinger and KingFaisal of Saudi Arabia (left) inRiyadh on March 19, 1975. In the far background behind Faisal is his half-brother, the futureKing Fahd.
A major concern for Kissinger was the possibility of Soviet influence in thePersian Gulf. In April 1969,Iraq came into conflict withIran when ShahMohammad Reza Pahlavi renounced the 1937 treaty governing theShatt-al-Arab river. On December 1, 1971, after two years of skirmishes along the border, PresidentAhmed Hassan al-Bakr broke offdiplomatic relations with Iran.[148] In May 1972, Nixon and Kissinger visitedTehran to tell the Shah that there would be no "second-guessing of his requests" to buy American weapons.[148] At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to a plan of the Shah's that the United States together with Iran and Israel would support theKurdishpeshmerga guerrillas fighting for independence from Iraq.[148] Kissinger later wrote that after Vietnam, there was no possibility of deploying American forces in the Middle East, and henceforward Iran was to act as America's surrogate in the Persian Gulf.[149] Kissinger described theBa'athist regime in Iraq as a potential threat to the United States and believed that building up Iran and supporting thepeshmerga was the best counterweight.[149]
Following aperiod of steady relations between the U.S. Government and theGreek military regime after 1967, Secretary of State Kissinger was faced with thecoup by the Greek junta and theTurkish invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974. In an August 1974 edition ofThe New York Times, it was revealed that Kissinger and the State Department were informed in advance of the impending coup by the Greek junta in Cyprus. Indeed, according to the journalist,[150] the official version of events as told by the State Department was that it felt it had to warn the Greek military regime not to carry out the coup.
Kissinger was a target ofanti-American sentiment which was a significant feature of Greek public opinion at the time—particularly among young people—viewing the U.S. role in Cyprus as negative. In a demonstration by students inHeraklion,Crete,[151][152] soon after the second phase of the Turkish invasion in August 1974, slogans such as "Kissinger, murderer", "Americans get out", "No to Partition" and "Cyprus is no Vietnam" were heard. Some years later, Kissinger expressed the opinion that theCyprus issue was resolved in 1974.[153]The New York Times and other major newspapers were highly critical, and even State Department officials did not hide their dissatisfaction with his alleged arrogance and ignorance of the basic facts of the issue.[154]
Kissinger was reported to have said, "The Turkish tactics are right – grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession".[155]
However, Kissinger never felt comfortable with the way he handled the Cyprus issue.[154] JournalistAlexis Papahelas stated that Kissinger's "facial expression changes markedly when someone—usually Greek or Cypriot—refers to the crisis".[154] According to him, Kissinger had felt since the summer of 1974 that history would not treat him lightly in relation to his actions.[154]
Ford and Kissinger conversing on theWhite House grounds, August 1974
In 1970, Kissinger parroted to Nixon the United States Department of Defense's position that the country should maintain control over thePanama Canal, which was a reversal of the commitment by theLyndon Johnson administration.[156] Later, in the face of international pressure, Kissinger changed his stance, viewing the past hardline position in the Panama Canal issue as a hindrance to American relations with Latin America and an international setback that the Soviet Union would approve of.[156] Kissinger in 1973 called for "new dialogue" between the United States and Latin America, then in 1974, Kissinger met Panama military leaderOmar Torrijos and an agreement on eight operating principles for an eventual handover of the Panama Canal to Panama was made between Kissinger and Panamanian foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, which angered the United States Congress, but ultimately provided a framework for the1977 U.S.–Panama treaties.[156]
Kissinger initially supported the normalization ofUnited States–Cuba relations, broken since 1961 (all U.S.–Cuban trade was blocked in February 1962, a few weeks after the exclusion of Cuba from theOrganization of American States because of U.S. pressure). However, he quickly changed his mind and followed Kennedy's policy. After the involvement of theCuban Revolutionary Armed Forces in the independence struggles inAngola andMozambique, Kissinger said that unless Cuba withdrew its forces relations would not be normalized. Cuba refused.[157][158]
In February 1976, Kissinger considered launching air strikes against ports and military installations in Cuba, as well as deployingU.S. Marine Corps battalions based at the U.S. Navy base atGuantanamo Bay, in retaliation for Cuban presidentFidel Castro's decision in late 1975 tosend troops to newly independent Angola to help theMPLA in its fight againstUNITA and South Africa during the start of theAngolan Civil War.[160]
Following the uprising of October 7, 1970, GeneralJuan José Torres came to power in Bolivia, forming a left-wing nationalist government with an "anti-imperialist" stance. His policies, which included the nationalization of some American-owned property, led to the U.S. exerting external pressure over his government.
On June 11, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger discussed plans for a coup in Bolivia,[161] and later in July, the40 Committee approved covert funding towards Torres's opposition.[162] Torres was successfully overthrown by theNationalist Popular Front, led by Hugo Banzer, in August 21, 1971.
