Beneš spent much of his youth in theVinohrady district ofPrague, where he attended agrammar school from 1896 to 1904. His landlord's family was acquainted with his future wife Anna Vlčková (1885–1974, later Hana Benešová) (cs). The two would study French, history, and literature together at theSorbonne. Edvard and Anna got engaged in May 1906, and married in November 1909. Some time after their engagement, Anna changed her name to Hana. Edvard had always preferred to call her Hana, because he had just ended a relationship with another woman named Anna. Around the same time, Edvard Beneš also changed his name, going from the original spelling "Eduard" to "Edvard".[6][7]
In 1907, Beneš published over 200 articles in the Czech social democratic newspaperPrávo lidu [cs] containing his impressions of life inWestern Europe.[10] Beneš wrote he foundGermany to be repulsive and an "empire of force and power" after visitingBerlin.[10] InLondon, he wrote that "the situation here is terrible and so is life".[10] During World War II, when Beneš was living in exile in London, theGerman Propaganda Ministry gleefully republished his articles from 1907 expressing mostly negative sentiments about life in Britain.[10] However, Beneš lovedParis, the "city of light".[11] He wrote that he found it to be "almost miraculously ... a magnificent synthesis of modern civilization, of which France is the bearer".[10] For the rest of his life, Beneš was a passionateFrancophile and he always stated that Paris was his favorite city.[11]
In May 1917, Beneš,Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk andMilan Rastislav Štefánik were reported to be organizing a "Czechoslovak Legion" to fight for the WesternAllies in France and Italy, recruited from amongCzechs andSlovaks who were able to get to the front and also from the large emigrant populations in theUnited States, which was said to number more than 1,500,000.[12] The force grew into one of tens of thousands and took part in several battles, including the Battles ofZborov andBakhmach inRussia.[13]
Time cover, 23 March 1925Beneš (center) with the Czechoslovak delegation at the Locarno Treaties, 1925Autochrome by Roger Dumas
From 1918 to 1935, Beneš was the first and longest-servingForeign Minister of Czechoslovakia. On 31 October 1918,Karel Kramář reported fromGeneva toPrague: "If you saw our Dr. Beneš and his mastery of global questions ... you would take off your hat and say it was truly marvelous!"[14] His international stature was such that he held the post through 10 successive governments, one of which he headed himself from 1921 to 1922. In 1919, his decision to pull demoralizedCzechoslovak Legions out of theRussian Civil War was denounced by Kramář as a betrayal.[15] He represented Czechoslovakia at the1919 peace conference in Paris, which led to theVersailles Treaty.
In the early 1920s, Beneš and his mentorPresident Masaryk viewed Kramář as the principal threat to Czechoslovakdemocracy, seeing him as a "reactionary" Czech chauvinist who was opposed to their plans for Czechoslovakia as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic state.[15] Masaryk and Beneš were openly doubtful of Kramář's commitment to "Western values" that they were committed to such asdemocracy,enlightenment,rationality andtolerance, seeing him as a romanticPan-Slavist who looked towards the east rather than the west for ideas.[15]
Kramář very much resented the way in which Masaryk openly groomed Beneš as his successor, noting that Masaryk put articles intothe Constitution that set 45 as the age limit for senators, but 35 as the age limit for the presidency, which conveniently made Beneš eligible for the presidency.[15] The charge of Czech chauvinism against Kramář had some substance as he openly proclaimed his belief that the Czechs should be the dominant people in Czechoslovakia, denounced Masaryk and Beneš for their belief that theSudeten Germans should be equal to the Czechs, and made clear his opposition to havingGerman as one of theofficial languages of Czechoslovakia, views that made him abhorrent to Beneš.[16]
In 1927 Beneš was initiated infreemasonry at the Ian Amos Komensky Lodge No. 1.[17]
Between 1923 and 1927, Beneš was a member of theLeague of Nations Council, serving as president of its committee from 1927 to 1928. He was a renowned and influential figure at international conferences, such as those atGenoa in 1922,Locarno in 1925,The Hague in 1930 andLausanne in 1932.
When PresidentTomáš Masaryk retired in 1935, Beneš succeeded him. Under Masaryk, theHrad ("the castle", as the Czechs calledthe presidency) had been built up into a major extra-constitutional institution enjoying considerably more informal power than the plain language ofthe Constitution indicated.[18] The framers of the Constitution had intended to create aparliamentary system in which the Prime Minister would be the country's leading political figure. However, due to a complex system of proportional representation, a typical National Assembly saw as many as ten parties represented. No party even approached the 151 seats needed for a majority; indeed, no party ever won more than 25 percent of the vote. As mentioned above, there were ten cabinets during Masaryk's presidency.
The Czech historianIgor Lukes wrote about the power of theHrad under Beneš: "By the spring of 1938, theCzechoslovak parliament, theprime minister, and the cabinet had been pushed aside by Beneš. During the dramatic summer months he was – for better or worse – the sole decision-maker in the country".[18]
Edvard Beneš opposedNazi Germany's claim to the German-speakingSudetenland in 1938. The crisis began on 24 April 1938 whenKonrad Henlein at the party congress of theSudeten German Party in Karlsbad (modernKarlovy Vary) announced the 8-point "Karlsbad programme" demandingautonomy for the Sudetenland.[19] Beneš rejected the Karlsbad programme, but in May 1938 offered the "Third Plan" which would have created 20cantons in the Sudetenland with substantial autonomy, which in turn was rejected by Henlein.[20] Beneš was keen to go to war with Germany provided that one or more of theGreat Powers fought alongside Czechoslovakia, but was unwilling to fight Germany alone.[21]Sergei Aleksandrovsky, theSoviet minister in Prague, reported toMoscow after talking to Beneš that he was hoping to fight a "war against the whole world" provided theSoviet Union was willing to come in.[21]
InLondon in May 1938, Beneš came under diplomatic pressure from theBritish government to accede to the Karlsbad programme, which he initially refused. The British viewed the Sudetenland crisis as a domestic Czechoslovak crisis with international ramifications whereas Beneš saw the crisis as a matter between Czechoslovakia vs. Germany.
In July 1938, the BritishForeign Secretary,Lord Halifax, offered the services of a Britishmediator,Lord Runciman of Doxford, to resolve the crisis, with the promise that Britain would support Czechoslovakia if Beneš was willing to accept the conclusions of Runciman's findings.[22] Seeing a chance to enlist British support, Beneš accepted theRunciman Mission.[22] The British historianA. J. P. Taylor wrote: "Beneš, whatever his other defects, was an incomparable negotiator; and the talents which had been a match forLloyd George in 1919, soon took Runciman's measure in 1938 ... Instead, Runciman found that he was being maneuvered into a position where he had to endorse the Czech offers as reasonable, and to condemn the obstinacy of the Sudetens, not of Beneš. An appalling consequence [for Britain] loomed ever nearer; if Beneš did all that Runciman asked of him, and more, Great Britain would be saddled with the moral obligation to support Czechoslovakia in the ensuing crisis. To avert this consequence, Runciman, far from urging Beneš on, had to preach delay. Beneš did not allow him to escape."[23]
On 4 September 1938, Beneš presented the "Fourth Plan", which, had it happened, would essentially have turned Czechoslovakia into afederation, and would have given the Sudetenland widespread autonomy. Henlein rejected the Fourth Plan and instead launched arevolt in the Sudetenland, which soon failed. On 12 September 1938, in hiskeynote speech at theNuremberg rally,Adolf Hitler demanded the Sudetenland join Germany. On 30 September 1938,Germany,Italy,France and theUnited Kingdom signed theMunich Agreement, which allowed for the annexation and military occupation of the Sudetenland by Germany.Czechoslovakia was not consulted.
Beneš agreed, despite opposition from within his country, after France and the United Kingdom warned that they would remain neutral in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia, despite their previous guarantees to the contrary.[24] Beneš was forced to resign on 5 October 1938, under German pressure,[24] and was replaced byEmil Hácha. On Hácha's watch, Czechoslovakia lost more land toHungary in theFirst Vienna Award the following month.
