The party headed an electoral allianceCivic Coalition, which was founded in 2018. Since its creation, it had shown strong electoral performances inWarsaw, the west, and the north of Poland. Since the 2000s, the Civic Platform had established itself as one of the dominant political parties in Poland. On 25 October 2025, the party merged into a new party calledCivic Coalition, bearing the same name as the PO-led electoral coalition from 2018.
History
Establishment
The Civic Platform was founded in 2001 aseconomically liberal,Christian-democratic split from existing parties. FoundersAndrzej Olechowski,Maciej Płażyński, andDonald Tusk were sometimes jokingly called "the Three Tenors" by Polish media and commentators. Olechowski and Płażyński left the party during the 2001–2005 parliamentary term, leaving Tusk as the sole remaining founder, and current party leader.
First elections
In the2001 general election, the party secured 12.6% of the vote and 65 deputies in theSejm, making it the largest opposition party to the government led by theDemocratic Left Alliance (SLD). In the2002 local elections, PO stood together withLaw and Justice in 15 voivodeships (in 14 asPOPiS, in Podkarpacie with another centre-right political parties). They stood separately only in Mazovia.
The POPiS coalition won 12% of the popular vote nationally, which was well below the expectations.Ludwik Dorn, the chairman of the PiS parliamentary club at the time, remarked: "Together, we gained as much as the PO itself collected a year earlier." This marked the point at which PO and PiS, until now ideological and political allies, started to grow apart. The leadership of PiS decided that it had to distance itself from PO and change its ideology in order to increase its popular support.[2]
In 2005, PO led all opinion polls with 26% to 30% of public support. However, in the2005 general election, in which it was led byJan Rokita, PO polled only 24.1% and unexpectedly came second to the 27% garnered byLaw and Justice (PiS). Acentre-right coalition of PO and PiS (nicknamedPOPiS) was deemed most likely to form a government after the election. Yet the putative coalition parties had a falling out in the wake of the fiercely contestedPolish presidential election of 2005.
In the 2005 elections, PiS attacked PO by campaigning on a difference between "liberal Poland" and its "social Poland". The former was marked by economic liberalism, austerity, deregulation and "serving the rich". In contrast, Law and Justice stressed its "social" character, pledging policies that would help the poor. The party attacked Civic Platform's flat tax proposal and advocated a much more active role of the state in the economy. Law and Justice also made "an offer to the left", stressing its economically left-wing policies.[3]
Ultimately,Lech Kaczyński (PiS) won the second round of the presidential election on 23 October 2005 with 54% of the vote, ahead of Tusk, the PO candidate. Due to the demands of PiS for control of all the armed ministries (the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the office of the prime minister, PO and PiS were unable to form a coalition. Instead, PiS formed a coalition government with the support of theLeague of Polish Families (LPR) andSelf-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP). PO became the opposition to this PiS-led coalition government.
Ruling government (2007–2015)
The PiS-led coalition fell apart in 2007 amid a corruption scandal involvingAndrzej Lepper andTomasz Lipiec[4] and internal leadership disputes. These events led to new elections, and in the 21 October 2007parliamentary election PO won 41.51% of the popular vote and 209 out of 460 seats in theSejm and 60 out of 100 seats in theSenate of Poland. Civic Platform, now the largest party in both houses of parliament, subsequently formed a coalition with thePolish People's Party (PSL).
