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Canadian federalism (French:fédéralisme canadien) involves the current nature and historical development of the federal system inCanada.

Canada is a federation with eleven components: the nationalGovernment of Canada and tenprovincial governments. All eleven governments derive their authority from theConstitution of Canada. There are also three territorial governments in the far north, which exercise powers delegated by thefederal parliament, and municipal governments which exercise powers delegated by the province or territory. Each jurisdiction is generally independent from the others in its realm of legislative authority.^[1] The division of powers between the federal government and the provincial governments is based on the principle of exhaustive distribution: all legal issues are assigned to either the federal Parliament or the provincial Legislatures.

The division of powers is set out in theConstitution Act, 1867 (originally called theBritish North America Act, 1867), a key document in the Constitution of Canada. Some amendments to the division of powers have been made in the past century and a half, but the 1867 act still sets out the basic framework of the federal and provincial legislative jurisdictions. The division of power is reliant upon the "division" of the unitaryCanadian Crown and, with it, ofCanadian sovereignty, among the country's 11 jurisdictions.

Thefederal nature of the Canadian constitution was a response to thecolonial-era diversity ofthe Maritimes and theProvince of Canada, particularly the sharp distinction between the French-speaking inhabitants ofLower Canada and the English-speaking inhabitants ofUpper Canada and the Maritimes.John A. Macdonald,^[2] Canada's firstprime minister, originally favoured aunitary system.^[3]

The foundations of Canadian federalism were laid at theQuebec Conference of 1864. TheQuebec Resolutions were a compromise between those who wanted sovereignty vested in the federal government and those who wanted it vested in the provinces. The compromise based the federation on the constitution of theBritish Empire, under which the legal sovereignty of imperial power was modified by the conventions of colonialresponsible government, making colonies of settlement (such as those ofBritish North America) self-governing in domestic affairs. A lengthy political process ensued before theQuebec Resolutions became theBritish North America Act 1867. This process was dominated byJohn A. Macdonald, who joined British officials in attempting to make the federation more centralized than that envisaged by the Resolutions.^[4]

The resulting constitution was couched in more centralist terms than intended. As prime minister, Macdonald tried to exploit this discrepancy to impose his centralist ideal against chief opponentOliver Mowat. In a series of political battles and court cases from 1872 to 1896,^[a] Mowat reversed Macdonald's early victories and entrenched the co-ordinated sovereignty which he saw in the Quebec Resolutions.^[6] In 1888,Edward Blake summarized that view: "[It is] a federal as distinguished from a legislative union, but a union composed of several existing and continuing entities ... [The provinces are] not fractions of a unit but units of a multiple. The Dominion is the multiple and each province is a unit of that multiple ..."^[7] The accession ofWilfrid Laurier as prime minister inaugurated a new phase of constitutional consensus, marked by a more-egalitarian relationship between the jurisdictions. The federal government's quasi-imperial powers ofdisallowance and reservation, which Macdonald abused in his efforts to impose a centralised government, fell into disuse.

DuringWorld War I, the federal Crown's power was extended with the introduction ofincome taxes and passage of theWar Measures Act, the scope of which was determined by several court cases.^[b] The constitution's restrictions of parliamentary power were affirmed in 1919 when, in theInitiatives and Referendums Reference, a Manitoba act providing fordirect legislation by way ofinitiatives andreferendums was ruled unconstitutional by the Privy Council on the grounds that a provincial viceroy (even one advised by responsible ministers) could not permit "the abrogation of any power which the Crown possesses through a person directly representing it".^{[nb 11]} Social and technological changes also worked their way into constitutional authority; theRadio Reference found that federal jurisdiction extended tobroadcasting,^{[nb 12]} and theAeronautics Reference found the same foraeronautics.^{[nb 13]}

In 1926, theKing–Byng Affair resulted in aconstitutional crisis which was the impetus for changes in the relationship between thegovernor general and theprime minister. Although its key aspects were political in nature, its constitutional aspects continue to be debated.^[8] One result was theBalfour Declaration issued later that year, whose principles were eventually codified in theStatute of Westminster 1931. It, and the repeal of theColonial Laws Validity Act 1865, gave the federal parliament the ability to make extraterritorial laws and abolish appeals to theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council. Criminal appeals were abolished in 1933,^{[na 1]} but civil appeals continued until 1949.^{[na 2]} The last Privy Council ruling of constitutional significance occurred in 1954, inWinner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Limited.^{[nb 14]} After that, theSupreme Court of Canada became the final court of appeal.

