Frazier v. Cupp | |
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Argued February 26, 1969 Decided April 22, 1969 | |
Full case name | Frazier v. Cupp |
Citations | 394U.S.731 (more) 89 S. Ct. 1420; 22L. Ed. 2d 684 |
Holding | |
On its own, police deception in interrogations did not automatically constitute misconduct. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Marshall, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White |
Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. VI |
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), was aUnited States Supreme Court case that affirmed the legality of deceptive interrogation tactics by the police.[1]
Acting on a tip, police picked up and interrogated Martin E. Frazier, a 20-year-old U.S. Marine, about his possible involvement in the murder of Russell Anton Marleau.[2] Frazier, along with his cousin, Jerry Lee Rawls, were seen at a bar with the victim before the murder.[2]
During the interrogation, police falsely informed Frazier that Rawls had already confessed and implicated him in the murder.[1] Frazier denied any involvement in the crime and suggested speaking with an attorney, but police continued to question him.[1] Police elicited a confession, which was used against him at trial.[3]
Frazier was convicted of the murder of Russell Anton Marleau. Rawls pleaded guilty to the same offense.[2]
Frazier appealed his conviction to theUnited States Supreme Court on three main points.
The Court stated:
The fact that the police misrepresented the statements that Rawls had made is, while relevant, insufficient, in our view, to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.[1]
Later case law has interpretedFrazier v. Cupp as the case permitting police deception during interrogations. The language of the ruling did not specifically state which forms of police deception were acceptable, but the ruling provided a precedent for a confession being voluntary even though deceptive tactics were used.[4]
A compelling argument has not yet been made that drastic limits on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable.