| Fatimid army | |
|---|---|
 11th-century drawing of two Fatimid soldiers,Museum of Islamic Art, Cairo | |
| Foundation | c. 900 |
| Dissolved | 1169 |
| Allegiance | Fatimid Caliphate |
| Headquarters |
|
| Active regions | North Africa,Sicily andsouthern Italy,Levant |
| Ideology | Isma'ilism,Jihad |
| Opponents | Idrisid dynasty,Byzantine Empire,Abbasid Caliphate,Caliphate of Córdoba,Qarmatians,Mirdasid dynasty,Seljuk Empire,Kingdom of Jerusalem |
| Battles and wars | Arab–Byzantine wars, wars of expansion of the Fatimid Caliphate inNorth Africa and theLevant, wars against theSeljuk Turks,Crusades |
TheFatimid army was the land force of theFatimid Caliphate (909–1171). Like the other armies of the medieval Islamic world, it was a multi-ethnic army, drawn from marginal and even foreign peoples, rather than theArab mainstream of Fatimid society. The core of the Fatimid army emerged from theBerberKutama tribe, who had accepted theIsma'ili propaganda ofAbu Abdallah al-Shi'i and overthrown theAghlabids ofIfriqiya between 902 and 909. Very quickly the Kutama were supplemented with other ethnic contingents, such as theRūm (Byzantine Greeks) and theSudān (Black Africans), inherited from the Aghlabid military, but the Berbers remained the mainstay of Fatimid armies until the 970s, when theFatimid conquest of Egypt and their subsequent expansion intoSyria brought them into conflict with theTurkicghulām cavalry of the eastern Islamic world. The Fatimids began to incorporate Turks andDaylamites in large numbers into their army, which led to—often bloody—rivalry with the Kutama. The Turks enjoyed an almost absolute ascendancy during the chaotic years 1062–1073, when the Fatimid regime almost collapsed during theMustansirite Hardship. Their regime was ended by the ArmenianBadr al-Jamali, who instituted a quasi-military dictatorship under the guise of an all-powerfulvizierate, which effectively reduced theFatimid caliphs to puppets. Under Badr and his successors, the Armenians rose to prominence in state and army, and during the final century of the Fatimid state it was them and theSudān who provided the bulk of the Fatimid armies, until their power was broken bySaladin in theBattle of the Blacks in 1169.
The fighting record of the Fatimid army was mixed. It began as a quasi-revolutionary force during its early decades, when it was marked by indiscipline and tribal rivalries, which resulted in the failure of the first attempts to conquer Egypt. As the Fatimid regime consolidated itself, however, the army's quality improved, and during the conflicts of the 950s inNorth Africa and against theByzantine Empire inSicily, it performed well. The conquest of Egypt in 969, a watershed moment in the Fatimid Caliphate's history, was a political rather than a military triumph, and the subsequent advance into theLevant brought the Fatimid military to face with enemies—the Turks, theQarmatians, and the Byzantines—that it struggled to defeat. During the crisis of the mid-11th century, the military became the real power brokers in the Fatimid state, culminating in the rise of Badr al-Jamali. During theCrusades, the Fatimid army again performed unsatisfactorily: while large and relatively strong on paper, it repeatedly failed to defeat the Crusaders, and by the end of the Fatimid regime it had become the object of derision among its Christian and Muslim enemies alike. When Saladintook power in Egypt and abolished theFatimid dynasty, he almost completely disbanded the Fatimid army; very few Fatimid troops were taken over into the armies of Saladin'sAyyubid Sultanate.
