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Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Part of the Thirty Years' War
For other uses, seeFranco-Spanish War (disambiguation).
Franco–Spanish War
Part ofFrench–Habsburg rivalry

The war was driven by long standing French attempts to strengthen their borders withHabsburg Spain (red) andHabsburg Austria (yellow)
Date19 May 1635 – 7 November 1659
(24 years, 5 months, 2 weeks and 5 days)
Location
ResultTreaty of the Pyrenees
Territorial
changes
Artois andRoussillon annexed by France
Belligerents
Phase I: 1635–1648
 France
 Dutch Republic
Duchy of SavoySavoy
MantuaMantua
Modena and Reggio[a]
Duchy of Parma
Phase II: 1648–1659
 France
Duchy of SavoySavoy
Modena and Reggio[b]
Commonwealth of EnglandCommonwealth of England[c]
Phase I: 1635–1648
SpainSpanish Empire
 Holy Roman Empire
Duchy of Parma
Modena and Reggio[d]
Phase II: 1648–1659
SpainSpanish Empire
Commanders and leaders
Kingdom of FranceLouis XIII
Kingdom of FranceLouis XIV
Kingdom of FranceCardinal Richelieu
Kingdom of FranceCardinal Mazarin
Kingdom of FranceTurenne
Kingdom of FranceCondé[e]
Kingdom of FranceChoiseul
Kingdom of FranceColigny
Kingdom of Francede la Porte
Kingdom of Francede Gassion (DOW)
Kingdom of FranceLa Ferté-Senneterre
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar
Dutch RepublicFrederick Henry
SpainPhilip IV
SpainOlivares
Spainde Haro
SpainCardinal-Infante Ferdinand
SpainFrancisco de Melo
SpainJohn of Austria
SpainCaracena
SpainPedro de Vélez
Spanish EmpireHoly Roman EmpireArchduke Leopold
Strength
France:
c. 100,000–125,000[1][f]
Spain:
c. 200,000 (1640)[4]
Casualties and losses
France:
c. 200,000 to 300,000 killed or wounded[5]
300,000 killed or wounded in combat[6][7]
Spain:
Unknown
SeeFinancial and military impact
Franco-Spanish War
(1635–1659)
Flanders and Northern France
Northern Spain and Southern France
Italy
France hinterland
Franche-Comté,Lorraine, andGermany
Caribbean
Naval battles
Bohemian Revolt (1618–1620)
Palatinate campaign (1620–1623)
Transylvanian invasions of Hungary(1619-1621),(1623–1624),(1626),(1644-1645)
Danish intervention (1625–1629)
Swedish intervention (1630–1635)
Swedish-French period (1635–1648)
Naval battles
Global battles

Related conflicts

TheFranco-Spanish War,[g] May 1635 to November 1659, was fought betweenFrance andSpain, each supported by various allies at different points. The first phase, from May 1635 to the 1648Peace of Westphalia, is a related conflict of theThirty Years' War, while the second continued until theTreaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.

Major areas of conflict includednorthern Italy, theSpanish Netherlands and theRhineland. France supported revolts against Spanish rule inPortugal (1640–1668),Catalonia (1640–1653) andNaples (1647), while Spain backed French rebels in the 1647 to 1653 "Fronde". Both also backed opposing sides in the 1639 to 1642Piedmontese Civil War.

France was a long-time supporter of theDutch Republic andSweden, but had avoided direct conflict with Spain orAustria. In May 1635, France declared war on Spain, then shortly afterwards separately entered the 30 Years War against Austria. After the latter ended in 1648, fighting continued between Spain and France, with neither able to achieve decisive victory. France made some gains inFlanders and thePyrenees, but by 1658 both sides were financially exhausted and made peace in November 1659.

