TheProtocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, usually called theGeneva Protocol, is atreaty prohibiting the use ofchemical andbiological weapons in internationalarmed conflicts. It was signed atGeneva on 17 June 1925 and entered into force on 8 February 1928. It was registered inLeague of NationsTreaty Series on 7 September 1929.[4] The Geneva Protocol is a protocol to the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War signed on the same date, and followed theHague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
It prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare". This is now understood to be a general prohibition on chemical weapons and biological weapons between state parties, but has nothing to say about production, storage or transfer. Later treaties did cover these aspects – the 1972Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying to other parties and that these obligations would cease to apply if the prohibited weapons were used against them.[5][6]
This resulted in the development of a range of horrific chemicals affecting lungs, skin, or eyes. Some were intended to be lethal on the battlefield, likehydrogen cyanide, and efficient methods of deploying agents were invented. At least 124,000 tons were produced during the war. In 1918, about one grenade out of three was filled with dangerous chemical agents.[citation needed] Around 500k-1.3 million casualties of the conflict were attributed to the use of gas, and the psychological effect on troops may have had a much greater effect. A few thousand civilians also became casualties as collateral damage or due to production accidents.[7]
At the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms the French suggested a protocol for non-use of poisonous gases. TheSecond Polish Republic suggested the addition of bacteriological weapons.[10] It was signed on 17 June.[11]
Rabbit used to check for leaks at asarin production plant in 1970
Eric Croddy, assessing the Protocol in 2005, took the view that the historic record showed it had been largely ineffectual. Specifically it does not prohibit:[11]
use against not-ratifying parties
retaliation using such weapons, so effectively making it a no-first-use agreement
use within a state's own borders in a civil conflict
research and development of such weapons, or stockpiling them
In light of these shortcomings, Jack Beard notes that "the Protocol (...) resulted in a legal framework that allowed states to conduct [biological weapons] research, develop new biological weapons, and ultimately engage in [biological weapons] arms races".[6]
Several state parties have deployed chemical weapons for combat in spite of the treaty.Italy usedmustard gas against theEthiopian Empire in theSecond Italo-Ethiopian War. InWorld War II, Germany employed chemical weapons in combat on several occasions along theBlack Sea, notably inSevastopol, where they used toxic smoke to force Soviet resistance fighters out of caverns below the city. They also used asphyxiating gas in the catacombs ofOdesa in November 1941, following theircapture of the city, and in late May 1942 during theBattle of the Kerch Peninsula in easternCrimea, perpetrated by the Wehrmacht's Chemical Forces and organized by a special detail ofSS troops with the help of a field engineer battalion.[16] After the battle in mid-May 1942, the Germans gassed and killed almost 3,000 of the besieged and non-evacuatedRed Army soldiers and Soviet civilians hiding in a series of caves and tunnels in the nearbyAdzhimushkay quarry.[17]
During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is known to have employed a variety of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Some 100,000 Iranian troops were casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the war.[18][19][20]
In 1966,United Nations General Assembly resolution 2162B called for, without any dissent, all states to strictly observe the protocol. In 1969, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) declared that the prohibition on use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, as embodied in the protocol (though restated in a more general form), were generally recognized rules of international law.[21] Following this, there was discussion of whether the main elements of the protocol now form part ofcustomary international law, and now this is widely accepted to be the case.[15][22]
There have been differing interpretations over whether the protocol covers the use of harassing agents, such asadamsite andtear gas, anddefoliants andherbicides, such asAgent Orange, in warfare.[15][23] The 1977Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the military use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. Many states do not regard this as a complete ban on the use of herbicides in warfare, but it does require case-by-case consideration.[24] The 1993Chemical Weapons Convention effectively banned riot control agents from being used as a method of warfare, though still permitting it forriot control.[25]
In recent times, the protocol had been interpreted to cover non-international armed conflicts as well international ones. In 1995, an appellate chamber in theInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated that "there had undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of chemical weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts." In 2005, theInternational Committee of the Red Cross concluded that customary international law includes a ban on the use of chemical weapons in internal as well as international conflicts.[26]
However, such views drew general criticism from legal authors. They noted that much of thechemical arms control agreements stems from the context ofinternational conflicts. Furthermore, the application of customary international law to banning chemical warfare in non-international conflicts fails to meet two requirements: state practice andopinio juris. Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud cited the periodic use of chemical weapons in non-international conflicts since the end of WWI (asstated above) as well as the lack of existinginternational humanitarian law (such as theGeneva Conventions) and national legislation and manuals prohibiting using them in such conflicts.[27] Anne Lorenzat stated the 2005 ICRC study was rooted in "'political and operational issues rather than legal ones".[28]
Parties with unwithdrawn reservations limiting the applicability of provisions of the Protocol
Non-parties
To become party to the Protocol, states must deposit an instrument with the government ofFrance (thedepositary power). Thirty-eight states originally signed the Protocol. France was the first signatory to ratify the Protocol on 10 May 1926. El Salvador, the final signatory to ratify the Protocol, did so on 26 February 2008. As of April 2021, 146 states have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to the Protocol,[3] most recently Colombia on 24 November 2015.
A number of countries submittedreservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying with respect to other parties to the Protocol and/or that these obligations would cease to apply with respect to any state, or its allies, which used the prohibited weapons. Several Arab states also declared that their ratification did not constitute recognition of, or diplomatic relations with,Israel, or that the provision of the Protocol were not binding with respect to Israel.
Generally, reservations not only modify treaty provisions for the reserving party, but also symmetrically modify the provisions for previously ratifying parties in dealing with the reserving party.[15]: 394 Subsequently, numerous states have withdrawn their reservations, including the formerCzechoslovakia in 1990 prior to itsdissolution,[29] or the Russian reservation on biological weapons that "preserved the right to retaliate in kind if attacked" with them, which was dissolved byPresident Yeltsin.[30]
According to theVienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." While some states have explicitly either retained or renounced their reservations inherited on succession, states which have not clarified their position on their inherited reservations are listed as "implicit" reservations.
The Protocol was ratified by theCoalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in exile in 1983. 13 states (including the depositary France) objected to their ratification, and considered it legally invalid. In 1993, theKingdom of Cambodia stated in anote verbale that it considered itself bound by the provisions of the Protocol.[54]
Implicit on succession.[Note 1] Serbia's Parliament voted to withdraw their reservation in May 2009[76] and the withdrawal was announced in 2010, but the depositary has not been notified.[77]
^abcdefghijklmnopqrsAccording to theVienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations.
^Although the FR Yugoslavia claimed to be the continuator state of the SFR of Yugoslavia, theUnited Nations General Assembly did not accept this and forced them to reapply for membership.
Failed because France objected to clauses relating to submarine warfare.
1925
Geneva Protocol
Prohibited the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods" in international conflicts.
^abBeard, J. (2007). "The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention". American Journal of International Law. 101(2): 271–321. doi:10.1017/S0002930000030098. p., 277
^Haber, L. F. (2002).The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical warfare in the First World War. Oxford University Press. pp. 239–253.ISBN9780191512315.
^"2603 (XXIV). Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"(PDF). United Nations General Assembly. 16 December 1969. Retrieved24 August 2013.use in international armed conflicts of: (a) Any chemical agents of warfare - chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid - which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; (b) Any biological agents of warfare - living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them - which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.
Bunn, George. "Gas and germ warfare: international legal history and present status."Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 65.1 (1970): 253+.online
Webster, Andrew. "Making Disarmament Work: The implementation of the international disarmament provisions in the League of Nations Covenant, 1919–1925."Diplomacy and Statecraft 16.3 (2005): 551–569.
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