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Civic Platform

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Political party in Poland (2001–2025)

This article is about a political party in Poland. For the political party in Russia with the same name in English, seeCivic Platform (Russia).

Civic Platform of
the Republic of Poland
Platforma Obywatelska
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
AbbreviationPO
ChairmanMaciej Płażyński (first)
Donald Tusk (last)
Founders
Founded24 January 2001;
24 years ago
 (2001-01-24)
Dissolved25 October 2025;
32 days ago
 (2025-10-25)
Split from
Merged intoCivic Coalition (party)
Headquartersul. Wiejska 12A, 00-490Warsaw
Membership(2025)~25,000[1]
Ideology
Political positionCentre-right
National affiliationCivic Coalition
Senate 2001 (2001)
Senate Pact 2023 (2023)
European affiliationEuropean People's Party
European Parliament groupEuropean People's Party Group
Colours
  •   Orange
  •   Blue
Website
platforma.org

TheCivic Platform (Polish:Platforma Obywatelska,PO)[nb 1] was acentre-rightliberal conservativepolitical party in Poland. The party's most prominent leader wasDonald Tusk, party chairman between 2003–2014 and 2021–2025.

It was formed in 2001 by splinter factions from theSolidarity Electoral Action, theFreedom Union and theConservative People's Party, and it later placed second in the2001 Polish parliamentary election. It remained at the opposition until the2007 Polish parliamentary opposition, when it overtookLaw and Justice, won 209 seats, and Tusk was elected asPrime Minister of Poland. Following theSmolensk air disaster in 2010,Bronisław Komorowski served as actingpresident of Poland and later won the2010 Polish presidential election. Tusk continued to serve as prime minister and leader of Civic Platform until he resigned in 2014 to assume the post of the president of the European Council. The party was defeated in the2015 Polish parliamentary andpresidential elections. It placed second in the2019 Polish parliamentary election, and its2020 Polish presidential election candidate,Rafał Trzaskowski, won 49% of the popular vote in the second round and lost the election toAndrzej Duda.

Initially positioned as aChristian democratic party with strongeconomically liberal tendencies, it soon adoptedliberal conservatism throughout the 2000s. During its time in power, it was aligned with morepragmatic andcentrist views, and was characterized as acatch-all party. In the 2010s, the Civic Platform adopted moresocially liberal policies, aligned itself withconservative liberalism and economic neoliberalism, and it has since been positioned in the centre-right. It has also strongly advocated for Poland's membership in theEuropean Union andNATO. It was a member of theEuropean People's Party.

The party headed an electoral allianceCivic Coalition, which was founded in 2018. Since its creation, it had shown strong electoral performances inWarsaw, the west, and the north of Poland. Since the 2000s, the Civic Platform had established itself as one of the dominant political parties in Poland. On 25 October 2025, the party merged into a new party calledCivic Coalition, bearing the same name as the PO-led electoral coalition from 2018.

History

Establishment

The Civic Platform was founded in 2001 aseconomically liberal,Christian-democratic split from existing parties. FoundersAndrzej Olechowski,Maciej Płażyński, andDonald Tusk were sometimes jokingly called "the Three Tenors" by Polish media and commentators. Olechowski and Płażyński left the party during the 2001–2005 parliamentary term, leaving Tusk as the sole remaining founder, and current party leader.

First elections

In the2001 general election, the party secured 12.6% of the vote and 65 deputies in theSejm, making it the largest opposition party to the government led by theDemocratic Left Alliance (SLD). In the2002 local elections, PO stood together withLaw and Justice in 15 voivodeships (in 14 asPOPiS, in Podkarpacie with another centre-right political parties). They stood separately only in Mazovia.

The POPiS coalition won 12% of the popular vote nationally, which was well below the expectations.Ludwik Dorn, the chairman of the PiS parliamentary club at the time, remarked: "Together, we gained as much as the PO itself collected a year earlier." This marked the point at which PO and PiS, until now ideological and political allies, started to grow apart. The leadership of PiS decided that it had to distance itself from PO and change its ideology in order to increase its popular support.[2]

In 2005, PO led all opinion polls with 26% to 30% of public support. However, in the2005 general election, in which it was led byJan Rokita, PO polled only 24.1% and unexpectedly came second to the 27% garnered byLaw and Justice (PiS). Acentre-right coalition of PO and PiS (nicknamedPOPiS) was deemed most likely to form a government after the election. Yet the putative coalition parties had a falling out in the wake of the fiercely contestedPolish presidential election of 2005.