The organization of the Fatimid army at any particular moment in time is difficult to determine, as at different times it recruited its troops from different ethnicities, fielded a different mix of troop types and with different status (free or slave).[1] Originally dominated by theKutama Berbers who bore the dynasty to power, the Fatimid army from the beginning incorporated additional ethnicities inherited from the Aghlabid army, and throughout its history was what the military historianYaacov Lev has described as a "multi-ethnic army with a very marked congruence of military specialization and ethnic origin"; this internal division into ethnic lines however also negatively affected its discipline and cohesion.[2]
The expenses of maintaining a standing army were enormous: in the words of the historianClaude Cahen, in the medieval Islamic world "the chief preoccupation, whether of the soldiers or of the power they served, was the provision for their pay (riqz,khubz)".[3] Cahen stresses that detailed information is "scattered and inaccurate", but during the 10th century an infantryman inIraq could expect a yearly pay of between 500–1,000 silverdirham, approximately two to three times as much as an artisan. Cavalrymen were paid twice the amount as infantrymen, and commanders multiple times that.[3]
Following the model common in the Islamic world, the army was administered by a special fiscal bureau (dīwān), the 'department for the armies and recruitment' (dīwān al-juyūsh wa'l-rawātib).[4][3] The government was also responsible for providing the troops with additional weaponry—often bought at the open market in Cairo—as well as horses and pack animals; Caliph al-Aziz is said to have maintained a stable of 12,000 horses and 36,000 camels for the purpose.[5] During the first years of Caliphal-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (r. 996–1021), salaries were paid eight times a year, but byal-Mustansir Billah's time (r. 1036–1094) this had changed to monthly payments, which was the system retained until the end of the Fatimid state.[4] Like the Abbasids before them, the Fatimids also awarded land grants (iqṭāʾ) to their troops for their upkeep. Under al-Hakim, such grants were made even to ordinary soldiers.[4] Bedouin tribes also receivediqṭāʾ, but usually these were chosen among the less productive lands, and had to be supplemented by a monetary stipend.[4] While regular soldiers were allocated individual grants (iqṭāʿ jayshī), Bedouin companies were allocated collectiveiqṭāʾs.[6]
The economic problems that began in the late 10th century meant that the troops were sometimes left unpaid, leading to indiscipline and protests by the soldiers: the army rioted and ransacked Cairo in 1024, and in 1036, one of the exasperated soldiers threw a javelin that just missed killing al-Mustansir.[7] The military's dissatisfaction over lack of pay was the main reason for the anarchy between 1062, which led to the virtual disintegration of both army and country, that lasted until the rise to power of Badr al-Jamali in 1073.[7][8] Many soldiers resorted to farming their estates when plagues killed much of the peasantry in the mid-11th century.[4] As in other areas of the Muslim world using theiqṭāʾ system, it led to deteriorating quality of land, and after Badr al-Jamali came to power, he engaged in reforms aiming to address the problem.[9]
While previously the bulk of the army had been paid salaries directly from thedīwān, Badr al-Jamali's reforms generalized the use ofiqṭāʾ for the upkeep of the soldiers. Most of the revenue from aniqṭāʾ still went to the state, but its recipient (muqṭāʾ) was still entitled to a fixed stipend (ʿibra) from it. Unlike the contemporarySeljuk model, themuqṭāʾ did not hold administrative powers over his grant.[10] Nevertheless, the reform bound the soldiers to the land,[11] and inaugurated a system that survived into theMamluk Sultanate.[12]
Several commanders are known to have raised and maintained armed retinues from these estates, and to have used them as normal troops on campaign.[4]
Little is known about the details of the organization of the Fatimid army.[13] Following the model current in the Islamic world, the Fatimid army was originally divided into ethnic and tribal units, which also generally coincided with functional distinctions of light and heavy cavalry, infantry, etc. Other units were established as the result of recruitment by specific generals or monarchs, establishing a strong group identity and henceforth beingknown after their founders.[3][14] Each of the various corps of the Fatimid army was further subdivided into units with a base of ten.[15] In the 12th century the Fatimids also established theHujariyya, a special cadet corps, which was subdivided was according to age.[15] Regular musters for the inspection of the troops (ʿarḍ) are known, following the Abbasid model, either ad hoc before major battles or campaigns, or as a regular, annual occurrence under al-Aziz, although al-Hakim stopped the practice.[13]
