Palestinian Christian communities areemigrating from bothPalestine andIsrael, particularly from cities such asBethlehem,Jerusalem,Nazareth,Beit Jala, andBeit Sahour. Scholars characterize this emigration as a structurally driven phenomenon linked to political conflict, economic pressures, and migration networks, rather thanreligious persecution.
Prior to theNakba, 135,550 Christians lived inMandatory Palestine, of which 110,200 (81%) lived in areas that are todayIsrael andEast Jerusalem, and 25,350 (19%) in what is now theWest Bank and theGaza Strip.[1] The most recent censuses show 180,300Christians in Israel (including East Jerusalem), of which c.141,900 (79%) are Arab Christians (Palestinian Christians),[2] and 46,850 Christians in thePalestinian territories.[3]
The phenomenon is part of the wider trend ofPalestinian emigration, which has been higher among Christians due to historical circumstances,[4] and part of a wider trend amongArab Christians.[5]
Christian emigration is often undertaken in pursuit of better living standards, and primarily driven by economic considerations.[6][7] TheThe Jerusalem Post stated in 2009 that the "shrinking of the Palestinian Christian community in the Holy Land came as a direct result of its middle-class standards".[8] A survey carried out in 1993 showed that "the poor economic situation is cited as a cause for emigration by the overwhelming majority of those intending to leave, with the political conditions given as a second reason."[9] A 2020 survey showed a similar result: "The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons".[10]
In a 2020 study, similar factors were noted with respect to emigration of Christian communities in Gaza.[11]
Chain migration is a significant factor particularly from areas such as Bethlehem and adjacent towns which produced some of the largest Palestinian Christian communities outside the Middle East. Scholars note that remittances and return visits have mitigated—but not reversed—the long-term population decline of Christian communities in Palestine.[12][13]
Transnational family networks have shapedemigration amongPalestinian Christians, providing knowledge of and access to opportunities abroad. Long-standing migration to theAmericas created dense networks andfamily business structures that provided economic support and reduced the risks associated with relocation. These networks influenced migrants’ destinations and facilitated the establishment of new diaspora hubs. In addition, the emigration of entire family groups weakened ties to local communities, contributing to further pressure for outward migration.[14]
The Christian share of overall population has also decreased due to low birth rates compared to both Jewish and Muslim communities.[15][7] In Israel in 2024, Jewish and Muslim women had a fertility rate of 3.10 and 2.68 children respectively, significantly higher that the 1.62 fertility rate amongst Christian women.[16]
The Vatican and the Catholic Church blamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the Christian exodus from the Holy Land and the Middle East in general.[17]
In a 2006 poll of Christians in Bethlehem by the Palestinian Centre for Research and Cultural Dialogue, 90% reported having Muslim friends, 73% agreed that the Palestinian Authority treats Christian heritage in the city with respect, and 78% attributed the ongoing exodus of Christians from Bethlehem to theIsraeli West Bank barrier causing an economic crisis in Bethlehem.[18] Daniel Rossing, the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs' chief liaison to Christians in the 1970s and 1980s, has stated that the situation for them in Gaza became much worse after the election of Hamas. He also stated that the Palestinian Authority, which counts on Christian westerners for financial support, treats the minority fairly.[8]