In 1937,Lieutenant Governor of AlbertaJohn C. Bowen refused to giveRoyal Assent to threeLegislative Assembly of Alberta bills. Two would have put the province's banks under the control of the provincial government; the third, theAccurate News and Information Act, would have forced newspapers to print government rebuttals to stories the provincialcabinet considered "inaccurate". All three bills were later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada inReference re Alberta Statutes, which was upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.^{[nb 15]}

World War II's broader scope required passage of theNational Resources Mobilization Act to supplement the powers in theWar Measures Act to pursue the national war effort. The extent to which wartime federal power could expand was further clarified in theChemicals Reference (which held thatOrders in Council under theWar Measures Act were equivalent to acts of parliament)^{[nb 16]} and theWartime Leasehold Regulations Reference, which held that wartime regulations could displace provincial jurisdiction for the duration of an emergency.^{[nb 17]} Additional measures were required in order to secure control of the economy during that time. Jurisdiction over unemployment insurance was transferred permanently to the federal sphere;^{[na 3]} the provinces surrendered their power to levy succession duties and personal and corporate income taxes for the duration of the war (and for one year afterwards) under the Wartime Tax Rental Agreement;^[9] and labour relations were centralized under federal control with theWartime Labour Relations Regulations (lasting until 1948), in which the provinces ceded their jurisdiction over all labour issues.^[10]

Canada emerged from the war with better cooperation between the federal and provincial governments. This led to awelfare state, a government-fundedhealth care system and the adoption ofKeynesian economics. In 1951 section 94A was added to theBritish North America Act, 1867 to allow the Canadian parliament to provide for pensions.^{[na 4]} This was extended in 1964 to allow supplementary benefits, including disability and survivors' benefits.^{[na 5]} The era saw an increase inFirst Ministers' Conferences to resolve federal-provincial issues. TheSupreme Court of Canada became the court of final appeal after the 1949 abolition of appeals to theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council and the federal parliament received the power to amend the constitution, limited to non-provincial matters and subject to other constraints.^{[na 6]}

1961 saw the last instance of a lieutenant governor reserving a bill passed by a provincial legislature.Frank Lindsay Bastedo,Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan, withheld Royal Assent and reserved Bill 5,An Act to Provide for the Alteration of Certain Mineral Contracts, to theGovernor-in-Council for review. According to Bastedo, "[T]his is a very important bill affecting hundreds of mineral contracts. It raises implications which throw grave doubts of the legislation being in the public interest. There is grave doubt as to its validity". The act was upheld in an Order in Council by the federal government.^{[11][na 7]}

Parliament passed theCanadian Bill of Rights, the first codification of rights by the federal government. Prime MinisterLester Pearson obtained passage of major social programs, includinguniversal health care (a federal-provincial cost-sharing program), theCanada Pension Plan andCanada Student Loans. Quebec'sQuiet Revolution encouraged increased administrative decentralization in Canada, withQuebec often opting out of federal initiatives and instituting its own (such as theQuebec Pension Plan). TheQuebec sovereignty movement led to the victory of theParti Québécois in the1976 Quebec election, prompting consideration of further loosening ties with the rest of Canada; this was rejected in a1980 referendum.