While relatively minor in extent, French territorial gains significantly strengthened their borders, whileLouis XIV marriedMaria Theresa of Spain, eldest daughter ofPhilip IV. Although Spain retained its vast global empire, some commentators argue the Treaty of the Pyrenees marks the end of its position as the predominant power in Europe.[8][9]

Strategic overview

[edit]

In the first half of the 17th century, Europe was dominated by the 1618 to 1648Thirty Years' War, and theFrench-Habsburg rivalry, a contest for supremacy betweenFrance, and itsHabsburg rivals inSpain and theHoly Roman Empire. Prior to May 1635, France avoided direct involvement, instead financing Habsburg opponents such as theDutch Republic, and backingSwedish intervention in the Thirty Years' War. When thePeace of Prague (1635) seemed likely to end the fighting in May 1635, France declared war on Spain, then joined the 30 Years War against Austria. From 1640 onwards, it also supported insurgencies inCatalonia,Portugal, andNaples[10]

For their part, the Habsburgs backed a series ofHuguenot rebellions and conspiracies organised by feudal lords who resented their loss of power underCardinal Richelieu and his successor,Cardinal Mazarin. The most significant included those led byMontmorency in 1632, thePrinces des Paix plot byLouis, Count of Soissons in 1641, andCinq-Mars in 1642. Spain also backed anti-government rebels in the 1648–1653 French civil war known as theFronde.[11]

TheSpanish Road;Purple:Spanish dependencies;Green: Ruled byAustria;Orange: Ruled bySpain

Wider co-operation between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs was limited since their objectives did not always align. Spain was a global maritime power, andAustria was primarily a European land power and focused on the Holy Roman Empire, which contained over 1,800 states, most of them extremely small. Although the Habsburgs had beenHoly Roman Emperors since 1440, their control over the empire was weakened by the 1555Peace of Augsburg, which continued in the period leading up to 1620. Reversing the trend was a major Habsburg objective during the Thirty Years' War, but failure was acknowledged by the 1648Peace of Westphalia.[12]

France faced the same issue of diverging objectives with its allies. The war coincided with the period of economic supremacy known as theDutch Golden Age, and by 1640, many Dutch statesmen viewed French ambitions in the Spanish Netherlands as a threat.[13] Unlike France, Swedish war aims were restricted to Germany, and in 1641, the Swedes considered a separate peace with EmperorFerdinand III.[14]

From the late 16th century, Italy, especially theKingdom of Naples, was the primary source of money for theArmy of Flanders.[15] As a result, much of the fighting focused on theSpanish Road, a land supply route connectingSpanish possessions in Italy withFlanders but also passing through areas considered vital to French security, likeAlsace. The independentDuchy of Savoy and Spanish-heldDuchy of Milan were strategically important to the Road but also provided access to the vulnerable southern borders of France and Habsburgterritories in Austria. Richelieu aimed to end Spanish dominance in those areas, an objective that had been largely achieved at his death in 1642.[12]

Until the advent of railways in the 19th century, water was the primary means of bulk transportation, and campaigns focused on control of rivers and ports. Armies relied onforaging, while the feeding of the draught animals essential for transport and cavalry restricted campaigning in the winter. By the 1630s, the countryside had been devastated by years of constant warfare, which limited the size of the armies and their ability to conduct operations. Sickness killed far more soldiers than combat. The French army that invaded Flanders in May 1635 had been reduced by desertion and disease from 27,000 to under 17,000 by early July.[16]

Background

[edit]
Louis XIII, King of France from 1610 to 1643

TheThirty Years' War began in 1618 when theProtestant-dominatedBohemian Estates offered theCrown of Bohemia toFrederick V of the Palatinate, in place of the conservativeCatholicFerdinand II. Most of theHoly Roman Empire remained neutral, and theBohemian Revolt was quickly suppressed. However, the war expanded whenSpanish forces invaded thePalatinate and forced Frederick into exile. The removal of a hereditary prince changed the nature and extent of the war.[17]

As part of ageneral policy to weaken Ferdinand wherever possible, Catholic France supported his internal and external opponents. This included the ProtestantDutch Republic in itswar against Spain, as well as funding firstDanish and thenSwedish intervention in the Empire. In 1630,Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden invadedPomerania partly to support his Protestant coreligionists, but he also sought control of theBaltic trade, which provided much of Sweden's income.[18]

Although Swedish intervention continued after Gustavus' death atLützen in 1632, it caused tensions withSaxony andBrandenburg-Prussia, whose lands were devastated by the plague and famine that accompanied the war.[19] A significant Imperial-Spanish victory atNördlingen in September 1634 forced the Swedes to abandon southern Germany, and most of theirGerman allies made peace with Ferdinand IIat Prague in April 1635.[20]