TheUnited States State Department's 2006 report onreligious freedom criticized both Israel for its restrictions on travel to Christian holy sites and the Palestinian Authority for its failure to stamp out anti-Christian crime. It also reported that the former gives preferential treatment in basic civic services to Jews and the latter does so to Muslims. The report stated that, generally, ordinary Muslim and Christian citizens enjoy good relations in contrast to the "strained" Jewish and Arab relations.[15] A 2005BBC report also described Muslim and Christian relations as generally "peaceful", while noting that some Christians complain of harassment and discrimination.[7] The Arab Human Rights Association, an ArabNGO in Israel, has stated that Israeli authorities have denied Palestinian Christians in Israel access to holy places, prevented repairs needed to preserve historic holy sites, and carried out physical attacks on religious leaders.[19] Kairos Palestine—an independent coalition Christian organisation, set up to help communicate to the Christian world what is happening in Palestine—sent a letter toThe Wall Street Journal to explain that "In the case of Bethlehem, for instance, it is in fact the rampant construction of Israeli settlements, the chokehold imposed by the separation wall and the Israeli government's confiscation of Palestinian land that has driven many Christians to leave."[20]
Contrary to some claims, the emigration phenomenon is not primarily driven by Muslim-Christian relations.[21][22][23]The Jerusalem Post stated that Muslim pressure has not played a major role according to Christian residents themselves. Hanna Siniora, a prominent Christian Palestinian human rights activist, has attributed harassment against Christians to "little groups" of "hoodlums" rather than to the Hamas and Fatah governments.[8] In his last novel, the Palestinian Christian writerEmile Habibi has a character affirm that: "There is no difference between Christian and Muslim: we are all Palestinian in our predicament."[24]
Blame games over the causes of Christian emigration from Palestine have become a recurring feature inmedia coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in efforts to influence opinion of Christian communities in the West.[25]
In 2006, a draft bill was introduced by RepresentativesMichael McCaul andJoseph Crowley, drafted by their staffers Ari Stein and Gregg Sheiowitz,[26] which attributed the decline of the Christian population primarily to alleged failures by thePalestinian Authority.[27] According to Professor Daphne Tsimhoni of theIsrael Institute of Technology “almost all the bill's assertions are either exaggerations, misrepresentations or sheer fabrications.”[26] Representatives of churches in Palestine submitted a letter to theU.S. House Committee on International Relations stating that the resolution misrepresented the causes of Christian emigration by emphasizing internal religious or political factors while omitting the impact of theIsraeli occupation of the West Bank, including movement restrictions and economic constraints. Critics noted that the resolution had been drafted without consultation with Palestinian Christian institutions and risked reinforcing politicized narratives about Christian–Muslim relations in the region. The resolution was quietly withdrawn following the criticism.[28]
In 2012, theCBS News program60 Minutes aired a report titled “Christians of the Holy Land”, presented by correspondentBob Simon, examining the decline of Christian communities inBethlehem,Jerusalem, and surrounding areas.[29] The segment linked emigration to conditions associated with the broaderIsraeli–Palestinian conflict, including restrictions on movement and economic pressures.Michael Oren, thenIsraeli ambassador to the United States, attempted to influence CBS to withdraw it prior to publication, arguing that it placed disproportionate blame on Israel. Simon responded by defending the reporting both on air and in subsequent interviews, stating that the segment reflected the testimony of local Christian residents and clergy and was consistent with available historical and empirical research.[30]
Christian emigration from Palestine predates the Arab–Israeli conflict, beginning in the late Ottoman period and intensifying during the British Mandate, when drought, economic marginalization, and early transnational family networks facilitated large-scale movement to the Americas. Scholarly studies describe this emigration as structural rather than episodic, rooted in unequal access to land, capital, and political power rather than solely in sectarian relations.[31]