During the premiership ofPierre Trudeau, the federal government became more centralist. Canada experienced "conflictual federalism" from 1970 to 1984, generating tensions with Quebec and other provinces. TheNational Energy Program and otherpetroleum disputes sparked bitterness inAlberta,Saskatchewan andNewfoundland toward the federal government.^[12]

Although Canada achieved full status as a sovereign nation in the Statute of Westminster 1931, there was no consensus on a process to amend the constitution; attempts such as the 1965Fulton–Favreau formula and the 1971Victoria Charter failed to receive unanimous approval from both levels of government. When negotiations with the provinces again stalled in 1980, Trudeau threatened to take the case for patriation to theBritish parliament "[without] bothering to ask one premier". According to the federal cabinet and Crown counsel, if the British Crown (in council, in parliament, and on the bench) exercised sovereignty over Canada, it would do so only at the request of the federal ministers.^[13]

Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec posedreference questions to their respective courts of appeal, in which five other provinces intervened in support. In his ruling, Justice Joseph O'Sullivan of theManitoba Court of Appeal held that the federal government's position was incorrect; the constitutionally-entrenched principle of responsible government meant that "Canada had not one responsible government but eleven."^[13] Officials in the United Kingdom indicated that the British parliament was under no obligation to fulfill a request for legal changes desired by Trudeau, particularly if Canadian convention was not followed.^[14] All rulings were appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a decision later known as thePatriation Reference, the court ruled that such a convention existed but did not prevent the federal parliament from attempting to amend the constitution without provincial consent and it was not the role of the courts to enforce constitutional conventions.

The Canadian parliament asked the British parliament to approve theConstitution Act, 1982, which it did in passage of theCanada Act 1982. This resulted in the introduction of theCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the transfer of constitutional amendment to a Canadian framework and the addition of section 92A to theConstitution Act, 1867, giving the provinces more jurisdiction over their natural resources.

TheProgressive Conservative Party underJoe Clark andBrian Mulroney favoured the devolution of power to the provinces, culminating in the failedMeech Lake andCharlottetown accords. After merging in 2003 with the heavily devolutionistCanadian Alliance, theConservative Party underStephen Harper has maintained the same stance. When Harper was appointed prime minister in 2006, the frequency of First Ministers' conferences declined significantly; inter-provincial cooperation increased with meetings of theCouncil of the Federation, established by the provincial premiers, in 2003.

After the1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty, Prime MinisterJean Chrétien limited the ability of the federal government to spend money in areas under provincial jurisdiction. In 1999 the federal government and all provincial governments except Quebec's agreed to theSocial Union Framework Agreement, which promoted common standards for social programmes across Canada.^[15] Former Prime MinisterPaul Martin used the phrase "asymmetrical federalism" to describe this arrangement.^[16][17] The Supreme Court upholds the concepts of flexible federalism (where jurisdictions overlap) and cooperative federalism (where they can favourably interact),^[18] as noted inReference re Securities Act.

As afederal monarchy, the CanadianCrown is present in all jurisdictions in the country,^{[nb 18]} with theheadship of state a part of all equally.^[19]Sovereignty is conveyed not by the governor general or federal parliament, but through the Crown itself as a part of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of Canada's 11 (one federal and 10 provincial) legal jurisdictions; linking the governments into a federal state,^[20] the Crown is "divided" into 11 "crowns".^[21] The fathers of theCanadian Confederation viewed the constitutional monarchy as a bulwark against potential fracturing of theCanadian federation,^[22] and the Crown remains central to Canadian federalism.^[23]

The King
(Charles III)

The Senate

The House of Commons

Thefederal–provincial distribution of legislative powers (also known asthe division of powers) defines the scope of the federal and provincial legislatures. These have been identified as exclusive to the federal or provincial jurisdictions or shared by all.Section 91 of theConstitution Act, 1867, lists the major federal parliament powers, based on the concepts ofpeace, order, and good government; while Section 92 of theConstitution Act, 1867 enumerates those of the provincial governments.

The Act puts remedial legislation on education rights, uniform laws relating to property and civil rights (in all provinces other than Quebec), creation of ageneral court of appeal and other courts "for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada," and implementing obligations arising from foreign treaties, all under the purview of the federal legislature in Section 91. Some aspects of theSupreme Court of Canada were elevated to constitutional status in 1982.^{[nb 19]}

The Act lists the powers of the provincial parliaments (subject to the federal parliament's authority to regulate inter-provincial movement) in Section 92. These powers include the exploration, development and export to other provinces of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy. Education is under provincial jurisdiction, subject to the rights ofseparate schools.

