 Bound edition ofDe divinatione andDe fato, 1828 | |
| Author | Marcus Tullius Cicero |
|---|---|
| Language | Latin |
| Subject | Fate andfree will |
| Genre | Dialogue |
Publication date | 44 BC |
De Fato (English: "ConcerningFate") is a partiallylost philosophical treatise written by the Roman oratorCicero in 44 BC. Only two-thirds of the work exists; the beginning and ending are missing.[1][2] It takes the form of adialogue, although it reads more like an exposition,[1][3] whoseinterlocutors are Cicero and his friendAulus Hirtius.
In the work, Cicero analyzes the concept ofFate, and suggests thatfree will is a condition of Fate.[4][5] Cicero, however, does not consciously deal with the distinction betweenfatalism anddeterminism.[6]
It appears thatDe Fato is an appendix to the treatise on theology formed by the three books ofDe Natura Deorum and the two books ofDe Divinatione.[7] These three books provide important information regardingStoiccosmology andtheology.[8]
De fato is part of the second group of Cicero's writings.[1][9] The work was composed at Pozzuoli between April 17 and May 23 of 44 BC.[1][3] In any case, the work would have most likely been completed prior to Cicero's abortive departure for Greece in July of that year.[1][3] The work was written in haste, as Cicero was planning to return to the political arena.[1][2]
Hirtius notes that Cicero has adopted theAcademic method of investigation: arguing against all propositions.[10] Therefore, he outlines the positions ofDemocritus,Heraclitus,Empedocles, andAristotle as those who maintained that everything happens by necessity. As such Cicero develops the propositions offate and necessity as follows:
"If all things happen by fate, all things happen with an antecedent cause; and if this is true of desire, it is true also of what follows desire, and therefore true of assent. But if the cause of desire is not within us, desire itself is not in our power; and if this is so, then those things which are brought about by desire are not within us. Therefore neither assent nor action is in our power; and from this it follows that neither praise nor blame are just, nor honours nor punishment"[11]
Cicero essentially dismisses this proposition asantithetical to what is observed, but postulates freedom as a necessity for moral life.[6] Ultimately, Cicero maintains this position as he is emotionally convinced that it is in man's power to achieve virtue for himself; if determinism were the order of things, then such ability would not be true.[6]
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