The school spread throughout the Muslim world under the patronage of various Islamic empires, including theAbbasids andSeljuks. TheCentral Asian region ofTransoxiana emerged as a centre of classical Hanafi scholarship between the 10th and 12th centuries, which gave rise to theMaturidi school of theology. TheOttoman Empire adopted Hanafism as its official school of law and influenced the legal thought of the school, eventuallycodifying it as theMecelle in the 1870s.
Followers of the Hanafi school are called Hanafis, who are estimated to comprise one third of all Muslims. It is the largest Islamic legal school and is predominant in theBalkans, Central Asia,Turkey, theLevant, andSouth Asia, in the latter of which it is mainly split between theBarelvi andDeobandi movements.
The Hanafi school emerged from the legal tradition ofKufa inIraq, in which its eponymAbu Hanifa (d. 150/767) resided.[1] Iraqi jurists were known for their use of independent reasoning (ra'y) in deriving law.[2] Kufa, alongsideMedina andBasra, was a centre of legal activity at the beginning of the second Hijri century. Its prominent jurists includedAmir al-Sha'bi,Ibrahim al-Nakha'i andHammad ibn Abi Sulayman.[3] The opinions of Abu Hanifa and the earlier Kufan jurists closely correspond,[4] particularly those of al-Nakha'i.[5] Abu Hanifa's legal doctrine, as conveyed to his students, was predominantly derived from his own instructors, chiefly Hammad.[6] Abu Hanifa attended Hammad'sstudy circle for approximately 20 years and inherited it upon Hammad's death.[7]
TheAbu Hanifa Mosque in Baghdad, which houses the tomb of Abu Hanifa
Abu Hanifa and his students were responsible for systemising the use ofra'y,[2] of which Abu Hanifa was its "unrivalled master".[8] According to his contemporaryShu'bah, Abu Hanifa was the "most systematic jurist of his time".[9] His legal thought was distinct for its treatment of hypothetical scenarios, which he held would help prepare for disastrous circumstances. It was also distinct for its method of analogical reasoning (qiyas). Abu Hanifa would identify the normative, underlying principles of the law from the Quran,hadith and practices ofMuhammad's companions, and applied these to solve unprecedented legal cases.[10]Qiyas and adherence to analogical consistency were defining characteristics of early Hanafis,[11] who employed juristic discretion (istihsan) to depart from the results ofqiyas when deemed appropriate.[12] Asqiyas enabled the treatment of multiple legal cases from a single case, it facilitated the systematic compilation of legal literature.[10]
There is no record of legal treatises authored by Abu Hanifa.[13][10] His teachings were transmitted by his disciplesAbu Yusuf (d. 182/798) andMuhammad al-Shaybani (d. 189/804), the last of whom was the most prolific.[13] Later Hanafis termed the corpus of al-Shaybani as the "zahir al-riwaya" and ascribed it an authoritative status.[14] The students of Abu Hanifa establishedstudy circles inBaghdad, an emerging hub of cultural activity and the seat of theAbbasid Caliphate.[15] The school won the support of the centralising Abbasid state, which sought to unify the legal system.[16] The Abbasids' preference for appointing Hanafi judges assisted in spreading the school. Abu Yusuf served as ajudge in Baghdad; the Abbasid caliphHarun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) later appointed him as thechief judge. By the time of al-Shaybani's death, the school had spread toEgypt andBalkh inTokharistan.[15]
Ra'y dialectics involved the interlocutors exploring a series of hypothetical legal cases to delineate the limits of legal assumptions.[17] In practice, it led Hanafis to favour widely accepted hadith, particularly those which enshrined general principles that were applicable to other cases.[18] When the widespread collection of hadith led to the circulation of reports that contradicted Hanafi positions, the Hanafis prioritised those that were acted upon by the Iraqi legal tradition.[19] Reports supported by Iraqi juristic practice were deemed more authoritative than those which were not.[20] Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani separately authored works namedKitab al-Athar (lit.'Book of Traditions'), which sought to ground Hanafi teachings in the precedent of the early Kufan jurists and the Kufan companions ofMuhammad, notablyAbd Allah ibn Mas'ud andAli.[21] Abu Hanifa himself is known to have used hadith; in Abu Yusuf'sIkhtilaf Abi Ḥanifa wa-Ibn Abi Layla, which lists cases where Abu Hanifa differed with his contemporaryIbn Abi Layla, Abu Hanifa is quoted as citing a hadith in around 10% of the cases presented, but cites narrations attributed to Muhammad's companions more often.[7]
