| Fiallo v. Bell | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued December 7, 1976 Decided April 26, 1977 | |
| Full case name | Fiallo v. Bell |
| Citations | 430U.S.787 (more) |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York |
| Holding | |
| Section 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of theImmigration and Nationality Act of 1952 are constitutional, even though they exclude the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father from the immigration preferences granted to the "child" or "parent" of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Powell, joined by Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan and White |
| Laws applied | |
| Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 | |
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), was aU.S. Supreme Court case that challenged the constitutionality of Sections 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of theImmigration and Nationality Act of 1952.[1] The Sections gave immigration preference to children or parents of either existing U.S. citizens or of noncitizens residing underlawful permanent resident status.[1] But, as the Court wrote, the statute defined “child” narrowly: “an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship withhis mother”.[1]
Theappellants, three sets of unmarried biological fathers, contended that the law was discriminatory to the relationship between natural fathers and theirillegitimate child and claimedequal protection anddue process violations.[2]
The Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ claims and upheld the Sections, citingCongress' “exceptionally broad power” to admit or excludenon-citizens and acknowledging the intentional political choice of Congress to exclude a select group.[3] As put byJustice Powell, who wrote for the majority, it was not, “the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision.”[4]
Ramon Fiallo was a United States born citizen, but resident of theDominican Republic, whose mother petitioned, on his behalf, for his Dominican father to be legally declared his parent.[3] The United States Consul in the Dominican Republic rejected Fiallo’s petition, citing his illegitimacy—his parents were not married nor would be in the future.[3] Fiallo, along with appellant Cleophus Warner—a US citizen with an illegitimate child in theFrench West Indies—and appellants Trevor and Earl Wilson—permanent residents petitioning for theirJamaican father—sued Attorney GeneralEdward H. Levi in theUS District Court for the Eastern District of New York.[5]
The District Court dismissed the suit, alluding to theplenary power of Congress over matters of admission and exclusion of non-residents.[3]
In 1976, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and accepted the appeal.[3]
The appellants, represented byHarold R. Tyler Jr., put forth three key arguments against the identified Sections of the 1952 Act:
From the outset of the decision, the Court emphasized the “limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”, citingShaughnessy v. Mezei which recognized Congressional power to expel or exclude aliens as “a fundamental sovereign attribute”,[6] and more recent cases from the 1970s consistent withMathews v. Diaz.
Appellants did not challenge the practice of judicial deference to congressional immigration policy decisions. The appellants asserted a violation of equal protection, referencing previous border search cases (Almeida-Sanchez v. United States andUnited States v. Brignoni-Ponce) for their argument that the judiciary mustscrutinize immigration legislation to protect the rights of citizens.[5] The Court, however, found that these precedents did not limit Congress' authority to make classifications for regulating alien entrance, and refused to apply the principle.[5]
The Court was similarly unconvinced with the appellants’ attempt to apply stricter judicial scrutiny by claiming the discrimination within the statute (i.e., based on sex and illegitimacy) infringed on rights of citizens to familial relationships and denied due process.[5] The Court cited its prior holding in theFirst Amendment caseKleindienst v. Mandel, in which the Court refused to apply thestrict scrutinystandard to ensure the executive branch had acted within its bounds to deny immigration.[5] To Fiallo, therefore, the Court applied the same judicial standard it had when a first amendment right was in question.[5]
Finally, given that the 1952 Act was amended in 1957 specifically to add illegitimate children and theirmothers, the Court recognized that the omission of illegitimate children and their fathers was an “intentional choice” on the part of Congress.[4] The Court, therefore, asserted that it was not its role to “probe” and “test” the reasons for Congress’ legislative actions.[4]
On April 26, 1977, the Supreme Court ruled against appellants Fiallo, Warner, and Wilson in a 6-3 majority withJustices Marshall,Brennan, andWhite dissenting.[4] Justice Marshall was alone in writing a dissenting opinion.[4]
Justice Marshall asserted thatFifth Amendment rights are still applicable to immigration law and reasons that the mere involvement of immigration should not result in an immediate deferral to Congress under the rationale of plenary power:[4]
Until today I thought it clear that when Congress grants benefits to some citizens, but not to others, it is our duty to insure that the decision comports with Fifth Amendment principles of due process and equal protection. Today, however, the Court appears to hold that discrimination among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must be tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws. Since I cannot agree that Congress has license to deny fundamental rights to citizens according to the most disfavored criteria simply because the Immigration and Nationality Act is involved, I dissent.
He also noted that the case “directly involves the rights of citizens, not aliens.”[7] Accordingly, because Fifth Amendment rights are pertinent to immigration and becausecitizens’ rights are involved, Marshall agreed with the appellants’ contention that the Sections violated equal protection and due process rights.[7]
Justice Marshall also parted with the majority in asserting that the case should have been held to a higher form of judicial scrutiny, reasoning that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” is afundamental right and is grounds for strict scrutiny.[4]
The Fiallo Court, in asserting that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens”, built upon theprecedent set by cases likeChae Chan Ping v. United States andFong Yue Ting v. United States in establishingjudicial deference and Congressional plenary power in the realm of immigration.[8][9] Because Fiallo involved the rights of US citizens (i.e., the right to personal choice in family matters), the Court’s decision established Congressional power to legislate immigration policy that affects citizens.[10]
In 1999, as part of Chapter 12 ofTitle 8 of the United States Code, Congress enacted legislation reversing the Sections of the 1952 Act challenged in Fiallo.[11] Fathers can now petition for their illegitimate child’s permanent residence, if they can prove a “bona fide parent-child relationship.”[11] No such burden of proof is put on mothers.[11]