Prague led to rumours of a proposed Austro-Spanish offensive in the Netherlands and ledLouis XIII of France and Richelieu to decide on direct intervention. In early 1635, they signed an agreement withBernard of Saxe-Weimar to provide 16,000 troops for a campaign in Alsace and the Rhineland, formed an anti-Spanish alliance with the Dutch, and signed theTreaty of Compiègne with Sweden.[21]

Phase I: 1635 to 1648 Treaty of Westphalia

[edit]
Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659) is located in Belgium
Les Avins
Les Avins
Dunkirk
Dunkirk
Brussels
Brussels
Leuven
Leuven
Valenciennes
Valenciennes
Maastricht
Maastricht
Corbie
Corbie
Lens
Lens
Arras
Arras
1635–1659; key locations in northern France and the Spanish Netherlands (current Belgium borders shown; Arras, Valenciennes and Dunkirk were part of the Spanish Netherlands)

In May, a French army of 27,000 invaded the Spanish Netherlands and defeated a smaller Spanish force atLes Avins and besiegedLeuven on 24 June, where they were joined by Dutch reinforcements. Disease and lack of supplies quickly reduced the besieging army, which withdrew in the face of a relief force underOttavio Piccolomini on 4 July.[22] Led byCardinal-Infante Ferdinand of Austria, the Spanish took the initiative and capturedLimbourg,Gennep,Diest andGoch and besieged Dutch garrisons in theDuchy of Cleves. The French retreated across the border, and the Dutch, underFrederick Henry, marched urgently on the strategic position ofSchenkenschans. Captured by the Spanish on 28 July, it was recovered only after a long and costly siege.[16]

After that failure, theStates General of the Netherlands opposed further large-scale land operations in favour of attacks on Spanish trade.[23] In the campaign of 1636, Philip switched his focus to recovering territories in theLow Countries, while a Franco-Savoyard offensive inLombardy was defeated atTornavento in June. ASpanish incursion led by Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand into northern France quickly captured the key fortified town ofCorbie in August, but despite causing panic inParis, the Cardinal-Infante decided to halt the advance on Paris because he deemed his stretched supply lines to be too great a risk. The attack would not be repeated during the war since the Cardinal-Infante himself would fall ill in the coming years.[24]

As agreed at Compiègne in 1635, the French replaced Swedish garrisons in Alsace. Prior to his death in 1639, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar won a series of victories over the Imperials in the Rhineland, notably thecapture of Breisach in December 1638.[25] Severing the Spanish Road meant the Spanish armies in Flanders had to be resupplied by sea, which made them vulnerable to attack by theDutch States Navy, which destroyed a large Spanish fleet at theBattle of the Downs in 1639. Although most convoys managed to get through, that illustrated the difficulties Spain faced in sustaining its war effort in the Low Countries.[26]

With Spanish resources stretched to the limit in Europe, the Dutch used the opportunity to attack their possessions in the Americas, Africa and Asia, especially those belonging to thePortuguese Empire, which was also ruled by Philip IV. Spanish inability to protect those interests caused increasing unrest inPortugal.[27] Damage to the economy and tax increases imposed to pay for the war led to protests throughout Spanish territories, which in 1640 erupted into open revolts inPortugal andCatalonia.[28] In 1641, theCatalan Courts recognised Louis XIII of France asCount of Barcelona and the ruler of thePrincipality of Catalonia.[29] However, they soon found the new administration differed little from the old, which turned the war into a three sided contest between the Franco-Catalan elite, the rural peasantry and the Spanish.[30]

Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659) is located in Baden-Württemberg
Breisach
Breisach
Rheinfelden
Rheinfelden
Mergentheim
Mergentheim
Mannheim
Mannheim
Tuttlingen
Tuttlingen
Zusmarshausen
Zusmarshausen
Nördlingen
Nördlingen
1635–1648; key locations Rhineland campaign

Louis XIII died on 14 May 1643, and was succeeded by his five-year-old son,Louis XIV, whose mother, the former Spanish princess,Anne of Austria, took control of the Regency Council that ruled in his name. Five days later,Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of Condé defeated the SpanishArmy of Flanders atRocroi.[31] Victory gave Condé, a royal prince and effective ruler of large parts of eastern France, leverage in his struggle with Queen Anne andCardinal Mazarin.[32]