The officer corps (amīrs orqāʾids,lit. 'commanders') were divided into three grades, distinguished by dress,[15] according to the size of their commands: the highest-ranked wore golden collars (arbāb al-aṭwāq oral-umarāʾ al-mutawwaqūn), the next held silver batons (arbāb al-quḍub al-fiḍḍa), and the lesser commanders (adwān al-umarāʾ) had no distinctive insignia.[16][17] The existence of sub-units of the ethnic contingents is known, but no details on the distinction between the various titles or their responsibilities survives.[13] In the 11th century, each ethnic contingent apparently had an auditor (zimām), often a member of the caliphal secretariat, who was responsible for mediating between the unit and the caliph.[13]
The most senior Fatimid commander was usually the commander-in-chief of the army in Syria, who bore the title ofamīr al-umarāʾ ('commander of commanders') oramīr al-juyūsh ('commander of the armies').[15] The latter title was borne by Badr al-Jamali when he came to power,[15] and henceforth designated the quasi-dictatorial viziers who ruled the Fatimid state almost without interruption until its end.[18]
Despite the high prestige of the Turkishghulām cavalry, during the 11th century the bulk of the Fatimid field armies remained infantry, with the cavalry (usually augmented by Bedouin tribesmen), positioned on the flanks.[8]
It is difficult to estimate the size of the Fatimid army. Medieval sources provide vastly exaggerated numbers, such as 100,000 or even 200,000 men during Jawhar's invasion of Egypt,[19] a claim that 300,000 men were stationed in Egypt alone during a parade in 993, and 215,000 reported by Nasir Khusraw in 1047.[20] Such numbers are dubious, as it is known that the cost of professional army was enormous; during the heyday of the Abbasid Caliphate in the 9th century, a standing army of 50,000 men required no less than 14 milliongold dinars per year for their upkeep. In addition, in accounts of individual battles, even crucial ones, the figures mentioned are usually around the 10,000 mark.[4]
During the late Fatimid period, more conservative figures are given: the 14th-century Egyptian historianal-Maqrizi quotes an account by the head of thedīwān al-juyūsh,Ibn Mammati, that during the vizierate ofTala'i ibn Ruzzik (1154–1161), the army comprised 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 Black African infantry. At another point, however, referring to the same account, al-Maqrizi writes of 40,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 10,000marines on tengalleys.[21] These figures too are considered implausible by modern scholars, even if they are interpreted to include auxiliary forces and volunteers;[22] as the historianYaacov Lev points out, particularly the high ratio of cavalry to infantry is implausible, as is the ratio of 1,000 marines to one galley.[21] Much more plausible are the figures given elsewhere by al-Maqrizi, referring to the late 1160s, duringShirkuh's arrival in Egypt: 10,000 cavalry, 40,0000 Black African infantry, and 10,000 marines andiqṭāʾ troops.[21]
The early Fatimid armies inIfriqiya relied mostly on the Kutama Berbers, as they were the first adherents of the Fatimiddaʿwa and had borne them to power.[2] Other ethnic contingents were also recruited or absorbed during the conquest ofAghlabid Ifriqiya andIkhshidid Egypt, but it was not until the Fatimids expanded into theLevant, where they came into contact and conflict with the more advanced imperial military organizations of theByzantine Empire and theBuyids, who followed the earlier Abbasid model, that the shortcomings of their own military became apparent.[2] This led to a reform under the Caliphal-Aziz Billah (r. 975–996), with the help of thevizierYa'qub ibn Killis, and brought the Fatimid military more in line with practices in the eastern Islamic world, most notably in the use ofTurkishghilmān.[2]