Thousands of Christian Palestinians "emigrated to Latin America in the 1920s, when Mandatory Palestine was hit by drought and a severe economic depression."[32] Today, Chile houses the largest Palestinian Christian community in the world outside of the Levant. As many as 350,000 Palestinians reside in Chile, most of whose families came from Christian villages such as Bethlehem and surrounding villages.[33] Also,El Salvador,Honduras,Brazil,Colombia, Argentina,Venezuela, and other Latin American countries have significant Palestinian Christian communities, some of whom immigrated almost a century ago during the time ofOttoman Palestine.[34]
Prior to theNakba, 135,550 Christians lived inMandatory Palestine, of which 110,200 (81%) lived in areas that are todayIsrael andEast Jerusalem, and 25,350 (19%) in what is now theWest Bank and theGaza Strip.[1] Palestinian Christians were disproportionately affected by displacement, with an estimated 35–40% becoming refugees, accelerating the demographic contraction of historic Christian centers such as Jaffa, West Jerusalem, and Galilee towns.[35] Subsequent Israeli policies restricting return, residency rights, family reunification, land use, and access to employment have been identified as long-term drivers of Christian out-migration from East Jerusalem and the West Bank.[36][35]
From 1948 to the early 1950s,Ben-Gurion'sTransfer Committee authorized projects for the transference of the Christian communities of the Galilee toArgentina, but the proposal failed in the face of Christian opposition.[37][38]
In 2024, according to theIsrael Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 180,300Christians in Israel (including East Jerusalem), of which c.141,900 (79%) are Arab Christians (Palestinian Christians) living in theNorthern District (68%, c.96,500),Haifa District (15%, c.21,300) and other areas (17%), with 44% in just three locations:Nazareth andNof HaGalil (30,300 combined),[39]Haifa (18,700) andJerusalem (13,100). The c.38,400 non-Arab Christians live mainly in theTel Aviv District andCentral District (41% combined), and in the Northern and Haifa Districts (35% combined).[2]
In 2017, the most recent census by thePalestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 46,850 Christians in thePalestinian territories, the vast majority living in theWest Bank, which accounted for 45,712 Christians (c.98%), while theGaza Strip was home to just 1,138 Christians (c.2%). Christian communities in the West Bank were highly concentrated, with nearly three-quarters living in three governorates: theBethlehem Governorate (23,165; 51%), theRamallah & Al-Bireh Governorate (10,255; 22%), and theJerusalem Governorate (8,558; 19%). Smaller Christian populations were present in theJenin Governorate (2,699), theNablus Governorate (601), theJericho & Al-Aghwar Governorate (285), and other governorates, each accounting for less than 2% of the total. In the Gaza Strip, Christians were concentrated primarily in theGaza Governorate (1,082; 95%), with very small communities in theNorth Gaza,Khan Yunis,Rafah, andDeir Al-Balah Governorates.[3]
Most of the Gaza Strip's Christian population lived inGaza City, in the northern part of the Gaza Strip.[40] As of October 2024, most of Gaza's Christians had decided to remain in the churches' compounds in northern Gaza.[41] In November 2024, Israel announced that no Palestinians would be allowed to "return" to North Gaza.[42][43][44]
The tables below show the Christian population ofMandatory Palestine by location, compared to the modern day Christian population for the same location where available. The tables are separated into the two tables showing each location in modern Israel andEast Jerusalem in which more than 250 Christians were living in 1945, and the remaining locations with less than 250 Christians each, and two equivalent tables for the Christian population of theWest Bank andGaza Strip.
| Locations in 1945Mandatory Palestine with >250 Christians – currently under Israeli jurisdiction (Israel and East Jerusalem), ordered by 1945 Christian population | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 population | Nakba population impact | Current population | |||||
| Christians[45] | %[45] | Modern jurisdiction | Christians | % | Date | ||