Old-age pensions, agriculture and immigration are shared by federal and provincial jurisdictions. One prevails over the other in cases of conflict, however: for pensions, federal legislation will not displace provincial laws, and for agriculture and immigration it is the reverse.^[why?]

TheConstitution Act, 1871 allowed parliament to govern any territories not forming part of any province, and theStatute of Westminster 1931, gave parliament the ability to pass extraterritorial laws.

To rationalize how each jurisdiction may use its authority, certain doctrines have been devised by the courts:pith and substance^{[definition needed]}, including the nature of any ancillary powers and the colourability of legislation^{[clarification needed]};double aspect;paramountcy;inter-jurisdictional immunity; theliving tree; thepurposive approach; and charter compliance^{[definition needed]} (most notably through theOakes test). Additionally, there is theimplied Bill of Rights.

Jurisdiction over Crown property is divided between the provincial legislatures and the federal parliament, with the key provisions Sections 108, 109, and 117 of theConstitution Act, 1867. Public works are the property of the federal Crown, and natural resources are within the purview of the provinces.^{[nb 20]} Title to such property is not vested in one jurisdiction or another, however, since the Canadian Crown is indivisible.^[24][25] Section 109 has been given a particularly-broad meaning;^[26] provincial legislation regulating labour used to harvest and the disposal of natural resources does not interfere with federaltrade and commerce power,^{[nb 21][27][nb 22][27]} and royalties have been held to cover the law relating toescheats.^{[nb 23]} Canada cannot unilaterally createIndian reserves, since the transfer of such lands requires federal and provincial approval by Order in Council (although discussion exists about whether this is sound jurisprudence).^{[26][nb 24]}

The provincial power to manageCrown land did not initially extend toManitoba,Alberta andSaskatchewan when they were created from part of theNorthwest Territories, since the land was vested in the federal Crown. It was vacated on some land (theRailway Belt and thePeace River Block) byBritish Columbia when it entered the confederation. Title to this land was not vested in those provinces until the passage of theNatural Resources Acts in 1930. The power is not absolute, however; provincial Crown land may be regulated or expropriated for federal purposes.^{[nb 25][nb 26]} The administration of crown land is also subject to the rights ofFirst Nations^{[nb 27]} (since they are a relevant interest),^{[nb 28]} and provincial power "is burdened by the Crown obligations toward the Aboriginal people in question".^{[nb 29]} Debate exists about whether such burdens apply in the same manner in the Western provinces under the Natural Resources Acts.^[28]

Management of offshore resources is complex; although management of the beds ofinternal waters is vested in the provincial Crowns, management of beds ofterritorial seas is vested in the federal Crown (with management of thecontinental shelf and theexclusive economic zone).^{[nb 30][nb 31][29]} The beds and islands of the waters betweenVancouver Island and mainlandBritish Columbia have been declared the property of theCrown in right of British Columbia.^{[nb 32]} Federal-provincial management agreements have been implemented concerning offshore petroleum resources in the areas aroundNewfoundland and Labrador andNova Scotia.^{[na 8][na 9]}

Taxation is a power of the federal and provincial legislatures; provincial taxation is more restricted, in accordance with sections 92(2) and 92(9) of theConstitution Act, 1867. InAllard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District), provincial legislatures may levy an indirect fee as part of a valid regulatory scheme.^{[nb 33]}Gérard La Forest observedobiter dicta that section 92(9) (with provincial powers overproperty and civil rights and matters of a local or private nature) allows for the levying of license fees even if they constitute indirect taxation.^[30]

Parliament has the power to spend money on public debt and property. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not ruled directly about constitutional limits on federal spending power,^{[nb 34][31]} parliament cantransfer payments to the provinces.^[c] This arises from the 1937 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on theUnemployment Insurance Reference, whereLord Atkin observed: "Assuming the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund, it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within Dominion competence ... If on the true view of the legislation it is found that in reality in pith and substance the legislation invades civil rights within the Province, or in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise encroaches upon the provincial field, the legislation will be invalid".^{[nb 36]} InRe Canada Assistance Plan,Justice Sopinka held that the withholding of federal money previously granted to fund a matter within provincial jurisdiction does not amount to the regulation of that matter.^{[nb 37]}