The Kutama were the mainstay and elite of the early Fatimid armies.[23][24] It was among the Kutama thatAbu Abdallah al-Shi'i began his revolutionary propaganda in favour of the Fatimids, and it was from them that he raised the army that between 903 and 909 overthrew theAghlabids and established the Fatimid Caliphate inIfriqiya.[25] Although other Berber tribes soon flocked to the Fatimid banner—notably the largeSanhaja confederation during the reign ofal-Mansur bi-Nasr Allah—the Kutama continued to provide the bulk of the Fatimid armies until after theFatimid conquest of Egypt in 969.[26][27] Al-Maqrizi calls them "the [chosen] people of the dynasty" (ahl al-dawla),[28] while the early Fatimid caliphs singled them out as theawlīyāʾ, the 'friends' of God and of the dynasty, and asmuʾminūn, the 'faithful', distinct from the mass of ordinary Muslims.[24][29] According to the historianHeinz Halm, the early Fatimid state can be likened to a "hegemony of the Kutama".[30] In 948, Caliph al-Mansur publicly remarked that God had granted the Kutama pre-eminence among all other peoples, since they had first seen and accepted the truth.[31]
On the other hand, this dominion of the semi-civilized Kutama was greatly resented, not only by the other Berber tribes, but chiefly by the inhabitants of the cities, where the Arabic culture predominated.[32] As Halm writes, the situation was similar to a scenario where, "in the early eighteenth-century North America, theIroquois, converted to Catholicism byJesuit missionaries, had overrun thePuritan provinces ofNew England, installed their chieftains as governors in Boston, Providence and Hartford, and proclaimed a European with dubious credentials as King of England".[32] Inevitably, the arrogance and exactions of the Kutama led to rebellions in the newly conquered Fatimid domains, in which the Kutama particularly were singled out and killed by the rebels.[33] During the early Fatimid invasions of Egypt, the Kutama-based Fatimid army also suffered from indiscipline.[34]
After the move of the seat of the caliphate to Egypt in 973, a large number of Kutama accompanied the dynasty east, while the Sanhaja, under the leadership of theZirid dynasty, were left behind to uphold Fatimid authority and the Isma'ili doctrine in Ifriqiya.[35] Rather superficially converted amidst a largelySunni population, the Sanhaja and the Zirids were unable (or unwilling) to prevent the resurgence of Sunnism, the massacre of the Isma'ili communities of Ifriqiya in 1016/7, and the eventual break of the Zirid dynasty from even nominal recognition of Fatimid overlordship during the 11th century.[36]
However, the forays into the Levant in the 970s revealed the inadequacies of an army based solely on the Kutama, and from 978, the Fatimids began incorporating ethnic groups, notably the Turks and Daylamites, from the eastern Islamic lands into their army.[37] In combination with the increasing difficulty of renewing their pool of Kutama recruits afterc. 987/88, these events challenged the hitherto dominant position of the Kutama in the army. Thereafter, a fierce rivalry developed between the Kutama and the 'Easterners' (Mashāriqa).[38] In 996, on the accession ofal-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, the Kutama refused to acknowledge the new caliph unless the Kutama leaderal-Hasan ibn Ammar was appointed asvizier. This was done but Ibn Ammar's blatantly pro-Berber regime quickly alienated other members of the elite, and he was overthrown a year later.[39][40] Finally, when al-Hakim assumed the reins of government in 1000, he launched a purge of the Fatimid elites, during which Ibn Ammar and many of the other prominent Kutama were executed.[41]
Thereafter the position of the Kutama steadily declined,[42] so that in November 1025, during an official review, the once numerous and proud Kutama were reduced to demanding bread to sate their hunger.[43] Shortly after, they were unable to mobilize even 100 horsemen at short notice.[44] On the other hand, the Persian travellerNasir Khusraw mentions that there were 20,000 Kutama horsemen during his visit to Egypt in 1047.[42] During thechaos of the years 1062–1073, the Kutama allied themselves with theSudān against the Turks and the Daylamites.[42] The last remnants of the Kutama were dismissed from the Fatimid army after Badr al-Jamali came to power in 1073.[42]
Other Berber groups attested in the Fatimid army were theBāṭiliyya orBāṭilīs ('the Champions'), who participated in the conquest of Egypt and had a quarter of their own in Cairo.[42][45][46] Nasir Khusraw reported seeing 15,000Bāṭili horsemen during a military review in Cairo.[42][46] TheBarqiyya were another group of Berber origin (fromBarqa) which is first mentioned as part of Jawhar's army.[42][46]
The last major Berber regiment are theMaṣāmida, recruited from theHigh Atlas.[45] They are stated to have been first recruited underal-Aziz Billah, but only appear in the sources in the mid-11th century, in the account of Nasir Khusraw. They numbered 20,000 infantry armed with spear and sword, and were often used to garrison cities in Syria.[42][45] They apparently survived the regime of Badr al-Jamali, since they reappear briefly during the vizierate ofal-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi (1121–1125).