Despite some successes in northern France and the Spanish Netherlands, including victory atLens in August 1648, France was unable to knock Spain out of the war. In the Holy Roman Empire, Imperial victories atTuttlingen andMergentheim were offset by French success atNördlingen andZusmarshausen. In Italy, French-backedSavoyard offensives against the Spanish-ruledDuchy of Milan achieved little because of lack of resources and the disruption caused by the 1639 to 1642Piedmontese Civil War. Victory atOrbetello in June 1646, and the recapture ofNaples in 1647 left Spain firmly in control of the region.[33]

The 1648Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War, recognised Dutch independence and ended the drain on Spanish resources. Under the October 1648 Treaty of Münster, France gained strategic locations in Alsace andLorraine, as well asPinerolo, which controlled access to Alpine passes in Northern Italy.[33] However, the peace excluded Italy,Imperial territories in the Low Countries and French-occupied Lorraine. Although Emperor Ferdinand was now at peace with France, the fighting between France and Spain continued.[34]

Phase II: 1648 to 1659

[edit]
Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659) is located in Northern Italy
Tornavento
Tornavento
Turin
Turin
Mantua
Mantua
Casale
Casale
Milan
Milan
Cremona
Cremona
Pinerolo
Pinerolo
Genoa
Genoa
Modena
Modena
Pavia
Pavia
Northern Italy; key locations 1635–1659 (note Pinerolo, ceded to France in 1648)

When financial pressure forcedPhilip IV of Spain to declare bankruptcy in 1647, he focused on retaking Catalonia, while remaining on the defensive elsewhere. Although many of the troops captured at Rocroi soon returned to service, in their absence a significant part of Flanders was overrun, includingDunkirk, a major base forSpanish privateers attacking Dutch and French shipping.[h] However, Spain's position improved when the Dutch war ended in 1648, along with the outbreak of civil war in France, theFronde.[36]

The resulting turmoil allowed Philip IV to retake most of the lost territories in Flanders, includingYpres, but neither side was able to gain a significant advantage. In 1650, Spanish success in crushing theNeapolitan Revolt was offset by the loss of Barcelona to French-backed Catalan rebels. Mazarin forced Condé into exile in the Spanish Netherlands in 1651, where his immense prestige in territories adjacent to the Spanish possession ofFranche-Comté made him a valuable ally for Philip.[37]

Over the course of 1652, Spain recaptured both Dunkirk andBarcelona, and although limited combat continued inRoussillon, the front by 1653 had stabilised along the modernPyrenees border.[38] However, doing so forced Philip into bankruptcy again, while the end of the Fronde allowed Mazarin to resume attacks on Milan, possession of which would allow France to threatenHabsburg Austria. The attempt failed despite support from Savoy,Modena and Portugal.[39] By now, the two antagonists were exhausted, with neither able to establish dominance. From 1654 to 1656, major French victories atArras,Landrecies andSaint-Ghislain were offset by Spanish victories atPavia andValenciennes. Under pressure fromPope Alexander VII, Mazarin offered peace terms but refused to accept Philip's insistence for Condé to be restored to his French titles and lands.[40] Since the Spanish king viewed this as a personal obligation to Condé, the war continued.[41]

France had previously relied on the Dutch to provide naval support against Spain, which ended after Westphalia. In 1657, Mazarin replaced the loss by negotiating ananti-Spanish alliance with theCommonwealth of England. That expanded the scope of theAnglo-Spanish War (1654–1660), and France withdrew support for the exiledCharles II of England, whose supporters joined the Spanish as a result.[42] After the Anglo-Frenchcapture of Dunkirk in June 1658, Philip requested a truce, which Mazarin refused, but once again success proved illusory. On 15 August, Spain won an important victory atCamprodon in Catalonia,Oliver Cromwell's death in September led to political chaos in England, and fighting in northern Italy ended when French allies Savoy and Modena agreed to a truce with the Spanish commanderCaracena.[43]