Although many Czechs view theMunich Agreement as part of a "Western betrayal", some scholars such asGeorge F. Kennan and John Holroyd-Doveton suggest that the Agreement may have been a surprisingly positive outcome for Czechoslovakia. They argue that, if war had broken out in 1938, Czechoslovakia would have faced a similar destruction to thatsuffered by Poland the following year. As Poland was attacked in 1939, France launched its unsuccessfulSaar Offensive in western Germany. One can only assume France's attack would have been equally futile in 1938, had a Czech-German war been sparked.[25] Kennan wrote in his memoirs:
The benefit of the Munich Agreement was that it has preserved for the exacting task of the future a magnificent younger generation disciplined, industrious and physically fit that would have undoubtedly been sacrificed if the solution had been the romantic one of hopeless resistance rather than the humiliating but true heroic one of realism.[26]
It is the opinion of several Czech, Slovak and German historians that theCzechoslovak border fortifications made the Czechoslovak-German boundary the best-fortified in Europe, as it was built on the French model of theMaginot Line defense system. But despite this, Germany'soccupation of Austria earlier that year meant Czechoslovakia could equally have been attacked from the south. If Czechoslovakia had fought, it might have assisted Britain, France and the Soviet Union, but it may not have benefitted Czechoslovakia itself. There were various predictions of how long it would take the German army to defeat the Czechs, but seldom did a prediction contemplate a Czech victory.[27] Speculating the length of a hypothesised Czech-German war,Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk predicted two months,Winston Churchill wagered three months and according toLavrentiy Beria's son, his father envisioned at least six months. Six months of modern warfare in a small country like Czechoslovakia would likely have left it devastated.[28][29][30]
In July 1939, Beneš realising that "information is power", started to share with the British some of the intelligence provided by "Agent A-54" as Thümmel was code-named.[31] As the British lacked anyspies in Germany comparable to Agent A-54, the British were intensely interested in the intelligence provided by him, which Beneš used to bargain with in dealings with the British.[31]
By July 1939, theDanzig crisis had pushed Britain to the brink of war with Germany, and British decision-makers were keenly interested in any high-level intelligence about Germany.[31] In the summer of 1939, Beneš hoped that the Danzig crisis would end in war, seeing a war with Germany as his only hope of restoring Czechoslovakia.[31] At the same time, Beneš started to have regular lunches withWinston Churchill, at the time only abackbench Conservative MP, andHarold Nicolson, a backbencherNational Labour MP who was likewise opposed to theMunich Agreement.[31] Besides his new British friends like Churchill and Nicolson, Beneš also resumed contact with old British friends fromWorld War I such as the historianRobert Seton-Watson and the journalistHenry Wickham Steed, who wrote articles urging the restoration of Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich Agreement borders.[31]
On 23 August 1939, Beneš metIvan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to theCourt of St. James, to ask for Soviet support. According to Maisky'sdiary, Beneš told him that he wanted a common frontier between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.[32] Furthermore, Maisky's diary had Beneš saying that if Czechoslovakia were restored, he would cedeRuthenia, whose people Beneš noted were mostlyUkrainian, to the Soviet Union to bring about a common frontier.[32]
On the same day, Beneš learned of theMolotov–Ribbentrop pact. When he confronted Maisky, he was told that war would break out "in two weeks' time", causing Beneš to write: "My overall impression is that the Soviets want war, they have prepared for it conscientiously and they maintain that the war will take place – and that they have reserved some freedom of action for themselves ... [The pact was] a rather rough tactic to drive Hitler into war ... the Soviets are convinced that the time has come for a final struggle betweencapitalism,fascism andNazism and that there will be aworld revolution, which they will trigger at an opportune moment when others are exhausted by war".[33] Maisky would be proven right on 1 September, when Germanyinvaded Poland, and the British and French both declared war on Germany two days later.
26 Gwendolen Avenue inPutney, where Beneš lived between 1938 and 1940.
In October 1939, Beneš organised the Czechoslovak National Liberation Committee, which immediately declared itself theProvisional Government of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France withheld full recognition, though unofficial contacts were permitted.[34] A major issue inwartime Anglo-Czechoslovak relations was theMunich Agreement, which the British still stood by, and which Beneš wanted the British to abrogate.[35] The issue was important because as long the British continued to view the Munich Agreement as being in effect, they recognized theSudetenland as part of Germany, a British war aim that Beneš naturally objected to.
A problem for Beneš during thePhoney War in the winter of 1939–40 was the BritishPrime MinisterNeville Chamberlain attached much hope to the idea thatanti-Nazi conservatives in Germany would persuade theWehrmacht to overthrow Hitler, and as the anti-Nazi conservatives were adamant that the Sudetenland remain part of Germany, Chamberlain made it clear that Britain was not at war to undo the Munich Agreement.[36]
On 22 February 1940 during a secret meeting inSwitzerland betweenUlrich von Hassell representing the German conservatives andJames Lonsdale-Bryans representing Great Britain, the former told the latter there was no possibility of a post-Nazi Germany ever agreeing to return the Sudetenland.[37] In 1939 and 1940, Chamberlain repeatedly made public statements that Britain was willing to make an "honorable peace" with a post-Nazi Germany, which meant the Sudetenland would remain within theReich.[36] Beneš with his insistence on restoring Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich borders was seen by Chamberlain as an obstacle that was standing in the way of his hope that the Wehrmacht would depose Hitler.
