Condottieri (Italian:[kondotˈtjɛːri]; singular:condottiero orcondottiere) were Italian military leaders active during theMiddle Ages and theearly modern period. The term originally referred specifically to commanders ofmercenary companies, derived from the Italian wordcondotta—the contract under which they served acity-state or lord. The wordcondottiero thus meant 'contractor'. Over time, however, in Italian usage,condottiero came to mean any 'commander' or 'military leader'.[1][2][3]
In the 13th and 14th centuries, theItalian city-states ofVenice,Florence, andGenoa were very rich from their trade with theLevant, yet possessed woefully small armies. In the event that foreign powers and envious neighbours attacked, the ruling nobles hired foreign mercenaries to fight for them. The military-service terms and conditions were stipulated in acondotta (contract) between the city-state and the soldiers (officer and enlisted man), thus, the "contracted" leader, the mercenary captain commanding, was titled the "Condottiere".
From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, European soldiers led by professional officers fought against theMuslims inthe Crusades (1095–1291). These crusading officers provided large-scale warfare combat experience in the Holy Land. At the Crusades' conclusion, the firstmasnada (bands of roving soldiers;pl.:masnade) appeared in Italy. Given the profession, somemasnade were less mercenaries than bandits and desperate men. Thesemasnade were not Italian, but (mostly)Flemings, from theDuchy of Brabant (hence,Brabanzoni), and fromAragon. The latter were Spanish soldiers who had followed KingPeter III of Aragon in theWar of the Sicilian Vespers in Italy in October 1282, and, post-war, remained there, seeking military employment. By 1333 other mercenaries had arrived in Italy to fight withJohn of Bohemia as theCompagnia della Colomba (Company of the Dove) inPerugia's war againstArezzo. The first well-organised mercenaries in Italy were the Ventura Companies ofDuke Werner von Urslingen andCount Konrad von Landau. Werner's company differed from other mercenary companies because its code of military justice imposed discipline and an equal division of the contract's income. The Ventura Company increased in number until becoming the fearsome "Great Company" of some 3,000barbute (eachbarbuta comprised a knight and a sergeant).
 | This sectiondoes notcite anysources. Please helpimprove this section byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged andremoved.(April 2018) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
.jpg)
The first mercenary company with an Italian as its chief was the "Company of St. George" formed in 1339 and led byLodrisio Visconti. This company was defeated and destroyed byLuchino Visconti of Milan (anothercondottiero and uncle of Lodrisio) in April 1339. Later, in 1377, a second "Company of St. George" was formed under the leadership ofAlberico da Barbiano, also an Italian and the Count of Conio, who later taughtmilitary science tocondottieri such asBraccio da Montone andGiacomuzzo Attendolo Sforza, who also served in the company.[4]
Once aware of their military power monopoly in Italy, thecondottieri bands became notorious for their capriciousness and soon dictated terms to their ostensible employers. In turn, many condottieri, such as Braccio da Montone and Muzio Sforza, became powerful politicians. As most were educated men acquainted with Roman military science manuals (e.g.Vegetius'sEpitoma rei militarii), they began viewing warfare from the perspective of military science, rather than as a matter of valour or physical courage—a great, consequential departure fromchivalry, the traditional medieval model of soldiering. Consequently, thecondottieri fought by outmanoeuvring the opponent and fighting his ability to wage war, rather than risking uncertain fortune—defeat, capture, death—in battlefield combat.
