Conservatism in China (simplified Chinese:保守主义;traditional Chinese:保守主義;pinyin:bǎoshǒu zhǔyì) emphasizesauthority andmeritocracy stemming fromConfucian values, and economically, it aims forstate capitalism rather thanfree markets. Many Chinese conservatives rejectindividualism orclassical liberal principles and differ from modern Western conservatism because Chinese conservatism has a strongcommunitarian element. A major concern of modern Chinese conservatism is the preservation oftraditional Chinese culture.[1]
Chinese conservatism can be traced back toConfucius, whosephilosophy is based on the values of loyalty, duty, and respect. He believed in a hierarchically organized society,modeled after the patriarchal family and headed by anabsolute sovereign. However, Confucius also believed that the state should employ ameritocratic class of administrators and advisers, recruited bycivil service exams. An alternative school of thought calledLegalism argued that administrative discipline, not Confucian virtue, was crucial for the governance of the state.[2]
For thousands of years, China was ruled by monarchs of various imperial dynasties. TheMandate of Heaven theory was invoked in order to legitimize the absolute authority of the Emperor.[3] In the nineteenth century, imperial rule was challenged from within and without. TheTaiping Rebellion (1849–1861) was a massive popular movement that aimed at both social and political revolution, but theTongzhi Restoration (1861–1872) rejuvenated the regime with a combination of military innovation and social order. The historianMary C. Wright calls this "the last stand of Chinese conservatism," although later historians have different views.[4]
TheXinhai Revolution of 1911 overthrewPuyi, the last Chinese Emperor, and ushered in theRepublic of China. The Chinese nationalist partyKuomintang (KMT) was originally asocial democratic party that advocatedWesternization during theSun Yat-sen period.Chiang Kai-shek, who succeeded Sun as leader of the KMT, was originally classified as "centrist", with the more Buddhist traditional and conservative "rightist"Western Hills Group and the "leftist"Reorganization Group led byWang Jingwei. KMT was a Chinese nationalist party that ruled mainland China from 1927 to 1949, and after the anti-communistShanghai massacre in 1927, Chiang was reinforced in right-wing and conservative elements (such as traditional values).
Chiang's Nationalist revolution became "conservative" in rejecting the communist attack on social hierarchies and inequalities, but remained revolutionary in the party-state's attack on the "materialist" order and mobilization of the masses to avoid a Western style capitalist modernity.[5] TheNew Life Movement was a government-led civic campaign in the 1930s to promote cultural reform andNeo-Confucian social morality. The goal was to unite China under a centralised ideology following the emergence of ideological challenges to the status quo. This movement was related to Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist campaign at the time, but today it also inspires conservatives likeGeneral SecretaryXi Jinping of theChinese Communist Party (CCP).[citation needed]
Following his defeat in theChinese Civil War by theChinese Communist Party (CCP), Chiang continued right-wing authoritarian ruling the island ofTaiwan until his death in 1975.[6]
On the mainland, Chinese conservatism was vehemently opposed and suppressed by the CCP, especially during theCultural Revolution. Members of the "Five Black Categories"—landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, bad influencers, and right-wingers—were violently persecuted. Young people formed cadres ofRed Guards throughout the country and sought to destroy theFour Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits—leading to the destruction of a large part of China'scultural heritage, including historical artifacts and religious sites.[7] Among them, some Red Guards who embraced local officials were pejoratively called "conservatives."[8]
Following the Mao era, cultural conservatism developed as a loose grouping of intellectual trends focused on indigenous sources of modernization.[9]: 103 In recent decades, Chinese conservatism has experienced a national revival.[10]
The influence of neoconservatism in political and intellectual circles increased following 1989.[9]: 102 This trend of neoconservatism advocated a state-centered "realistic response" to what they perceived as a failure of the Mao-era socialist approach and the advancement of Western hegemony.[9]: 167 Adherents of this view contend that liberal democracy is a nihilistic and Eurocentric model incompatible with Chinese cultural and political tradition.[9]: 167
Conservatives have called for a new religious consciousness and opposed the secular order envisioned by proponents of theNew Enlightenment.[9]: 167 Confucianism has increased its presence in mainstream Chinese thought.[11][12] In addition to a New Confucianism, some conservatives embrace theSino-Christian theology movement.[9]: 167
CCP General SecretaryXi Jinping has called traditionalChinese culture the soul of the nation and the foundation of the CCP.[13][14]
Since Xi took office asCCP general secretary and became thetop leader in November 2012,social conservatism has been strengthened, including the traditional gender role for women.[15]
As a term, conservativism has been used to characterize multiple intellectual trends, including Confucian revivalists, cultural nationalists, and proponents ofrealpolitick.[9]: 10 A common theme among the diverse trends of conservatism in China is the continuity of the Chinese civilizational tradition and opposition to Western secular modernity.[9]: 10
Chiangism (Chinese:蔣介石主義) is the political philosophy ofPresidentGeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek, who used it during his rule in China under theKuomintang on both the mainland and Taiwan. It is aright-wing[a]authoritariannationalist ideology based on mostlyTridemist principles mixed withConfucianism.[18] It was primarily practiced as part of theNew Life Movement, as well as theChinese Cultural Renaissance movement. It wasinfluenced by other political ideologies, includingsocialism,fascism,party-state capitalismandpaternalistic conservatism, as well as by Chiang'sMethodistChristian beliefs.
