In 1957, the French government decided to create experimental nuclear testing facilities in the Sahara. To this end, 108,000 square kilometers of land were allocated to the French Ministry of Defense for the first French nuclear experiments. TheCentre Saharien d'Expérimentations Militaires (CSEM) for atmospheric testing was set up in Hamoudia some 50 km south of Reggane, an oasis in the south of theGrand Erg Occidental, 700 km fromColomb Béchar. TheCentre d'Expérimentations Militaires des Oasis (CEMO) was later built in theHoggar Mountains, nearIn Ekker, 150 km north ofTamanrasset, to carry out underground nuclear tests.[1] Between 1960 and 1966, France carried out 4 atmospheric tests and 13 underground tests in the Sahara.[2][3]
Synthesis of the aerial nuclear tests at the CSEM[3]
From 13 February 1960 to 25 April 1961, France carried out theReggane series of four atmospheric tests,Gerboise Bleue,Gerboise Blanche,Gerboise Rouge, andGerboise Verte, at the CSEM. For these tests, with the exception of theGerboise Blanche, the explosive device to be tested was placed in a shelter at the top of a tower. For theGerboise Blanche, the low-power explosive device was placed on a platform at ground level.
TheFrench government hastily ordered the detonation ofGerboise Verte on 25 April 1961 immediately following thegenerals' putsch, so that the nuclear device could not fall into the hands of the putschists.[4][5][6][7][8]
Gerboise Verte was tested at26°19′18″N0°04′24″W / 26.32167°N 0.07333°W /26.32167; -0.07333.[9] From a technical point of view,Gerboise Verte was a failure. Installed on a 50-meter tower, the bomb was designed with an estimated yield between 6 and 18kilotons, but only had a yield of around 1 kiloton in the test.[7][10]Yves Rocard recounts that meteorological precautions were not taken, so much so that the bomb was tested in asandstorm whose intensity masked even the light of the explosion.[11][12][13]
LikeGerboise Rouge, a joint exercise in the contaminated area, codenamedGarigliano was conducted to see how infantrymen and armored vehicles could protect themselves and then operate after the explosion.[14] Conscripts from the contingent played the role of guinea pigs.[15] Shortly after the test, they were sent to a contaminated zone to shelter in manholes 800 meters (1⁄2mile) from the point of impact or in 4 × 4 trucks.[16][17]
The doses received by the participants in these maneuvers were low, well below the annual limits of 50 millisieverts (mSv) in force at the time: for the helicopter crews guiding the ground troops, they were between 1 and 5 mSv; for the crews of the armoured vehicles, they were of the order of 0.5 mSv, with the exception of one person who had received a dose of 10 mSv; for infantrymen, they were about 2 mSv, i.e. twenty-fifth of the regulatory annual limits of the time for professionals and a tenth of the current limit value. At no time did the command pose a health risk to its troops, either at the time of firing or during post-firing maneuvers
An urban legend holds that the bomb was transported from a warehouse in the port of Algiers to Reggane (1,500 km) in aCitroën 2CV.[18] According to witnesses, only theplutonium core (the "pit") traveled in a 2CV and only between Reggane and the CSEM the night preceding the explosion.[12][19]
^Bendjebbar, André (2022).Histoire secrète de la bombe atomique française [A secret history of the French atomic bomb]. Document (in French). Paris: le Cherche midi.ISBN978-2-7491-7587-4.
^Billaud, Pierre (1 July 1989)."Quatrième expérience nucléaire française".Report of Pierre Billaud, engineer present at the test (in French).Archived from the original on 5 June 2023. Retrieved5 April 2024.
^Bruno Barrillot (1996). "Les essais nucléaires français 1960–1996: Conséquences sur l'environnement et la santé".Études du CDRPC. Lyon: Centre de documentation et de recherche sur la paix et les conflits: 48.ISBN2-9508291-2-0.
^abBruno Barrillot (2002). "L'héritage de la bombe: Sahara, Polynésie (1960–2002), les faits, les personnels, les populations".Études du CDRPC. Centre de documentation et de recherche sur la paix et les conflits: 34.ISBN2-913374-15-8.
^Stein, Peter; Feaver, Peter (1987).Assuring control of nuclear weapons: the evolution of permissive action links. Occasional Paper. Lanham, Md.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Univ.ISBN978-0-8191-6336-3.