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2021 Russian ultimatum to NATO

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(Redirected fromDecember 2021 Russian ultimatum to NATO)
Presented before Russian invasion of Ukraine

On 17 December 2021, during theprelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia submitted a list of demands widely seen as anultimatum regarding Eastern Europe to theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States. The demands were rejected and shortly afterwards Russia invaded Ukraine.

Although NATO expansion into Eastern Europe during the 1990s and 2000s had been accepted by Russia at the time, and Russia itself had joined NATO'sPartnership for Peace program, from the 2010s onwards Russia became concerned with the decline of its influence in former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and theBaltic States, which were aligning themselves with the West economically and politically.

On 15 December 2021, Russia submitted a list of demands in the form of two draft treaties, one with NATO and another with the United States. The proposed treaties included a ban on Ukraine and otherex-Soviet countries joining NATO, and the removal of NATO troops and weapons from Central and Eastern Europe. The demands, issued during a period of high tension, during which about 100,000 Russian troops were massed on Ukraine's borders, were widely seen as an ultimatum and an attempt by Russia to exert pressure onWestern countries.

The main demands were rejected by NATO and the United States on 26 January 2022, although counterproposals were made and the USA indicated a willingness to negotiate if Russia ceased threatening Ukraine. TheRussian invasion of Ukraine followed less than a month later on 24 February.[1]

Background

Cold War

AfterWorld War II, theSoviet Union established theWarsaw Pact: while the Pact was nominally a defensive alliance, in practice it functioned to safeguard theSoviet Union's hegemony over itsEastern European satellites.[2] Effectively, the Pact was a direct reflection of the Soviet Union's authoritarianism and undisputed domination over theEastern Bloc, in the context of the so-calledSoviet Empire. The Pact's only direct military actions having been the invasions of its own member states to keep them from breaking away, as per theBrezhnev Doctrine policy that permitted only limited independence of the satellite states' communist parties and that none would be allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc in any way. Decisions in the Pact were ultimately taken by theSoviet Union alone; the countries of the Warsaw Pact were not equally able to negotiate their entry in the Pact nor the decisions taken.[3] By contrast, inNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance including the United States and its allies in Europe), all decisions required unanimous consensus in theNorth Atlantic Council despite U.S. influence (mainly military and economic) over NATO. The entry of countries into the NATO alliance was not subject to domination but rather a natural democratic process.[3]

NATO expansion and rapprochement with Russia

Following the end of theCold War in 1991, including the disbanding ofWarsaw Pact and thedissolution of the Soviet Union,NATO expanded its membership eastward, eventually incorporating all former Pact countries as well as severalformer republics of the Soviet Union.[4] Russian military actions, including theFirst Chechen War, were among the factors drivingCentral and Eastern European countries, particularly those with memories of similar Soviet offensives, to push for NATO application and ensure their long-term security.[5][6]

In 1994, Russia joined NATO'sPartnership for Peace program to facilitate cooperation and better relations with NATO, and signed theBudapest Memorandum on Security Assurances pledging to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for the latter's relinquishing of its nuclear weapons.[7] In 1996, Russia joined theCouncil of Europe as well. The following year, in 1997, NATO and Russia signed theFounding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, which stated, among other things, that Russia and NATO did not "consider each other as adversaries."[8][9][10]

End of friendly NATO-Russia relationship

Despite this, NATO expansion became a point of contention for Russia, particularlyunder Vladimir Putin, who asserted that it was a breach of assurances made by Western leaders in the early 1990s,[citation needed] and as a strategic encirclement aimed at undermining its security.[11] Although Russia has obstinately described NATO expansion as a threat, Putin was actually more concerned about the loss of Russia's perceived sphere of influence in former Soviet republics which were aligning themselves with the West economically and politically. Putin aimed to regain control of these republics as part of re-establishing Russia as a great power.[12]

Putin has aimed to create disruption within the NATO alliance, by establishing relationships with NATO membersHungary andTurkey. With numerous Western European countries dependent on Russia for energy, particularly Germany which was a major benefactor of theNord Stream 2 pipeline, Putin believed that NATO was too divided and would not stand in his way.[12]

Russian failure to dominate Ukraine

Putin initially attempted to install a pro-Russian government in Kyiv, including thepoisoning of pro-Western presidential candidateViktor Yushchenko, but this backfired due to theOrange Revolution. While Putin's effort succeeded in 2010, the massiveEuromaidan protests in 2013 forced pro-Russian Ukrainian PresidentViktor Yanukovych into exile. Theannexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and subsequentwar in the Donbas marked the start of theRusso-Ukrainian War, leading to diplomatic fallout and the imposition ofeconomic sanctions by Western nations.[4][12]