ChileanSocialist Party presidential candidateSalvador Allende was elected in 1970, causing serious concern in Washington, D.C., due to his socialist and pro-Cuban politics. The Nixon administration, with Kissinger's input, authorized theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) to encourage amilitary coup that would prevent Allende's inauguration, but the plan was not successful.: 115 [163]: 495 [164]: 177 Prior to Allende's election Kissinger had said that "I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people".[165]
On September 11, 1973, Allende died during an army attack on thepresidential palace that was an element of a military coup launched by Army Commander-in-ChiefAugusto Pinochet, who then became the head of themilitary junta which replaced Allende.[166] In September 1976,Orlando Letelier, a Chilean opponent of the new Pinochet regime,was assassinated in Washington, D.C., with a car bomb. Previously, Kissinger had helped secure his release from prison,[167] and had chosen to cancel an official U.S. letter to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations.[168] This murder was part ofOperation Condor, a covert program of political repression and assassination carried out bySouthern Cone nations that Kissinger has beenaccused of being involved in.[169][170]
On September 10, 2001, after recent declassification of documents, relatives and survivors of GeneralRené Schneider filed civil proceedings against Kissinger, in federal court in Washington, D.C.,[171] accusing him of collaborating in arranging Schneider's kidnapping which resulted in his death.[172] The case was later dismissed by theU.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citingseparation of powers: "The decision to support a coup of the Chilean government to prevent Dr. Allende from coming to power, and the means by which the United States Government sought to effect that goal, implicate policy makers in the murky realm of foreign affairs and national security best left to the political branches."[173] Decades later, the CIA admitted its involvement in the kidnapping of General Schneider, but not his murder, and subsequently paid the group responsible for his death $35,000 "to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the goodwill of the group, and for humanitarian reasons".[174][175]
Kissinger took a similar line as he had toward Chile when theArgentine Armed Forces, led byJorge Videla, toppled the elected government ofIsabel Perón in 1976 with a process called theNational Reorganization Process by the military, with which they consolidated power, launching brutal reprisals and "disappearances" against political opponents. An October 1987 investigative report inThe Nation broke the story of how, in a June 1976 meeting in the Hotel Carrera inSantiago, Kissinger gave the military junta in neighboring Argentina the "green light" for their own clandestine repression against leftwing guerrillas and other dissidents, thousands of whom were kept in more than 400 secretconcentration camps before they were executed. During a meeting with Argentine foreign ministerCésar Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger assured him that the United States was an ally but urged him to "get back to normal procedures" quickly before theU.S. Congress reconvened and had a chance to consider sanctions.[176][177][178][179]
As the article published inThe Nation noted, as the state-sponsored terror mounted, conservative Republican U.S. Ambassador to Buenos AiresRobert C. Hill"'was shaken, he became very disturbed, by the case of the son of a thirty-year embassy employee, a student who was arrested, never to be seen again,' recalled Juan de Onis, former reporter forThe New York Times. 'Hill took a personal interest.' He went to the Interior Minister, a general with whom he had worked on drug cases, saying, 'Hey, what about this? We're interested in this case.' He questioned (Foreign Minister Cesar)Guzzetti and, finally, PresidentJorge Videla himself. 'All he got was stonewalling; he got nowhere.' de Onis said. 'His last year was marked by increasing disillusionment and dismay, and he backed his staff on human rights right to the hilt."[180]
In a letter toThe Nation editorVictor Navasky, protesting publication of the article, Kissinger claimed that: "At any rate, the notion of Hill as a passionate human rights advocate is news to all his former associates." Yet Kissinger aideHarry W. Shlaudeman later disagreed with Kissinger, telling the oral historian William E. Knight of theAssociation for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project:
It really came to a head when I was Assistant Secretary, or it began to come to a head, in the case of Argentina where the dirty war was in full flower. Bob Hill, who was Ambassador then inBuenos Aires, a very conservative Republican politician—by no means liberal or anything of the kind, began to report quite effectively about what was going on, this slaughter of innocent civilians, supposedly innocent civilians—this vicious war that they were conducting, underground war. He, at one time in fact, sent me a back-channel telegram saying that the Foreign Minister, who had just come for a visit to Washington and had returned to Buenos Aires, had gloated to him that Kissinger had said nothing to him about human rights. I don't know—I wasn't present at the interview.[181]
Navasky later wrote in his book about being confronted by Kissinger:
'Tell me, Mr. Navasky,' [Kissinger] said in his famous guttural tones, 'how is it that a short article in an obscure journal such as yours about a conversation that was supposed to have taken place years ago about something that did or didn't happen in Argentina resulted in sixty people holding placards denouncing me a few months ago at the airport when I got off the plane inCopenhagen?'[182]
According to declassified state department files, Kissinger also hindered theCarter administration's efforts to halt the mass killings by the 1976–1983 military dictatorship by visiting the country asVidela's personal guest to attend the1978 FIFA World Cup and praising the regime.[183]
Brazil's nuclear weapons program
Kissinger was in favor of accommodatingBrazil while it pursueda nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. Kissinger justified his position by arguing that Brazil was a U.S. ally and on the grounds that it would benefit privatenuclear industry actors in the U.S. Kissinger's position on Brazil was out of sync with influential voices in the U.S. Congress, the State Department, and theU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[184]
Rhodesia
In September 1976, Kissinger was actively involved in negotiations regarding theRhodesian Bush War. Kissinger, along with South Africa's prime ministerJohn Vorster, pressuredRhodesian prime ministerIan Smith to hasten the transition to blackmajority rule inRhodesia. WithFRELIMO in control ofMozambique and even theapartheid regime of South Africa withdrawing its support, Rhodesia's isolation was nearly complete. According to Smith's autobiography, Kissinger told Smith of Mrs. Kissinger's admiration for him, but Smith stated that he thought Kissinger was asking him to sign Rhodesia's "death certificate". Kissinger, bringing the weight of the United States, and corralling other relevant parties to put pressure on Rhodesia, hastened the end of white minority rule.[185]
Portuguese Empire
In contrast to the unfriendly disposition of the previous Kennedy and Johnson administrations towards theEstado Novo regime of Portugal, particularly with regards to its attempts to maintain thePortuguese Colonial Empire by waging thePortuguese Colonial War against anti-colonial rebellions in defense of its empire, the Department of State under Kissinger adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards Portugal. In 1971, the administration of President Nixon successfully renewed the lease of the American military base in theAzores, despite condemnation from theCongressional Black Caucus and some members of the Senate. Though privately continuing to view Portugal contemptibly for its perceived atavistic foreign policy towards Africa, Kissinger publicly expressed thanks for Portugal's agreement to use its military base inLajes in theAzores to resupply Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Following thefall of the far-right Portuguese regime in 1974, Kissinger worried that the new government's hasty decolonization plan might benefit radical factions such as theMPLA inAngola. He also expressed concern that the inclusion of thePortuguese Communist Party in the new Portuguese government could legitimize communist parties in other NATO member states, such as Italy.[186]
The Portuguese decolonization process brought U.S. attention to theformer Portuguese colony ofEast Timor, which declared its independence in 1975. Indonesian presidentSuharto regarded East Timor as rightfully part of Indonesia. In December 1975, Suharto discussed invasion plans during a meeting with Kissinger and President Ford in the Indonesian capital ofJakarta. Both Ford and Kissinger made clear that U.S. relations with Indonesia would remain strong and that it would not object to the proposedannexation.[187] They only wanted it done "fast" and proposed that it be delayed until after they had returned to Washington.[188] Accordingly, Suharto delayed the operation for one day. Finally on December 7,Indonesian forces invaded the former Portuguese colony. U.S. arms sales to Indonesia continued, and Suharto went ahead with the annexation plan. According toBen Kiernan, the invasion and occupation resulted in thedeaths of nearly a quarter of the Timorese population from 1975 to 1981.[189]
The Kissingerian doctrine endorsed the forced concession ofSpanish Sahara toMorocco.[190] At the height of the 1975 Sahara crisis, Kissinger misled Gerald Ford into thinking theInternational Court of Justice had ruled in favor of Morocco.[191] Kissinger was aware in advance of the Moroccan plans for the invasion of the territory, materialized on November 6, 1975, in the so-calledGreen March.[191]
Zaire
Henry Kissinger meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko and others at the Presidential Residence inKinshasa, Zaire
Kissinger was involved in furthering cooperation between the U.S. and theZairian dictatorMobutu Sese Seko and held multiple meetings with him. Kissinger later described these efforts as "one of our policy successes in Africa" and praised Mobutu as "courageous, politically astute" and "relatively honest in a country where governmental corruption is a way of life".[192]
Later roles
Kissinger meeting with PresidentRonald Reagan in the White House family quarters, 1981
