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Conflict escalation

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Conflict escalation is the process by which conflicts grow in severity or scale over time. That may refer to conflicts between individuals or groups in interpersonal relationships, or it may refer to the escalation of hostilities in a political or military context. Insystems theory, the process of conflict escalation is modeled bypositive feedback. Conflict escalation can be modeled withgame theory.[1] In contrast,de-escalation are approaches which lead to a decrease or end of aconflict.[2]

While the wordescalation was used as early as in 1938, it was popularized during theCold War by two important books:On Escalation (Herman Kahn, 1965) andEscalation and the Nuclear Option (Bernard Brodie, 1966).[3] In those contexts, it especially referred to war between two major states withweapons of mass destruction during the Cold War.

Conflict escalation has a tactical role in military conflict and is often formalized with explicitrules of engagement. Highly-successfulmilitary tactics exploit a particular form of conflict escalation such as by controlling an opponent's reaction time, which allows the tactician to pursue or trap his opponent. BothNapoleon Bonaparte andHeinz Guderian advocated that approach.Sun Tzu elaborated it in a more abstract form and maintained thatmilitary strategy was about minimizing escalation anddiplomacy was about eliminating it.

Continuum of force

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Main article:Use of force continuum

TheUnited States Marine Corps' "Continuum of Force" (found in MCRP 3-02B)[clarification needed] documents the stages of conflict escalation in combat for a typical subject:

Level 1: Compliant (cooperative)

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The subject responds to and obeys verbal commands. He refrains from close combat.

Level 2: Resistant (passive)

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The subject resists verbal commands but complies to commands immediately upon contact controls. He refrains from close combat.

Level 3: Resistant (active)

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Initially, the subject physically resists commands, but he can be made to comply by compliance techniques, including come-along holds, soft-handed stunning blows, and techniques inducing pain by joint manipulation and pressure points.

Level 4: Assaultive (bodily harm)

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The unarmed subject physically attacks his opponent. He can be controlled by certain defensive tactics, including blocks, strikes, kicks, enhancedpain compliance procedures, impact weapon blocks, andblows.

Level 5: Assaultive (lethal force)

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The subject has a weapon and will likely kill or injure someone unless he is controlled. That is possible only by lethal force, which possibly requires firearms or weapons. This could also include the subject physically overpowering someone and choking them out, which will cause injury or death if sustained for a long period of time.

International relations

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Conflict escalation forecasts have been increasing in reliability.[4]Asymmetric warfare can in some situations lead to persistent conflict escalation.[5] AFait accompli can result in rewards for short periods of conflict escalation.[6]Appeasement can in some situations lead to conflict escalation.[7] Overconfidence inescalation control can potentially lead to further conflict escalation includingnuclear escalation.[8]

See also

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References

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  1. ^Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc (1987). "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis".The American Political Science Review.81 (3):833–850.doi:10.2307/1962679.JSTOR 1962679.
  2. ^Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Rational Deescalation." (1985).
  3. ^Freedman, Lawrence (1993).The evolution of nuclear strategy (2nd ed.). New York: St Martin's press. pp. 198–199.ISBN 0-312-02843-1.
  4. ^Hegre, Håvard; Metternich, Nils W.; Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv; Wucherpfennig, Julian (2017)."Introduction".Journal of Peace Research.54 (2):113–124.doi:10.1177/0022343317691330.
  5. ^Langlois, Jean-Pierre P.; Langlois, Catherine C. (2005). "Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence".International Studies Quarterly.49 (3):503–528.doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x.
  6. ^Tarar, Ahmer (2016). "A Strategic Logic of the MilitaryFait Accompli".International Studies Quarterly.60 (4):742–752.doi:10.1093/isq/sqw018.
  7. ^McKeil, Aaron (2021-07-09)."The Limits of Realism after Liberal Hegemony".Journal of Global Security Studies.7 ogab020.doi:10.1093/jogss/ogab020.ISSN 2057-3170.
  8. ^Larsen, Even Hellan (21 Feb 2024)."Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Escalation".Security Studies:1–37.doi:10.1080/09636412.2024.2311106.ISSN 0963-6412.
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