Already following the overthrow of the Aghlabid dynasty, the Fatimids incorporated remnants of the defeated Aghlabid military into their own army. Among them were theRūm. The term normally denotes specificallyByzantine Greeks, but probably also included slaves of European origin bought or captured in raids in Italy and elsewhere.[47] TheRūm followed Jawhar in his conquest of Egypt, and were given their own quarter in Cairo.[47][20] They are still attested in Fatimid service until the early years of the 11th century, both as slaves (mamlūks) as well as mercenaries (al-murtaziqa).[47] The Cairo quarter of theRūm was destroyed in 1009 on the orders of Caliph al-Hakim, possibly also signalling their expulsion from the army at the same time.[20] According to the contemporary Syrian Christian chroniclerYahya of Antioch, during al-Hakim's persecution of the Christians, most of theRūm soldiers converted to Islam, but secretly intended to defect to the Byzantines.[47]
A similar group in many respects were theṢaqāliba ('Slavs', sing.Ṣaqlabī), a term frequently applied to European slaves in Islamic lands, but not tied to a specific ethnic or regional origin.[48][49] TheṢaqāliba were also extensively used by the Aghlabids, and were inherited by the Fatimids, who used them in their military, court, and administration.[50] TheṢaqāliba provided many of the court eunuchs that were entrusted with high offices and military commands, particularly under Caliph al-Mu'izz. Such were the chamberlainJawdhar,Sabir al-Fata, who led naval raids against the Italian coasts, the eunuch general Qaysar, the general Muzaffar, and even Jawhar, the conqueror of Egypt.[51][49]Barjawan, the quasi-dictator in 996–1000, may also have been one of them.[52]
TheṢaqāliba enjoyed the peak of their prominence in the late 10th century.[52] They too moved to Egypt with Jawhar, and a lane in Cairo was named after them.[51] MoreṢaqāliba were inherited from the Ikhshidids after the conquest of Egypt,[50] and in 974/5, Caliphal-Mu'izz bought all privately ownedṢaqāliba.[51] As theHamdanid dynasty ofAleppo declined during the late 10th century, many of theirṢaqāliba were also taken over into Fatimid service, while theIberian peninsula proved a major source of newṢaqāliba recruits.[50]
While theṢaqāliba are mentioned in records as forming a distinct contingent of the Fatimid army, their role is obscure, and most of their members mentioned in the sources are associated with administrative or courtly functions rather than as soldiers.[50][51] With the arrival of the Turks, they began to lose their prominent position, but remained favoured for the prestigious court function ofṣāḥib al-miẓalla (bearer of themiẓalla, likely a sort ofparasol and one of the chief regalia of the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphs[53]), a position that ranked fourth in the administrative hierarchy of the Fatimid state.[52]
TheṢaqāliba are still mentioned as a distinct palace corps in 1024/5, but by Nasir Khusraw's time a generation later they appear to have been replaced by the black and white palace eunuchs (ustādhs).[54]
As with theRūm, the Fatimids inherited from the Aghlabids the use of Black African slave-soldiers (Sudān orʿabīd, more fullyʿabīd al-shirāʾ, 'bought slaves'[55]), who were in widespread use in the Islamic world.[56] The Fatimidʿabīd are known to have been active in Ifriqiya alongside the Kutama.[46] Already Caliph al-Mahdi recruited blacks into his army, and in 935, a black commander, Sandal, led an expedition againstFez inMorocco.[57] Blacks are not mentioned in Jawhar's army of conquest,[46] unless theZuwayla can be identified as blacks.[57]
However black troops were heavily used by the previous Egyptian regimes of theIkhshidids andTulunids, and the conquest of the county opened a more direct way of recruitment via theNubian kingdoms to the south of Egypt.[57] Under Caliphal-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (r. 996–1021), the corps was greatly expanded, as the Caliph bought up black slaves in large numbers, setting them free and taking them into his service.[57][46] Black slaves are thus mentioned during theRevolt of Tyre (996–998).[46]