After Nixon was forced to resign in August 1974 due to theWatergate scandal, Kissinger initially kept both of his positions as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the new presidential administration ofGerald Ford. However, his influence was somewhat diminished when he was replaced byBrent Scowcroft as National Security Advisor during the "Halloween Massacre" cabinet reshuffle of November 1975.[193] Ford later explained his decision to journalist Thomas M. DeFrank: "When Kissinger had both State and NSC, there was not an independent evaluation of proposals, and I never liked that arrangement that I inherited. And when the time came to make some [other] changes at the Pentagon and CIA, it was logical to tell Henry, 'I’m gonna just leave you as secretary of state and upgrade Brent Scowcroft.'"[194] Kissinger left office as Secretary of State when DemocratJimmy Carter defeated Ford in the1976 presidential election.[195]
Kissinger continued to participate in policy groups, such as theTrilateral Commission, and to maintain political consulting, speaking, and writing engagements. In 1978, he was secretly involved in thwarting efforts by the Carter administration to indict three Chilean intelligence agents for masterminding the 1976assassination of Orlando Letelier.[196] Kissinger was critical of theforeign policy of the Jimmy Carter administration, saying in 1980 that "has managed the extraordinary feat of having, at one and the same time, the worst relations with our allies, the worst relations with our adversaries, and the most serious upheavals in thedeveloping world since the end of the Second World War."[197]
In September 1989,The Wall Street Journal's John Fialka disclosed that Kissinger took a direct economic interest in U.S.–China relations in March 1989 with the establishment of China Ventures, Inc., a Delaware limited partnership, of which he was chairman of the board and chief executive officer. A US$75 million investment in a joint venture with the Communist Party government's primary commercial vehicle at the time,China International Trust & Investment Corporation (CITIC), was its purpose. Board members were major clients of Kissinger Associates. Kissinger was criticized for not disclosing his role in the venture when called upon by ABC'sPeter Jennings to comment the morning after theJune 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre. Kissinger's position was generally supportive ofDeng Xiaoping's decision to use the military against the demonstrating students and he opposedeconomic sanctions.[204]
Kissinger with German chancellorAngela Merkel on June 21, 2017
In 1998, in response to the2002 Winter Olympic bid scandal, theInternational Olympic Committee formed a commission, called the "2000 Commission", to recommend reforms, which Kissinger served on. This service led in 2000 to his appointment as one of five IOC "honor members", a category the organization described as granted to "eminent personalities from outside the IOC who have rendered particularly outstanding services to it".[207]
From 2000 to 2006, Kissinger served as chairman of the board of trustees ofEisenhower Fellowships. In 2006, upon his departure from Eisenhower Fellowships, he received the Dwight D. Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service.[210]
In theRio Tinto espionage case of 2009–2010, Kissinger was paid US$5 million to advise the multinational mining company how to distance itself from an employee who had been arrested in China for bribery.[216]
PresidentDonald Trump meeting with Kissinger on May 10, 2017
Kissinger—along withWilliam Perry,Sam Nunn, andGeorge Shultz—called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in three op-eds inThe Wall Street Journal proposed an ambitious program of urgent steps to that end. The four created theNuclear Threat Initiative to advance this agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitledNuclear Tipping Point. The film is a visual and historical depiction of the ideas laid forth inThe Wall Street Journal op-eds and reinforces their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and the steps that can be taken to reach that goal.[217][218]
On November 17, 2016, Kissinger met withPresident-electDonald Trump during which they discussed global affairs.[219] Kissinger also met with President Trump at the White House in May 2017.[220]
In an interview withCharlie Rose on August 17, 2017, Kissinger said about President Trump: "I'm hoping for an Augustinian moment, forSt. Augustine ... who in his early life followed a pattern that was quite incompatible with later on when he had a vision, and rose tosainthood. One does not expect the president to become that, but it's conceivable".[221] Kissinger also argued that Russian presidentVladimir Putin wanted to weakenHillary Clinton, not elect Donald Trump. Kissinger said that Putin "thought—wrongly incidentally—that she would be extremely confrontational ... I think he tried to weaken the incoming president [Clinton]".[222]
Views on U.S. foreign policy
Yugoslav Wars
Kissinger, alongside PresidentBarack Obama and other politicians, discussing theNew START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, 2010
In several articles of his and interviews that he gave during theYugoslav Wars, he criticized the United States' policies in Southeast Europe, among other things for the recognition ofBosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, which he described as a foolish act.[223] Most importantly he dismissed the notion ofSerbs andCroats being aggressors or separatist, saying that "they can't be separating from something that has never existed".[224] In addition, he repeatedly warned the West against inserting itself into a conflict that has its roots at least hundreds of years back in time, and said that the West would do better if it allowed the Serbs and Croats to join their respective countries.[224] Kissinger shared similarly critical views onWestern involvement in Kosovo. In particular, he held a disparaging view of theRambouillet Agreement:[225]
The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.
However, as theSerbs did not accept the Rambouillet text andNATO bombings started, he opted to support a continuation of the bombing as NATO's credibility was now at stake, but dismissed the use of ground forces in claiming that it was not worth it.[226]
Iraq
Kissinger speaking duringGerald Ford's funeral in January 2007
In an interview on theBBC'sSunday AM on November 19, 2006, Kissinger was asked whether there was any hope left for a clear military victory in Iraq and responded, "If you mean by 'military victory' anIraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets thecivil war under control andsectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible. ... I think we have to redefine the course. But I don't believe that the alternative is between military victory as it had been defined previously, or total withdrawal."[231]
Kissinger said in April 2008 that "India has parallel objectives to the United States", and he called the nation anally of the U.S.[233]
China
Angela Merkel and Kissinger attending the state funeral for former German chancellorHelmut Schmidt, November 23, 2015
Kissinger attended the opening ceremony of the2008 Beijing Summer Olympics.[234] A few months before the Games opened, as controversy over China's human rights record was intensifying due to criticism byAmnesty International and other groups of the widespread use of the death penalty and other issues, Kissinger told China's official press agencyXinhua: "I think one should separate Olympics as a sporting event from whatever political disagreements people may have had with China. I expect that the games will proceed in the spirit for which they were designed, which is friendship among nations, and that other issues are discussed in other forums." He said China had made huge efforts to stage the Games. "Friends of China should not use the Olympics to pressure China now." He added that he would bring two of his grandchildren to watch the Games and planned to attend the opening ceremony.[235] During the Games, he participated with Australian swimmerIan Thorpe, film starJackie Chan, and former British prime ministerTony Blair at aPeking University forum on the qualities that make a champion.[236] He sat with his wifeNancy Kissinger, PresidentGeorge W. Bush, former presidentGeorge H. W. Bush, and Foreign MinisterYang Jiechi at the men's basketball game between China and the U.S.[237]
In 2011, Kissinger publishedOn China, chronicling the evolution ofSino-American relations and laying out the challenges to a partnership of "genuine strategic trust" between the U.S. and China.[238] In this bookOn China and his 2014 bookWorld Order, as well as in his 2018 interview withFinancial Times, Kissinger consistently stated that he believed that China wants to restore its historic role as theMiddle Kingdom and be "the principal adviser to all humanity".[239][240][241]
In July 2023, Kissinger traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese Defense MinisterLi Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2018 for engaging in the purchase of combat aircraft from a Russian arms exporter.[244] Kissinger emphasized Sino-American relations in the meeting, stating that "the United States and China should eliminate misunderstandings, coexist peacefully, and avoid confrontation".[245] Later that trip, Kissinger met with Xi with the intention of defrosting relations between the U.S. and China.[246]
Iran
Kissinger's position on this issue of U.S.–Iran talks was reported by theTehran Times to be that "Any direct talks between the U.S. and Iran on issues such as the nuclear dispute would be most likely to succeed if they first involved only diplomatic staff and progressed to the level of secretary of state before the heads of state meet."[247] In 2016, Kissinger said that the biggest challenge facing the Middle East is the "potential domination of the region by an Iran that is both imperial andjihadist". He further wrote in August 2017 that if theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran and its Shiite allies were allowed to fill the territorial vacuum left by a militarily defeatedIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the region would be left with a land corridor extending from Iran to the Levant "which could mark the emergence of an Iranian radical empire".[248] Commenting on theJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kissinger said that he would not have agreed to it, but that Trump's plan to end the agreement after it was signed would "enable the Iranians to do more than us".[249]
2014 Ukrainian crisis
Henry Kissinger on April 26, 2016
On March 5, 2014,The Washington Post published anop-ed piece by Kissinger, 11 days before theCrimean status referendum on whether Crimea should officially keep being a part of Ukraine or join Russia.[250] In it, he attempted to balance the Ukrainian, Russian, and Western desires for a functional state. He made four main points:
Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe;
Ukraine should not join NATO, a repetition of the position he took seven years before;
Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. He imagined an international position for Ukraine like that of Finland.