In the 2005 elections, PiS attacked PO by campaigning on a difference between "liberal Poland" and its "social Poland". The former was marked by economic liberalism, austerity, deregulation and "serving the rich". In contrast, Law and Justice stressed its "social" character, pledging policies that would help the poor. The party attacked Civic Platform's flat tax proposal and advocated a much more active role of the state in the economy. Law and Justice also made "an offer to the left", stressing its economically left-wing policies.[3]

Ultimately,Lech Kaczyński (PiS) won the second round of the presidential election on 23 October 2005 with 54% of the vote, ahead of Tusk, the PO candidate. Due to the demands of PiS for control of all the armed ministries (the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the office of the prime minister, PO and PiS were unable to form a coalition. Instead, PiS formed a coalition government with the support of theLeague of Polish Families (LPR) andSelf-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP). PO became the opposition to this PiS-led coalition government.

Ruling government (2007–2015)

The PiS-led coalition fell apart in 2007 amid a corruption scandal involvingAndrzej Lepper andTomasz Lipiec[4] and internal leadership disputes. These events led to new elections, and in the 21 October 2007parliamentary election PO won 41.51% of the popular vote and 209 out of 460 seats in theSejm and 60 out of 100 seats in theSenate of Poland. Civic Platform, now the largest party in both houses of parliament, subsequently formed a coalition with thePolish People's Party (PSL).

Despite declaring the parliamentary election campaign the will to limit taxation in Poland,[5] the Civic Platform implemented an ideologically diverse set of policies - it increased the excise imposed on diesel oil, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and oil.[8] It had also eliminatedtax exemptions.[12]

At the2010 Polish presidential election, following theSmolensk air disaster which killed the incumbent Polish presidentLech Kaczyński, Tusk decided not to present his candidature, considered an easy possible victory over PiS leaderJarosław Kaczyński. During the POprimary elections,Bronisław Komorowski defeated Foreign MinisterRadosław Sikorski. At the polls, Komorowski defeatedJarosław Kaczyński, ensuring PO dominance over the contemporary Polish political landscape.[13]

In November 2010, local elections granted Civic Platform about 30.1 percent of the votes and PiS at 23.2 percent, an increase for the former and a drop for the latter compared to the 2006 elections.[13] PO succeeded in winning four consecutive elections, and Tusk remained askingmaker. PO's dominance was also a reflection of left-wing weakness and divisions on both sides of the political scene, with PiS suffering a splinter in Autumn 2010.[13] Civic Platform won the plurality of votes in the9 October 2011 parliamentary election, gaining 39.18% of the popular vote, 207 of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 63 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[14]

In the2014 European elections, Civic Platform came first place nationally, achieving 32.13% of the vote and returning 19MEPs.[15] In the2014 local elections, PO achieved 179 seats, the highest single number.[16] In the2015 presidential election, PO endorsedBronisław Komorowski, a former member of PO from 2001 till 2010. He lost the election receiving 48.5% of the popular vote, whileAndrzej Duda won with 51.5%.[17]

Opposition (2015–2023)

In the2015 parliamentary election, PO came in second place, after PiS, achieving 24.09% of the popular vote, 138 out of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 34 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[18] In the2018 local elections, PO achieved 26.97% of the votes, coming second after PiS.[19] In the2019 European elections, PO participated in theEuropean Coalition electoral alliance which achieved 38.47%, coming second after PiS.[20] On 1 October 2023, it held The Million Hearts march in Warsaw.[21]

Return to power (2023–2025) and unification

The Civic Platform returned to power in acoalition with thePolish People's Party,Poland 2050 andNew Left in the2023 parliamentary election.