Despite declaring the parliamentary election campaign the will to limit taxation in Poland,[5] the Civic Platform implemented an ideologically diverse set of policies - it increased the excise imposed on diesel oil, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and oil.[8] It had also eliminatedtax exemptions.[12]
In November 2010, local elections granted Civic Platform about 30.1 percent of the votes and PiS at 23.2 percent, an increase for the former and a drop for the latter compared to the 2006 elections.[13] PO succeeded in winning four consecutive elections, and Tusk remained askingmaker. PO's dominance was also a reflection of left-wing weakness and divisions on both sides of the political scene, with PiS suffering a splinter in Autumn 2010.[13] Civic Platform won the plurality of votes in the9 October 2011 parliamentary election, gaining 39.18% of the popular vote, 207 of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 63 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[14]
In the2015 parliamentary election, PO came in second place, after PiS, achieving 24.09% of the popular vote, 138 out of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 34 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[18] In the2018 local elections, PO achieved 26.97% of the votes, coming second after PiS.[19] In the2019 European elections, PO participated in theEuropean Coalition electoral alliance which achieved 38.47%, coming second after PiS.[20] On 1 October 2023, it held The Million Hearts march in Warsaw.[21]
In October 2025, the party announed its plans to merge into a new party with two of its smaller coalition partners,Modern andPolish Initiative.[22] The unification convention was held on 25 October 2025, where the three parties merged into a single party known as theCivic Coalition.[23] Some members of the 2018 electoral alliance Civic Coalition, such as theGreens, opted to remain a separate party.[24] The leader of the new party became Donald Tusk,[25] and the new party is to complete its leadership election on 26 January 2026.[26] The creation of Civic Coalition marked the dissolution of the Civic Platform.[27]
Ideology
Civic Platform banner carried during the opposition march on 4 June 2023
Since 2007, when Civic Platform formed the government, the party has gradually moved from its Christian-democratic stances, and many of its politicians hold more liberal positions on social issues. In 2013, the Civic Platform's government introduced public funding ofin vitro fertilization program. Civic Platform also supportedcivil unions for same-sex couples but was againstsame-sex marriage and theadoption of children by same-sex couples. The party also supportedliberalization of the abortion law,[68] which it had opposed while in government.[69] In response to theclimate crisis, the Civic Platform pledged to end the use ofcoal forenergy in Poland by 2040.[70]
After becoming the biggest opposition party, the Civic Platform became moreculturally liberal andpopulist.[81][82][83][84] This tendency became especially popular among the younger generation of the party's politicians, such asmayor of Warsaw and presidential candidateRafał Trzaskowski. The party has also changed its opinion about the social programs of PiS, starting to support them.[85][86][87] After returning to the government in 2023, the party adopted ananti-immigration stance to migrants coming from Russia and Belarus.[88]
Civic Platform's support was concentrated in the west and north of the country. Areas voting forBronisław Komorowski in 2010 are shaded orange above.
As of 2020, the party enjoyed the greatest support in large cities and among people with higher education and in managerial positions, while in terms of age, the electorate was evenly distributed,[89] and the electoral base of the Civic Platform lay in middle-aged, highly educatedgold-collar andwhite-collar workers of themiddle andupper-middle classes.[89] As of 2020, the Civic Platform electorate was made up of more women than men, was disproportionally represented by middle-aged, urban and middle-class voters, and was characterized by higher levels of education, higher position in the socio-professional structure, as well as moderate religiosity and Roman Catholicism.[90] The party consistently enjoyed overwhelming support of workers such as directors, managers and specialists, business owners and co-owners, and administrative workers.[89] At the same time, the party underperformed amongstblue-collar workers, young voters, farmers and students, as well as unemployed voters.[89] In regards to age, Civic Platform performed the best amongst voters aged 40–49, while also performing strongly among 30-39 and 50-59 year olds. The party performs the worst amongst the oldest (aged 60 or more) and the youngest (aged 29 or less) voters.[89] The party strongly appealed to urban voters, as almost a half of voters living in big cities (500,000 people or more) vote for Civic Platform; support for the party remains strong in middle-sized cities but strongly declines in small towns and the countryside, as on average only 15% of rural voters support it.[89]