Ukraine should maintain sovereignty over Crimea.
Kissinger also wrote: "The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other—as has been the pattern—would lead eventually to civil war or break up."[250]
Following the publication of his book titledWorld Order, Kissinger participated in an interview withCharlie Rose and updated his position on Ukraine, which he saw as a possible geographical mediator between Russia and the West.[251] In a question he posed to himself for illustration regarding re-conceiving policy regarding Ukraine, Kissinger stated: "If Ukraine is considered an outpost, then the situation is that its eastern border is the NATO strategic line, and NATO will be within 200 miles (320 km) ofVolgograd. That will never be accepted by Russia. On the other hand, if the Russian western line is at theborder of Poland, Europe will be permanently disquieted. The Strategic objective should have been to see whether one can build Ukraine as a bridge between East and West, and whether one can do it as a kind of a joint effort."[252]
In December 2016, Kissinger advisedPresident-electDonald Trump to accept "Crimea as a part of Russia" in an attempt to secure a rapprochement between the United States and Russia, whose relations soured as a result of the Crimean crisis.[253] When asked if he explicitly considered Russia's sovereignty over Crimea legitimate, Kissinger answered in the affirmative, reversing the position he took in hisWashington Post op-ed.[254]
Computers and nuclear weapons
In 2019, Kissinger wrote about the increasing tendency to give control ofnuclear weapons to computers operating withartificial intelligence (AI) that: "Adversaries' ignorance of AI-developed configurations will become a strategic advantage".[255] Kissinger argued that giving power to launch nuclear weapons to computers usingalgorithms to make decisions would eliminate the human factor and give the advantage to the state that had the most effective AI system as a computer can make decisions about war and peace far faster than any human ever could.[255] Just as an AI-enhanced computer can win chess games by anticipating human decision-making, an AI-enhanced computer could be useful in a crisis as in anuclear war, the side that strikes first would have the advantage by destroying the opponent's nuclear capacity. Kissinger also noted there was always the danger that a computer could make a decision to start a nuclear war before diplomacy had been exhausted, or for a reason that would not be understandable to the operators.[256] Kissinger also warned the use of AI to control nuclear weapons would impose "opacity" on the decision-making process as the algorithms that control the AI system are not readily understandable, destabilizing the decision-making process:
grand strategy requires an understanding of the capabilities and military deployments of potential adversaries. But if more and more intelligence becomes opaque, how will policy makers understand the views and abilities of their adversaries and perhaps even allies? Will many different internets emerge or, in the end, only one? What will be the implications for cooperation? For confrontation? As AI becomes ubiquitous, new concepts for its security need to emerge.[256]
COVID-19 pandemic
On April 3, 2020, Kissinger shared his diagnostic view of theCOVID-19 pandemic, saying that it threatens the "liberal world order". Kissinger added that the virus does not know borders although global leaders are trying to address the crisis on a mainly national basis. He stressed that the key is not a purely national effort but greater international cooperation.[1]
Russian invasion of Ukraine
In May 2022, speaking to theWorld Economic Forum on theRussian invasion of Ukraine, Kissinger advocated for a diplomatic settlement that would restore thestatus quo ante bellum, effectively cedingCrimea and parts ofDonbas to Russian control.[257] Kissinger urged Ukrainians to "match the heroism they have shown with wisdom", arguing that "[p]ursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, but a new war against Russia itself."[258] He spoke toEdward Luce and aFinancial Times audience in the same month.[259] Ukrainian presidentVolodymyr Zelenskyy rejected Kissinger's suggestions, saying Ukraine would not agree to peace until Russia agreed to return Crimea and the Donbas region to Ukraine.[260]
On a book tour to sellLeadership: Six Studies in World Strategy in July 2022 he spoke toJudy Woodruff ofPBS and he was still of the opinion that "a negotiation is desirable" and clarified his earlier statements, saying that he supported a ceasefire line on the borders of February 24 and that "Russia should not gain anything from the war... Ukraine above all cannot give up territory that it had when the war started because this would be symbolically dangerous."[261]
On January 18, 2023, Kissinger was interviewed byGraham Allison for aWorld Economic Forum audience; he said that U.S. support should be intensified until either the February 24 borders are reached or the February 24 borders are recognized, upon which time under aceasefire agreement negotiations would begin. Kissinger felt that Russia needs to be given an opportunity to rejoin thecomity of nations while the sanctions are maintained until final settlement is reached. He expressed his admiration for President Zelenskyy and lauded the heroic conduct of the Ukrainian people. Kissinger felt that the invasion hasipso facto its logical outcome pointed to NATO membership for Ukraine at the end of the peace process.[262]
In September 2023, Kissinger met with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in New York City, on which occasion they discussed his change in position on Ukraine's NATO membership ambitions.[263]In September 2023, Kissinger also presented a reformulated response endorsing Ukraine's NATO membership as an “appropriate outcome,” which could be seen as a substantial boost to the transatlantic aspirations of embattled Ukraine.[264]
Gaza war
In a statement made a month before his death, Kissinger responded to theOctober 7 attacks and outbreak of theGaza war by saying that the goals of Hamas "can only be to mobilize the Arab world against Israel and to get off the track of peaceful negotiations". In response to celebrations of the attack by some Arabs in Germany, he issued a statement denouncingMuslim immigration into Germany: "It was a grave mistake to let in so many people of totally different culture and religion and concepts, because it creates a pressure group inside each country that does that."[265]
A 2014 poll of American international relations scholars conducted by theCollege of William & Mary ranked Kissinger as the most effective Secretary of State in the 50 years prior to 2015.[7] In 1972,Time commented that "a streak of suspicion seems to underlie all that he does" and "His jokes about his paranoia have an uncomfortable edge of truth". He was so often seen escorting Hollywood starlets that theVillage Voice charged he was "a secret square posing as a swinger".[266] The insight, "Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac", is widely attributed to him, although Kissinger was paraphrasingNapoleon Bonaparte.[267]