In contemporary external sources, members of the nascent school were described as theashab abi ḥanifa ("companions of Abu Hanifa") and theashab al-ra'y ("companions ofra'y").[22] Early Hanafi doctrine was attacked by thetraditionists[b], who accused Hanafis of preferring theirra'y to hadith.[23] The traditionists primarily found objectionable the Hanafi practice of sometimes favouringqiyas over hadith that were not widely transmitted (ahad).[10] The identification of Hanafis with theashab al-ra'y in contradistinction to the traditionistashab al-hadīth strengthened during the resurgence of the latter following theMihna.[24]Al-Shafi'i (b. 150/767), too, critiqued the Hanafis' treatment of hadith and their claim that their positions reflected those of the Kufan companions of Muhammad.[25] He further argued thatistihsan was subjective, which later led to classical Hanafi legal theorists articulating it as being completely dependent on the primary sources of law.[26]
During the 9th century, the Hanafi school transitioned from a "personal school" centered around individual jurists and their study circles to a distinct legal community with a collectively recognised doctrine and authoritative figures.[27] By the end of the century, the school resembled a professional body with a doctrine that was systematically transmitted from teachers to students, maturing into its classical form.[28] Hanafis began to write commentaries on earlier works; until the 12th century, these were mostly on the works of al-Shaybani.[29]Al-Quduri (d. 428/1036–37)'s legal primerMukhtasar al-Quduri was the classical school's first work of themukhtasar genre and the most authoritative after that of al-Shaybani.[30]
Criticism from the traditionists led to the Hanafis grounding their positions in hadith over the 9th century.[31] Some Hanafis moved towards using the traditionists' method ofhadith criticism to justify the school's positions, such as the Egyptian juristal-Tahawi (d. 321/933).[32] Nonetheless, the classical legal theorists focused on formulating a Hanafi approach to hadith criticism that emphasised a hadith's acceptance by early jurists, withtransmitter analysis taking a secondary role.[33]
During the 9th century, the Hanafi school also emerged as the prevailing school inTransoxiana and Tokharistan.[34] The school was introduced to Transoxiana by the students of Abu Hanifa and al-Shaybani, but became prevalent under theSamanids, during whose rule Hanafi scholars received official favour.[35] The Transoxianan Hanafi tradition was highly influential in defining the doctrine of the later school.[36] Works authored by Transoxianan jurists and accorded a high status in later Hanafi tradition include:
The jurisprudential work ofal-Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090), known asUsul al-Sarakhsi,[37] as well as his legal commentaryal-Mabsut.[38]
The intellectual descendants of al-Sarakhsi and his teacher, Abd al-Aziz ibn Ahmad al-Halwani (d. 448/1056-57), eventually became the primary branch of the Transoxianan tradition. For 300 years after al-Sarakhsi, the Halwani-Sarakhsi branch constituted almost all of the major jurists engaged in rule-formulation[c] (tarjih) within the school, and dominated the process. The process contributed to the stabilisation of the school's laws.[41] The branch also popularised the doctrine of thezahir al-riwaya: that the opinions transmitted from the school's founders command the highest level of authority within the school.[42]
In the 10th century, the Hanafi theologianAbu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333/944) developed akalam tradition that crystallised into theMaturidi school of theology,[43] which had descended directly from the theological views of the earliest Hanafis.[44] Due to philosophical differences, the Transoxianan Maturidis disagreed with theMu'tazilite strain of Iraqi Hanafis on several technical points of legal theory, but saw limited success in expunging the Mu'tazilite influence.[45]