Main article:Civic Coalition unification congress

In October 2025, the party announed its plans to merge into a new party with two of its smaller coalition partners,Modern andPolish Initiative.[22] The unification convention was held on 25 October 2025, where the three parties merged into a single party known as theCivic Coalition.[23] Some members of the 2018 electoral alliance Civic Coalition, such as theGreens, opted to remain a separate party.[24] The leader of the new party became Donald Tusk,[25] and the new party is to complete its leadership election on 26 January 2026.[26] The creation of Civic Coalition marked the dissolution of the Civic Platform.[27]

Ideology

Civic Platform banner carried during the opposition march on 4 June 2023

The Civic Platform was mainly described as acentre-right political party.[43] Due to the peculiarity of Polish politics, as a major liberal opponent of the conservative PiS, the party was also classified ascentrist[44] orcentre-left,[45] although since 2023 the party was considered to have shifted back towards the centre-right.[46] It has also been described asliberal-conservative,[47][48][49][50][51][52]Christian democratic,[53][54][55][56]conservative,[57][5]conservative-liberal,[58][59]classical-liberal,[60]liberal,[61] andsocial-liberal.[62][63] It was also described aspragmatic andbig tent.[64][65][66] It supported Poland's membership in theEuropean Union.[67]

Since 2007, when Civic Platform formed the government, the party has gradually moved from its Christian-democratic stances, and many of its politicians hold more liberal positions on social issues. In 2013, the Civic Platform's government introduced public funding ofin vitro fertilization program. Civic Platform also supportedcivil unions for same-sex couples but was againstsame-sex marriage and theadoption of children by same-sex couples. The party also supportedliberalization of the abortion law,[68] which it had opposed while in government.[69] In response to theclimate crisis, the Civic Platform pledged to end the use ofcoal forenergy in Poland by 2040.[70]

PO was described asneoliberal,[36][71][37][72][73]economically liberal,[34][5][74]right-wing liberal,[75] andfiscally conservative.[76] It represented moderately conservative positions, and pursued deregulatory economic policies.[35] TheThird Cabinet of Donald Tusk led by the Civic Platform pursued economic deregulation,[77] lowering healthcare tax for business,[78] restricting immigration and tax cuts.[79] It also pursuedlaissez-faire economic policies, such as introducing tax exemptions for self-employed and high earners.[80]

After becoming the biggest opposition party, the Civic Platform became moreculturally liberal andpopulist.[81][82][83][84] This tendency became especially popular among the younger generation of the party's politicians, such asmayor of Warsaw and presidential candidateRafał Trzaskowski. The party has also changed its opinion about the social programs of PiS, starting to support them.[85][86][87] After returning to the government in 2023, the party adopted ananti-immigration stance to migrants coming from Russia and Belarus.[88]

Organization

Leadership

No.ImageNameTenure
1Maciej Płażyński18 October 2001–
1 June 2003
2Donald Tusk1 June 2003–
8 November 2014
3Ewa Kopacz8 November 2014–
26 January 2016
4Grzegorz Schetyna26 January 2016–
29 January 2020
5Borys Budka29 January 2020–
3 July 2021
(2)Donald Tusksince 3 July 2021

Notable politicians

Political support

See also:Poland A and B
Civic Platform's support was concentrated in the west and north of the country. Areas voting forBronisław Komorowski in 2010 are shaded orange above.

As of 2020, the party enjoyed the greatest support in large cities and among people with higher education and in managerial positions, while in terms of age, the electorate was evenly distributed,[89] and the electoral base of the Civic Platform lay in middle-aged, highly educatedgold-collar andwhite-collar workers of themiddle andupper-middle classes.[89] As of 2020, the Civic Platform electorate was made up of more women than men, was disproportionally represented by middle-aged, urban and middle-class voters, and was characterized by higher levels of education, higher position in the socio-professional structure, as well as moderate religiosity and Roman Catholicism.[90] The party consistently enjoyed overwhelming support of workers such as directors, managers and specialists, business owners and co-owners, and administrative workers.[89] At the same time, the party underperformed amongstblue-collar workers, young voters, farmers and students, as well as unemployed voters.[89] In regards to age, Civic Platform performed the best amongst voters aged 40–49, while also performing strongly among 30-39 and 50-59 year olds. The party performs the worst amongst the oldest (aged 60 or more) and the youngest (aged 29 or less) voters.[89] The party strongly appealed to urban voters, as almost a half of voters living in big cities (500,000 people or more) vote for Civic Platform; support for the party remains strong in middle-sized cities but strongly declines in small towns and the countryside, as on average only 15% of rural voters support it.[89]