HistorianJeffrey Kimball developed the theory that Kissinger and the Nixon administration accepted a South Vietnamese collapse provided a face-savingdecent interval passed between U.S. withdrawal and defeat.[268] In his first meeting withZhou Enlai in 1971, Kissinger "laid out in detail the settlement terms that would produce such a delayed defeat: total American withdrawal, return of all American POWs, and a ceasefire-in-place for '18 months or some period'", in the words of historianKen Hughes.[269] On October 6, 1972, Kissinger told Nixon twice that the terms of the Paris Peace Accords would probably destroy South Vietnam: "I also think that Thieu is right, that our terms will eventually destroy him."[270][271] However, Kissinger denied using a "decent interval" strategy, writing "All of us who negotiated the agreement of October 12 were convinced that we had vindicated the anguish of a decade not by a 'decent interval' but by a decent settlement."[272] Johannes Kadura offers a positive assessment of Nixon and Kissinger's strategy, arguing that the two men "simultaneously maintained a Plan A of further supporting Saigon and a Plan B of shielding Washington should their maneuvers prove futile." According to Kadura, the "decent interval" concept has been "largely misrepresented", in that Nixon and Kissinger "sought to gain time, make the North turn inward, and create a perpetual equilibrium" rather than acquiescing in the collapse of South Vietnam.[273]
Kissinger's record was brought up during the2016 Democratic Party presidential primaries.Hillary Clinton had cultivated a close relationship with Kissinger, describing him as a "friend" and a source of "counsel".[274] During theDemocratic primary debates, Clinton touted Kissinger's praise for her record as secretary of state.[275][276] In response, candidateBernie Sanders criticized Kissinger and said: "I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend. I will not take advice from Henry Kissinger."[277]
Kissinger was an immensely beloved figure within China, withChina News Service describing him in his obituary as someone "who had a sharp vision and a thorough understanding of world affairs".[278][279]
Legacy and reception
Kissinger has generally received a polarizing reception; some have portrayed him as a strategic genius who was willing to act in autilitarian manner, others have portrayed his foreign policy decisions as immoral and profoundly damaging in the long run.[280]
Positive views
HistorianNiall Ferguson has argued that Kissinger is one of the most effective secretaries of state in American history.[281] Theeditorial board ofThe Wall Street Journal stated in the aftermath of his death "Kissinger was a target of both the right and left in those perilous Cold War years, often unfairly". The article noted that he was often criticized byAmerican conservatives for overlookinghuman rights in China, while saying "he had no illusions about theCommunist Party or its nationalist ambitions. His view was that the U.S. and China had to achieve somemodus vivendi to avoid war despite their profound cultural and political differences" while claiming that "the alternatives then, as now, weren't usually [democracy advocates] of the left's imagining. They wereoften Communists who would have aligned themselves with theSoviets ... . The U.S. provided covert aid toAllende's political opponents, but declassified briefings from the time show the U.S. was unaware of the military coup that deposed him. Kissinger wasn't responsible forAugusto Pinochet's coup or its bloody excesses. Chile eventually became a democracy ... Cuba remains a dictatorship."[282]
Negative views
A number of journalists, activists, and human rights lawyers accused Kissinger of being responsible forwar crimes during his tenure in government.[8][283] Some sought civil and even criminal penalties against Kissinger, but none of these attempts were successful.[169] In September 2001, relatives and survivors of GeneralRene Schneider filed civil proceedings in federal court in Washington, D.C.[284] The suit was later dismissed.[173] In April 2002, a petition for Kissinger's arrest was filed in theHigh Court of Justice in London by human rights campaignerPeter Tatchell, citing the destruction of civilian populations and the environment inIndochina during the years 1969–1975.[285][286] The petition was rejected one day after filing.[287]
AuthorRobert D. Kaplan and historian Niall Ferguson have disputed these notions and argued that there is adouble standard in how Kissinger is judged in comparison to others. They have defended Kissinger by arguing that American power to advocate for human rights in other nations is often counterproductive and limited, that taking into considerationgeopolitical realities is an inevitable part of any effective foreign policy, and that there are utilitarian reasons to defend most of the decisions of his tenure.[294]
Other perspectives
Several historians have rejected both prominent reputations of Kissinger.David Greenberg argued that each are exaggerated caricatures that overstate both his genius and immorality:
In fact, if there's a single word I'd apply to Kissinger, it's 'overrated.' He was overrated as a scholar (famous mainly for writing a very long dissertation). He was overrated as a strategist (he often gave bad advice, as he did in urging George W. Bush not to withdraw troops from Iraq). He was even overrated as a villain – the 'Christopher Hitchenses' of the world loved to call him a 'war criminal,' but this was a fundamentally unserious charge. TheDefense Department, not theState Department, prosecutes wars, and the president oversees it – but the Hitchenses preferred to go after Kissinger rather than (Defense Secretaries)Mel Laird orJames Schlesinger or even Nixon.[295]
He was not particularly original or bold, once we scratch away from his writings the deliberately opaque and convoluted prose he often used, possibly to try to render more original thoughts and reflections that were in reality fairly conventional. ... In short, he wasn't a war criminal, he wasn't a very deep or sophisticated thinker, he rarely challenged the intellectual vogues of the time (even because it would have meant to challenge those in power, something he always was—and still is—reluctant to do), and once in government he displayed a certain intellectual laziness vis-à-vis the intricacies and complexities of a world that he still tended to see in black-and-white.[296]
Family and personal life
Nancy and Henry Kissinger in their New York City apartment with their dog Tyler, 1978
Kissinger married Anneliese "Ann" Fleischer (born November 6, 1925, inFürth, Germany) on February 6, 1949. They had two children, Elizabeth and David, and divorced in 1964. In 1955, he met Austrian poetIngeborg Bachmann during a symposium at Harvard; the two had a romantic relationship that lasted several years.[297] On March 30, 1974, he marriedNancy Maginnes.[298][299] They lived inKent, Connecticut, and in New York City. Kissinger's son David served as an executive withNBC Universal Television Studio before becoming head ofConaco,Conan O'Brien's production company, in 2005.[300] In February 1982, at the age of 58, Henry Kissinger underwentcoronary bypass surgery. On May 27, 2023, he turned 100.[301]