After theDunkirk evacuation, Britain was faced with aGerman invasion while theBritish Army had lost most of its equipment, which it had to abandon atDunkirk. At the same time, 500 Czechoslovakairmen had arrived in Britain together with half of adivision, which Beneš called his "last and most impressive argument" for diplomatic recognition.[34] On 21 July 1940, the United Kingdom recognised the National Liberation Committee as being the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, withJan Šrámek as prime minister and Beneš as president.[34] In reclaiming the presidency, Beneš took the line that his 1938 resignation was void since it had been underduress.
The intelligence provided byAgent A-54 was greatly valued byMI6, the Britishintelligence service, and Beneš used it to improve his bargaining position, telling the British he would share more intelligence from Agent A-54 in return for concessions to his government-in-exile.[38] As part of his efforts to improve his bargaining position, Beneš often exaggerated to the British the efficiency ofMoravec's group, the Czechoslovak army in exile and the undergroundUVOD resistance group.[38] Besides Agent A-54, the Prime Minister of the Czech government under theProtectorate, GeneralAlois Eliáš, was in contact with Moravec's agents. Beneš's efforts paid off as he was invited to lunch, first at10 Downing Street byChurchill (who was now Prime Minister), and then by KingGeorge VI atBuckingham Palace.[38]
In September 1940, MI6 set up a communications center inSurrey for Czechoslovak intelligence and in October 1940 aVictorian mansion atLeamington Spa was given to the Czechoslovak brigade under General Miroslav.[38] At the same time, Moravec's group began to work with theSpecial Operations Executive (SOE) to planresistance in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, though the distance between Britain and the Protectorate made it difficult for the SOE to parachute in agents.[38]
Beneš'srelations with the Polish government-in-exile headed by GeneralWładysław Sikorski were difficult due to theTeschen dispute, as General Sikorski insisted on claiming the region for Poland, while Beneš argued that it should return to Czechoslovakia when the war was over.[39] However, Beneš felt a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance was needed to counter Germany in the post-war world, and came around to the idea of aPolish-Czechoslovak federation as the best way ofsquaring the circle caused by the Teschen dispute.[39] In November 1940, Beneš and Sikorski signed an agreement in principle calling for federation, though Beneš's insistence that the Slovaks were not a nation andSlovakia would not be a full member of the federation caused much tension between himself and Slovak members of the government-in-exile.[39]
However, afterOperation Barbarossa brought the Soviet Union into the war in June 1941, Beneš started to lose interest in the project, though a detailed agreement for the proposed federation was worked out and signed in January 1942.[39] TheRussophile Beneš always felt more comfortable with dealing with Russians rather than the Poles, whose behavior in September 1938 was a source of much resentment to Beneš.[39] The promise from theNarkomindel that the Soviet Union supported returning Teschen to Czechoslovakia negated the whole purpose of the proposed federation for Beneš.[39]
On 22 June 1941, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. PresidentEmil Hacha of thepuppet government serving under theProtectorate praised Hitler in a statement for launching the "crusade againstBolshevism" and urged Czech workers to work even harder for aGerman victory, observing that much of the material used by theWehrmacht was manufactured in the Protectorate.[40] ThroughMoravec, Beneš sent word to both GeneralEliáš and Hacha that they should resign rather than give comfort to the enemy, stating his belief that the Soviet Union would inevitably defeat Germany and thus would have a decisive role in the affairs ofEastern Europe after the war.[40] Moreover, Beneš charged that if most of the resistance work in the Protectorate were done by the Czech communists that would give them "a pretext to take over power on the basis of the justified reproach that we helped Hitler".[40]
During the war Beneš toldIlya Ehrenburg, the Soviet writer: "The only salvation lies in a close alliance with your country. The Czechs may have different political opinions, but on one point we can be sure. The Soviet Union will not only liberate us from the Germans. It will also allow us to live without constant fear of the future."[41][42]