As of 2016, an overwhelming majority of party's supporters (83%) were Roman Catholics, and 44% of these voters partook in religious practices at least once a week.[91] As of 2016, the party was supported by theChristian left, as well as liberal and moderate Catholics,[91] while most of conservative Catholics in Poland supportLaw and Justice instead.[91] Churchgoing Catholics are roughly evenly split between Civic Platform and Law and Justice, with a significant minority of churchgoers supportingPolish People's Party as well.[91] Catholics who support Civic Platform "oppose, on the one hand, the state's enforcement of religious norms and, on the other, do not condone their violation".[92] This was largely consistent with the party's attitude towards religion, which combines a moderately conservative andpolitically Catholic program with left-wing economic slogans, supported byCatholic social teaching and the teaching ofJohn Paul II contained in the encyclicalCentesimus annus.[92]

As of 2020, most of Civic Platform's electorate identified asliberal conservatives, centrists and moderate conservatives.[93] No tendency dominates, as the party's supporters are roughly evenly split between political tendencies - 35% of party's supporters identify withpolitical center, 28% asleft-wing, and 24% asright-wing.[93] Throughout the 2010s, Civic Platform had been losing left-wing supporters due to the re-emergence ofLewica as well asJanusz Palikot's defection from the party.[93] The party also faced a challenge fromNowoczesna, whose vote "came largely from former Civic Platform supporters, disappointed with its failure to shake off its social conservatism".[94] According to Janusz Jartyś of theUniversity of Szczecin, the ideological base of Civic Platform are "national-conservative, liberal and social-democratic voters", with each faction expecting "at least partial implementation of their demands, stability in the governance of the country and social peace".[95] According toSøren Riishøj, the party was also unpopular amongst the traditionally social-democratic voters, who were opposed toEuropeanisation andglobalization, and were critical of the Civic Platform's "almost U.S. type of election campaign."[96]

As of 2021, according toCBOS, Civic Platform was overwhelmingly popular amongst pro-European voters, with almost 80% of party's supporters wishing to cooperate with theEuropean Union more.[97] The party was generally supported by moderates, as most of the party's voters wish for a "compromise" on issues such as abortion.[97] Economically, the party was supported by pro-business and welfare-oriented voters alike; while most of Civic Platform's supporters believe that Poland should become awelfare state, they are evenly split on issues such asprogressive taxation andflat tax, andnationalization vs.privatization.[97] The party has also enjoyed the support ofregionalists,autonomists and voters supportive ofdecentralization andlocalism in general.[97] Over 90% of Civic Platform supporters believe that local governments should have more power and that the national government should devolve its power to the regional governments ofgminas andvoivodeships.[97] The party was supported bySilesian regionalists,[98] and had organized joint electoral lists with Silesian parties likeSilesian Autonomy Movement andSilesian Regional Party.[99] Local politicians of the Civic Platform in Silesia are often associated with Silesian regionalism as well.[100] The party also enjoys support from theKashubians and their local autonomist movement,[101] with the co-founder of the party,Donald Tusk, having expressed his support for autonomousKashubia in 1992.[102]

In March 2023, Tusk stated thatSilesian should be considered a language rather than anethnolect as it has unique literature and grammar, and promised to recognize Silesian as an official, statutory language of Upper Silesia.[103][104] Tusk also declared that he was a regionalist.[103]

Election results

Presidential

Election yearCandidate1st round2nd round
# of overall votes% of overall vote# of overall votes% of overall vote
2005Donald Tusk5,429,66636.3 (#1)7,022,31946.0 (#2)
2010Bronisław Komorowski6,981,31941.5 (#1)8,933,88753.0 (#1)
2015SupportedBronisław Komorowski5,031,06033.8 (#2)8,112,31148.5 (#2)
2020Rafał Trzaskowski5,917,34030.5 (#2)10,018,26348.9 (#2)
2025Rafał Trzaskowski6,147,79731.4 (#1)10,237,28649.1 (#2)

Sejm

ElectionLeaderVotes%Seats+/–Government
2001Maciej Płażyński1,651,09912.7 (#2)
65 / 460
SLD-UP-PSL (2001-2003)
SLD-UP (2003-2005)
SLD-UP-SDPL (2004-2005)
2005Donald Tusk2,849,25924.1 (#2)
133 / 460
Increase 68PiS Minority (2005)
PiSSRPLPR (2006-2007)
20076,701,01041.5 (#1)
209 / 460
Increase 76POPSL
20115,629,77339.2 (#1)
207 / 460
Decrease 2POPSL
2015Ewa Kopacz3,661,47424.1 (#2)
138 / 460
Decrease 69PiS
2019Grzegorz Schetyna5,060,35527.4 (#2)
102 / 460
Decrease 36PiS
As part ofCivic Coalition, which won 134 seats in total.
2023Donald Tusk6,629,40230.7 (#2)
127 / 460
Increase 25KO-PL2050-KP-NL
As part ofCivic Coalition, which won 157 seats in total.