| Jerusalem | 29,350 | 19% | Partly depopulated | Israel and East Jerusalem | 12,760[46] | 1%[46] | 2022 |
| Haifa | 26,570 | 19% | Depopulated | Israel | 16,840[47] | 6%[47] | 2022 |
| Jaffa | 15,400 | 16% | Depopulated | ||||
| Nazareth | 8,600 | 61% | Addition ofIDPs | 20,910[48] | 27%[48] | 2022 | |
| Ramle | 3,260 | 22% | Depopulated | 3,720[49] | 5%[49] | 2022 | |
| Acre | 2,330 | 19% | Depopulated | 1,390[50] | 3%[50] | 2022 | |
| Lydda | 1,840 | 11% | Depopulated | 770[51] | 0.9%[51] | 2022 | |
| El Bassa | 1,590 | 54% | Expelled and destroyed[52] | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Shafa ‘Amr | 1,560 | 43% | Addition ofIDPs | 10,620[53] | 24%[53] | 2022 | |
| Er Rama | 1,160 | 69% | 3,880[54] | 50%[54] | 2022 | ||
| I'billin | 1,060 | 64% | 5,790[55] | 42%[55] | 2022 | ||
| Kafr Yasif | 1,010 | 72% | 5,450[56] | 52%[56] | 2022 | ||
| Deir el Qasi andEl Mansura | 880 | 70% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Maghar andEl Mansura | 800 | 37% | Addition of IDPs, and depopulated | 5,110[57] | 21%[57] | 2022 | |
| Mi'ilya | 790 | 88% | Addition of IDPs | 3,270[58] | 100%[58] | 2022 | |
| Tiberias | 760 | 7% | Evacuated and refused reentry[59] | n.a.[60] | n.a.[60] | 2022 | |
| Kafr Bir‘im | 700 | 99% | Expelled and destroyed[61][62] | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Tarshiha | 690 | 18% | Addition ofIDPs | 2,430[63] | 11%[63] | 2022 | |
| Ein Karim | 670 | 21% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Kafr Kanna | 610 | 32% | Addition of IDPs | 2,270[64] | 9.4%[64] | 2022 | |
| Eilabun | 530 | 96% | 4,090[65] | 71%[65] | 2022 | ||
| Er Reina | 500 | 39% | 2,830[66] | 15%[66] | 2022 | ||
| Yafa | 490 | 46% | 3,410[67] | 17%[67] | 2022 | ||
| Iqrith | 460 | 94% | Expelled and destroyed[61][62] | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Beisan | 430 | 8% | Depopulated | n.a.[68] | n.a.[68] | - | |
| Safad | 430 | 4% | Depopulated | n.a.[69] | n.a.[69] | 2022 | |
| Et Tur | 390 | 14% | Addition of refugees | East Jerusalem | n.a. | n.a. | |
| Abu Sinan | 380 | 46% | Addition of IDPs[62] | Israel | 2,200[70] | 15%[70] | 2022 |
| El Buqeia | 370 | 37% | 1,280[71] | 21%[71] | 2022 | ||
| Jish | 350 | 32% | 2,030[72] | 63%[72] | 2022 | ||
| Tur‘an | 340 | 25% | 1,610[73] | 11%[73] | 2022 | ||
| Isfiya | 300 | 17% | 1,770[74] | 14%[74] | 2022 | ||
| El Bi'na | 300 | 36% | 640[75] | 7%[75] | 2022 | ||
| Sakhnin | 290 | 11% | 1,660[76] | 5%[76] | 2022 | ||
| El Mujeidil | 260 | 14% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Subtotal | 105,450 | 77.8% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945) | |||||
| Locations in 1945Mandatory Palestine with <250 Christians – currently under Israeli jurisdiction (Israel and East Jerusalem), ordered by 1945 Christian population | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 population | Nakba population impact | Current population | |||||
| Christians | % | Modern jurisdiction | Christians | % | Date | ||
| Wilhelma | 240 | 100% | Depopulated (Templer) | Israel | 0 | 0 | - |
| Tel Aviv | 230 | 0% | - | ||||
| Deir Hanna | 210 | 28% | Addition of IDPs | 1,090[77] | 10%[77] | 2022 | |
| Beersheba | 200 | 4% | Depopulated | ||||
| Ma'lul | 200 | 29% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Sirin | 190 | 23% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Latrun | 190 | 100% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Buraq | 180 | 7% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Beit Lahm | 160 | 43% | Depopulated (Templer) | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Sarona | 150 | 100% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Silwan | 140 | 4% | Addition ofrefugees | East Jerusalem | |||
| Ijzim | 140 | 5% | Depopulated | Israel | 0 | 0 | - |
| El Birwa | 130 | 9% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Judeida | 130 | 46% | Addition of IDPs | ||||
| Samakh | 130 | 4% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Beit Jimal | 120 | 50% | Depopulated[78] | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Waldheim (Umm el ‘Amad) | 110 | 42% | Depopulated (Templer) | ||||