As of 2016, an overwhelming majority of party's supporters (83%) were Roman Catholics, and 44% of these voters partook in religious practices at least once a week.[91] As of 2016, the party was supported by theChristian left, as well as liberal and moderate Catholics,[91] while most of conservative Catholics in Poland supportLaw and Justice instead.[91] Churchgoing Catholics are roughly evenly split between Civic Platform and Law and Justice, with a significant minority of churchgoers supportingPolish People's Party as well.[91] Catholics who support Civic Platform "oppose, on the one hand, the state's enforcement of religious norms and, on the other, do not condone their violation".[92] This was largely consistent with the party's attitude towards religion, which combines a moderately conservative andpolitically Catholic program with left-wing economic slogans, supported byCatholic social teaching and the teaching ofJohn Paul II contained in the encyclicalCentesimus annus.[92]
As of 2020, most of Civic Platform's electorate identified asliberal conservatives, centrists and moderate conservatives.[93] No tendency dominates, as the party's supporters are roughly evenly split between political tendencies - 35% of party's supporters identify withpolitical center, 28% asleft-wing, and 24% asright-wing.[93] Throughout the 2010s, Civic Platform had been losing left-wing supporters due to the re-emergence ofLewica as well asJanusz Palikot's defection from the party.[93] The party also faced a challenge fromNowoczesna, whose vote "came largely from former Civic Platform supporters, disappointed with its failure to shake off its social conservatism".[94] According to Janusz Jartyś of theUniversity of Szczecin, the ideological base of Civic Platform are "national-conservative, liberal and social-democratic voters", with each faction expecting "at least partial implementation of their demands, stability in the governance of the country and social peace".[95] According toSøren Riishøj, the party was also unpopular amongst the traditionally social-democratic voters, who were opposed toEuropeanisation andglobalization, and were critical of the Civic Platform's "almost U.S. type of election campaign."[96]
As of 2021, according toCBOS, Civic Platform was overwhelmingly popular amongst pro-European voters, with almost 80% of party's supporters wishing to cooperate with theEuropean Union more.[97] The party was generally supported by moderates, as most of the party's voters wish for a "compromise" on issues such as abortion.[97] Economically, the party was supported by pro-business and welfare-oriented voters alike; while most of Civic Platform's supporters believe that Poland should become awelfare state, they are evenly split on issues such asprogressive taxation andflat tax, andnationalization vs.privatization.[97] The party has also enjoyed the support ofregionalists,autonomists and voters supportive ofdecentralization andlocalism in general.[97] Over 90% of Civic Platform supporters believe that local governments should have more power and that the national government should devolve its power to the regional governments ofgminas andvoivodeships.[97] The party was supported bySilesian regionalists,[98] and had organized joint electoral lists with Silesian parties likeSilesian Autonomy Movement andSilesian Regional Party.[99] Local politicians of the Civic Platform in Silesia are often associated with Silesian regionalism as well.[100] The party also enjoys support from theKashubians and their local autonomist movement,[101] with the co-founder of the party,Donald Tusk, having expressed his support for autonomousKashubia in 1992.[102]
In March 2023, Tusk stated thatSilesian should be considered a language rather than anethnolect as it has unique literature and grammar, and promised to recognize Silesian as an official, statutory language of Upper Silesia.[103][104] Tusk also declared that he was a regionalist.[103]
^The party was officially theCivic Platform of the Republic of Poland (Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej).
References
^Wójcik, Piotr (4 June 2025)."Wójcik: Wahadło jeszcze wychyli się w lewą stronę".Krytyka Polityczna (in Polish).6 tysięcy członków to wcale nie mało jak na polskie warunki. Przypomnijmy, że Platforma Obywatelska ma 25 tys. członków, a PiS 48 tys. Konfederacja ma zaledwie 11,5 tys. członków. Jeśli dodamy do 6 tys. Razemitów 25 tys. członków Nowej Lewicy, to mamy trzecią największą partię w Polsce – po PiS i PSL (73 tys.). [6,000 members is not a small number by Polish standards. Let us recall that the Civic Platform has 25,000 members, and PiS has 48,000. The Confederation has only 11,500 members. If we add the 25,000 members of the New Left to the 6,000 Razem members, we have the third largest party in Poland – after PiS and PSL (73,000).]
^Millard, Frances (2007). "The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland".Electoral Studies.26. Colchester: University of Essex: 213.doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.03.001.
^Pietruszka, Radek (25 October 2025)."Platforma Obywatelska znika ze sceny politycznej. Nowa formuła według Tuska".Polskie Radio 24 (in Polish).Powstanie nowej formacji oznacza zakończenie działalności Platformy Obywatelskiej funkcjonującej pod tą nazwą od blisko 25 lat. [The creation of the new party marks the end of the Civic Platform, which has operated under this name for nearly 25 years.]
^Thevenin, Elodie (2025). "From Division towards Convergence? Comparing Crises Discourses on Migration in the Polish Parliament". In Jozef Bátora; John Erik Fossum (eds.).Differentiation and Dominance in Europe's Poly-Crises. New York:Routledge. p. 261.doi:10.4324/9781003291190.ISBN978-1-003-29119-0.This is the case of the Civic Coalition, which has members in both the centre-right family (PO, Nowoczesna, and iPL) and in the left (PZ).
^Mix, Derek E. (10 July 2025).Poland: Background and U.S. Relations(PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. p. 2.Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party has led a coalition government in Poland since 2023.
