Inphilosophy, aconstruct is anobject which isideal, that is, an object of the mind or of thought, meaning that its existence may be said to depend upon a subject'smind. This contrasts with any possiblymind-independent objects, the existence of which purportedly does not depend on the existence of a conscious observing subject.[1] Thus, the distinction between these two terms may be compared to that betweenphenomenon andnoumenon in other philosophical contexts and to many of the typical definitions of the termsrealism andidealism also. In thecorrespondence theory of truth, ideas, such as constructs, are to be judged and checked according to how well they correspond with theirreferents, often conceived as part of amind-independent reality.
As mind-dependent objects, concepts that are typically viewed as constructs include theabstract objects designated by such symbols as 3 or 4, or words such asliberty orcold as they are seen as a result ofinduction orabstraction that can be later applied to observable objects or compared to other constructs. Therefore, scientifichypotheses andtheories (e.g.evolutionary theory,gravitational theory), as well as classifications (for example, in biologicaltaxonomy), are also conceptual entities often considered to be constructs in the aforementioned sense. In contrast, most everyday, concrete things that surround the observer can be classified as objective (in the sense of being "real," that is, believed to be existing externally to the observer).
How much of what the observer perceives is objective is controversial, so the exact definition of constructs varies greatly across different views and philosophies. The view that the senses capture most or all of theproperties of external objects directly is usually associated with the termdirect realism. Many forms ofnominalism ascribe the process of conceptual construction to language itself, for instance, constructing the idea of "fishness" by drawing distinctions between the word "fish" and other words (such as "rock") or through some kind of resemblance between the referents that the class implied by the word encompasses. Conversely,Platonic idealism generally maintains that a "reality" independent of the subject exists, though this reality is seen as ideal, not physical or material, and so it cannot be known by the senses. As such, theidea of "liberty" or "coldness" is just asreal as that of "rockness" or "fishness."
The creation of constructs is a part ofoperationalization, especially the creation oftheoretical definitions. The usefulness of one conceptualization over another depends largely onconstruct validity. To address the non-observability of constructs, U.S. federal agencies such as theNational Institutes of Health and theNational Cancer Institute have created a construct database termedGrid-Enabled Measures (GEM) to improve construct use and reuse.
In thephilosophy of science, particularly in reference toscientific theories, ahypothetical construct is an explanatory variable which is not directly observable. For example, the concepts ofintelligence andmotivation are used to explain phenomena inpsychology, but neither is directly observable. A hypothetical construct differs from anintervening variable in that it has properties and implications which have not been demonstrated in empirical research. These serve as a guide to further research. An intervening variable, on the other hand, is a summary of observed empirical findings.
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) define a hypothetical construct as aconcept for which there is not a single observable referent, which cannot be directly observed, and for which there exist multiple referents, but none all-inclusive.[2] For example, according to Cronbach and Meehl a fish is not a hypothetical construct because, despite variation in species and varieties of fish, there is an agreed upon definition for a fish with specific characteristics that distinguish a fish from a bird. Furthermore, a fish can be directly observed. On the other hand, a hypothetical construct has no single referent; rather, hypothetical constructs consist of groups of functionally related behaviors, attitudes, processes, and experiences. Instead of seeing intelligence, love, or fear we see indicators or manifestations of what we have agreed to call intelligence, love, or fear.
McCorquodale and Meehl (1948) discussed the distinction between what they called intervening variables and these hypothetical constructs.[3] They describe hypothetical constructs as containing surplus meaning, as they imply more than just the operations by which they are measured.
In the positivist tradition, Boring (1923) described intelligence as whatever the intelligence test measures.[4] As a reaction to suchoperational definitions, Cronbach and Meehl (1955) emphasized the necessity of viewing constructs like intelligence as hypothetical constructs. They asserted that there is no adequate criterion for the operational definition of constructs like abilities and personality. Thus, according to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), a useful construct of intelligence or personality should imply more than simply test scores. Instead, these constructs should predict a wide range of behaviors.