On 18 July 1941, the Soviet Union and UK[43] recognizedBeneš's government-in-exile, promised non-interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, allowed the government-in-exile to raise anarmy to fight alongside the Red Army on theEastern Front; and recognized the borders of Czechoslovakia as those before theMunich Agreement.[40] The last was the most important to Beneš, as the British government still maintained that the Munich Agreement was in effect and regarded theSudetenland as part of Germany.[40] Even theUnited States (which wasneutral) very tentatively regarded the government-in-exile as only a "provisional" government and rather vaguely stated the borders of Czechoslovakia were to be determined after the war, implying the Sudetenland might remain part of Germany.[40]
During the summer and fall of 1941, Beneš came under increasing pressure from theAllies to have the Czechs play a greater role inresistance work.[44] TheNarkomindel informed Beneš that the Soviets were disappointed that there was so littlesabotage going on in the factories of theProtectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which were such an important source of arms and other material for the Wehrmacht.[44] Likewise, the British started to demand that the Czechs do more resistance work.[44] Moravec after meeting theMI6's Director,Stewart Menzies, told Beneš that the British viewpoint was that when the United Kingdom was fighting for its life that "placing violets at thegrave of the unknown soldier was simply not good enough".[44]
Making matters worse for Beneš was in late September 1941 thatReinhard Heydrich, who effectively taken over the Protectorate, launched a major crackdown on resistance.[45] The Prime Minister, General Eliáš, was arrested on 27 September 1941 on Heydrich's orders;martial law was proclaimed in the Protectorate; thousands were arrested and executed including two prominent leaders of theUVOD resistance group,Josef Bílý andHugo Vojta (cs) who were arrested and shotwithout trial.[45]
On 5 October 1941, thelines of communication between the UVOD group andLondon were severed when theGestapo, during the course of itsraids, seized various radios and the codes for communicating with London.[45] At the same time, the Gestapo also learned of the existence of Agent A-54 and after an investigation arrestedThümmel, depriving Beneš of one of his most valuable bargaining chips.[45] Faced with this situation when the Allies were demanding more Czech resistance at the same time that Heydrich had launching a crackdown that was weakening the resistance, Beneš decided in October 1941 on a spectacular act of resistance that would prove to the world that the Czechs were still resisting.[46]
In 1941, Beneš andFrantišek Moravec plannedOperation Anthropoid to assassinateReinhard Heydrich,[47] a high-ranking German official who was responsible for suppressingCzech culture, and for deporting and executing members of the Czech resistance. Beneš felt his dealings with the Allies, especially his campaign to persuade the British to nullify theMunich Agreement, was being weakened by the lack of any visible resistance in the Protectorate.[48] Beneš decided that assassinating Heydrich was the best way to improve his bargaining position, and it was largely he who pressed for Operation Anthropoid.[49]
Upon learning of the nature of the mission, resistance leaders begged theCzechoslovak government-in-exile to call off the attack, saying that "An attempt against Heydrich's life ... would be of no use to the Allies and its consequences for our people would be immeasurable."[50] Beneš personally broadcast a message insisting that the attack go forwards,[50] although he denied any involvement after the war.[51] HistorianVojtěch Mastný argues that he "clung to the scheme as the last resort to dramatize Czech resistance."[51] The 1942 assassination resulted in brutal German reprisals such as the execution of thousands of Czechs and the eradication of two villages:Lidice andLežáky.
Arnold J. Toynbee, a prominent historian at the time, vehemently made the argument that the Czech regime was largely comparable to the situations in Germany, Poland and with the Magyars.[52][incomprehensible]
In 1942, Beneš finally persuaded theForeign Office to issue a statement saying Britain had revoked theMunich Agreement and supported the return of theSudetenland to Czechoslovakia.[35] Beneš saw the statement by theForeign Secretary,Anthony Eden, to theHouse of Commons on 5 August 1942 revoking the Munich Agreement as a diplomatic triumph for himself.[34] Beneš had been greatly embittered by the behavior of theethnic Germans of the Sudetenland in 1938, which he viewed astreasonous, and during his exile in London had decided that when Czechoslovakia was reestablished, he was going to expel all of the Sudeten Germans into Germany.[35]