Much distribution of power has been ambiguous, leading to disputes which have been decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and (after 1949) the Supreme Court of Canada. The nature of the Canadian constitution was described by the Privy Council in 1913 as not truly federal (unlike theUnited States andAustralia); although theBritish North America Act, 1867, states in its preamble that the colonies had expressed "their desire to be federally united into one Dominion", "the natural and literal interpretation of the word [federal] confines its application to cases in which these States, while agreeing on a measure of delegation, yet in the main continue to preserve their original Constitutions". The Privy Council determined that the Fathers of Confederation desired a "general Government charged with matters of common interest, and new and merely local Governments for the Provinces". Matters other than those listed in theBritish North America Act, 1867, as the responsibility of the federal or provincial parliaments fell to the federal legislature (the reverse of the arrangement between the federal and state congresses in the United States).^{[nb 38]}

The preamble ofSection 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 states: "It shall be lawful for the Queen ... to make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces". In addition to assigning powers not stated elsewhere (which has been narrowly interpreted), this has led to the creation of the national-emergency and national-concern doctrines.

The national-emergency doctrine was described byMr Justice Beetz inReference re Anti-Inflation Act.^{[nb 39][d][e]} The national-concern doctrine is governed by the principles stated byMr Justice Le Dain inR. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd..^{[nb 41][f]}

The federal government is partially limited by powers assigned to the provincial legislatures; for example, the Canadian constitution created broad provincial jurisdiction over direct taxation andproperty and civil rights. Many disputes between the two levels of government revolve around conflicting interpretations of the meaning of these powers.

In theLocal Prohibition Case of 1896, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council arrived at a method of interpretation, known as the "four-departments doctrine", in which jurisdiction over a matter is determined in the following order:^{[nb 42]}

1. Does it fall under Section 92, classes 1–15?
2. Can it be characterized as falling under Section 91, classes 1–29?
3. Is it of a general nature, bringing it within Section 91's residuary clause?
4. If not, it falls under Section 92, class 16.^[32]

By the 1930s, as noted in theFish Canneries Reference andAeronautics Reference, the division of responsibilities between federal and provincial jurisdictions was summarized byLord Sankey.^[g]

Although the Statute of Westminster 1931 declared that the Parliament of Canada hadextraterritorial jurisdiction, the provincial legislatures did not achieve similar status. According tos. 92, "In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws ...".

If a provincial law affects the rights of individuals outside the province:

• If it is, inpith and substance, provincial, ancillary effects on the rights of individuals outside the province are irrelevant^{[nb 43]} but
• Where it is, in pith and substance, legislation in relation to the rights of individuals outside the province, it will beultra vires the province^{[nb 5][nb 44]}

InThe Queen (Man.) v. Air Canada, it was held that the s. 92(2) power providing for "direct taxation within the province" does not extend to taxing sales on flights passing over (or through) a province, but the question of how far provincial jurisdiction can extend into a province'sairspace was left undecided.^{[nb 45]} However, theproperty and civil rights power does allow for determining rules with respect toconflict of laws in civil matters.^{[na 10]}

Federal jurisdiction arises in several circumstances:

• Under the national-emergency doctrine for temporary legislation (theWar Measures Act)
• Under the national-concern doctrine for:
  • Matters not existing at confederation (radio and television)
  • Matters of a local or private nature in a province which have become matters of national concern, such as what can accrue tothe regulation of trade and commerce
• Matters where the grant is exclusive underSection 91 (criminal law)
• Matters where authority may be assumed (as withworks for the general advantage of Canada)

Thegap approach, employed sparingly, identifies areas of jurisdiction arising from oversights by the drafters of the constitution; for example, federal jurisdiction to incorporate companies is inferred from the power provinces have under Section 92 for "The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects".

Section 129 of theConstitution Act, 1867 provided for laws in effect at the time of Confederation to continue until repealed or altered by the appropriate legislative authority. Similar provisions were included in the terms of union of other territories that were subsequently incorporated into Canada.