TheOghuz Turks who founded theSeljuk Empire became attached to the Transoxianan Hanafi tradition. The Seljuks favoured these eastern Hanafis and appointed them to various official positions in their new territories, encouraging their migration out of Central Asia.[46] During the Seljuk expansion of the 11th and 12th centuries, the Hanafi and Maturidi schools spread westward into Syria,Anatolia and western Persia.[13] In Syria and Iraq, the Central Asian scholars brought with them an increased emphasis on thezahir al-riwaya.[47] Hanafi migration out of Central Asia accelerated during theMongol invasions, which ravaged the region.[46]
During the 13th and 14th centuries, theMamluk Sultanate saw an influx of Hanafi scholars from Anatolia and Central Asia. Discussions ofIslamic logic andkalam in the Mamluk jurisprudential literature reflect the influence of Central Asian scholars.[48]
Criticism of the Hanafi approach to hadith prompted Mamluk Hanafi scholars to treat the subject in more detail.[48] In his legal commentaryFath al-Qadir, the Mamluk juristIbn al-Humam (d. 861/1457) engages with the traditionists' approach to hadith criticism,[49] and attempts to navigate the associated legal consequences.[50] His approach to hadith influenced later Egyptian and Syrian Hanafi scholars.[38] This "Egyptian school" of Hanafi hadith criticism referenced hadith from thehadith collections instead of Hanafi legal works, and employed the traditionists' terminology to assess their authenticity.[51]
Mamluk jurists faced difficulties in interpreting the plurality of legal opinions that had accrued in the school. In his workal-Tashih wa-al-tarjih, the Mamluk juristIbn Qutlubugha [ar] (d. 879/1474) developed and detailed the process of rule-determination[d], clarifying the role of precedent and enabling other jurists to engage in the process themselves, and thus determine the applicable legal ruling for a given case. It marked a shift in the material consulted by muftis from the primary literature of the school to its secondary literature, comprising legal commentaries and compendia which contained rulings.[53]
17th-century manuscript of Ibrahim al-Halabi'sMultaqa al-Abhur
TheOttoman Empire adopted the Hanafi school as their official legal school.[54] The Ottomans established an extensive network ofmadrasas to train jurists, with the most prestigious located in the capitalConstantinople.[55] By the 16th century, theŞeyḫülislâm emerged as the chief imperial religious and judicial authority.[56] TheŞeyḫülislâm was appointed by the sultan and presided over the imperial canon,[57] a collection of legal texts that theimperial religious hierarchy was required to consult.[58] Many jurists from Arab provinces of the empire were critical of the imperial canon, partly because of its inclusion of later works which they judged as contradicting the preferred opinions (tarjih) of the school.[59] The sultans influenced the formation of the imperial religious hierarchy by appointingmuftis directly and through theŞeyḫülislâm, delineating the range of legal opinions in the Ottoman Hanafi tradition.[60] Members of the imperial religious hierarchy were described as "Rūmīs".[58][61] Intellectual genealogies (tabaqat) authored by the imperial religious hierarchy aimed to demarcate the institution, situate themselves and their endorsed works in the broader Hanafi tradition and construct an unbroken intellectual chain to Abu Hanifa.[62]
Hanafi law co-existed with theqanun (dynastic law), decrees and edicts promulgated by thesultans. Theqanun often reaffirmed religious laws; in other cases, it authorised actions that the jurists opposed, such as torture.[63] TheŞeyḫülislâm would sometimes request sultanic edicts to require the imperial religious hierarchy to enforce particular rulings of the school.[64] TheMaʿrūḍāt of theŞeyḫülislâmEbussuud Efendi (d. 982/1574), a collection offatwas endorsed bySuleiman I, contained sultanic edicts and was frequently referenced in later Hanafi works which considered its opinions binding.[65] Late Hanafis believed that judges could act as deputies of the sultan who could thus regulate,inter alia, the legal opinions judges could reference, such as in the case of inter-school disputes.[66] In the 17th and 18th centuries, Hanafi jurists began to incorporate sultanic edicts into authoritative legal works.[66]
