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Fatalism is abelief[1] andphilosophical doctrine[2][3] which considers the entire universe as adeterministic system and stresses the subjugation of all events, actions, and behaviors tofate ordestiny, which is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable and outside of human control.[1][2][3][4]
The term "fatalism" can refer to any of the following ideas:
Broadly, any view according to whichhuman beings are powerless to do anything other than what they actually do.[1][2][3][4] Included in this is the belief that all events are decided by fate and are outside human control, hence humans have no power to influence the future or indeed the outcome of their own thoughts and actions.[1][3][4][5]
Logical fatalism, according to which propositions about the future which we take to currently be eithertrue or false can only be true or false if future events arealready determined.[2]
Causal determinism, which is usually treated as distinct from fatalism, on the grounds that it requires only the determination of eachsuccessive state in a system by that system's prior state, rather than thefinal state of a system beingpredetermined.[2]
The view that the appropriate reaction to the inevitability of some future event is acceptance or resignation, rather than resistance. For instance, 19th-century German philosopherFriedrich Nietzsche discusses what he calls "Turkish fatalism" (Türkenfatalismus) in his essayThe Wanderer and His Shadow (1880),[4] where he makes no distinction between the terms "fate" and "fatalism".[4] This view is closer to everyday use of the word "fatalism" and parallelsdefeatism.[1][4]
The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other greatly. For example, inSikhism, god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.[9]Jainists believe in a sort ofcompatibilism, in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.
Buddhist philosophy contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.[13]
One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine ofdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in theearly Buddhist texts, which states that allphenomena (dharma) are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to bedependent on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they arefundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence and thereforeare impermanent.[13][14] In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of theeternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra); all thoughts and actions exert akarmic force that attaches to the individual'sconsciousness, which will manifest throughreincarnation and results in future lives.[13] In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.[15] The early Buddhist texts and laterTibetan Buddhist scriptures associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines ofemptiness (śūnyatā) andnon-self (anattā).[13][14]
Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine ofnon-self (anattā).[13] In Buddhism,attaining enlightenment involves one realizing that neither inhumans nor any othersentient beings is there a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made ofseveral, constantly changing factors which bind them to theeternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra).[13][14] Sentient beings are composed of thefive aggregates of existence (skandha): matter, sensation, perception,mental formations, and consciousness.[13] In theSaṃyutta Nikāya of thePāli Canon, thehistorical Buddha is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."[16] The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "monist" and "pluralist" ontologies ormaterialist anddualist views of mind-body relation).[17] In theKaccānagotta Sutta of thePāli Canon (SN 12.15, parallel atSA 301), thehistorical Buddha stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:[18]
But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.[19]
While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, fatalism,determinism, andpredeterminism are distinct, as each emphasizes a different aspect of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.
Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereasfatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due tocausality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality.[21]
Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is an idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.[2] This idea has roots in Aristotle's work, "De interpretatione".[22]
Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free.[23] Theearly Islamic philosopher,Al Farabi, makes the case that if God does in fact know all human actions and choices, then Aristotle's original solution to this dilemma stands.[24]
One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-calledIdle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described byOrigen andCicero and it went like this:
If it isfated for you to recover from this illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so whether you call a doctor or not.
But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness, or it is fated that you will not recover.
Therefore, it is futile to consult a doctor.[25][26]
The Idle Argument was anticipated byAristotle in hisDe Interpretatione chapter 9. TheStoics considered it to be asophism and the StoicChrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can beco-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other.[27]
Arguments for logical fatalism go back to antiquity. The argument from bivalence depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based onlogical truths andmetaphysical necessity. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those byAristotle[28] andRichard Clyde Taylor.[5]
The key idea of logical fatalism is that there exists necessarilytrue or false future describingpropositions, or statements about what is going to happen in the future, and that there is somethingmetaphysically necessary about the truth value of these statements.[2] So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.