Senate

ElectionVtes%Seats+/–Majority
20016,582,22424.34 (#2)
2 / 100
SLD–UP
As part of theSenate 2001 coalition, which won 15 seats.
20054,090,49716.94 (#2)
34 / 100
Increase 32No majority -PiS largest (2005)
PiSSRPLPR (2006-2007)
200712,734,74239.14 (#1)
60 / 100
Increase 26PO
20115,173,30035.60 (#1)
63 / 100
Increase 3POPSL
20154,323,78928.85 (#2)
34 / 100
Decrease 29PiS
20196,490,30635.66 (#2)
41 / 100
Increase 7KOKPSLD
As part of theCivic Coalition, which won 43 seats.
20236,187,29528.91 (#2)
41 / 100
Steady 0KOPL2050KPNLLR
As part of theSenate Pact 2023, which won 66 seats.

European Parliament

ElectionLeadervotes%Seats+/–EP Group
2004Jerzy Buzek1,467,77524.1 (#1)
15 / 54
NewEPP-ED
2009Danuta Hübner3,271,85244.4 (#1)
25 / 50
Increase 10EPP
20142,271,21532.1 (#1)
19 / 51
Decrease 6EPP
2019Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz5,249,93527.89 (#2)
14 / 51
Decrease 5EPP
As part of theEuropean Coalition, that won 22 seats in total.
2024Marcin Kierwiński4,359,44337.04 (#1)
18 / 51
Increase 4EPP
As part of theCivic Coalition, that won 21 seats in total.

Regional assemblies

Election year% of
vote
# of
overall seats won
+/–
200212.1 (#4)
79 / 561
In coalition withLaw and Justice (POPiS).
200627.2 (#1)
186 / 561
201030.9 (#1)
222 / 561
Increase 36
201426.3 (#2)
179 / 555
Decrease 43
201827.1 (#2)
194 / 552
Increase 15
As theCivic Coalition.
202430.6 (#2)
210 / 552
Increase 16
As theCivic Coalition.

Voivodeship Marshals

NameImageVoivodeshipDate Vocation
Elżbieta PolakLubusz Voivodeship29 November 2010
Marek WoźniakGreater Poland Voivodeship10 October 2005
Piotr CałbeckiKuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship24 January 2006
Olgierd GeblewiczWest Pomeranian Voivodeship7 December 2010
Mieczysław StrukPomeranian Voivodeship22 February 2010
Andrzej BułaOpole Voivodeship12 November 2013

See also

Notes

  1. ^The party was officially theCivic Platform of the Republic of Poland (Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej).