Dai Jitao Thought (Chinese:戴季陶主義) is an ideology based on the interpretation of the Tridemism by some Kuomintang members, includingDai Jitao, since Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925. Dai Jitao Thought became the ideological foundation of the right wing Kuomintang, including the Western Hills Group. Dai Jitao himself described it as "Pure Tridemism" (纯粹三民主义).
Neoauthoritarianism (Chinese:新权威主义;pinyin:xīn quánwēi zhǔyì) is a current of political thought within thePeople's Republic of China (PRC), and to some extent theChinese Communist Party (CCP), that advocates a strong, centralized state to facilitatemarket reforms as necessary for democratic political reform,[19]: 475 [20] emphasizing stability.[20] Though incorporating aspects ofMarxist-Leninist andMaoist theories in its origination, it was described asright-wing byYuezhi Zhao,[21] and earlier asclassically conservative byBarry Sautman, with formal debate not involving Marxism.[22]
Its origin was based in reworked ideas ofSamuel Huntington, who advised thepost-Communist East European elite to take a gradualist approach towards market liberalization, rejecting earlieroptimistic modernization theories; hence, "new authoritarianism."[20] The concept of liberal democracy led to intense debate between democratic advocates and neoauthoritarians prior to the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre,[23][24] with the Neoauthoritarian wing close toZhao Ziyang.[22][25][26]
The Tianamen Square protests led to the debate being stalled.[23] ThoughDeng Xiaoping was reputedly open to Neo-authoritarian ideas,[27] the current was further moderated by his commitment to keeping state control over the commanding heights of the economy. Chris Bamall considered Chinese policy following Deng's death (1997) consistent with Neoauthoritarianism underJiang Zemin and the early leadership ofHu Jintao up to the late 2000s, including decoupling the Renminbi currency from the dollar, liberalizing prices, and passing a law allowing an increase in inheritance in 2008.[19]
Nigel Inkster considersJiang Shigong a major promoter of the ideas of neoauthoritarianism.[28][29] CCP senior officialWang Huning, widely regarded as thegrey eminence and chief ideologue of the CCP, has criticized aspects ofMarxism and recommended that China combine its historical and modern values.[30][additional citation(s) needed] According to Christer Pursiainen, "Consequently, the CCP's transformation into a right-wing elitist party occurred during the 1990s under Jiang Zeming's reign."[31]
Following the 1978Third Plenum, which madeDeng Xiaopingparamount leader, China employed a variety of strategies to develop its economy, beginning theChinese economic reform.[23] By 1982 the success of China's market experiments had become apparent, making more radical strategies seem possible and desirable. This led to the lifting of price controls and agricultural decollectivization, signaling the abandonment of theNew Economic Policy, or economicLeninism, in favour ofmarket socialism.[19]
With economic developments and political changes, China departed from totalitarianism towards whatHarry Harding characterizes as a "consultative authoritarian regime." One desire of political reform was to "restore normalcy and unity to elite politics so as to bring to an end the chronic instability of the late Maoist period and create a more orderly process of leadership succession." With cadre reform, individual leaders in China, recruited for their performance and education, became more economically liberal, with less ideological loyalty.[23]
Having begun in the era ofChairmanMao Zedong'sCultural Revolution, decentralization accelerated under Deng Xiaoping. In a neoauthoritarian vein,Zheng Yongnian (1994) believed that Deng's early reforms shifted power to local governments, aiming eventually to give it to individual enterprises. Local government, however, opposed enterprise profit retention, and began bargaining with the central government, taking over enterprise decision-making power. This inhibited the industrial efficiency that reforms aimed aimed to achieve. Thus, decentralization limited progress.
