David Sztybel | |
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| Born | (1967-02-02)2 February 1967 (age 58) |
| Education | BA (philosophy, 1991) MA (philosophy, 1994) PhD (philosophy, 2000) BEd (English and Social Studies, 2006) |
| Alma mater | University of Toronto |
| Occupation(s) | Philosopher, writer |
| Known for | Animal ethics |
| Website | davidsztybel.info |
David Sztybel (born 2 February 1967) is a Canadian philosopher specializing inanimal ethics.
Sztybel was born inToronto,Ontario. He obtained his BA in philosophy in 1991, his MA in 1994, and his PhD in 2000 – for a thesis entitled "Empathy and Rationality in Ethics" – from theUniversity of Toronto.[1]
He fulfilled an Advisory Research Committee Post-Doctoral Fellowship atQueen's University (2001-2002), held a fellowship at theOxford Centre for Animal Ethics (2007–2011), and a research fellowship at theUniversity of Vienna (2011 to present).[1] Most of his work is related toanimal rights.[2]
Sztybel has been avegan since 1988.[3]
Sztybel has developed a new theory ofanimal rights which he terms "best caring", as outlined in his paper "The Rights of Animal Persons". Criticizing conventional theories of rights based on intuition, traditionalism or common sense, compassion,Immanuel Kant's theory,John Rawls's theory, andAlan Gewirth's theory, Sztybel devises a new theory of rights for human and nonhuman animals. Sztybel bases his theory, in part, on the idea that sentient beings are ends-in-themselves, a theory of emotional cognition which verifies that some things really are good or bad for sentient beings. This is a non-utilitarian or "individuals-respecting" theory that defends the proposition that all sentient beings should be legally recognized as persons.[4]
He is critical of utilitarianism and the traditional feministethics of care. He also takes issue with the traditional notion ofanimal welfare, which supports the use of animals if steps are taken to avoid "unnecessary" suffering, the parameters of which vary. Sztybel argues that we would never call the same treatment of humans, mentally disabled or otherwise, to be consistent with their welfare. He coined the term "animal illfare" to describe conventional animal treatment. He holds that true animal welfare would only entail wishing animals good (never anything avoidably malicious). He supports that fully realized substantial animal rights correspond to a significant respect for allsentient beings.
Sztybel contends that Singer's philosophy of animal liberation is not really about liberating animals in general; he accuses Singer of being aspeciesist for defending the vivisection of animals on the ground that they have inferior cognitive capacities. In so doing, Singer is effectively sanctioning the harmful treatment of nonhuman animals on the basis of a species-characteristic which does not justify violent treatment.
He also provides a critique of theabolitionist views ofGary L. Francione andJoan Dunayer, who argue that animal rights supporters should not pursue a welfarist approach. A defense of suffering-reduction laws and a discussion of the logical problems of anti-welfarism are featured in Sztybel's article "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism".
Authority control databases: Academics |
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