Georg Michaelis[1] (8 September 1857 – 24 July 1936) was theimperial chancellor of the German Empire for a few months in 1917. He was the first (and, in theGerman Empire, the only) commoner to hold the post. With an economic background in business, Michaelis' main achievement was to encourage theruling classes to open peace talks with Russia. Contemplating that the end of the war was near, he encouraged infrastructure development to facilitate recovery at war's end through the media ofMitteleuropa. A somewhat humourless character, known for process engineering, Michaelis was faced with insurmountable problems of logistics and supply in his brief period as chancellor.
After his return to Germany, he became a member of the Prussian administration. In 1909 he was appointed asundersecretary of state to the Prussian Treasury inBerlin. From 1915 onward, he headed the Imperial Grain Office, which was responsible for the administration of Prussian corn and wheat duringWorld War I.[2]
He had visited the OHL on several occasions in his position as Undersecretary of State in the Prussian Ministry of Finance and Commissioner of Food Supplies, when his brusque manner had made a good impression on staff officers present.[4] "The truth was that anyone more radical than Bethmann would have been unacceptable to the High Command as Chancellor, while anyone more reactionary would have been unacceptable to the Reichstag; the only way out was to choose a nonentity."[5]
Michaelis was described as "Germany's first bourgeois chancellor",[6][7] as he was the only non-titled person to serve as chief minister during theHohenzollern monarchy's 400-year rule over Prussia and Germany.But the forces of theGerman General Staff remained in control behind the scenes.[8]
On 19 July, the Reichstag passed Erzberger'sPeace Resolution for "a peace without annexations or indemnities", after the Chancellor's speech had "devalued" the resolution.[9] The inability of the government to impose controls on rising prices, demands for wage increases, strikes, and mounting economic chaos, drove the "political fixers" towards a military takeover of the reins of power. The Kaiser wanted a chancellor who could manage the Reichstag, and the army wanted a chancellor who would bring about a "German Peace".[citation needed]
On 25 July 1917, Michaelis told the crown prince that the devil was in the detail;"I have deprived it of its most dangerous features by my interpretation of it. One can make any peace one likes with this resolution", he reassured the heir to the throne. But it was a feint, and Michaelis’ role in the discreditable episode was designed to facilitate a permanent closure of the Reichstag.[citation needed]
The army perceived the majority parties as posing a threat to stability in Germany in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution had brought an end to the Russian war effort. But this had left him very "uncertain" as to the place of the Central Powers. Knowing Austro-Hungary was bankrupted by the fighting, he understood their demand to sue for peace; but the military was unwilling to relinquish any power to the civilian authorities. The OHL hoped to destabilize Ukraine and the Baltic States so as to bring Russia's ailing Tsarist regime to the negotiations, while guaranteeing Germanic frontiers, in more than Michaelis'status quo ante bellum.[citation needed]
But Michaelis was a pragmatist and a realist, whatever the Kaiser might have believed about military victory.[citation needed]
The Chancellor chaired the Second Kreuznach Conference discussing the fate of Alsace-Lorraine on 14 August 1917.[10][citation not found][11]
The proposal included one for an integrated Federal State coupled to socio-economic changes connecting the Prussian-Hessian railways across Germany. Alsace's connectivity was an extension of a war aims policy via Aachen into the Belgian occupied zones and across neutral Netherlands, as had already been achieved in Luxembourg. Longwiy was the centre of German Steel Association's industry. Located on the border of Belgium and Lorraine, it was at the contractual nexus of the Low Countries adjacent to the Dutch treaty town ofMaastricht. German industrialists, including Thyssen and Krupp, wanted a guaranteed supply of coal from France and return to an answer to the Belgian Question, which monopolised the thinkers on the Western Front.[12]