Though the government clearly opposedliberalization in December 1986, democratic and Neoauthoritarian political discussions centered inBeijing emerged in academic circles in 1988.[32] Neoauthoritarianism would catch the attention of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in early 1988 whenWu Jiaxiang wrote an article in which he concluded that the British monarchy initiated modernization by "pulling down 100 castles overnight", thus developmentally linking autocracy and freedom as preceding democracy and freedom.[22] Neoauthoritarian school was influenced bySingapore led byLee Kuan Yew andGoh Chok Tong,Taiwan led byChiang Kai-shek,Chiang Ching-kuo andLee Teng-hui, andSouth Korea led byPark Chung-hee,Chun Doo-hwan andRoh Tae-woo.[33]
Neoauthoritarianism lost favor after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. Henry He considers that, while June 4 halted the movement for democracy, because neoauthoritarianism avoids the issue of popular involvement, it would therefore be a downfall for it and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang as well. He considers it to have transformed into a kind of "neo-conservatism" after that.[35]
With the failure of democracy inRussia, and the goodperformance of Singapore, it would continue to infiltrate the upper echelons of the CCP as a neo-conservatism. Most associated withShanghai intellectuals,Wang Huning, a leading advocate in the 1980s, would go on to become a close advisor toCCP general secretaryJiang Zemin in the 1990s. The neo-conservatives would enjoy Jiang's patronage.[36]
New Conservatism or neoconservatism (Chinese:新保守主义;pinyin:xīn bǎoshǒu zhǔyì) argued for political and economic centralization and the establishment of shared moral values.[37]: 637–9 [38]: 33 The movement has been described in the West by political scientist Joseph Fewsmith.[37] Neoconservatives are opposed to radical reform projects and argue that an authoritarian and incrementalist approach is necessary to stabilize the process ofmodernization.[39]
Prominent neoconservative theorists includeXiao Gongqin, initially a leading neoauthoritarian who promoted "gradual reform under strong rule" after 1989.[40]: 53
A central figure, if not principal proponent of Neoauthoritarianism, the "well-connected"[22]Wu Jiaxiang was an advisor to PremierZhao Ziyang,[20] the latter being a major architect of the Deng Xiaoping reforms.[citation needed]
Samuel Huntington'sPolitical Order in Changing Societies rejected economic development or modernization as transferable to the political sphere as a mere variable of the former. He preconditioned democracy on institutionalization and stability, with democracy and economic change undermining or putting strain on political stability in poor circumstances. He considered the measure of a political system to be its ability to keep order. Writing in the 1960s, he lauded the United States and Soviet Union equally; what the Soviet Union lacked in social justice was made up for in strong controls.[20]
Wu considered social developments like liberal democracy unable to proceed simply from new authorities. Democracy has to be based on the development of the market, because the market reduces the number of public decisions, the number of people seeking political power and rights for economic benefit, and therefore the "cost" of political action. The separation of the political and economic spheres lays a foundation for a further separation of powers, thereby negating autocracy despite the centralizing tendency of the state. The market also defines interests, increasing "responsibility" and thereby decreasing the possibility of bribery in preparation for democratic politics. On the other hand, political actions become excessive without a market, or with a mixed market, because a large number of people will seek political posts, raising the "cost" of political action and making effective consultation difficult. To avoid this problem, a country without a developed market has to maintain strongman politics and a high degree of centralism.[41]
China's measures for successful economic and political stabilization led many scholars and politicians to accept the role of an authoritarian regime in fast and stable economic growth. Although the Chinese state is seen as legitimizing democracy as a modernization goal, economic growth is seen as more important.[23]
In his 1994 article Zheng Yongnian elaborates that,
Administrative power should be strengthened in order to provide favorable conditions, especially stable politics, for market development. Without such a political instrument, both 'reform' and 'open door' are impossible... A precondition of political development is the provision of very favorable conditions for economic progress. Political stability must be given highest priority... without stable politics, domestic construction is impossible, let alone an 'open door' policy. So, if political reform or democracy undermines political stability, it is not worthwhile. In other words, an authoritarian regime is desirable if it can produce stable politics.[23]
