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Heinrich von Eckardt (20 July 1861, inRiga,Russian Empire – 3 March 1944, inJena,Germany) was aBaltic Germandiplomat in the service of theGerman Empire.
After studyingjurisprudence at theUniversity of Jena from 1881 to 1885, Eckardt went toIstanbul in 1886, as a member of the German diplomatic service. From 1899 he was posted toTehran,Belgrade,Athens,Havana (1908 – 1910) andCetinje (1911 – 1914).
During theFirst World War, Eckardt wasResident Minister for theGerman Empire inMexico, taking up the appointment in 1914 and holding it until 1918. After the departure of the German supportedPresidentVictoriano Huerta in 1914, German sentiment towards the new President,Venustiano Carranza, was significantly negative; Eckardt believed Carranza's government ministries were "prototypes of vulgarity and depravity". His attitude towards the president remained bitter, despite attempts by Carranza to suppressanti-German publications, which he described as "pedant mediocrity".
Eckardt is known for being the recipient of theZimmermann Telegram, atelegram sent byGerman Foreign SecretaryArthur Zimmermann on January 16, 1917. The message was first sent to the German ambassador to theUnited States,Johann von Bernstorff, to deter interception, and he relayed it to Eckardt on January 19. However, the telegram was intercepted by theBritish on its way from Bernstorff to Eckardt and was decoded byRoom 40. In the telegram, Zimmermann instructed Eckardt to approach President Venustiano Carranza with a proposition in two parts: firstly, to form an alliance with Germany, and secondly, should Germany drop its neutrality against the United States, to join Germany in attacking the U.S. and to help persuadeJapan into aiding them with the attack. The telegram was left vague and Eckardt was told to work out the details himself as he presented them to Carranza. He was also asked to call Carranza's attention to theBattle of the Atlantic and the possibility that it may further attempts to compel the British into peace.
Despite the discovery of the telegram by the United States and Britain, Eckardt approachedForeign Secretary Cándido Aguilar and gave him the proposal a month after the message was sent. Aguilar was sympathetic, but both he and Carranza eventually turned Germany down, mainly due to the premature release. Mexico fearedAmerican influence, though, and Eckardt was somewhat able to sway Carranza, who ordered pro-Alliednewspapers to reverse their stance[verification needed]. These German-centric reports initially led Eckardt to believe thearmistice was apropagandic myth. Further confusion resulted in aGuadalajaran newspaper overlapping pro-German sentiment with Eckardt's instructions for pro-Carranza reports when Carranza'santiclericalism caused the newspaper tocriticise theCatholic Church, leading to the church'sboycott and Eckardt's unsuccessful attempts to coax them out of it.
Eckardt was previously the German ambassador to theKingdom of Montenegro during theBalkan Wars. He was present on April 27, 1913 when Austria demanded toKing Nicholas that Montenegro returnScutari toAlbania.