Treaty of the Pyrenees and marriage contract

[edit]
Philip IV of Spain, ruler from 1621 to 1665

On 8 May 1659, France and Spain began negotiating terms; the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658 weakened England, which was allowed to observe but excluded from the talks. Although the Anglo-Spanish War was suspended after the 1660restoration of Charles II, it did not formally end until theTreaty of Madrid (1667).[44]

Under theTreaty of the Pyrenees, signed on 5 November 1659, France gainedArtois andHainaut along its border with the Spanish Netherlands, as well asRoussillon. These were more significant than often assumed; in combination with the 1648 Treaty of Münster, France strengthened its borders in the east and south-west, while in 1662, Charles IIsold Dunkirk to France. Acquisition of Roussillon established the Franco-Spanish border along the Pyrenees, but divided the historicPrincipality of Catalonia, an event still commemorated each year by French Catalan-speakers inPerpignan.[45] In addition to these territorial loses, Spain was forced to recognize and confirm all of the French territorial gains at the Peace of Westphalia.[46]

France withdrew support fromAfonso VI of Portugal, while Louis XIV renounced his claim to be Count of Barcelona, and king of Catalonia. Condé regained his possessions and titles, as did many of his followers, such as theComte de Montal, but his political power was broken, and he did not hold military command again until 1667.[47]

An integral part of the peace negotiations was the marriage contract between Louis andMaria Theresa, which he used to justify the 1666 to 1667War of Devolution, and formed the basis of French claims over the next 50 years. The marriage was more significant than intended, since it was agreed shortly after Philip's second wife,Mariana of Austria, gave birth to a second son, both of whom died young.[48] Philip died in 1665, leaving his four-year-old sonCharles as king, once described as "always on the verge of death, but repeatedly baffling Christendom by continuing to live."[49]

Aftermath and historical assessment

[edit]
Maria Theresa of Spain, whose marriage to Louis XIV was part of the peace negotiations

The Treaty of the Pyrenees was traditionally viewed as the start of the process whereby France under Louis XIV ultimately replaced Spain as the predominant European power.[9][50] Some historians go further and suggest that, on balance, it ended largely in favour of France.[51][52][53] The alternative analysis is that this relies on hindsight and in reality the outcome was far more balanced, with the two parties effectively settling for a draw.[9][54][55]

Advocates of this perspective argue that only the alliance with England in 1657 allowed France to force Spain into peace talks, due to the ongoing military stalemate,[56][57] while it was also the desire to prioritise the war with Portugal that convinced Philip IV to come to terms.[58] Even then, Mazarin essentially accepted far less satisfactory terms in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 than were available in November 1647.[59] Despite this, the treaty has also been seen as a major foreign policy success for Mazarin[60]. One view is Spain escaped the treaty surprisingly lightly, due to its alleged weakness from defeats it had suffered, however they achieved worse terms than offered in 1656.[61]

In territorial terms, Spain remained the predominant European power for years to come, but its economic and military power suffered an abrupt decline after 1659.[8] Although it was an important participant in the European coalitions against Louis XIV during theFranco-Dutch War andNine Years' War, Madrid was increasingly unable to defend territories outside themainland from France without foreign support. TheSpanish Netherlands, with many of its fortresses in disrepair and its troops poorly supplied, became particularly vulnerable to French attack.[62][63]

Financial and military impact

[edit]

Taking on theSpanish Empire, then the strongest military power in Europe, required French forces of unprecedented size and an associated expansion of the taxation and supply base needed to support them. To meet these needs, official estimates for the army expanded from 39,000 in 1630 to around 150,000 shortly before the declaration of war in May 1635.[64] However, at this stage the French state was unable to support such large numbers; of the 27,000 men who took part in the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in May of the same year, fewer than 15,000 remained a month later. Throughout the war, both sides struggled to support offensives outside their own boundaries; the Spanish invasion of northern France in 1636 was withdrawn due to a lack of supplies and was not repeated.[16]

TheBattle of Rocroi (1643) is often seen as the end of the battlefield supremacy of thetercios.