Prelude to full-scale invasion of Ukraine

On 12 July 2021, Russian PresidentVladimir Putin published his essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", which openly questioned Ukrainian territorial integrity and claimed that it was a "product of the Soviet era" formed "on the lands of historical Russia". A Kremlin-affiliated outlet described the essay as his "final ultimatum to Ukraine".[12]

Starting in 2021, Russian units that were originally intended to defend against a NATO invasion had been withdrawn from actual land borders with NATO in order to support an expected invasion of Ukraine.[12] Russiasignificantly increased its military presence along its border withUkraine, massing about 100,000 troops by December.[13] The build-up was viewed as a show of strength, and as a pressure tactic aimed at compelling Western concessions.[14] US intelligence also uncovered Russian false flag operations and disinformation campaigns in occupied Donbas that aimed to create a justification for the invasion in January and early February 2022. Putin had framed Ukraine as a threat to Russia and claimed a potential attack upon Russian-occupied territories and Russia in 2022, even though the Kremlin had assessed Ukraine’s military capabilities and will to fight to be so weak that Russian forces would overrun the country in a matter of days.[12]

Ultimatum

On 15 December 2021, Putin submitted "specific proposals" on Russia's demands for security guarantees from the West to U.S. Assistant Secretary of StateKaren Donfried.[15] Two days later, on 17 December, the RussianMinistry of Foreign Affairs published the demands in the form of two draft treaties with NATO and the U.S., proposing limits on their influence and activities in Europe.[16] Russian Deputy Foreign MinisterSergei Ryabkov said that "The line pursued by the United States and NATO over recent years to aggressively escalate the security situation is absolutely unacceptable and extremely dangerous". Ryabkov also stated that Russia was ready to begin negotiations as soon as 18 December, and suggestedGeneva as a possible venue.[17]

The first draft treaty, titled "Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization",[18] included the following provisions, among others:

  • that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine
  • that NATO deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997[a]
  • a ban on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side's territory
  • a ban on any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia
  • language on consultative mechanisms, such as theNATO–Russia Council, and on the establishment of a hotline[16]

The second, titled "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees",[19] included the following:

  • a requirement that both countries "not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party"
  • a requirement that the United States undertake to prevent further NATO enlargement
  • a ban on deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe
  • limits on the ability of heavy bombers and surface warships to operate in and over international waters in range of the other side
  • a requirement that both side's nuclear weapons only be deployed on national territory[16]

Reception

The primary demand from Russia to halt NATO's eastward expansion was rejected by NATO and the U.S., which argued that Russia should not have a veto on the alliance's expansion and that it had the right to decide its own military posture, defendingits open door policy as a fundamental principle of the organization.[17] In response to the draft treaties, NATO Secretary GeneralJens Stoltenberg stated that any dialogue with Russia "would also need to address NATO's concerns about Russia's actions, be based on core principles and documents of European security, and take place in consultation with NATO's European partners, such as Ukraine". U.S. National Security AdviserJake Sullivan stated that the U.S. was committed to the "principle of nothing about you without you" in shaping its foreign policy in Europe.[20] Ukraine'sMinistry of Foreign Affairs stated that Ukraine had an "exclusive sovereign right" to run its foreign policy, and only it and NATO could determine the relationship between them, including the question of its potential membership.[17]

Some Western political analysts suggested Russia was knowingly presenting unrealistic demands to provide a diplomatic distraction while maintaining military pressure on Ukraine, withMichael Kofman calling the draft treaties a "smokescreen" andSam Greene calling them a "declaration" rather than a basis for negotiation.[17]

Boris Bondarev, a Russian diplomat who later resigned in protest of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, recalled that the draft treaties had shocked many Russian diplomats and that he immediately viewed the demands as non-negotiable. Bondarev also stated that during a dinner amid bilateral U.S–Russia strategic stability talks in Geneva on 10 January 2022, that Ryabkov had screamed at U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of StateWendy Sherman, that "[Russia] need[s] Ukraine! We won't go anywhere without Ukraine! Get out with your belongings [to the 1997 borders]!".[12]

NATO and U.S. response

According toThe New York Times, high-level U.S. officials conducted more than 180 meetings with their European counterparts in the weeks after the Russian demands. The NATO and U.S. response to the proposals was drafted together, and approved by U.S. PresidentJoe Biden and Ukraine.[21]