Since his childhood, Kissinger had been a fan of his hometown's soccer club,SpVgg Fürth (nowSpVgg Greuther Fürth). Even during his time in office, the German Embassy informed him about the team's results every Monday morning. He was an honorary member[306] with lifetime season tickets.[307] In September 2012, Kissinger attended a home game in which Greuther Fürth lost 0–2 againstSchalke, after promising years previously that he would attend a Greuther Fürth home game if they were promoted to theBundesliga from the2. Bundesliga.[308] From 1989 onward, he was an honorary member ofBayern Munich.[309]
Death
Henry and Nancy Kissinger at the Metropolitan Opera opening in 2008
Kissinger was widely admired within China and praised by theChinese Communist Party.[318] Government figures onstate media uniformly released posts mourning his death.Chinese social media expressed widespread sorrow after news of his death was released, andhashtags idolizing Kissinger became the most searched trend in China.[319][279]China News Service stated in its obituary for Kissinger that "Today, this 'old friend of the Chinese people,' who had a sharp vision and a thorough understanding of world affairs, has completed his legendary life".China Central Television, the state broadcaster, called Kissinger a "legendary diplomat" and a "living fossil" who had witnessed the development of China-U.S. relations.[278] Shortly before his death, Chinese presidentXi Jinping stated: "The Chinese people never forget their old friends, and Sino-U.S. relations will always be linked with the name of Henry Kissinger".[278]
Former British prime ministers mourned Kissinger.[320]Tony Blair, the formerleader of the Labour Party andprime minister of the United Kingdom, released a statement saying: "There is no-one like Henry Kissinger... From the first time I met him as a newLabour Party opposition leader in 1994, struggling to form views on foreign policy, to the last occasion when I visited him in New York and, later, he spoke at my institute's annual gathering, I was in awe of him... If it is possible for diplomacy, at its highest level, to be a form of art, Henry was an artist."[321]David Cameron stated "He was a great statesman and a deeply respected diplomat who will be greatly missed on the world stage... Even at 100, his wisdom and thoughtfulness shone through".Boris Johnson said: "The world needs him now. If ever there was an author of peace and lover of concord, that man was Henry Kissinger".[322]
European Council presidentCharles Michel called Kissinger a "strategist with attention to the smallest detail" and "a kind human and a brilliant mind who, over 100 years, shaped the [destinies] of some of the most important events of the century." Russian presidentVladimir Putin stated in a telegram to Kissinger's widow Nancy that he was a "wise and farsighted statesman".[323] Israeli prime ministerBenjamin Netanyahu stated that he "had the privilege of meeting Dr. Kissinger on numerous occasions, the most recent being just two months ago in New York. Each meeting with him was not just a lesson in diplomacy but also a masterclass in statesmanship. His understanding of the complexities of international relations and his unique insights into the challenges facing our world were unparalleled." German chancellorOlaf Scholz stated: "The world has lost a great diplomat".[324]
Chile's ambassador to the United States,Juan Gabriel Valdés, released a statement saying he possessed "brilliance" but also "profound moral wretchedness". This statement was reposted by PresidentGabriel Boric.[325][326] The Bangladeshi foreign ministerAK Abdul Momen said that Kissinger did "inhumane things", adding that "he should have apologized to the people of Bangladesh for what he has done".[327][328]
Domestic reactions
The announcement of Kissinger's death saw a widespread mix of tribute and criticism on American social media.[329]
Joe Biden praised Kissinger's "fierce intellect" while noting that they often "disagreed strongly".[330] Former presidentGeorge W. Bush stated: "America has lost one of the most dependable and distinctive voices on foreign affairs with the passing of Henry Kissinger. I have long admired the man who fled the Nazis as a young boy from a Jewish family, then fought them in the United States Army".Cindy McCain, the widow ofJohn McCain, wrote: "Henry Kissinger was ever present in my late husband's life. While John was a prisoner of war, and in the later years, as a senator and statesman. The McCain family will miss his wit, charm, and intelligence terribly".[324]
Many negative reactions to Kissinger's death argued his decisions in government violatedAmerican values.[311][331] House of Representative membersJim McGovern,Gerry Connolly, andGreg Casar issued critical reactions to his death, with Connolly stating Kissinger's "indifference to human suffering will forever tarnish his name and shape his legacy".[332] The front page ofHuffPost labeled him "The Beltway Butcher", while anotherHuffPost article described him as "America's Most Notorious War Criminal".[333][334]Teen Vogue mocked Kissinger with the headline: "War Criminal Responsible for Millions of Deaths Dies at 100",[335] a statement similar to that ofNick Turse ofThe Intercept.[336] ACNN op-ed byPeter Bergen entitled "Christopher Hitchens was right about Henry Kissinger" stated that to Kissinger "the ends almost always justified the means,"[337] referencing Hitchens's 2001 bookThe Trial of Henry Kissinger. Socialist magazineJacobin released a book-length anthology entitledThe Good Die Young.[338] The introduction by historianGreg Grandin notes "We all live now in the Kissingerian void."[339]
Kissinger was defended by conservative commentatorDavid Harsanyi in an op-ed on theNew York Post, where he stated that "the left disgustingly dances on Kissinger's grave because it hates America".[340]The New York Sun also defended Kissinger, describing him as "one of the most remarkable figures in American history".[341]
Kissinger andLê Đức Thọ were jointly offered the1973 Nobel Peace Prize for their work on theParis Peace Accords which prompted the withdrawal of American forces from theVietnam War. Lê Đức Thọ declined to accept the award on the grounds that peace had not actually been achieved in Vietnam.[342] Kissinger donated his prize money to charity, did not attend the award ceremony and later offered to return his prize medal after thefall of South Vietnam to North Vietnamese forces 18 months later.[60][61]
In 1973, Kissinger received the U.S. Senator John Heinz Award for Greatest Public Service by an Elected or Appointed Official, an award given out annually byJefferson Awards.[343]
2002.Vietnam: A Personal History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War.ISBN0-7432-1916-3.
2003.Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises: Based on the Record of Henry Kissinger's Hitherto Secret Telephone Conversations. New York:Simon & Schuster.ISBN978-0-7432-4911-9.
^abFrom 1980 to 1983 there were dual hardcover and paperback awards in most categories, andmultiple nonfiction subcategories. Most of the paperback award-winners were reprints, including Kissinger's.
^Nevius, James (February 13, 2016)."Does Hillary Clinton see that invoking Henry Kissinger harms her campaign?".The Guardian.Archived from the original on January 30, 2020. RetrievedOctober 23, 2016.many consider Kissinger a war criminal, most famously Christopher Hitchens, who, in a lengthy two-part article for Harper's in 2001 (later expanded into the book and documentary, The Trial of Henry Kissinger), laid out his case that Kissinger should be brought up on charges 'for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture'.