A number of distinct corps were apparently formed from theʿabīd: theʿAbīd al-Jawwāla, theal-Faraḥiyya, theʿAṭūfiyya, and especially al-Hakim's sword-armed personal guard, theal-Saʿdiyya.[58] Theal-Saʿdiyya were sufficiently prominent that Byzantine envoys visiting the court brought gifts specifically for them, but in 1005 al-Hakim suddenly, for reasons unknown, purged the unit, killing its commander and half of its 100 men.[59]
The influx of black soldiers upset the balance with the other groups, as well as relations with the civilian population, who were exposed to plundering and even killings at the hands of theʿabīd.[46] Al-Hakim put officers of theʿabīd in command of the Turks in a deliberate move to humiliate the latter for their unruliness; the result was a major battle between the two groups in February/March 1020.[46] On occasion, theʿabīd also joined with other military corps in looting the markets, or assaulting the non-Muslim population of Cairo.[60] This unruliness continued during the reign ofal-Zahir (r. 1021–1036), particularly as the economic crisis hit the army and diminished both its fighting ability and its discipline. The situation was so bad, that theʿabid were reportedly reduced to eating dogs, as they did not receive any pay; repeated riots and mutinies are recorded for the years 1024–25.[58] Nevertheless, they remained quite numerous: Nasir Khusraw mentions 30,000ʿabīd, but also 20,000Maṣāmida—Berbers from the westernMaghreb, but Nasir Khusraw calls them black—and a further 30,000Zanj (blacks from East Africa), who do not appear in any other source.[57][58]
After Badr al-Jamali's rise to power, the existing black regiments were disbanded as too loyal to the caliph, although Badr did raise a personal guard of black troops.[57] After the death of Badr, the blacks became the mainstay of the Fatimid army, and remained loyal to the dynasty to the end, trying unsuccessfully to revolt against Saladin when the latter's intention to depose the Fatimids became clear, in the so-called "Battle of the Blacks".[61] Defeated, the black troops were driven out of Cairo into the country, hunted down and killed. This removed the last support of the Fatimid dynasty and left Saladin as the undisputed master of Egypt.[62]
Another early ethnic group were the Zawila or Zuwayla, who received their name from thetown of the same name inFezzan, where they were recruited or purchased.[63] Their exact ethnic make-up—Arab, Berber, or Black African—is unclear: the town was ruled by a Berber dynasty, but it was also a centre for the African slave trade,[51][64] so it is usually assumed that they were Black Africans sold into slavery.[65][63]
The Zuwayla are first mentioned during thesecond Fatimid invasion of Egypt, where captured Zuwayla executed by the Abbasid authorities alongside captured Kutama soldiers.[51] When al-Mahdi Billah founded a new palace city atMahdiya, they provided part of its garrison, and the extramural suburb where they lived became known as Zawila after them.[63]
The Zuwayla came to Egypt in Jawhar's army and were assigned a special quarter in Cairo; theBab Zuwayla gate was also named after them.[64][66] They appear in a list of military units as late as 1004/5, but thereafter vanish from the sources. The reason is unknown; they may have been disbanded, or the supply of fresh recruits stagnated and the unit lost its importance.[46]
Turkic slave soldiers orghulāms had been employed by the Ikhshidids, but it was only in 978 that Turks entered into Fatimid service, following the defeat of the Turkic ruler ofDamascus,Alptakin, and his Turkic and Daylamite army. Impressed by their performance, Caliph al-Aziz pardoned Alptakin and incorporated a few thousand of his men into the Fatimid military.[67][68] While Alptakin's Turks were freedmen,[69] in the following decades, Turkic slave soldiers (ghilmān al-Atrāk) were recruited in large numbers.[69] These came either from the slave markets of the Levant, or perhaps, with the consent of the Byzantines, from the emporia of the northern Black Sea, in theCrimea and theSea of Azov. Other Turks are known to have entered Fatimid service after previously serving various other masters in the Middle East.[70] By the mid-11th century, Nasir Khusraw reports that the Turks in Fatimid service had been born in Egypt.[70][8]