^Sørensen, Ditte Brasso; Nielsen, Emmanuel Molding; Wentzer, Anna.The Green State of the Nation(s): Poland(PDF) (Report). Think Europa. p. 3.In December 2023, Donald Tusk returned to power as Prime Minister in Poland leading a coalition of parties – the Civic Coalition – comprising his own centre-right party, Civic Platform, Modern, a broadly liberal party, and The Left, itself a coalition of left-wing parties.
^abMaatsch, Aleksandra (2023). "Explaining democratic backsliding in Poland: The interplay of party-specific and contextual factors". In Ben Crum; Alvaro Oleart (eds.).Populist Parties and Democratic Resilience: A Cross-National Analysis of Populist Parties' Impact on Democratic Pluralism in Europe. New York: Routledge. p. 44.doi:10.4324/9781003271321.ISBN978-1-003-27132-1.The major opposition party represented in the parliament, the Civic Platform, represents moderate conservative values (centre-right). The party is clearly pro-European. On the socio-economic dimension it has pursued de-regulatory practices combined with moderate redistribution.
^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe".Party Politics.14 (4): 436.doi:10.1177/1354068808090253.ISSN1426-8876.S2CID16727049.This argument also seems broadly confirmed taking into account more recent developments in Poland where both large newer centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, have developed more complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation.
^Anna Pacześniak; Michał Jacuński; Jean-Michel De Waele (2012)."Ideological Identification of Medium–Level Party Cadres in Poland".Polish Political Science Yearbook.41 (1): 383.doi:10.15804/ppsy2012019.ISSN0208-7375.Since 2005 the main political competitors have been two parties with Solidarity roots enjoying the highest electoral support: the right–wing Law and Justice (PiS) and the centre–right Civic Platform (PO).
"The perfect enemy: From migrants to sexual minorities".CHR Michelsen Institute. 2019. Retrieved28 February 2023.The tactic worked well for the PiS is in 2015 when anti-migrant rhetoric drummed up the party´s support before its election defeat of the governing centre-left Civic Platform.
"Poland's ruling party picks LGBTQ rights as election battlefront".NBC News. 15 March 2019. Retrieved28 February 2023.The tactic worked for PiS previously, analysts said, noting how in 2015 it used anti-migrant rhetoric to drum up support before its election defeat of the governing center-left Civic Platform.
^Staniszewski, Bartek; Prescott, William; Harrison, Joe; Shorthouse, Ryan (June 2025)."The right road: The future of the European centre-right"(PDF).Bright Blue. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: 206.ISBN978-1-911128-80-9.PO's shift back towards the centre-right, 2023-2025: As it stands, Tusk's grand coalition, despite Tusk having campaigned on a centre-left platform, is proving surprisingly centre-right. Trzecia Droga controls 12 of the 38 ministries in Tusk's cabinet as well as the important position of Speaker – despite representing only a quarter of the coalition's voters – while Tusk himself has embraced increasingly right-leaning policy after his electoral victory.
^Schindler, Frederik (21 November 2025)."Dieser AfD-Mann verärgert den polnischen Ministerpräsidenten".Die Welt (in German).Am Donnerstag reagierte nun der polnische Ministerpräsident Tusk von der liberalkonservativen Bürgerplattform (PO) auf die Äußerungen des jungen AfD-Mitglieds. [On Thursday, Polish Prime Minister Tusk of the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) responded to the comments made by the young AfD member.]
^Lepiarz, Jacek (27 October 2025)."Polen: Oppositionschef erklärt EU und Deutschland zum Gegner".Deutsche Welle (in German). Warsaw.Zwei Jahre vor der Parlamentswahl in Polen haben die beiden Hauptrivalen, die liberalkonservative Regierungspartei Bürgerplattform (PO) von Premier Donald Tusk und die größte Oppositionspartei, die rechtskonservative Recht und Gerechtigkeit (PiS) unter ihrem Chef Jaroslaw Kaczynski, die ersten Vorbereitungen für den Wahlkampf begonnen. [Two years before the parliamentary elections in Poland, the two main rivals, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's liberal-conservative ruling party, Civic Platform (PO), and the largest opposition party, the right-wing conservative Law and Justice (PiS) under its leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, have begun their initial preparations for the election campaign.]
^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe".Party Politics.14 (4): 417.doi:10.1177/1354068808090253.ISSN1426-8876.S2CID16727049.Instead, three new centre-right and right-wing parliamentary parties emerged: the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), the national-social conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR).