At the Munich Debate in the House of Commons, Anthony Eden acknowledged that there had been "discrimination, even severe discrimination" against the Sudeten Germans.[53] During his exile, Beneš had come to obsessively brood over the behavior of the Sudetenlanders and had reached the conclusion that they were allcollectively guilty of treason.[39] In 1942, he stated the compulsorypopulation exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922–23 was his model for solving the problem of the Sudetenland, though unlike the Greek-Turkish population exchange, he proposed financial compensation to be paid to the Sudeten Germans expelled into Germany.[54]
Although not a Communist, Beneš was also on friendly terms withJoseph Stalin. Believing that Czechoslovakia had more to gain from an alliance with theSoviet Union than one withPoland, he torpedoed plans for aPolish–Czechoslovak confederation and in 1943, he signed anentente with the Soviets.[55][56][57] During his visit to Moscow to sign the alliance, Beneš complained about the "feudal" systems existing in Poland and Hungary, charging that unlike Czechoslovakia, which after World War I had broken up theestates owned mostly by ethnic Germans and Hungarians, the majority of the land in Poland and Hungary was still owned by the nobility, which he claimed was the source of political and economic backwardness in both nations.[58]
Beneš believed in the ideal of "convergence" between the Soviet Union and the western nations, arguing that based on what he was seeing inwartime Britain that the western nations would become moresocialist after the war while at same time that wartimeliberalising reforms in the Soviet Union meant the Soviet system would be more "western" after the war.[39] Beneš hoped and believed that the wartime alliance of the "Big Three" of theSoviet Union, theUnited Kingdom, and theUnited States would continue after the war, with the "Big Three" co-operating in an international system that would hold Germany in check.[39]
Though Beneš did not attend theTehran Conference himself, the news of the mood of harmony that prevailed among the American, Soviet and British delegations at Tehran certainly gave him hope that the Big Three alliance would continue after the war.[59] Beneš saw the role of Czechoslovakia and his own role as being that of a mediator between the Big Three.[60] The fact that his old friendChurchill took him into his confidence concerning the post-war borders of Poland boosted Beneš's own perception of himself as an important diplomat, settling the disputes of Eastern Europe.[61] After talking to Beneš for four hours on 4 January 1944 about Poland's post-war borders, Churchill cabled toAmerican PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt: "Beneš may be most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed".[61]
General Bunyachenko and his First Division defected to theAllied side, where it played a key role in holding off the German forces intent on retaking Prague and prevented the SS from massacring the people of Prague.[65] However, when General Bunyachenko learned on 7 May that he and his men would not be offered asylum after all, the First Division abandoned Prague in order to surrender to theAmerican 3rd Army. Despite the promise that the men of First Division would be granted asylum, Beneš instead repatriated the First Division, and the rest of the ROA men in Czechoslovakia who were captured by his government, to the Soviet Union.[65]
After the Prague uprising at the end ofWorld War II, Beneš returned home and resumed his former position as president. Article 58.5 ofthe Constitution said, "The former president shall stay in his or her function till the new president shall be elected". He wasunanimously confirmed in office by theInterim National Assembly on 28 October 1945. In December 1945, all of theRed Army forces left Czechoslovakia.[62] On 19 June 1946, Beneš was formally elected to his second term as president.[66]
In July 1947, both Beneš and Gottwald had decided to acceptMarshall Plan aid, only for theKremlin to order Gottwald to do aU-turn on the question of accepting the Marshall Plan.[67] When Beneš visited Moscow, the SovietForeign MinisterVyacheslav Molotov quite brutally informed him that the Kremlin regarded accepting Marshall Plan aid as a violation of the1943 alliance, causing Beneš on his return to Prague to speak of a "secondMunich", saying it was not acceptable for the Soviet Union toveto decisions made by Czechoslovakia.[67] The volte-face on the issue of the Marshall Plan did much damage to the image of the Czechoslovak Communists, and public opinion started to turn against them.[68] A public opinion poll showed that only 25% of the voters planned to vote Communist after the rejection of the Marshall Plan.[68]