Ibrahim al-Halabi (d. 1549)'s legal manualMultaqa al-Abhur was among the most popular in the empire and was the subject of over 70 commentaries.[67] By the 19th century, it had become the standard legal textbook.[68] Other popular Ottoman manuals were theDurar al-Hukkam ofMolla Hüsrev (d. 885/1479–80) andal-Durr al-Mukhtar of Haskafi.[69] TheRadd al-Muhtar of the late Arab-Ottoman juristIbn Abidin (d. 1252/1836) is considered an authoritative and representative work of the late Hanafi tradition.[70] It lists most opinions within the school and their level of authoritativeness, incorporating most primary Hanafi sources produced until its writing.[69] It employs legal devices such as necessity (darura) to depart from the canonicalzahir al-riwaya where necessary to ensure the continued relevancy of the school, and references sultanic edicts to revise the school's opinions.[71]
Between 1869 and 1877, the Ottomans promulgated theMecelle, acodification of Hanafi jurisprudence.[72] TheMecelle was drafted by a committee led by the juristAhmed Cevdet Pasha,[72] who had successfully argued against the implementation of theNapoleonic Code.[73] It drew from the Hanafi literature on legal maxims (qawaʿid fiqhiyya) and to a great degree favoured the opinions of the late Hanafi tradition.[74] Many of its articles were fully or partially derived from al-Halabi'sMultaqa al-Abhur.[75] However, theMecelle also marked the state's assumption of control over jurisprudence, which had previously been the purview of the decentralized juristic community.[76]
William Jones' manuscript of theal-Fatawa l-ʿAlamgiriyya
The Hanafi school spread to India from Transoxiana and eastern Persia.[13] To consolidate control over his realm, theMughal emperorAurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) ordered the compilation of Hanafifatwas. Completed between 1664 and 1672, the resultingal-Fatawa l-ʿAlamgiriyya selected legal opinions from earlier Hanafi legal works and is modelled after theHidayah of al-Marghinani.[77]
During thecolonization of India, theEast India Company sought to create a "complete digest of Hindu and Mussulman law" to eliminate legal pluralism. The resultingAnglo-Muhammadan law was based in part on a translation of al-Marghinani'sHidayah, which was chosen for its brevity and its belonging to the Hanafi school, which most Indian Muslims followed. Consequently, theHidayah was effectively codified and severed from the Hanafi commentarial tradition under which it was traditionally interpreted.[78]
In the 19th century, the HanafiDeobandi movement emerged in India.[79] The Deobandis'legal views include strict adherence (taqlid) to a legal school in contradistinction to theAhl-i Hadith movement,[80] and emphasise the importance of hadith.[81] The Deobandi acceptance of Ibn al-Humam's approach to hadith criticism culminated in theI'la al-Sunan of Deobandi scholarZafar Ahmad Usmani (d. 1974),[79] a work that attempts to justify Hanafi positions using hadith.[81]
The OttomanMecelle was repealed by most post-Ottoman states over the first half of the 20th century. Parts remained in force inJordan andIsrael until the 1970s.[92] Where it is dominant, the Hanafi school is followed in religious observance and, in some regions, continues to govern Muslimfamily law.[83]
The legal theory (usul al-fiqh) of the Hanafi school recognises the following sources of law, listed in order of epistemic authority: the Quran, the practices and sayings ofMuhammad (sunnah) as documented in thehadith, consensus of opinion (ijma), qiyas,istihsan and local customs (urf).[93] Texts with equal epistemic authority may modify each other; if they are of differing levels, the text with the weaker epistemic authority is rejected in favour of the stronger one.[94]
The Quran is the primary source of Hanafi law. In Hanafi legal theory, it is considered acceptable to adduce non-canonicalQuranic readings related by thecompanions of Muhammad as legal evidence, but they are not treated as part of the Quranic text.[2] For example, classical Hanafi jurists are known to have cited thenon-Uthmanic reading ofIbn Mas'ud but treated it akin to an exegetical gloss.[95]
The Hanafis categorise hadith as mass-transmitted (mutawatir), famous (mashhur) or solitary (ahad) depending on the nature of their chain of transmission (isnad):[96]