Seleny, Anna (July 2007). "Communism's Many Legacies in East-Central Europe".Journal of Democracy.18 (3):156–170.doi:10.1353/jod.2007.0056.S2CID154971163.
^Kowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii".Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish).15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 250.ISSN2353-9747.When it was established in 2001, the Civic Platform (PO) referred to liberal and conservative values. In its ideological declaration, Christian values were recognised as one of the canons.
^Marjorie Castle (2015)."Poland". In M. Donald Hancock; Christopher J. Carman; Marjorie Castle; David P. Conradt; Raffaella Y. Nanetti; Robert Leonardi; William Safran; Stephen White (eds.).Politics in Europe. CQ Press. p. 636.ISBN978-1-4833-2305-3.
^Szczepański, Jarosław (2015).Raport z badania : trójkąt ideologiczny. Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.ISBN978-83-63183-98-1.OCLC939904795.
^Korycki, Kate (2023). "Theory Localized, or Dramatis Personae of Polish Politics".Weaponizing The Past: Collective Memory and Jews, Poles, and Communists in Twenty-First-Century Poland. Berghahn Books. p. 45.doi:10.3167/9781805390503.ISBN978-1-80539-051-0.The PO may be characterized as neoliberal. It seeks to limit the state and promote market solutions to economic and social problems (PO Program 2015). It is mildly less friendly to the church than the PiS, and mildly less socially conservative (Szczerbiak 2008, 2013). It paints itself as progressive (and contrasts this progressivism with the PiS's conservatism), but this is mostly declarative. While in offi ce, the PO made few moves to limit the church's infl uence on policy and/or expand civil liberties. For example, the PO has not challenged religious instruction in schools or the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe (Grzymała-Busse 2014, 2015; Stan and Turcescu 2011). Its latest electoral platform includes limits on state financing for the church, but this is a recent development (PO Program 2015: 84). It declared support for same-sex partnerships, only to vote against them. In keeping with its image of openness, the party is staunchly pro-EU, at the level of both declarations and actions (PO Program 2015).
^Czarzasty, Jan; Mrozowicki, Adam (2022). "Unilateral crisis prevention and crumbling social partnership in Poland". In Bernhard Ebbinghaus; J. Timo Weishaupt (eds.).The Role of Social Partners in Managing Europes Great Recession: Crisis Corporatism or Corporatism in Crisis?. Routledge. p. 147.ISBN978-1-003-18614-4.Based on our analysis of policy documents, opinion polls, and expert interviews with social partners and policymakers, we explore the development of social dialogue during the successive cabinets of Donald Tusk and the government led by Ewa Kopacz, all three representing the coalition of right-wing liberal Civic Platform (PO; Platforma Obywatelska) and the agrarian (christian democratic) Polish People's Party (PSL; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011".Political Science Publications.24 (1): 30.In other words, on the policy and programme level the Civic Platform (PO) developed into a centre-right soft Thatcherite liberal, anti-communist, soft Christian nationalist and populist party.
^Szymon Wróbel (2011)."Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland".Polish Sociological Review.176 (1): 445, 448.JSTOR41478893.On the other hand however, the victory of Civic Platform (CP) [Platforma Obywatelska] in the parliamentary elections in September 2007 had much to do with the promise of a new Ireland, our dream to come true. The fact that it was such a successful message and that it became a true banner of the victory allows us to see CP's success in terms of populism. (...) If we come back to Laclau's distinction one could even say that CP's populism and L&J's populism seek to attain what Laclau recognizes as unconceivable.
Davison, Dan; Pospieszyńska, Ewa (2 October 2023)."On Migration, the Polish Left Has All But Given Up".Novara Media.With the Civic Coalition trying to woo Law and Justice voters by repackaging its xenophobia, it falls to the Polish left to change the narrative on immigration.
|""A powerful shot from a cannon." Tusk announces suspension of right to asylum".oko.press. 12 October 2024."There is no surprise, but Prime Minister Tusk went further than expected: he announced the suspension of the right to asylum. He said: "One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand recognition in Europe for this decision.
^abKowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii".Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish).15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 168.ISSN2353-9747.
^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011".Political Science Publications.24 (1): 15.
^abcdeRoguska, Beata (August 2021). "Elektoraty o istotnych kwestiach społeczno-politycznych".Komunikat z Badań (in Polish).91 (1). Centre for Public Opinion Research:9–10.ISSN2353-5822.