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TheGIUK gap (sometimes written G-I-UK) is an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean that forms anavalchoke point. Its name is aninitialism forGreenland,Iceland, and theUnited Kingdom, the gap being the two stretches of open ocean among these three landmasses. It separates theNorwegian Sea and theNorth Sea from the openAtlantic Ocean. The term is typically used in relation to military topics. The area has been considered strategically important since the beginning of the 20th century.[1]
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the exploitation of the GIUK gap by northern forces and measures to patrol and secure the gap by opposing forces have played an important role in naval and in overall military planning.[citation needed]
From the start ofWorld War II in 1939, German ships used the gap to break out from their bases in northern Germany (and fromoccupied Norway after April 1940) with a view to attacking Allied shippingconvoys, but Allied blocking efforts in the North Sea and in the GIUK gap impeded such break-outs. British forcesoccupied the Faroe Islands in April 1940, andIceland in May 1940; the United States took over effective control of Greenland in 1940. But the GermanKriegsmarine profited greatly from thefall of France in June 1940, after which German submarines could operate from bases on the French coast.[citation needed]
The origin of the term "gap" dates to this period, when there was a gap in air coverage known as theMid-Atlantic gap or the "Greenland air gap". This gap was an area that land-based aircraft could not reach and where, as a result, they could not carry out theiranti-submarine duties.[citation needed]
The GIUK gap again became the focus of naval planning in the 1950s, as it represented the only available outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for Soviet submarines operating from their bases on theKola Peninsula. NATO worried that if the Cold War "turned hot", naval convoys reinforcing Europe from the U.S. would suffer unacceptable losses if Soviet submarines could operate in the North Atlantic. The United States and the United Kingdom based much of their post-war naval strategy on blocking the gap, installing a chain of underwater listening posts right across it during the 1950s – an example of aSOSUS "sound surveillance system". This deployment of sonar surveillance in the gap, and elsewhere, hampered the Soviet Northern Fleet's ability to deploy its submarines without detection.[2]
The Royal Navy's primary mission during the Cold War, excluding its nuclear deterrent role, involved anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The development of theInvincible-class ASWaircraft carriers stemmed from this doctrine: their primary mission involved anti-submarine warfare usingSea King helicopters. TheType 23 frigate originated as a pure ASW platform; its mission expanded following theFalklands War of 1982.[citation needed]
The largest Russian submarine drills through the GIUK gap were operations Aport andAtrina, in 1985 and 1987, respectively, when the Soviets deployed several SSNs near the U.S. coast before the1985 Gorbachev–Reagan meeting.[3]
The Soviets planned to use the GIUK gap to intercept any NATO ships, especially aircraft carriers, heading towards the Soviet Union. Ships and submarines as well asTupolev Tu-142 maritime-surveillance aircraft aimed to track any threatening ships.[citation needed]
The advent of longer-ranged Sovietsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) allowed the Soviet Navy to deploy theirballistic missile submarine (SSBNs) within protected bastions in theBarents Sea and reduced their need to transit the GIUK gap. The much reduced, post-Cold War Russian Navy has even less need to transit the GIUK gap.[citation needed]
Crossing the GIUK gap was a major strategic move for Ocean Venture in 1992, in which 84 NATO ships, including 4 US aircraft carriers, departed from their usual August exercise pattern, deployed a decoy south toward the mid-Atlantic, and then entered waters in a move that had historically been associated with a risk of destabilizingdétente.[4][5]
In late October 2019, a week before Commander of the Northern FleetAleksandr Moiseyev and Russian Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov met their Norwegian counterparts inKirkenes, Norway, ten submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet, among them two diesel-electric and eight non-strategic nuclear, left their homebases in the Kola Peninsula to participate in submarine drills that were the largest, on the Russian side, since Cold War operations[when?] Aport and Atrina.[clarification needed]The main task of the submarines was reportedly testing Russian ability to breach the GIUK gap undetected and sail into the Atlantic Ocean. The drills were expected to last up to two months.[6][7]
ComprisingGreenland, theFaroe Islands andDenmark, theKingdom of Denmark is an Arctic state alongside seven other countries whose territories cover theArctic region.[8] All matters of foreign policy for both Greenland and theFaroe Islands fall within the jurisdiction of the Danish government.[9]
The Danish government has historically used its jurisdiction over foreign policy in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands to assist in securing the GIUK gap and the wider Arctic for its allies. In doing so, Denmark has arguably acquired a sense of goodwill from particularly the US government andNATO.[10] The Danish government views the Arctic as a central component of its foreign security policy and will continue to expand its spending, surveillance and military presence in the region.[11]
Despite the relatively small-sized population of Denmark, roughly 6 million, the Danish government's close ties to Greenland and the Faroe Islands legitimises it as an inherently important Arctic actor on matters of geopolitical security and great-power tensions. Danish assertion of sovereignty in the GIUK gap and the wider Arctic is already a key concern to the Danish Realm[12] and is expected to be an increasingly important component of Denmark's future responsibilities in NATO.[13]
The GIUK gap is also a key supply line between the US and its European allies. With war on-going in Ukraine, NATO and the US are showing renewed interest in the GIUK gap,[11] positioning Denmark to be a key player in matters of broader European security and increasing the gap's strategic importance to the Danish Realm.