On 26 January 2022, NATO and the U.S. issued their formal response to Russia, in which they rejected demands that Ukraine never join NATO and that the alliance withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe; the confidential document was later published byEl País.[22] It called on Russia to withdraw forces from Ukraine,Georgia, andMoldova, and discussed a potential transparency mechanism to confirm the absence of U.S.Tomahawk cruise missiles at twoAegis Ashore sites inRomania andPoland in exchange for transparency at two ground-launched missile bases in Russia.[23] Other areas indicated for negotiation were a potential revival of theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and new mutual rules limiting the size and locations of military exercises.[21]

Despite this initial rejection of Russia's ultimatum, by early February, the U.S. was reportedly offering to prevent Ukraine's NATO accession if Russia backed away from the imminent invasion.[24]

Russian response to NATO counterproposals

Alexander Gabuev, director of theCarnegie Russia Eurasia Center, later recalled that Russian diplomats were "pleasantly" surprised with the counterproposals and believed that they could achieve agreements which would strengthen Russian security, but that the Kremlin was uninterested.[12]

On 17 February, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a response in which it stated that the NATO and U.S. proposals were not "constructive" and that both parties continued to ignore Russia's "red lines and core security interests", and threatened that Russia would be forced to respond through the implementation of unspecified "military-technical measures".[23] One week later, on 24 February, Russia launched afull-scale invasion of Ukraine.[12]

See also

References

  1. ^Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
  1. ^Kuzio, Taras; Jajecznyk-Kelman, Stefan (2023).Fascism and Genocide: Russia's War Against Ukrainians. COLUMBIA University Press.ISBN 978-3-8382-1791-8.
  2. ^"Warsaw Pact ends".History.com.
  3. ^ab"Differences Between Nato and the Warsaw Pact".Atlantische Tijdingen (57):1–16. 1967.JSTOR 45343492. Retrieved9 January 2022.
  4. ^ab"Russia sets out tough demands for security pact with NATO".AP News. 2021-12-17. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  5. ^"Irony Amid the Menace".CEPA. 2020-05-26.Archived from the original on 31 July 2020. Retrieved2020-05-27.
  6. ^Murphy, Dean E. (1995-01-14)."Chechnya Summons Uneasy Memories in Former East Bloc".Los Angeles Times.ISSN 0458-3035.Archived from the original on 23 November 2015. Retrieved2015-11-22.
  7. ^"UNTC".treaties.un.org.
  8. ^https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm
  9. ^"5/15/97 Fact Sheet: NATO-Russia Founding Act".1997-2001.state.gov.
  10. ^"Defense Technical Information Center".
  11. ^Kramer, Andrew E.; Erlanger, Steven (2021-12-17)."Russia Lays Out Demands for a Sweeping New Security Deal With NATO".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  12. ^abcdefghiBugayova, Nataliya; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Kagan, Frederick W. (1 October 2023)."Weakness is Lethal: Why Putin Invaded Ukraine and How the War Must End". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved2024-09-18.
  13. ^Roth, Andrew (2021-12-17)."Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe".The Guardian.ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  14. ^"Responding to Russia's New Military Buildup Near Ukraine | Crisis Group".www.crisisgroup.org. 2021-12-08. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  15. ^"Россия передала США предложения по гарантиям безопасности для России".Forbes.ru (in Russian). 2021-12-15. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  16. ^abc"Russia's draft agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for rejection?".Brookings. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  17. ^abcdTétrault-Farber, Gabrielle; Balmforth, Tom (17 December 2021)."Russia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine".Reuters.
  18. ^"Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization".MID RF. 17 December 2021.
  19. ^"Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees".MID RF. 17 December 2021.
  20. ^"Russia demands Ukraine, ex-Soviet nations be barred from NATO".Al Jazeera. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  21. ^abCrowley, Michael; Sanger, David E. (2022-01-27)."U.S. and NATO Respond to Putin's Demands as Ukraine Tensions Mount".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved2024-08-13.
  22. ^Aza, Hibai Arbide; González, Miguel (2022-02-02)."US offered disarmament measures to Russia in exchange for deescalation of military threat in Ukraine".EL PAÍS English. Retrieved2024-09-18.
  23. ^ab"Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus"(PDF). Institute for the Study of War. 17 February 2022.
  24. ^Kaplan, Fred (October 12, 2022)."The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis Are Actually Pretty Useless Right Now".Slate.
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