| Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium | |
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| Type | Peace agreement |
| Signed | 12 November 1995[1] |
| Location | Erdut,Croatia |
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| Full text | |
 Erdut Agreement atWikisource | |
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TheErdut Agreement (Serbo-Croatian:Erdutski sporazum /Ердутски споразум), officially theBasic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, is an agreement reached on 12 November 1995 between the authorities of theRepublic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities of theEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia region on the peaceful resolution to theCroatian War of Independence in eastern Croatia. It effectively ended theethno-nationalist conflict in the region and initiated the process of peaceful reintegration of the region to central government control of Croatia. The reintegration was directly implemented by theUnited Nations. The agreement provided a set of guarantees onhuman andminority rights as well as on therefugee return. It was named afterErdut, the village in which it was signed by local Serb representatives.
The signers wereHrvoje Šarinić, the formerprime minister of Croatia, and Milan Milanović, a localSerb politician representing the self-proclaimedRepublic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) under instructions from the authorities of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. The witnesses werePeter Galbraith, the ambassador of theUnited States to Croatia at the time, andThorvald Stoltenberg, theUnited Nations intermediary.[4]
The territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium had previously been controlled by the RSK, and before that by theSAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia. The agreement was acknowledged by theUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1023, and it paved the way to the establishment of theUnited Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. Contrary to most of the other missions, UNTAES was modelled as the supreme governing authority in the region creating one of only a couple ofUnited Nations protectorates in the organization's history. While ensuring full reintegration of the region without territorial autonomy clauses, the agreement served as a cornerstone for the establishment of contemporary Serb minority institutions not only in the region but the rest of Croatia as well. It explicitly provided the basis for the establishment of the regional Serb institution of theJoint Council of Municipalities.
In 1995 miniContact Group of foreign ambassadors in Zagreb drafted a comprehensive proposal toCroatian PresidentFranjo Tuđman and the leaders of theRepublic of Serbian Krajina inKnin aimed at peaceful resolution of theCroatian War of Independence. The proposal was known as theZ-4 Plan and it proposed reintegration of Krajina to Croatian constitutional framework on the basis of a new Constitutional Agreement which defined Krajina as an autonomous region of Croatia. The plan did not envisage special autonomy for Eastern Slavonia but rather two years long transitional period. Krajina leaders in Knin refused to receive the draft proposal which subsequently led toOperation Flash andOperation Storm and complete military defeat of Krajina resulting in over 200,000 Croatian Serb refugees who left their homes.
Rump and geographically separated territory ofEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia (commonly known as Eastern Slavonia) remained the only part of Croatia under Serb control. Contrary to Krajina, Eastern Slavonia shared a long border with theRepublic of Serbia. It was also economically and socially dependent and politically much more closely aligned with authorities inBelgrade andNovi Sad than Krajina.[5] This led the international community to believe that Croatian intervention in Eastern Slavonia would trigger a military reaction from Yugoslavia and result in an escalation of hostilities.[6] At the same time, the military defeat at Krajina and signing of theWashington Agreement opened the space to resolve thearmed conflict in Bosnia which the US Administration wanted to use as political ammunition before the1996 United States presidential election.[7] Croatia conditioned its participation at theDayton Peace Conference on the resolution of conflict in Eastern Slavonia, while international community insisted on avoidance of any new major escalation of Yugoslav crisis. This created conditions in which peaceful resolution was preferred or acceptable to all parties concerned.
As a part of his Bosnia peace effortsUnited States PresidentBill Clinton also stated:
"There must be a long-term plan for resolving the situation in Eastern Slavonia ... based on Croatian sovereignty and the principles of the Z-4 Plan (e.g. Serb home rule, the right of refugees to return, and the other guarantees for Serbs who live there)."[1]
Despiteterritorial autonomy's prominent place in President Clinton's plans and effort by the US ambassadorPeter Galbraith to model this autonomy proposal on recently suspended precedent of theAutonomous District of Glina and Knin from theConstitutional Act on National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities, this proposal was rejected by Serbian authorities in Krajna and by the Croatian Government, which preferred military solution over territorial autonomy.[1] This convinced international community to focus on the models of non-territorialnational personal autonomy,minority rights andinter-municipal cooperation. The refusal to include any territorial autonomy provisions strengthened demands forhuman rights provisions.[8]
United Nations Transitional Administration was requested to ensure the possibility for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin. The same rights were to be enjoyed both to those who have left the region or those who have come to the region from other parts of Croatia.
Joint Implementation Committees formed both by local Croat and Serb communities assisted the UNTAES in governing the region. Local police forces were organized to have equal number of ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs plus additional smaller numbers of personnel from all the other communities in the region.
The agreement itself and subsequent developments and commitments during the UNTAES mandate represent the basis on which numerous minority institutions operate today. Establishment of theJoint Council of Municipalities, with a Serbian majority population was one of explicit rights granted to the Serb community. Other institutions such asSerb National Council and weekly magazineNovosti were established at the same time, while some, such asRadio Borovo, were registered in accordance with Croatian laws. Agreement requires respect of the highest levels of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In February 2020, the Erdut Agreement was quoted as a precedent for and a comparable case byUkrainian diplomats for implementation of the Minsk II measures agreed upon in theMinsk Protocol intended to halt theWar in Donbas.[9]
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