^"Die Kissingers in Bad Kissingen" [The Kissingers in Bad Kissingen] (in German). Bayerischer Rundfunk. June 2, 2005. Archived fromthe original on October 18, 2007. RetrievedFebruary 3, 2007.
^Thomas A. Schwartz (2011) Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy,Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:1, 121–141,doi:10.1080/09592296.2011.549746
^Kissinger, Henry (1954).Peace, legitimacy, and the equilibrium: (a study of the statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich) (Thesis). Cambridge, Mass.: Kissinger.OCLC63222254.
^Geoffrey Warner, "Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971".International Affairs 81.5 (2005): 1097–1118.
^David Rothkopf,Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Foreign Policy (2004), pp. 111–112.
^abcdDommen, Arthur (2002).The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indiana University Press. p. 878.ISBN978-0-253-10925-5.
^Kim, Hong N.; Hammersmith, Jack L. (Spring 1986). "U.S.-China Relations in the Post-Normalization Era, 1979–1985".Pacific Affairs.59 (1):69–91.doi:10.2307/2759004.JSTOR2759004.
^Turse, Nick (December 1, 2023)."Opinion | Ask Brutalized Cambodians What They Think of Kissinger".The New York Times.ISSN0362-4331. RetrievedJanuary 13, 2024.Mr. Kissinger's critics, includingBen Kiernan, former director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, say he bears substantial responsibility for attacks in Cambodia that ultimately killed as many as 150,000 civilians—up to six times more noncombatants than the United States is believed to have killed in airstrikes since Sept. 11.
^Abrams, Irwin (2001).The Nobel Peace Prize and the Laureates: An Illustrated Biographical History, 1901–2001. Science History Pubns. p. 219.ISBN978-0-88135-388-4.
^"The Nobel Peace Prize 1973: Presentation Speech by Mrs. Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Storting".Nobel Foundation. December 10, 1973.Archived from the original on May 18, 2007. RetrievedApril 28, 2007.In his letter of November 2 to the Nobel Committee Henry Kissinger expresses his deep sense of this obligation. In the letter he writes among other things: 'I am deeply moved by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, which I regard as the highest honor one could hope to achieve in the pursuit of peace on this earth. When I consider the list of those who have been so honored before me, I can only accept this award with humility.' ... This year Henry Kissinger was appointed Secretary-of-State in the United States. In his letter to the Committee he writes as follows: 'I greatly regret that because of the press of business in a world beset by recurrent crisis I shall be unable to come to Oslo on December 10 for the award ceremony. I have accordingly designated Ambassador Byrne to represent me on that occasion.'
^abcRobb, Thomas (2013).A Strained Partnership?: US–UK Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969–77. Manchester University Press. pp. 75–76.ISBN978-1-5261-2938-3.
^Robb, Thomas (2013).A Strained Partnership?: US–UK Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969–77. Manchester University Press. p. 78.ISBN978-1-5261-2938-3.
^Arnon Gutfeld and Boaz Vanetik."'A Situation That Had to Be Manipulated': The American Airlift to Israel During the Yom Kippur War".Middle Eastern Studies 52.3 (2016): 419–447.
^Article republished on the front page of the Greek newspaperTo Vima, issue of August 2, 1974, article "The Americans knew there was plan to overthrow Makarios" [Οἱ Ἀμερικανοί ἐγνώριζον ὅτι ἑτοιμάζετο ἀνατροπή τοῦ Μακαρίου στήν Κύπρο] (photo-reprint in the book seriesTo Vima – 90 Years. Vol. XI1972–1981. Lambrakis Press. 2012.
^Front page of the Greek newspaperTo Vima, issue of August 17, 1974, articles "The Cyprus crisis is Kissinger's Watergate" [Τό Κυπριακό εἶναι το Γουώτεργκέητ τοῦ κ. Κίσσινγκερ] and "Anti-American youth demonstration in Thessaloniki and Heraklion" [Ἀντιαμερικανική διαδήλωσις νέων εἰς τήν Θεσσαλονίκην και εἰς τό Ἡράκλειον] (photo-reprint in the book seriesTo Vima – 90 Years. Vol. XI1972–1981. Lambrakis Press. 2012.
^Mallinson, William M. (2011).Cyprus: A Historical Overview(PDF). Republic of Cyprus.Archived(PDF) from the original on August 16, 2016. RetrievedFebruary 13, 2016.
^"Cable Ties Kissinger to Chile Scandal".Associated Press onBoston.com. April 10, 2010.Archived from the original on April 2, 2015. RetrievedAugust 14, 2014.As secretary of state, Henry Kissinger cancelled a U.S. warning against carrying out international political assassinations that was to have gone to Chile and two neighboring nations just days before a former ambassador was killed by Chilean agents on Washington's Embassy Row in 1976, a newly released State Department cable shows.
^"US Endorsed Indonesia's East Timor Invasion: Secret Documents", Agence France Press, December 6, 2001.
^Kiernan, Ben (2007).Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial & Justice in Cambodia & East Timor (2nd pr. ed.). New Brunswick, NJ [u.a.]: Transaction Publ. p. 281.ISBN978-1-4128-0669-5.
^abMundy, Jacob (2017). "The Geopolitical Functions of the Western Sahara Conflict: US Hegemony, Moroccan Stability and Sahrawi Strategies of Resistance. Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara's Protracted Decolonization". In Ojeda-Garcia, R. (ed.).Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara's Protracted Decolonization. Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 59–60.doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95035-5_3.ISBN978-1-349-95035-5.
^Schmitz, David F.The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965–1989. Cambridge University Press. pp. 83–84.
^DeFrank, Thomas M. (2007).Write It When I'm Gone: Remarkable Off-the-Record Conversations with Gerald R. Ford. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 91.ISBN978-0399154508.
^Soley, Lawrence C. (1992).The News Shapers: The Sources who Explain the News.Greenwood Publishing Group. p. ?.
^"Freeport McMoran Inc. 10-K". United States Securities and Exchange Commission. March 31, 1994. Archived fromthe original on February 12, 2008. RetrievedDecember 29, 2006.
^Wenn, Stephen;Barney, Robert; Martyn, Scott (2011).Tarnished Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Salt Lake City Bid Scandal. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. pp. 94, 111, 118,123–124, 159.
^Kissinger, Henry A. (August 12, 2005)."Lessons for an Exit Strategy".The Washington Post. p. A19.Archived from the original on January 13, 2007. RetrievedDecember 29, 2006.
^Juan Williams (August 12, 2008)."Pioneers of U.S.-China Relations Attend Olympics".NPR.org. NPR.Archived from the original on May 29, 2012. RetrievedMay 28, 2012.Among the political luminaries attending the Beijing Olympics are Henry Kissinger and former President George H.W. Bush.
^"Kissinger against Politicizing Olympics", Xinhua News Agency, April 9, 2008.