According to Lev, "the Turks were given a privileged position and special bonds of patronage tied them to the regime".[68] They had their own quarter, not in Cairo but in Fustat, and married local women.[69] They are mentioned in the riots of the 1020s, fighting against the Black Africans and the Berbers.[69] During the chaos of 1062–1073, the Turks emerged as the virtual rulers of the capital, until they were overthrown by Badr al-Jamali.[70] They disappear thereafter, although some attempts, apparently not very successful, were made to reintroduce them to confront the Crusaders.[70]
The Daylamites (al-Daylam), a mountain people from northern Iran, were a common source of soldiers for a number of Islamic potentates already since the 9th century.[70] In Egypt they were closely allied to the Turks, as they entered service in the same circumstances, after Alptakin's defeat;[69] they and the Turks shared a quarter in the capital.[70] In 1024, the Daylamites are attested as a separate regiment,[70] but Nasir Khusraw attests that "the Turks and Persians [are] collectively called theMashāriqa".[45] Nasir Khusraw also mentions that during his visit, he saw 300 Daylamites on foot escorting the caliph armed with axes and thezhupin (the characteristic Daylamite javelin or short spear).[69][71]
Armenians had been serving in the armies of Middle Eastern powers for centuries, and began entering Fatimid service after the conquest of Egypt.[72] Known for their skills as archers, they became particularly numerous after the rise of the Armenian Badr al-Jamali to power, although they never became the majority of the army.[72]
Along with the Black Africans, the Armenians opposed Saladin, but were defeated during the "Battle of the Blacks", massacred, and their possessions confiscated.[72]
In addition to the standing regiments, the Fatimid army made use ofBedouin tribes of the Egyptian and Syrian deserts as auxiliaries.[8] Nasir Khusraw claimed that there were no fewer than 50,000 spear-amed Bedouin in Fatimid employ.[20] For specific campaigns, especially as part of thejihad, volunteers were summoned to supplement the standing regiments.[20]
Fatimid sources report on the use ofsiege machines already during the Ifriqiyan period of the Fatimid state, includingmangonels,catapults, andsiege towers.[23] The Kutama, which formed the mainstay of the Fatimid army during its early period, were armed with swords, bows, and especially thejavelin, much as their forebears in classical antiquity. They were usually unarmoured; heavy armour seems to have not been used at least until Jawhar's conquest of Egypt.[23][81]
The major shift in the armament of the Fatimid armies came about as a result of their confrontation with the heavily armoured Turks of Alptakin in Syria in the 970s, which in short order led to the introduction of Turkish and Daylamite troops into the Fatimid army.[82] Heavy cavalry, where both the rider and the horse were armoured withchainmail, are a regular feature of Fatimid armies after that point.[82] Although a large variety of weapons is attested during the 12th century, both the infantry and the cavalry retained the javelin and the sword as their principal armaments.[83] Weapons were produced in special state-controlled workshops, but were also imported from abroad.[84]
During the final years of the Caliphate, the army remained large, but was largely ineffective. Its division into ethnic corps meant that it lacked cohesion, while the fact that Black African infantry comprised the bulk of its troops limited its mobility. Both the Crusaders and the Syrian Muslims were dismissive about its fighting abilities.[85] Saladin, shortly after he took power in Egypt, destroyed the Fatimid army, at the time chiefly composed ofSudān and Armenians. TheSudān, who served as infantry, were useless to Saladin, while the Armenians largely retained their ancestral Christian faith. As a result, the "Battle of the Blacks", where the Fatimid troops were defeated and driven to flee Cairo, was at least partly cast in religious terms as an attack on infidels.[86] Although in time Saladin would employ some of the remnants of the Fatimid army—the presence ofSudān andMaṣāmida in Cairo is attested until 1191/2—the military that Saladin built as ruler of Egypt represented, according to the historian Yaacov Lev, "a complete rupture with Fatimid military tradition and organization",[87] being a much smaller force based almost exclusively on cavalry.[88]