The earlier, medievalcondottieri developed the "art of war" (military strategy andtactics) into military science more than any of their historical military predecessors—fighting indirectly, not directly—thus, only reluctantly endangering themselves and their enlisted men, avoiding battle when possible, also avoiding hard work and winter campaigns, as these all reduced the total number of trained soldiers available, and were detrimental to their political and economic interest.[5]Niccolò Machiavelli even said thatcondottieri fought each other in grandiose, but often pointless and near-bloodless battles. However, later in the Renaissance thecondottieri line of battle still deployed the grand armoured knight and medieval weapons and tactics after most European powers had begun employing professional standing armies ofpikemen andmusketeers; this helped to contribute to their eventual decline and destruction.[citation needed]
In 1347,Cola di Rienzo (Tribune and effective dictator of the city) had Werner von Urslingen executed in Rome, and Konrad von Landau assumed command of the Great Company. On the conclusion (1360) of thePeace of Bretigny between England and France, SirJohn Hawkwood led an army of English mercenaries, called theWhite Company, into Italy, which took a prominent part in the confused wars of the next thirty years. Towards the end of the century, the Italians began to organize armies of the same description. This ended the reign of the purely mercenary company and began that of the semi-national mercenary army which endured in Europe till replaced by the national standing army system. In 1363, Count von Landau was betrayed by his Hungarian soldiers, and defeated in combat, by the White Company's more advanced tactics under commandersAlbert Sterz and John Hawkwood. Strategically, thebarbuta was replaced with the three-soldier, mountedlancia (acapo-lancia, a groom, and a boy); fivelance composed aposta, fiveposte composed abandiera (flag). By that time, the campaigningcondottieri companies were as much Italian as foreign: theAstorre I Manfredi'sCompagnia della Stella (Company of the Star); a newCompagnia di San Giorgio (Company of St. George) under Ambrogio Visconti; Niccolò da Montefeltro'sCompagnia del Cappelletto (Little Hat Company); and theCompagnia della Rosa (Company of the Rose), commanded by Giovanni da Buscareto and Bartolomeo Gonzaga.
From the 15th century hence, mostcondottieri were landless Italian nobles who had chosen the profession of arms as a livelihood; the most famous of such mercenary captains was the son ofCaterina Sforza,Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, fromForlì, known asThe Last Condottiere; his son wasCosimo I de' Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany; besides noblemen,princes also fought as condottieri, given the sizable income to their estates, notablySigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta, Lord ofRimini, andFederico da Montefeltro, Duke ofUrbino; despite war-timeinflation, soldier's pay was high:
Thecondottieri company commanders selected the soldiers to enlist; thecondotta was a consolidated contract, and, when theferma (service period) elapsed, the company entered anaspetto (wait) period, wherein the contracting city-state considered its renewal. If thecondotta expired definitively, thecondottiere could not declare war against the contracting city-state for two years. This military–business custom was respected because professional reputation (business credibility) was everything to the condottieri; a deceived employer was a reputation ruined; likewise, for maritime mercenaries, whosecontratto d'assento (lit. 'contract of assent') stipulated naval military-service terms and conditions; sea captains and sailors so-contracted were calledassentisti. Their principal employers wereGenoa and thePapal States, beginning in the fourteenth century, yetVenice considered it humiliating to so employ military sailors, and did not use naval mercenaries, even during the greatest danger in the city's history.
In 15th-century Italy, thecondottieri were masterful lords of war; during thewars in Lombardy, Machiavelli observed:
None of the principal states were armed with their own proper forces. Thus the arms of Italy were either in the hands of the lesser princes, or of men who possessed no state; for the minor princes did not adopt the practice of arms from any desire of glory, but for the acquisition of either property or safety. The others (those who possessed no state) being bred to arms from their infancy, were acquainted with no other art, and pursued war for emolument, or to confer honour upon themselves.
— History I. vii.
In 1487, atCalliano, theVenetians successfully met and acquitted themselves against the Germanlandsknechte and the Swiss infantry, the best soldiers in Europe at the time.
In 1494, the French kingCharles VIII's royal army invaded the Italian Peninsula, initiating theItalian Wars. The most renownedcondottieri fought in these conflicts. Since the mid-16th century, mercenary captains decline in importance. However, they continue to exist into the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The political practice of hiring foreign mercenaries also did not end. For example, theVatican'sSwiss Guard are the modern remnants of a historically effective mercenary army.
The following is a list of famous Italian mercenary captains:
Some of the most famous battles in which they were involved are:
While the military servicecondotta gradually disappeared, the termcondottiere remained in use, denominating the great Italian generals fighting for European states, monarchs and Popes during the Italian wars and theEuropean wars of religion.[6][7][8] Men referred to as 'condottieri' in this sense include theMarquis of Pescara (1489–1525), theMarquis of Vasto (1502–1546),Ferrante Gonzaga (1507–1557),Marcantonio II Colonna (1535–1584),Alexander Farnese (1545–1592),Torquato Conti (1591–1636),Ambrogio Spinola (1569–1630),Ottavio Piccolomini (1599–1656),Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680) and many others. Therefore, in Italian, the term 'condottiero' eventually became synonymous with 'military leader' or 'commander'.
This article incorporates text from a publication now in thepublic domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "condottiere".Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 6 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 854–855.