| Sarafand el Kharab | 110 | 11% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Makr | 100 | 20% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Deir Rifat | 100 | 23% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Abil el Qamh | 100 | 30% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Majdal | 90 | 1% | Depopulated | ||||
| Ed Damin | 70 | 5% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Suhmata | 70 | 6% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Atlit | 60 | 9% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Salama | 60 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Umm el Fahm | 60 | 1% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Yajur | 50 | 8% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Samakiya (Es) | 50 | 13% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Esh Shajara | 50 | 6% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Julis | 40 | 5% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Kafr Sumei' | 40 | 13% | |||||
| Hirbīya | 40 | 2% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Beit Safafa | 40 | 3% | Addition ofrefugees | East Jerusalem | |||
| Qaryat el ‘Inab (Abu Ghosh) | 40 | 5% | Addition ofIDPs | Israel | |||
| Sarafand el ‘Amar | 40 | 2% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Sha'ab | 30 | 2% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Qisariya (Caesarea) | 30 | 3% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Sabbirin | 30 | 2% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Tira (Et) | 30 | 1% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Palestine Potash Concession (North) | 30 | 1% | Depopulated | Israeli settlement | 0 | 0 | - |
| Daburiyya | 30 | 2% | Addition ofIDPs | Israel | |||
| Hurfeish | 30 | 4% | |||||
| Dalyat el Karmil | 20 | 1% | |||||
| Hadera | 20 | 0% | - | ||||
| El Mansi | 20 | 2% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Tantura | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Umm ez Zinat | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Kheiriya | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Mas‘udiya (Summeil) | 20 | 2% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Yahudiya | 20 | 0% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Yazur | 20 | 0% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Lifta | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Na‘ana (Ni‘ana) | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Rehovot | 20 | 0% | - | ||||
| Yibna | 20 | 0% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Khalisa | 20 | 1% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Dahamiya | 20 | 5% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Tabigha (Et) | 20 | 6% | Depopulated | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Yirka | 10 | 1% | Addition ofIDPs | ||||
| Jisr al-Majami' | 10 | 4% | Expelled and destroyed | 0 | 0 | - | |
| El Murassas | 10 | 2% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Es Samiriya | 10 | 4% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Hamāma | 10 | 0% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Masmiya el Kabīra, El | 10 | 0% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Es Sawāfīr es Sharqīya | 10 | 1% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Ajjur | 10 | 0% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Petah Tikva | 10 | 0% | - | ||||
| Deiraban | 10 | 0% | Expelled and destroyed | 0 | 0 | - | |
| Deir esh Sheikh | 10 | 5% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Malha (El) | 10 | 1% | n.a. | n.a. | - | ||
| Qaluniya | 10 | 1% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Saffuriya | 10 | 0% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Umm Khalid | 10 | 1% | 0 | 0 | - | ||
| Isawiya | 10 | 1% | Addition ofrefugees | East Jerusalem | |||
| Subtotal | 4,750 | 3.5% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945) | |||||
| Locations in 1945Mandatory Palestine with >250 Christians – currently under Palestinian jurisdiction (West Bank and Gaza Strip), ordered by 1945 Christian population | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 population | Nakba population impact | Current population | |||||
| Christians[45] | %[45] | Modern jurisdiction | Christians | % | Date | ||
| Bethlehem | 6,430 | 73% | Addition ofrefugees[79][80] | West Bank | 7,140[81] | 28%[81] | 2008 |