The uniformity of laws in some areas of federal jurisdiction was significantly delayed. Offences were not made uniform until 1892, when common-law criminal offences were abolished under theCriminal Code, 1892.^[33]Divorce law was not made uniform until 1968,Canadian maritime law not until 1971 andmarriage law not until 2005. Provisions of theCivil Code of Lower Canada, adopted in 1865 by the former Province of Canada, affecting federal jurisdiction continued to be in force in Quebec (if they had not been displaced by other federal Acts) until their repeal on 15 December 2004.^{[na 11][34]}

According to the Supreme Court of Canada, "our Constitution is based on an allocation of exclusive powers to both levels of government, not concurrent powers, although these powers are bound to interact in the realities of the life of our Constitution."^{[nb 46]}Chief Justice Dickson observed the complexity of that interaction:

The history of Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers. It is true that doctrines like interjurisdictional and Crown immunity and concepts like "watertight compartments" qualify the extent of that interplay. But it must be recognized that these doctrines and concepts have not been the dominant tide of constitutional doctrines; rather they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to concurrency and paramountcy issues.^{[nb 47]}

Notable examples include:

• Although the provinces have the power to createcriminal courts, only the federal government has the power to determinecriminal procedure. Criminal procedure includesprosecution, and federal law can determine the extent of federal and provincial involvement.^{[nb 48]} The provinces' power unders. 92(14) over theadministration of justice includes the organization ofcourts andpolice forces, which determines the level oflaw enforcement. TheRoyal Canadian Mounted Police, as the federal police, contracts for the provision of many provincial and municipal police forces.
• Although the federal power to regulate fisheries does not override provincial authority to require a permit for catching fish in waters under provincial control,^{[nb 49]} the regulation ofrecreational fisheries has been partially delegated under theFisheries Act^{[na 12]} to the provinces for specified species in specific provinces.^{[na 13]}
• Works affectingnavigation are subject to federal approval under theNavigable Waters Protection Act^[35] and provincial approval, since the beds of navigable waters are generally reserved to the Crown in right of the province.^[36][37][38]
• Although federal jurisdiction overbroadcasting and mosttelecommunications is exclusive, the provinces may regulate advertising^{[nb 50]} and cable installation (above or underground).^{[nb 51][39]}
• Although the concept ofmarriage is under federal jurisdiction, thesolemnization of marriages is controlled by the provinces.
• The provincial power to regulatesecurity interests under theproperty and civil-rights power will be displaced by security interests created under a federal head of power – most notably under thebanking power – but only to the extent that federal law has covered the field.^{[nb 52]}
• Laws arising from the property and civil-rights power will be used to complement the interpretation of federal legislation where the federal Act has not provided otherwise, but federal power cannot be used to create rules of private law in areas outside its jurisdiction.^{[nb 53][na 14]}
• Ininsolvency law, provincial statutes operate by federal incorporation into theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act and theCompanies' Creditors Arrangement Act. However, where a stay under federal law has been lifted in order to allow proceedings to take place, a province can impose amoratorium on proceedings falling under provincial law.^{[nb 54]}

In 1899,Lord Watson asserted during the argument inCPR v Bonsecours^{[nb 55]} that neither the federal parliament nor the provincial legislatures could give legislative authority to the other level.^[40] Subsequent attempts to dovetail federal and provincial legislation to achieve certain ends met with difficulty, such as an attempt by Saskatchewan to ensure enforcement of a federal statute^{[na 15]} by enacting a complementary Act^{[na 16]} declaring that the federal Act would continue in force under provincial authority if it was ruledultra vires. TheSaskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled a federal and provincial Actultra vires, voiding both as an attempt by the province to vest powers in parliament unauthorized by theBNA Act.^{[41][nb 56]}

The matter was addressed in 1950 by the Supreme Court,^[42] which heldultra vires a proposed Nova Scotia Act which would have authorized the inter-delegation of legislative and taxation authority between Parliament and the Nova Scotia legislature.^{[nb 57]} In that decision,Justice Rand explained the distinction between delegation to a subordinate body and that to a legislative body.^[h]

Later attempts to achieve federal-provincial coordination have succeeded with other types of legislative schemes^[43] involving:

• Conditional legislation (such as a federal Act, providing that it will not apply where a provincial Act has been enacted in a given matter). As Justice Rand declared in 1959, "That Parliament can so limit the operation of its own legislation and that it may do so upon any such event or condition is not open to serious debate".^{[nb 58]}
• Incorporation by reference or adoption (for example, a federal regulation prohibiting vehicles from operating on a federal highway except "in accordance with the laws of the province and the municipality in which the highway is situated")^{[na 17]}
• Joint schemes with administrative cooperation, such as the administrative authority granted by federal law to provincial transport boards to license extraprovincial transport^{[na 18]}

To understand how treaties can enter Canadian law, three significant cases must be considered: theAeronautics Reference, theRadio Reference and theLabour Conventions Reference.^{[nb 59]} Although the reasoning behind the judgments is complex,^[44] it is considered to break down as follows:

• Aeronautics were held by theAeronautics Reference to be within the authority of the Parliament of Canada under s. 132 governing treaties entered into by the British Empire. After that treaty was replaced, it was held inJohannesson v. West St. Paul that in accordance withOntario v. Canada Temperance Federation the field continued to be within federal jurisdiction under the power relating topeace, order and good government.
• Although an international agreement governingbroadcasting was not a treaty of the British Empire, theRadio Reference held that it fell within federal jurisdiction; Canada's obligations under its agreements in this field required it to pass legislation applying to all Canadian residents, and the matter could be seen as analogous totelegraphs (already in the federal sphere).
• TheLabour Conventions Reference dealt with labour relations (clearly within provincial jurisdiction); since the conventions were not treaties of the British Empire and no plausible argument could be made for the field attaining a national dimension or becoming of national concern, the Canadian Parliament was unable to exercise new legislative authority.

Although theStatute of Westminster 1931 had made Canada fully independent in governing its foreign affairs, theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council held that s. 132 did not evolve to take that into account. As noted byLord Atkin at the end of the judgment,

It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of legislative powers, Dominion and Provincial together, she is fully equipped. But the legislative powers remain distributed and if in the exercise of her new functions derived from her new international status she incurs obligations they must, so far as legislation be concerned when they deal with provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the totality of powers, in other words by co-operation between the Dominion and the Provinces. While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.

This case left undecided the extent of federal power to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties dealing with areas under provincial jurisdiction, and has generated extensive debate about complications introduced in implementing Canada's subsequent international obligations;^[45][46] the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated in severaldicta that it might revisit the issue in an appropriate case.^[47]

Outside the questions ofultra vires and compliance with theCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there are absolute limits on what the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures can legislate. According to theConstitution Act, 1867:

• S. 96 has been construed to hold that neither the provincial legislatures nor Parliament can enact legislation removing part of the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts.^{[nb 60]}
• S. 121 states, "All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces". This amounts to a prohibition of inter-provincialtariffs.
• S. 125 states, "No Lands or Property belonging to Canada or any Province shall be liable to Taxation".
• Under s. 129, limits have been placed on the ability of the legislatures of Ontario and Quebec to amend or repeal Acts of the formerProvince of Canada. Where such an act created abody corporate operating in the former Province, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that such bodies cannot have "provincial objects" and only the Parliament of Canada had power to deal with such acts.^{[nb 61]} It has been held that this restriction exists for any Act applying equally to Upper and Lower Canada,^[i] which became problematic when theCivil Code of Lower Canada was replaced by theCivil Code of Quebec.^[50]

While the Parliament of Canada has the ability to bind the Crown in right of Canada or of any province, the converse is not true for the provincial legislatures, as "[p]rovincial legislation cannotproprio vigore [ie, of its own force] take away or abridge any privilege of the Crown in right of the Dominion."^{[nb 63]}

• Federalism - The canadian encyclopedia
• Federalism in Canada: Basic Framework and Operation
• Federalism-e – published by Queen's University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations
• Canadian Federalism
• Studies on the Canadian Constitution and Canadian Federalism
• Constitutional Law professor Hester Lessard on the Downtown Eastside and Jurisdictional Justice
• Canadian Governments Compared – ENAP

• Canadian Confederation
• Federalism by country
• Federalism in Canada

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