In September 1947, the Communist-dominated police inSlovakia announced the discovery of an alleged separatist plot led by the followers ofFather Tiso who were allegedly infiltrating theSlovak Democrats, but by November 1947, the supposed plot was revealed as acanard, with the media exposing the evidence for it as being manufactured by the police.[68] The scandal in Slovakia led to demands by the other parties of the National Front that the police be depoliticised.[68] During this time, Beneš had become increasingly disillusioned with the Communists, telling his ambassador inBelgrade to report to him personally, as there were so many Communist agents both in the Czechoslovakembassy in Belgrade and in his own office that it was the only way of ensuring secrecy.[69]
TheBeneš decrees (officially called "Decrees of the President of the Republic"), among other things, expropriated the property of citizens ofGerman andHungarian ethnicity and facilitated Article 12 of thePotsdam Agreement by laying down a national legal framework for the loss of citizenship[citation needed] and theexpropriation of about three million Germans and Hungarians. However, Beneš's plans for expelling the Hungarian minority fromSlovakia caused tensions with Hungary, whosecoalition government was likewise leaning towards the Soviet Union, and ultimately objections from Moscow ended the expulsion of the Hungarians shortly after it had begun.[62] In contrast, the Soviets had no objections to theexpulsions of the Sudeten Germans, and the Czechoslovak authorities continued to expel the Sudeten Germans pursuant to the Potsdam Agreement until only a negligible number of Germans remained in theSudetenland.[62]
On 15 March 1946,SSObergruppenführerKarl Hermann Frank went on trial in Prague forwar crimes.[71] Beneš ensured that Frank's trial received maximum publicity, being broadcast live onstate radio, and statements from Frank's interrogations being leaked to the press.[71] On the stand, Frank remained a defiant Nazi, snarling insults at his Czech prosecutors, saying the Czechs were stillUntermenschen ("sub-humans") as far he was concerned, and only expressing regret that he did not kill more Czechs when he had the chance. After Frank's conviction, he was publiclyhanged before thousands of cheering people outside ofPankrác Prison on 22 May 1946.[71] As Frank was a Sudeten German, the political purpose of his trial was to symbolize to the world what Beneš called the "collective criminality" of the Sudeten Germans, which thus justified their expulsions.[71] The historianMary Heimann wrote that though Frank was indeed guilty of war crimes and treason, his trial was used for a political purpose, namely to illustrate the collective criminality of the Sudeten Germans to the world.[71]
On 12 February 1948, the non-Communist ministers threatened to resign unless the "packing" of the police by the Communist interior minister,Václav Nosek, stopped at once.[68] The Communists set up "action committees"; Nosek ordered thecivil servants to comply with the committees' directives.[69] Nosek also illegally had arms issued to the action committees.[69] On 20 February, the Communists formed a "people'smilitia" of 15,000.[69] On 21 February 1948, 12 non-Communist ministers resigned to protest Gottwald's refusal to stop the packing of the police with Communists despite the majority of the Cabinet having ordered it to end.[68] The non-Communists believed that Beneš would side with them to allow them to stay in office as acaretaker government until new elections.
Beneš initially refused to accept their resignations and insisted that no government could be formed without the non-Communist parties. However, Gottwald had by this time dropped all pretense of working within the system. He threatened ageneral strike unless Beneš appointed a Communist-dominated government. The Communists also occupied the offices of the non-Communists who had resigned. Faced with the crisis, Beneš hesitated and sought more time.[69]
On 22 February, a large parade by the Communist action committees took place in Prague, and ended with the people's militia attacking the offices of opposition parties and theSokols.[69] Amid fears thatcivil war was imminent and rumours that theRed Army would sweep in to back Gottwald, Beneš gave way. On 25 February, he accepted the resignations of the non-Communist ministers and appointed a new Communist-dominated government in accordance with Gottwald's specifications.[69] The non-Communist parties were still nominally represented, so the government was still technically a coalition. However, with the exception of Masaryk, the non-Communist ministers werefellow travellers. In effect, Beneš had given legal sanction to a Communistcoup.