| Ramallah | 4,440 | 87% | 6,120[81] | 22%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Beit Jala | 3,510 | 95% | 7,140[81] | 61%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Beit Sahur | 2,400 | 87% | 8,160[81] | 66%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Et Taiyiba | 1,180 | 89% | 1,300[81] | 90%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Gaza | 1,010 | 3% | Gaza Strip | 1,000[82] | <1% | 2025 | |
| Bir Zeit | 990 | 63% | West Bank | 2,244[81] | 50%[81] | 2008 | |
| Ez Zabubida | 780 | 90% | 2,500[81] | 68%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Nablus | 680 | 3% | |||||
| Jifna | 580 | 64% | 1,122[81] | 65%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Abud | 530 | 49% | 1,224[81] | 59%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Rafidiya | 350 | 81% | |||||
| El Bira | 280 | 10% | |||||
| Tulkarm | 280 | 3% | |||||
| Jericho | 260 | 9% | |||||
| Ein ‘Arik | 250 | 41% | 500[81] | 32%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Subtotal | 23,950 | 17.7% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945) | |||||
| Locations in 1945Mandatory Palestine with <250 Christians – currently under Palestinian jurisdiction (West Bank and Gaza Strip), ordered by 1945 Christian population | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 population | Nakba population impact | Current population | |||||
| Christians | % | Modern jurisdiction | Christians | % | Date | ||
| Nisf Jubeil | 180 | 69% | Addition ofrefugees | West Bank | |||
| Hebron | 150 | 1% | |||||
| Jenin | 150 | 4% | 306[81] | 1%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Beit Dajan | 130 | 3% | |||||
| Birqin | 110 | 7% | 63[81] | 1%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Artas | 110 | 14% | |||||
| Qubeiba | 80 | 19% | Partial depopulation[83] | 11[81] | 0.3%[81] | 2008 | |
| Arraba | 60 | 3% | Addition ofrefugees | ||||
| Tubas | 60 | 1% | |||||
| Deir el Balaḥ | 40 | 2% | Gaza Strip | ||||
| Khān Yūnis | 40 | 0% | |||||
| Sabastiya | 40 | 4% | West Bank | ||||
| Anabta andIktaba | 40 | 1% | |||||
| Deir Ghazala | 30 | 11% | 8[81] | 1%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Eizariya (El) | 20 | 2% | 550[81] | 3%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Aqqaba | 20 | 3% | |||||
| Ein Siniya | 20 | 6% | |||||
| Kafr Malik | 20 | 2% | |||||
| Azzun andEn Nabi Ilyas | 20 | 2% | |||||
| Mazra'a (El) | 10 | 2% | |||||
| Jaba‘ | 10 | 0% | |||||
| Kafr Qud | 10 | 4% | 24[81] | 2%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Kufeir | 10 | 7% | |||||
| Bureij | 10 | 1% | Gaza Strip | ||||
| Far‘un | 10 | 1% | West Bank | ||||
| Kafr Sur | 10 | 2% | |||||
| Qalqilya | 10 | 0% | |||||
| Jalamah | 0 | 0% | 50[81] | 2%[81] | 2008 | ||
| Subtotal | 1,400 | 1.0% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945) | |||||
The Gazan Christians in this study articulated several primary factors that influenced their motives for migration. The most significant motives involved the negative push factors drawing them away from the Strip and centered on the overwhelming precarity of their experience. This precarity was temporal and spatial in that Gazans were subject to a strict blockade; it was economic in that finding work and providing for families became exceptionally challenging; it was political because they could only envision a stalemate between contending political parties, and it was religious because they were concerned about deteriorating Muslim-Christian relations under Hamas' authority. Gazan Christians were also pulled to the West Bank by the precarity of personal factors. They desired stronger social connections with family and friends outside Gaza, and they needed to address the practical problem of finding marriage partners for young people among a dwindling population. The dominant constellation of Christian interviewees' motives for escaping Gaza included the blockade, the economic collapse, the destructions of wars, the lack of consistent electricity and clean drinking water, and the pervasive sense of despair. Every interviewee explained that these factors played a decisive role in the decision to escape.
The response had an effect: By the end of summer, Crowley and McCaul quietly withdrew the resolution.