On 29 August, it was in light of the Longwy-Briey Plan railway carriage meeting nearAachen that he was given "an impossible task" of perpetuating the war for "another ten years". But the economic planMitteleuropa depended on the Quadruple Alliance which was in trouble. The brains behind the second conference was the new Secretary of State, Max von Kuhlmann, with Czernin and Hohenlohe (Austria) chaired in chamber by Michaelis. But he underestimated Britain's economic determination to stay the course until the bitter end.[13]
The unenviable task to spell out the myth of a German victory fell to Michaelis, still obliged to the Kaiser and OHL in a report to the Conference.[14]
In the end the government won over the Reichstag with only one small party outstanding in its continual opposition to the plan. The Fatherland Party and the OHL, now under Ludendorff, demanded a rigorous pro-Kaiser pursuance of a Rumanian-Germany.Bessarabia, a rich and fertile agricultural basin, was ripe for the Central Powers to pick. Michaelis was sceptical of OHL's avowal of the closest relationship with Austria when another conference was called for 7 October. Still dominated by the obsession with seaports for the Reich, Michaelis demanded access inDalmatia from the Austrians, as well as those on the Belgian coast. Through the vehicle ofMitteleuropa he sought to enable the Austrian economy to withstand the peace conditions he knew would be imposed on the German customs union.[15]
But the candidate chosen as the new Chancellor was the Army's and not that of the Reichstag. "We have lost a statesman and secured a functionary in his place", remarkedConrad Haussmann, a member of the Reichstag from theProgressive People's Party.[16][full citation needed]
In August, the naval mutinies at Wilhelmshaven led to executions. Michaelis blamed the socialists in the Reichstag hoping to split the coalition. But the Reichstag demanded his resignation. On 24 October 1917 the National Liberals three socialist parties in the coalition made representations to the Kaiser.[clarification needed] In his autobiography he laid the blame on his own refusal to bend to pressure for liberal electoral reforms. The deputies hoped to replace him with aCentre Party aristocrat,Georg von Hertling.[2]
He remained in this position until 1 November 1917, when he was forced to resign after coming under fire for refusing to commit himself by endorsing aresolution passed by the Reichstag favouring peace without annexation or indemnities. Michaelis attempted to retain his role as Prussian Minister President, but without success as Count Hertling was determined that the two posts could not be separated.[17][18]
From 1 April 1918 to 31 March 1919 he served asOberpräsident of the Prussian province ofPomerania.[2] After the end of World War I, he cooperated with the localworkers' and soldiers' council. Nevertheless, the socialist-dominated government of Prussia soon replaced him.
Hord, Daniel, ed. (1969).The Private War of Seaman Stumpf. London.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
Kitchen, Martin (1976).The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff 1916-1918. London: Holmes & Meier Publishers.ISBN978-0841902770.
Michaelis, Georg (1922).Für Staat und Volk : Eine Lebensgeschichte [For State and People : A Life Story] (in German). Tübigen: Furche-Verlag.
Strachan, Hew (2003).First World War. London: Penguin Books.[ISBN missing]
Becker, Bert (2001).Georg Michaelis: Ein preußischer Jurist im Japan der Meiji-Zeit; Briefe, Tagebuchnotizen, Dokumente 1885–1889 [Georg Michaelis: A Prussian Jurist in Meiji Japan; Letters, Diary Notes, Documents 1885–1889] (in German). Munich: iudicum.ISBN978-3891296509.
Braun, Magnus von (1955).Von Ostpreussen bis Texas (in German). Holkamm.
Regulski, Christoph (2003).Die Reichskanzlerschaft von Georg Michaelis 1917: Deutschlands Entwicklung zur parlamentarisch-demokratischen Monarchie im Ersten Weltkrieg [The Imperial Chancellorship of Georg Michaelis in 1917: Germany's Development Towards a Parliamentary Democratic Monarchy in the First World War] (in German). Marburg: Tectum-Verlag.
Snell, John L. (July 1951). "Benedict XV, Wilson, Michaelis and German socialism".Catholic Historical Review.