During the crisis, Beneš failed to rally support as he could have done from the Sokols, theLegionnaire veterans' associations, the churches and many of the university students.[69]Richard J. Crampton wrote: "In February 1948, Beneš still commanded enormous respect and authority", and if he had used his moral prestige, he could have rallied public opinion against the Communists.[72] However, Beneš still saw Germany as the main danger to Czechoslovakia and ultimately believed that Czechoslovakia needed the alliance with the Soviet Union more than the other way around, and as such Prague could never afford a lasting rift with Moscow.[69] Finally, Beneš was a deeply ill man in February 1948, suffering fromhypertension,arteriosclerosis andPott's disease, and his poor health contributed to the lack of fight in him.[72]
Shortly afterward,elections were held in which voters were presented with a single list from theNational Front, now a Communist-dominated organization. On 12 March 1948, professorVáclav Černý visited Beneš at his villa atSezimovo Ústí, where the president accusedJoseph Stalin of using him. According to Černý, Beneš used such violent and vulgar language about Stalin that he did not bother writing down the president's commentary, believing it was unpublishable.[73]
TheConstituent National Assembly, now a subservient tool of the Communists, approveda new constitution on 9 May. Although it was not a completely Communist document, the influence of the1936 Soviet Constitution (known as the "Stalin Constitution") was strong enough that Beneš refused to sign it.[74] He resigned as president on 7 June 1948, and Gottwald took over most presidential functions until being elected his successor a week later.[72]
On 14 August 1948, the Soviet and Czechoslovak media launched a campaign of vilification against Beneš, accusing him of being an enemy of the Soviet Union and claimed that he refused a Soviet offer of unilateral military assistance in September 1938 because he wanted the Munich Agreement imposed on Czechoslovakia.[75]
On his deathbed, Beneš became furious about the claim the Soviet Union had offered to help unilaterally in 1938 with the former presidential chancellorJaromír Smutný (cs) writing: "He would like to know when, by whom and to whom was the offer made".[75] During theCommunist era in Czechoslovakia, Beneš was vilified as atraitor for turning down this purported offer.[76]
Beneš had been in poor health since the spring of 1945, when he suffered a minorstroke. He suffered two more strokes in 1947, and seeing the undoing of his life's work left him completely broken. In a 2018 interview withRadio Prague International, historianIgor Lukes recalled that by February 1948, Beneš' poor health left him "a shell of a man" who did not have the emotional or physical stamina to hold out against the "rough, rough players" of the KSČ.[77][3]
He died of natural causes at his villa inSezimovo Ústí on 3 September 1948, seven months after the communist coup.[3] He is interred in the garden of his villa, and his bust is part of theheadstone. His wife Hana, who lived until 2 December 1974, is interred next to him.
Much controversy remains on his character and policy.[78][needs update] According to theSVR, Beneš had closely co-operated with the Soviet intelligence before the war especially with Soviet agentPyotr Zubov.[79]
Beneš's friend, the British historianA. J. P. Taylor, wrote in 1945: "Beck, Stojadinović, Antonescu, and Bonnet despised Beneš's integrity and prided themselves on their cunning; but their countries, too, fell before the German aggressor, and every step they took has made the resurrection of their countries more difficult. In contrast, the foreign policy of Dr. Beneš during the present war has won Czechoslovakia a secure future."[80]
The leaders to whom Taylor referred were ColonelJózef Beck, the Polishforeign minister 1932–39 and a leading figure in theSanation military dictatorship, which at times worked with the Third Reich;Milan Stojadinović, who served as theprime minister of Yugoslavia 1935–39 and who followed a pro-German foreign policy; GeneralIon Antonescu, theConducător (dictator) of Romania 1940–44; andGeorges Bonnet, the Frenchforeign minister 1938–39, who favored abandoningEastern Europe to Nazi Germany. Taylor's assessment that Beneš was a man of integrity (unlike Bonnet, Antonescu, Beck and Stojadinović) and that he was leading Czechoslovakia in the right direction was widely shared in 1945.[80]
^abcDennis Kavanagh (1998)."Benes, Edvard".A Dictionary of Political Biography. Oxford University Press. p. 43. Archived fromthe original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved26 August 2017.[ISBN missing]
^'Czech Army for France' inThe Times, Thursday, 23 May 1918, p. 6, col. F
^Preclík, Vratislav (2019).Masaryk a legie (in Czech). Paris Karviná in association with the Masaryk Democratic Movement, Prague. pp. 40–90,124–128,140–148,184–190.ISBN978-80-87173-47-3.
Lukes, Igor (1999). "Stalin and Czechoslovakia: An Autopsy of a Myth". In Igor Lukes; Erik Goldstein (eds.).The Munich Crisis, 1938 Prelude to World War II. London: Frank Cass. pp. 13–47.ISBN9781136328329.
Mastný, Vojtěch (1971).The Czechs Under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939–1942. New York: Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0-231-03303-9.
Orzoff, Andrea (2009).The Battle for the Castle. Oxford University Press.
Konrád, Ota; Küpper, René (2013).Edvard Beneš: Vorbild und Feindbild : politische, mediale und historiographische Deutungen (in German). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.ISBN978-3-525-37302-6.
Hauner, Milan, ed.Edvard Beneš’ Memoirs: The Days of Munich (vol. 1),War and Resistance (vol. 2),Documents (vol. 3). First critical edition of reconstructedWar Memoirs 1938–45 of President Beneš of Czechoslovakia (published by Academia Prague 2007ISBN978-80-200-1529-7).
Biography at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs(in Czech)
"Sons of Death".Time. 26 September 1938. Archived fromthe original on 17 January 2008. Retrieved14 August 2008. – an article published inTime on 26 September 1938 – free archive
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