Including those supplied byBernard of Saxe-Weimar and paid by France, between 1635 and 1642 official troop levels averaged 150,000 to 160,000, with a peak of 211,000 in 1639.[65] These are based on official muster rolls and should be treated with caution, since officers were paid for numbers reported, rather than those actually present; in addition, during this period on average another 10% was absent due to sickness, although most generally recovered.[5] Parrott estimates variances between "Reported" and "Actual" averaged up to 35% for the French and 50% for the Spanish, althoughJohn A. Lynn suggests an average of 60%.[66][67]

Throughout the war, military strategy and objectives were often secondary to finding adequate provisions, especially given the primitive infrastructure then available. It was not until the 1660s thatLouvois created systems which allowed France to sustain an army of nearly 200,000 men for extended periods, and crucially ensure co-ordinated strategy between different fronts.[68] At the start of the war, the more experienced Spanish were better equipped while their resources made it easier to replace losses. The French sought to negate those advantages by fighting on multiple fronts and supporting anti-Spanish forces in Catalonia, Naples and Portugal.[69] Loss of Dutch naval support after 1648 severely impacted France's ability to challenge the Spanish at sea, until replaced with the English alliance in 1657.[70]

At its peak in 1632, the Spanish army contained around 300,000 regulars and 500,000 localmilitia, who were in general suitable only for garrison duty. In 1632, only 30% of the Castilian militia possessed firearms, and although this briefly improved, by 1659 this had fallen to less than 13% of the 465,000 listed in their registers.[71] A considerable portion of these were ethnic Spaniards; approximately 288,000 soldiers recruited from Castile and Aragon died, became prisoners, or went missing during the war according to a "very moderate" estimate, an average of 12,000 losses per year, not limited to combat only.[72] On the contrary, France lost over 300,000 soldiers killed or wounded in action alone, with the total figure rising up to 500,000 men dead or wounded on and off the battlefield.[6][73]

The Spanish retakeNaples, April 1648

During the 1630s, the Spanish state increasingly relied on its Italian territories for recruits and money; historian Davide Maffi calculating Milan provided around 4,000 recruits per year, along with 6 millionscudi in annual taxes. From 1631 to 1636 alone, Naples provided 3.5 million scudi, significant naval resources and 53,500 recruits, making it an important rear support zone of the empire.[74] In addition to maintaining its own garrison and navy, from 1630 to 1643 Naples supplied an average of 10,000 recruits a year to war theaters, an annual subsidy of one millionducats to support other areas of the Spanish Empire, and paid a third of Milan's government expenditures. As a result, its public debt quintupled and by 1648 interest payments constituted 57% of revenue, while taxes tripled between 1618 and 1688, crushing the southern Italian economy.[75] In October 1647, revolts in Sicily andNaples were quickly suppressed, but they exposed the weakness of Spanish rule in Italy and alienation of the local elites from Madrid.[76] In 1650, the governor of Milan claimed onlyParma could be relied upon.[77]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^1647 to 1649
  2. ^1655 to 1659
  3. ^1657 to 1659
  4. ^1636 to 1646
  5. ^Condé switched sides in 1652, but was pardoned in 1659 as part of the peace settlement
  6. ^French troop levels fluctuated greatly, particularly in the 1640s, and estimates by historians vary accordingly, ranging from 218,000 to just 40,000 between 1645 and 1648.[2] On average, it is likely no more than 100,000 were in the field at any given time.[3]
  7. ^French:Guerre franco-espagnoleSpanish:Guerra franco-española
  8. ^Ships based in Dunkirk could enter theNorth Sea on a single flood tide, which allowed them to raid as far north as theOrkney Islands, and so its closure was an English objective for centuries.[35]