Until 2007, the Faroe Islands were home to an air surveillance radar station, providing vital radar coverage during theCold War.[14] In light of broader geopolitical changes, such as theRussian invasion of Ukraine,c. 2022, the station was undergoing preparations to be reopened, closing an important surveillance gap in the GIUK gap.[15]
Maintaining thorough surveillance of the GIUK gap is crucial in order to ensure thatsea lines of communication (SLOCs) and supply lines are uninterrupted between NATO's European members and the United States. Military bases, space bases, surveillance drones and radar installations in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands can help ensure proper visibility in the region, and assist inanti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of actual conflict.[10][14][16] In 2021, Denmark unveiled a $250 million investment in surveillance capabilities in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.[17]
Responding to requests from NATO for Denmark to play its part in securing Arctic waters, Denmark is taking further steps to equip its ASW-frigates with sonar equipment, making them better equipped to detect and track submarines in theArctic Ocean, and particularly in the GIUK gap. In addition, the Danish government is equipping its Seahawk helicopters with sonar equipment and torpedoes. The upgrades have yet to be delivered, however, with delivery projections estimating 2024 at the earliest.[18]
During the Cold War, Russia relied on the ability of its nuclear submarines to pass through the GIUK gap in order to ensure maximum military capability. The introduction of long-range precision strike weapons, however, have reduced the significance of the GIUK gap in relation to intercontinental attacks and made it possible for Russia to target North American sites from safer waters, such as theNorwegian Sea. Still, the GIUK gap remains the obvious access point for Russian military operations in the wider NorthAtlantic Ocean since most of Russia's highest quality naval capabilities are deployed in theNorthern fleet, making the GIUK gap a significant transit route.[19]
For NATO allies, the GIUK gap is vital in terms of barrier defense for sea lines of communication protection.SLOCs are vulnerable in the North Atlantic both in the gap and beyond, and the US and NATO rely on Denmark to assist in protecting this critical infrastructure, including the vast number of seabed data cables.[19][20][21]
The Russian fleet has in recent years strategically upgraded its capabilities for covert subsea operations related to the targeting of seabed infrastructure[19] and reports of Russian "mapping" of critical seabed infrastructure in the North Sea and the seabed around Denmark are increasing.[22][23] NATO intelligence and security officials confirm these reports, warning that Russia has both the intent and necessary capabilities to target critical seabed installations if they so choose.[24] While such infrastructure has always been associated with some risk, the dependency ofDenmark and its allies on them are only increasing and is therefore posing a major threat in times of tension short of actual conflict.[14]
The GIUK gap is particularly important to theUK's Royal Navy, as any attempt by northern European forces to break into the open Atlantic would have to be made either through the heavily defendedEnglish Channel, one of the world's busiest seaways,[25] or through one of the exits on either side of Iceland. As the British also control the strategic port ofGibraltar at the entrance to theMediterranean, this means Spain, France, and Portugal are the only Continental European countries that possess direct access to the Atlantic Ocean that cannot easily be blocked at a choke point by the Royal Navy.
The GIUK gap is also a route formigratory birds such as thenorthern wheatear to cross the Atlantic to reach Greenland and eastern Canada.
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