Deng Xiaoping explains: "Why have we treated student demonstrations so seriously and so quickly? Because China is not able to bear more disturbance and more disorder." Given the dominance of the Chinese state, Zheng believes that, when democracy is finally implemented, it is more likely to be a gift from the elite to the society rather than brought about by internal[clarification needed] forces.[23]
When neoauthoritarianism emerged to scholarly debate, Rong Jian opposed his old idea as regressive, favoring the multiparty faction. He would become famous for a news article on the matter.[26]
Chinese-Canadian sociologistYuezhi Zhao views the neoauthoritarians as having attempted to avoid an economic crisis through dictatorship,[42] andBarry Sautman characterizes them as reflecting the policy of "pre-revolutionary Chinese leaders" as well as "contemporary Third World strongmen", as part of ideological developments of the decade he considers more recognizable to westerners as conservative and liberal. Sautman sums its theory with a quote from Su Shaozi (1986): "What China needs today is a strong liberal leader."[22]
Li Cheng and Lynn T. White nonetheless regard the neoauthoritarians as resonating withtechnocracy emerging in the 1980s as a result of "dramatic"policy shifts in 1978 that promoted such to top posts.[42] Henry He considers the main criticism of neoauthoritarianism to be its continued advocacy of an "old" type of establishment, relying on charismatic leaders. His view is corroborated by Yan Yining and Li Wei, with the addition that for Yan what is needed is law, or Li democracy, administrative efficiency and scientific government. Li points out that previous crisis in China were not due to popular participation, but power struggles and corruption, and that an authoritarian state does not usually separate powers.[35] A criticism by Zhou Wenzhang is that neoauthoritarianism only considers problems of authority from the angle of centralization, similarly considering the main problem of authority to be whether or not it is exercised scientifically.[43]
Party-state capitalism is a term used by some economists and sociologists to describe the contemporaryeconomy of China under the Chinese Communist Party.[44][45] The term has also been used to describe theeconomy of Taiwan under theauthoritarianmilitary government of the Kuomintang.
Conservatism inHong Kong has become the backbone of today'spro-Beijing camp, which has been the major supporting force of theSAR administration led by the indirectly electedChief Executive. It is one of two major political ideologies of theHong Kong, with the other beingliberalism. Since theSino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, conservatism has been characterised by business elites joining with pro-Communist traditional leftists in a "united front" to resist the rise of the demand fordemocratisation andliberalisation, in order to secure continued political stability and economic prosperity while maintaining a good relationship with thecommunist central government inBeijing leading up to and after the1997 handover.
Historically, conservatism derives from the Chinese tradition offamilism andConfucianism and was incorporated into the British colonial government's policies byGovernorCecil Clementi in the 1920s in the wake of risingMarxism–Leninism andcommunism in general. Theanti-communist sentiments continued after theSecond World War when waves of Chinese refugees fled to the colony as theChinese Communist Party (CCP) swept acrossMainland China in the renewedChinese Civil War. At this time, Conservatives supported theRepublic of China (ROC), and werepro–Kuomintang (KMT). After thede facto end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 when theROC government fled to Taiwan and throughout theCold War, Conservatives have also takenlibertarian thoughts on economic policies. Before the 1980s, most conservatives held a stronganti-communist sentiment.
Conservatism in Macau dates back to modernPortuguese Macau. Unlike Hong Kong, which was ruled byUnited Kingdom, aliberal democracy in the first half of the 20th century, Macao was influenced by Portugal'sAntónio de Oliveira Salazar'sright-wing dictatorship in the 20th century, resulting in a weak liberal pro-democracy movement.Macau people, on average, have much more pro-China sentiment thanHong Kong people. Today, Macau's conservatism is represented by thepro-Beijing camp.