There are two main forms of responses to logical fatalism.[29] The first response is concerned with logical fatalism's reliance on theprinciple of bivalence, which says that a proposition is necessarily either true or false. If one wants to reject logical fatalism, one move to take is to reject that this principle applies to future describing propositions. Aristotle is famously attributed as making this move, though there are views that he does not.[2][30] This response works well with an A-theory of time, which says that time is fundamentally tensed, and events can be classified as past, present, and perhaps, future.[31] A-theory supports views of time that say that the future does not yet exist, likepresentism. Relating to logical fatalism, If the future is considered to be undetermined, meaning that the truth value of a statement can only be determined once the event occurs, then theprinciple of bivalence can be rejected.[32] However, theB-theory of time sees the past and future as being just as real as the present. On aB-theory of time, future facts do exist, and therefore the solution to reject theprinciple of bivalence on the grounds of undetermined future propositions does not work.[2]
The second response can be attributed toWilliam of Ockham, and is often called theOckhamist Response.[29][33] This response, essentially, challenges the idea that we cannot affect the past truth of future describing propositions.[29] The truth value of propositions describing the future, then, may not be as metaphysically necessary as we think.[2][33]
The argument for logical fatalism and its responses relate closely to theproblem of future contingents. There are responses to this problem that allow one to also overcome logical fatalism. The third truth value view says that future contingents can have a third value which is beyond truth or falsity.[34] The all-false view says that all future contingents are false.[34]
One criticism comes from the novelistDavid Foster Wallace, who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor'sFatalism and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests thatRichard Taylor reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility.[35] Wallace did not reject fatalismper se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."[35]Willem deVries andJay Garfield, both of whom were advisers on Wallace's thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument.[35] In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously asTime, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will.
^abcdefgStambaugh, Joan (1994)."Amor dei andAmor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche".The Other Nietzsche.SUNY Press. pp. 79–81.ISBN9781438420929.Turkish fatalism contains the fundamental error of placing man and fate opposite each other like two separate things: Man, it says, can strive against fate, can try to defeat it, but in the end it always remains the winner, for which reason the smartest thing to do is to give up or live just any way at all. The truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when he thinks he is striving against fate in the way described, fate is being realized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is resignation to fate; all these imaginary ideas are included in fate. The fear that most people have of the doctrine of determinism of the will is precisely the fear of this Turkish fatalism. They think man will give up weakly and stand before the future with folded hands because he cannot change anything about it; or else he will give free rein to his total caprice because even this cannot make what is once determined still worse. The follies of man are just as much a part of fate as his cleverness: this fear of the belief in fate is also fate. You yourself, poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira reigning far above the gods; for everything that comes, you are blessing or curse and in any case the bonds in which the strongest man lies. In you the whole future of the human world is predetermined; it will not help you if you are terrified of yourself.
^House, H. Wayne. 1991. "Resurrection, Reincarnation, and Humanness."Bibliotheca Sacra 148(590). Retrieved 29 November 2013.
^abcdefBalcerowicz, Piotr (2016)."Determinism, Ājīvikas, and Jainism".Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism. Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies (1st ed.).London andNew York:Routledge. pp. 136–174.ISBN9781317538530.The Ājīvikas' doctrinal signature was indubitably the idea ofdeterminism andfate, which traditionally incorporated four elements: the doctrine of destiny (niyati-vāda), the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors (saṅgati-vāda), the doctrine of intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vāda), occasionally also linked tomaterialists, and the doctrine of fate (daiva-vāda), or simply fatalism. The Ājīvikas' emphasis on fate and determinism was so profound that later sources would consistently refer to them asniyati-vādins, or 'the propounders of the doctrine of destiny'.
^abcLeaman, Oliver, ed. (1999)."Fatalism".Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge Key Guides (1st ed.).London andNew York:Routledge. pp. 80–81.ISBN9780415173636.Fatalism. Some of the teachings ofIndian philosophy are fatalistic. For example, the Ajivika school argued that fate (nyati) governs both thecycle of birth and rebirth, and also individual lives. Suffering is not attributed to past actions, but just takes place without any cause or rationale, as does relief from suffering. There is nothing we can do to achievemoksha, we just have to hope that all will go well with us. [...] But the Ajivikas were committed toasceticism, and they justified this in terms of its practice being just as determined by fate as anything else.
^abcdBasham, Arthur L. (1981) [1951]."Chapter XII: Niyati".History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion. Lala L. S. Jain Series (1st ed.).Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 224–238.ISBN9788120812048.OCLC633493794.The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually calledNiyati.Buddhist andJaina sources agree thatGosāla was a rigid determinist, who exaltedNiyati to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in ourlocus classicus, theSamaññaphala Sutta. Sin and suffering, attributed byother sects to the laws ofkarma, the result of evil committed in the previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis, other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evilkarma, was likewise without cause or basis.
^David Kalupahana,Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 78.
^Choong, Mun-keat (2000).The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama, pp. 192-197. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
^Choong, Mun-keat (2000).The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama, p. 192. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.
^abcMackie, Penelope. “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power To Do Otherwise” Noûs, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 672-689, December 2003
^Whitaker, C. W.; Whitaker, C. W. A. (2002).Aristotle's De interpretatione: contradiction and dialectic. Oxford Aristotle studies. New York: Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0-19-925419-4.
^Emery, Nina; Markosian, Ned; Sullivan, Meghan (2024), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),"Time",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved1 August 2025