References

[edit]
  1. ^Chartrand 2019, pp. 33–34.
  2. ^Chartrand 2019, p. 33.
  3. ^Chartrand 2019, p. 24.
  4. ^Clodfelter 2008, p. 39.
  5. ^abWilson 2009, p. 790.
  6. ^abBodart 2016, p. 88.
  7. ^Clodfelter 2017, p. 40.
  8. ^abLevy 1983, p. 34.
  9. ^abcDarby 2015, p. 66.
  10. ^Jensen 1985, pp. 451–470.
  11. ^Wilson 2009, pp. 663–664.
  12. ^abWilson 1976, p. 259.
  13. ^Wilson 2009, p. 669.
  14. ^Wilson 2009, p. 627.
  15. ^Kamen 2002, p. 403.
  16. ^abcVan Nimwegen 2014, pp. 169–170.
  17. ^Wilson 2009, pp. 314–316.
  18. ^Wedgwood 1938, pp. 385–386.
  19. ^Riches 2012, pp. 125–126.
  20. ^Knox 2017, pp. 182–183.
  21. ^Poot 2013, pp. 120–122.
  22. ^Israel 1995, p. 70.
  23. ^Israel 1995, p. 934.
  24. ^Israel 1995, pp. 272–273.
  25. ^Bely 2014, pp. 94–95.
  26. ^Wilson 2009, p. 661.
  27. ^Costa 2005, p. 4.
  28. ^Kamen 2002, p. 402.
  29. ^Van Gelderen 2002, p. 284.
  30. ^Mitchell 2005, pp. 431–448.
  31. ^Black 2002, p. 147.
  32. ^Wilson 2009, pp. 666–668.
  33. ^abPaoletti 2007, pp. 27–28.
  34. ^Wilson 2009, p. 747.
  35. ^Bromley 1987, p. 233.
  36. ^Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 59–64.
  37. ^Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 9–12.
  38. ^Parker 1972, pp. 221–224.
  39. ^Schneid 2012, p. 69.
  40. ^Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 296–300.
  41. ^Black 1991, p. 16.
  42. ^Quainton 1935, p. 268.
  43. ^Hanlon 2016, p. 134.
  44. ^Davenport & Paullin 1917, p. 50.
  45. ^Serra 2008, pp. 82–84.
  46. ^Maland 1966, p. 227.
  47. ^Tucker 2011, p. 838.
  48. ^Inglis Jones 1994, p. 307.
  49. ^Durant & Durant 1963, p. 25.
  50. ^Collins 1995, p. 61.
  51. ^Israel 2003, pp. XVI–XVII.
  52. ^Lynn 1994, p. 892.
  53. ^Collins 1995, p. 95.
  54. ^Luard 1986, p. 50.
  55. ^Parrott 2006, pp. 31–49.
  56. ^Darby 2015, p. 62.
  57. ^Collins 1995, p. 62.
  58. ^Stradling 1994, p. 27.
  59. ^Wilson 2009, p. 846 (PDF).
  60. ^Geoffery Treasure, Mazarin, The crisis of Absolutism in France, p.209
  61. ^ J.H Elliot, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, PDF p.235
  62. ^Clark 1970, p. 233.
  63. ^Nimwegen 2020, p. 166–167.
  64. ^Lynn 1994, p. 890.
  65. ^Lynn 1994, p. 891.
  66. ^Parrott 2001, p. 8.
  67. ^Lynn 1994, p. 896–897.
  68. ^Parrott 2001, pp. 548–551.
  69. ^Stradling 1979, pp. 206–207.
  70. ^Ekberg 1981, pp. 324–325.
  71. ^White 2002, pp. 11–13.
  72. ^Ortiz 1970, p. 95: "Teniendo en cuenta que cada año solían pedirse a las provincias castellanas de ocho a doce mil reclutas puede calcularse que las bajas anuales de nuestros ejércitos ascendían a diez mil hombres por término medio, pues si bien no pueden contarse como bajas los numerosos desertores habría que contar aparte los voluntarios, las milicias de la frontera portuguesa, los soldados de armas y presidios, los contingentes aragoneses, valencianos, mallorquines y canarios y las bajas de la población civil, por lo que la cifra de diez mil muertos anuales puede estimarse muy moderada, aunque se aumente a doce mil para tener en cuenta los de las provincias catalanas; éstas no se limitaron a bajas en el campo de batalla; muchos irreconciliables, después de la reconquista del Principado, se retiraron a territorio francés. Doce mil bajas totales al año, repartidos entre tantos frentes de batalla, puede parecer una cantidad pequeña, desdeñable casi; pero multiplicada por 24 años da la impresionante cifra de 288.000 muertos, prisioneros y desaparecidos, sin contar los mutilados totales que restaban brazos a la población activa y cuyo destino final solía ser la mendicidad."
  73. ^Clodfelter 2017, pp. 2–4, 40.
  74. ^Hanlon 2014, p. 116.
  75. ^Hanlon 2016, pp. 119–120.
  76. ^Kamen 2002, p. 406.
  77. ^Kamen 2002, p. 407.

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