Conservatism in Taiwan is a broad political philosophy which espouses theOne-China policy as a vital component for theRepublic of China (ROC)'s international security and economic development, as opposed toTaiwanization and Taiwanese sovereignty. Fundamental conservative ideas are grounded inConfucian values and strands of Chinese philosophy associated withSun Yat-sen's teachings, a large centralized government which intervenes closely in the lives of individuals on both social and economic levels, and the construction of unifiedSinocentric national identity.
Conservative ideology in Taiwan constitutes the character and policies of theKuomintang (KMT) party and that of thepan-blue camp. However, not all conservatives in Taiwan are ideologically friendly to pan-blue, and there are also some conservatives, such as someconservative Taiwanese nationalists andpro-Beijing conservatives.
New Confucianism is anintellectual movement ofConfucianism that began in the early 20th century inRepublican China, and further developed in post-Mao eracontemporary China. It primarily developed during theMay Fourth Movement.[46] It is deeply influenced by, but not identical with, theneo-Confucianism of theSong andMing dynasties.[47]
It is a neo-conservative movement of various Chinese traditions and has been regarded as containing religious overtones; it advocates for certain Confucianist elements of society – such as social, ecological, and political harmony[46] – to be applied in a contemporary context in synthesis with Western philosophies such asrationalism andhumanism.[47] Its philosophies have emerged as a focal point of discussion between Confucian scholars inmainland China,Taiwan,Hong Kong, and theUnited States.
![Confucius[2]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2ff%2ff2%2fCropped_version_of_Confucius_Portrait%252C_Kongzi_%2528Confucius%2529_Family_Mansion%252C_Qufu_%252813044335945%2529.jpg%2f120px-Cropped_version_of_Confucius_Portrait%252C_Kongzi_%2528Confucius%2529_Family_Mansion%252C_Qufu_%252813044335945%2529.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Shang Yang[2][48]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f2%2f28%2fStatue_of_Shang_Yang.jpg%2f120px-Statue_of_Shang_Yang.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Dong Zhongshu[49]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2fd%2fd6%2f%25E6%25AD%25B7%25E4%25BB%25A3%25E8%2581%2596%25E8%25B3%25A2%25E5%258D%258A%25E8%25BA%25AB%25E5%2583%258F_%25E5%2586%258A_%25E8%2591%25A3%25E4%25BB%25B2%25E8%2588%2592_%2528Dong_Zhongshu%2529.png%2f120px-%25E6%25AD%25B7%25E4%25BB%25A3%25E8%2581%2596%25E8%25B3%25A2%25E5%258D%258A%25E8%25BA%25AB%25E5%2583%258F_%25E5%2586%258A_%25E8%2591%25A3%25E4%25BB%25B2%25E8%2588%2592_%2528Dong_Zhongshu%2529.png&f=jpg&w=240)
![Zhu Xi[50][51]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f9%2f9e%2fZhu_xi.jpg%2f120px-Zhu_xi.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Hu Hanmin[52]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f6%2f68%2fHu_Hanmin3.jpg%2f120px-Hu_Hanmin3.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Dai Jitao[53]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f5%2f54%2fDaichuanxian.jpg%2f120px-Daichuanxian.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Chiang Kai-shek[6]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f3%2f38%2fChiang_Kai-shek%25EF%25BC%2588%25E8%2594%25A3%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E6%25AD%25A3%25EF%25BC%2589.jpg%2f120px-Chiang_Kai-shek%25EF%25BC%2588%25E8%2594%25A3%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E6%25AD%25A3%25EF%25BC%2589.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Wang Huning[30]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f5%2f56%2f%25E7%258E%258B%25E6%25B2%25AA%25E5%25AE%2581_Wang_Huning_20221023.jpg%2f120px-%25E7%258E%258B%25E6%25B2%25AA%25E5%25AE%2581_Wang_Huning_20221023.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Xi Jinping[13]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f3%2f32%2fXi_Jinping_2019.jpg%2f120px-Xi_Jinping_2019.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Cecil Clementi[54]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f2%2f21%2fSIRCECILCLEMENTIHKU.jpg%2f120px-SIRCECILCLEMENTIHKU.