Amutawatir hadith is transmitted by such a large number of people on each level of itsisnad that it is impossible for it to have been forged.[97] It imparts epistemically certain knowledge about thesunnah.[2]
Amashhur hadith is transmitted by a limited number of people at the first level of itsisnad but was widely acted upon by jurists, beginning with their first generations.[98] It imparts epistemically near-certain knowledge about thesunnah.[2]
Anahad hadith, also known as a "singular report" (khabar al-wahid), is one which is neithermutawatir normashur.[99]
Onlymutawatir andmashhur hadith mayabrogate a Quranic verse, whether by replacing, qualifying or restricting its understanding.[100] Anahad hadith cannot be adduced in legal discussions of "great importance" as Hanafis assume that God would have ensured the reliable transmission of critical religious knowledge; nor can it be used if its early transmitters did not act upon it, as Hanafis assume that their inaction indicates that it is not part of thesunnah.[101]
Ijma refers to the consensus of opinion.Ijma may be explicit, with allmujtahids agreeing verbally or through actions, or tacit, where some express an opinion while others remain silent. In the Hanafi view, tacitijma can only establish a concession (rukhsah) rather than a strict rule (azimah).[102] The Hanafis believe that the companions of Muhammad reachedijma on some matters, and some Hanafis regard agreement betweenAbu Bakr andUmar, the first twoRashidun caliphs, as beingijma.[2]
Qiyas, also referred to analogical reasoning, involves extending a ruling on an original case (asl) to a subsidiary case ('far) where both cases share an effective cause ('illah).[103] For example, because of the prohibition ofusury, it is forbidden to exchange wheat and other commodities for each other unless the transaction is immediate and the amount of both goods are equal. Hanafis extend this prohibition to apples throughqiyas, as they identify the underlying'illah as the exchange of a measurable commodity, and apples are measurable.[104]
Compared to the other Sunni andShia schools of law, Hanafis useqiyas more extensively and grant it greater authority.[10] However, it is deemed a last resort only to be used when no ruling can be derived from the Quran,sunnah andijma.[105] Hanafis viewqiyas as a means of revealing pre-existing implicit rulings within the law rather than as a source of new rulings.[2] Because the law is viewed as coherent and internally consistent, a validqiyas must accord with the internal rationality of the law.[106]
If a ruling derived fromqiyas conflicts with that from anahad hadith, the Hanafis disagree on which takes precedence. One group argues that theahad hadith always takes precedence, while a second group, led byIsa ibn Aban (d. 221/836), opine that it only takes precedence if transmitted by a companion of Muhammad known to be a jurist.[2] In general, the early classical school always followed hadith transmitted by jurist-companions regardless of its correspondence withqiyas, but followed hadith transmitted by non-jurist companions only if it corresponded with a possibleqiyas, and thus accorded with the internal rationale of the law.[107][e] By the Ottoman period, however, the distinction had become less popular and non-jurist companions were largely treated the same as jurist companions.[108]
The Hanafis require the original case to not directly state the'illah. The'illah must be deduced by other means.[103][109] If the'illah is stated, then the ruling is applied to other cases via the "indication of the text" (dalalat al-nass), notqiyas.[109]Dalalat al-nass is an exercise in linguistic interpretation rather than analogical reasoning.[110][111]
Istihsan refers to juristic discretion. The Hanafi juristal-Sarakhsi (d. 483/1090) describes it as a means through which a jurist can depart from a ruling derived throughqiyas to ameliorate hardship, where the new ruling is typically supported by a superior proof, such as the Quran,sunnah, necessity (darurah) or an alternativeqiyas.[112] For example, by way of necessity, the Hanafi jurists allow a son to buy food or medicine for his ill father from the father's property without his prior permission.[113] Hanafiistihsan based on necessity is, however, less broad thanMalikiistihsan based on public welfare (maslaha).[10]