^"Highlights of the AAP Sports Wire (Sydney) at 15:08 Aug 5, 2008"
^MartinZhou, Martin, "Millions of Eyes on Clash of Titans",South China Morning Post, August 11, 2008, 3; Myers, Steven Lee, "Bush Mixes Sports, Diplomacy in China",Times-Colonist (Victoria, BC).
^Friedberg, Aaron (July 13, 2011)."The Unrealistic Realist".The New Republic.Archived from the original on December 19, 2012. RetrievedJuly 22, 2011.
^Pietrzak, P. (2024). Henry Kissinger's Shift on Ukraine and Its Implications for Russia: The Commencement but Not a Conclusion of the Sixth Great Debate in International Relations. In P. Pietrzak (Ed.), Analyzing Global Responses to Contemporary Regional Conflicts (pp. 133-162). IGI Global Scientific Publishing.https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-2837-8.ch007
^Hughes, Ken (2015).Fatal Politics: The Nixon Tapes, the Vietnam War, and the Casualties of Reelection. University of Virginia Press. p. 118.ISBN978-0-8139-3803-5.
^Kadura, Johannes (2016).The War After the War: The Struggle for Credibility During America's Exit From Vietnam. Cornell University Press. pp. 4, 153.ISBN978-0-8014-5396-0.
^Hartwig, Ina (2017).Wer war Ingeborg Bachmann? Eine Biographie in Bruchstücken [Who was Ingeborg Bachmann? A biography in fragments] (in German). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. p. 254.ISBN978-3-10-002303-2.
^Wang, Fan (November 30, 2023)."Henry Kissinger: China mourns 'a most valued old friend'".Archived from the original on November 30, 2023. RetrievedDecember 1, 2023.The Chinese Communist Party has been unabashed in its compliments to Mr Kissinger – a stark contrast to the reactions America usually draws... Disliked in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, he was nevertheless lionised in China for his role in launching what was the honeymoon period in US-China relations.
^"Founding Council". Rothermere American Institute. Archived fromthe original on November 17, 2012. RetrievedNovember 22, 2012.
^"Lifetime Trustees". The Aspen Institute.Archived from the original on July 8, 2010. RetrievedOctober 16, 2009.
^Atlantic Council."Board of Directors".Atlantic Council.Archived from the original on April 15, 2014. RetrievedFebruary 9, 2016.
^"Western Issues Aired".The Washington Post. April 24, 1978.The three-day 26th Bilderberg Meeting concluded at a secluded cluster of shingled buildings in what was once a farmer's field. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjorrn Falldin, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and NATO Commander Alexander M. Haig Jr. were among 104 North American and European leaders at the conference.
^Gaouette, Nicole."Henry A. Kissinger". Center for Strategic and International Studies.Archived from the original on March 27, 2014. RetrievedFebruary 15, 2014.
1974. Schlafly, Phyllis,Kissinger on the Couch. Arlington House Publishers.ISBN0-87000-216-3
1983. Hersh, Seymour,The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Summit Books.ISBN0-671-50688-9. (Awards: National Book Critics Circle, General Non-Fiction Award. Best Book of the Year:New York Times Book Review;Newsweek;San Francisco Chronicle)
2009. Kurz, Evi.The Kissinger Saga: Walter and Henry Kissinger, Two Brothers from Fuerth, Germany. London. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.ISBN978-0-297-85675-7.
2020.Runciman, David, "Don't be a Kerensky!" (review of Barry Gewen,The Inevitability of Tragedy: Henry Kissinger and His World, Norton, April 2020,ISBN978 1 324 00405 9, 452 pp.; and Thomas Schwartz,Henry Kissinger and American Power: A Political Biography, Hill and Wang, September 2020,ISBN978-0-8090-9537-7, 548 pp.),London Review of Books, vol. 42, no. 23 (December 3, 2020), pp. 13–16, 18. "[Kissinger] was ... a political opportunist doing his best to keep one step ahead of the people determined to bring him down. ... Unelected, unaccountable, never really representing anyone but himself, he rose so high and resided so long in America's political consciousness because his shapeshifting allowed people to find in him what they wanted to find." (P. 18.)
Bass, Gary.The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, 2013.ISBN0-307-70020-8.
Benedetti, Amedeo.Lezioni di politica di Henry Kissinger: linguaggio, pensiero ed aforismi del più abile politico di fine Novecento, Genova: Erga, 2005(in Italian).ISBN88-8163-391-4.
Berman, Larry,No peace, no honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, New York:Free Press, 2001.ISBN0-684-84968-2.
Dallek, Robert,Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. HarperCollins, 2007.ISBN0-06-072230-4.
Gaddis, John Lewis. "Rescuing Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft of Henry Kissinger".The Diplomats, 1939–1979 (Princeton UP, 1994) pp. 564–592doi:10.2307/j.ctv8pz9nc.25.
Grandin, Greg, "Kissinger Still at Large at 100",The Nation, vol. 316, no. 11 (May 29/June 5, 2023), pp. 16–19. "We now know much more about Kissinger's crimes, the immense suffering he caused during his years in public office." (p. 19.)
Grandin, Greg,Kissinger's Shadow: The Long Reach of America's Most Controversial Statesman. Metropolitan Books, 2015.ISBN978-1-62779-449-7.
Hanhimäki, Jussi M."'Dr. Kissinger' or 'Mr. Henry'? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting".Diplomatic History (November 2003), 27#5, pp. 637–676.JSTOR/24914443. Historiography.
Ki, Youn. "Tweaking or Breaking of the International Order: Kissinger, Shultz, and Transatlantic Relations, 1971–1973".The Korean Journal of International Studies 19.1 (2021): 1–28.doi:10.14731/kjis.2021.04.19.1.1.
Klitzing, Holger,The Nemesis of Stability: Henry A. Kissinger's Ambivalent Relationship with Germany. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier (WVT) 2007,ISBN3-88476-942-1.
Larson, Deborah Welch. "Learning in US–Soviet Relations: The Nixon-Kissinger Structure of Peace". inLearning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2019) pp. 350–399.
Lord, Winston, and Henry Kissinger.Kissinger on Kissinger: Reflections on Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Leadership (All Points Books, 2019).
Mohan, Shannon E."'Memorandum for Mr. Bundy': Henry Kissinger as Consultant to the Kennedy National Security Council",Historian, 71.2 (Summer 2009), 234–257.JSTOR24454497.
Morris, Roger,Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Harper and Row (1977),ISBN0-06-013097-0.
Rabe, Stephen G.Kissinger and Latin America: Intervention, Human Rights, and Diplomacy (2020).
Qureshi, Lubna Z.Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile.Lexington Books, 2009.ISBN0-7391-2656-3.
Schulzinger, Robert D.Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.ISBN0-231-06952-9.
Shawcross, William,Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (Revised edition October 2002)ISBN0-8154-1224-X.
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