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Allen Lee[55]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f9%2f95%2fAllen_Lee_at_71demo_2008.jpg%2f120px-Allen_Lee_at_71demo_2008.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Donald Tsang[56]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f6%2f65%2fDon%2526Selina_220.jpg%2f120px-Don%2526Selina_220.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Regina Ip[57]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f5%2f52%2fRegina_Ip_20230712_%2528cropped%2529.jpg%2f120px-Regina_Ip_20230712_%2528cropped%2529.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Junius Ho[58]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f1%2f1e%2fJuniusHo20180425_%2528cropped%2529.jpg%2f120px-JuniusHo20180425_%2528cropped%2529.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Chiang Kai-shek[6]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f2%2f27%2f%25E8%2594%25A3%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E6%25AD%25A3%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E7%258E%2589%25E7%2585%25A7.png%2f120px-%25E8%2594%25A3%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E6%25AD%25A3%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E7%258E%2589%25E7%2585%25A7.png&f=jpg&w=240)
![Chiang Ching-kuo[59]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f2%2f2b%2fPortrait_of_Chiang_Ching-kuo.jpg%2f120px-Portrait_of_Chiang_Ching-kuo.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Hau Pei-tsun[60]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2fd%2fda%2f%25E9%2583%259D%25E6%259F%258F%25E6%259D%2591%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7.jpg%2f120px-%25E9%2583%259D%25E6%259F%258F%25E6%259D%2591%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Ma Ying-jeou[61]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2fe%2fe4%2f%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E8%258F%25AF%25E6%25B0%2591%25E5%259C%258B%25E7%25AC%25AC12%25E3%2580%258113%25E4%25BB%25BB%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E9%25A6%25AC%25E8%258B%25B1%25E4%25B9%259D%25E5%2585%2588%25E7%2594%259F%25E5%25AE%2598%25E6%2596%25B9%25E8%2582%2596%25E5%2583%258F%25E7%2585%25A7.jpg%2f120px-%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E8%258F%25AF%25E6%25B0%2591%25E5%259C%258B%25E7%25AC%25AC12%25E3%2580%258113%25E4%25BB%25BB%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E9%25A6%25AC%25E8%258B%25B1%25E4%25B9%259D%25E5%2585%2588%25E7%2594%259F%25E5%25AE%2598%25E6%2596%25B9%25E8%2582%2596%25E5%2583%258F%25E7%2585%25A7.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Hung Hsiu-chu[62]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2f8%2f88%2f%25E6%25B4%25AA%25E7%25A7%2580%25E6%259F%25B1%25E5%2589%25AF%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7.jpg%2f120px-%25E6%25B4%25AA%25E7%25A7%2580%25E6%259F%25B1%25E5%2589%25AF%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Jaw Shaw-kong[63]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2fd%2fd7%2f%25E8%25B6%2599%25E5%25B0%2591%25E5%25BA%25B7%25E5%2589%25AF%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E5%2580%2599%25E9%2581%25B8%25E4%25BA%25BA.jpg%2f120px-%25E8%25B6%2599%25E5%25B0%2591%25E5%25BA%25B7%25E5%2589%25AF%25E7%25B8%25BD%25E7%25B5%25B1%25E5%2580%2599%25E9%2581%25B8%25E4%25BA%25BA.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
![Han Kuo-yu[64]](/image.pl?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2f%2fupload.wikimedia.org%2fwikipedia%2fcommons%2fthumb%2fb%2fba%2f%25E7%25AB%258B%25E6%25B3%2595%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7%25E9%259F%2593%25E5%259C%258B%25E7%2591%259C.jpg%2f120px-%25E7%25AB%258B%25E6%25B3%2595%25E9%2599%25A2%25E9%2595%25B7%25E9%259F%2593%25E5%259C%258B%25E7%2591%259C.jpg&f=jpg&w=240)
Consequently, the CCP's transformation into a right-wing elitist party occurred during the 1990s under Jiang Zeming's reign.
保守的,當時黨內出現「開明派」與「保守派」之爭,前者力主反共政策應當調整,黨禁、報禁必須開放,否則就得不到民心,後者則以國家安全為訴求,強調「安全第一、秩序第一,領導權威不容懷疑」等,蔣經國明顯是站在保守派這一邊,而保守派的代表人就是王昇 ...
Hou is a policeman-turned-mayor, while Jaw is a conservative media commentator.
Han Kuo-yu, seen by many as the 'Taiwanese Trump' due to his populist appeal to conservative social values