Istihsan emerged out of concerns among Hanafis that unrestrainedqiyas could lead to results that were absurd or contradicted thesunnah.[114] The earliest Hanafis, including Abu Hanifa and al-Shaybani, more frequently usedistihsan justified by subjective and pragmatic reasoning rather than on evidential grounds.[12] Their use ofistihsan sought to change the scope or outcome of a ruling due to its potential effects. More often than not, they deployedistihsan in a way that cannot be considered as ameliorating hardship, such as establishing the liability of a group of thieves involved in theft even if only one of them carried the stolen goods.[115] Subjectiveistihsan declined due to attacks fromal-Shafi'i, and Hanafi legal theorists would systemise it into the form eventually espoused by al-Sarakhsi,[26] attempting to incorporate elements of subjectivity into the definition of necessity.[116]
Urf refers to customary practices. The Hanafis consider it as an ancillary source of law that is subordinate to the primary sources of law.[2]Urf is divided into two types: general (al-urf al-'amm) and special (al-urf al-khass). A generalurf refers to a customary practice that is widely accepted among a people regardless of the time period. As part ofistihsan, the Hanafis permit favouring generalurf over a ruling derived throughqiyas. A specialurf is more local and is upheld by a particular location or profession. Most Hanafis agree that specialurf cannot qualify the general meaning of a textual evidence (nass), and that a ruling derived fromqiyas takes precedence over specialurf, although there is some disagreement on this.[117]Ali Bardakoğlu suggests that the emphasis given tourf in Hanafi legal theory can partly explain the spread of the school among disparate non-Arab groups.[2]
^Also referred to as theaṣḥāb al-ḥadīth orahl al-hadith.
^Younas cites Talal al-Azem's definition of rule-formulation: the "grantingof preponderance to some opinions [within the school] over others."[14]
^The combined process oftarjih (rule formulation; i.e. given multiple legal opinions in the school, "deciding which one he believes should be deemed the doctrinal rule of the school") andtashih (the review and confirmation of said rules; "confirmation or emendation by post-formulation scholars").[52]
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Burak, Guy (2015).The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press.ISBN9781316106341.
Dudgeon, Hamza (2022). "The Hanafis". In Leaman, Oliver (ed.).Routledge Handbook of Islamic Ritual and Practice. Routledge. pp. 65–89.ISBN9780367491246.
Hanif, Sohail (2018). "Al-Ḥadīth al-Mashhūr: A Ḥanafī Reference to Kufan Practice".Locating the Sharia: Legal Fluidity in Theory, History and Practice. Brill. pp. 89–110.ISBN978-90-04-37710-3.
Harvey, Ramon (2021).Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology. Edinburgh University Press.ISBN9781474451642.
Younas, Salman (2022). "Authority in the Classical Ḥanafī School: the Emergence & Evolution of Ẓāhir al-Riwāya".Islamic Law and Society.29 (1–2):58–122.doi:10.1163/15685195-bja10010.
Madelung, Wilferd (2002). "The Westward Migration of Hanafī Scholars from Central Asia in the 11th to 13th Centuries".Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi.43 (2).
Al-Azem, Talal (2017).Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition: Ibn Quṭlūbughā's Commentary on The Compendium of Qudūrī. Islamicate Intellectual History, Volume: 2. Brill.ISBN978-90-04-54423-9.
Dudgeon, Hamza (2022). "The Hanafis". In Leaman, Oliver (ed.).Routledge Handbook of Islamic Ritual and Practice. Routledge. pp. 65–89.ISBN9780367491246.
Behnam Sadeghi (2013), The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6, "The Historical Development of Hanafi Reasoning".ISBN978-1107009097
Nurit Tsafrir (2004),The History of an Islamic School of Law: The Early Spread of Hanafism (Harvard, Harvard Law School, 2004) (Harvard Series in Islamic Law, 3).
El Shamsy, Ahmed (2013).The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History. Cambridge University Press.ISBN978-1107546073.
Ayoub, Samy A. (2019).Law, Empire, and the Sultan: Ottoman Imperial Authority and Late Hanafi Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.ISBN9780190092924.
Burak, Guy (2015).The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press.ISBN9781316106341.
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