References

  1. ^Wójcik, Piotr (4 June 2025)."Wójcik: Wahadło jeszcze wychyli się w lewą stronę".Krytyka Polityczna (in Polish).6 tysięcy członków to wcale nie mało jak na polskie warunki. Przypomnijmy, że Platforma Obywatelska ma 25 tys. członków, a PiS 48 tys. Konfederacja ma zaledwie 11,5 tys. członków. Jeśli dodamy do 6 tys. Razemitów 25 tys. członków Nowej Lewicy, to mamy trzecią największą partię w Polsce – po PiS i PSL (73 tys.). [6,000 members is not a small number by Polish standards. Let us recall that the Civic Platform has 25,000 members, and PiS has 48,000. The Confederation has only 11,500 members. If we add the 25,000 members of the New Left to the 6,000 Razem members, we have the third largest party in Poland – after PiS and PSL (73,000).]
  2. ^Budny, Michał (2022)."The Process of Acquiring Political Relevance of Law and Justice Elections".Political Preferences.30 (2). Institute of Local Initiatives: 50.doi:10.31261/polpre.2022.2.45-59.
  3. ^Millard, Frances (2007). "The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland".Electoral Studies.26. Colchester: University of Essex: 213.doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.03.001.
  4. ^"BBC News (2007-10-22): Massive win for Polish opposition". 22 October 2007.
  5. ^abc"Wahlkampf-Attacken im konservativen Lager".Der Standard (in German). 29 June 2005. Retrieved1 April 2023.
  6. ^"ząd podwyższa akcyzę i zamraża płace". forsal.pl. 2 October 2013. Retrieved31 August 2014.
  7. ^"Rząd zaciska pasa: zamraża pensje, podnosi akcyzę na papierosy i paliwa". wyborcza.biz. 23 October 2011. Retrieved31 August 2014.
  8. ^[6][7]
  9. ^"Dziś dowiemy się, dlaczego rząd zabierze nam ulgi". bankier.pl. 26 July 2012. Retrieved31 August 2014.
  10. ^Sebastian Bobrowski (25 March 2014)."Zmiany w odliczaniu VAT od samochodów. Sprawdź ile i kiedy możesz odliczyć". mamstartup.pl. Archived fromthe original on 19 April 2014. Retrieved31 August 2014.
  11. ^"Głosowanie nad przyjęciem w całości projektu ustawy o zmianie niektórych ustaw związanych z realizacją ustawy budżetowej, w brzmieniu proponowanym przez Komisję Finansów Publicznych, wraz z przyjętymi poprawkami". sejm.gov.pl. 16 December 2011. Retrieved31 August 2014.
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  13. ^abcWarsaw Business JournalArchived 20 December 2010 at theWayback Machine
  14. ^"Elections 2011 - Election results". National Electoral Commission. Retrieved20 November 2011.
  15. ^"Pkw | Pkw". Pe2014.pkw.gov.pl. Archived fromthe original on 24 August 2014. Retrieved16 July 2014.
  16. ^"Oficjalne wyniki wyborów samorządowych. Zobacz, kto wygrał".TVN24.pl. Retrieved16 January 2019.
  17. ^Jęczmionka, Paulina (11 May 2015)."Oficjalne wyniki wyborów 2015: Bronisław Komorowski wziął Poznań i Wielkopolskę [INFOGRAFIKA]".Gloswielkopolski.pl (in Polish). Retrieved16 January 2019.
  18. ^"Wybory parlamentarne 2015. PKW podała ostateczne wyniki".Onet Wiadomości (in Polish). 27 October 2015. Retrieved16 January 2019.
  19. ^"Znamy wyniki wyborów! Relacja na żywo. Wybory samorządowe 2018".www.fakt.pl. 20 October 2018. Retrieved16 January 2019.
  20. ^"Oficjalne wyniki wyborów do europarlamentu".TVN24.pl. Retrieved14 August 2019.
  21. ^Jan Cienski (1 October 2023)."Huge but glum: Poland's opposition puts a million people on the streets".Politico. Retrieved16 October 2023.
  22. ^"Partię Donalda Tuska czeka rewolucja. Będzie nowa nazwa i logo".wiadomosci.onet.pl (in Polish). 3 October 2025. Retrieved9 October 2025.
  23. ^Bałczyk, Piotr (25 October 2025)."Koniec Platformy Obywatelskiej. Tusk przedstawił nowe ugrupowanie".Interia (in Polish).
  24. ^Szpala, Iwona (25 October 2025)."Tusk: Od dzisiaj nazywamy się Koalicja Obywatelska, bo jako KO wygrywaliśmy już wybory i wygramy następne".Gazeta Wyborcza (in Polish).
  25. ^"Koniec Platformy Obywatelskiej, premier ogłasza. "Rzecz niełatwa"".Polsat (in Polish). 25 October 2025.Nowa formacja w polskiej polityce. Na czele Donald Tusk.
  26. ^"Koniec Platformy Obywatelskiej, premier ogłasza. "Rzecz niełatwa"".Polsat (in Polish). 25 October 2025.
  27. ^Pietruszka, Radek (25 October 2025)."Platforma Obywatelska znika ze sceny politycznej. Nowa formuła według Tuska".Polskie Radio 24 (in Polish).Powstanie nowej formacji oznacza zakończenie działalności Platformy Obywatelskiej funkcjonującej pod tą nazwą od blisko 25 lat. [The creation of the new party marks the end of the Civic Platform, which has operated under this name for nearly 25 years.]
  28. ^Ayoub, Phillip M.; Page, Douglas; Whitt, Samuel (2025)."Anti-LGBTIQ rhetoric and electoral outcomes under the shadow of war: Evidence from Poland's 2023 parliamentary election".European Journal of Political Research.64 (4).Wiley Publishing: 1.doi:10.1111/1475-6765.70014.ISSN 1475-6765.In that election, competing coalitions led by the centre-right-liberal opposition Civic Platform(PO) and the incumbent right-wing-conservative PiS diverged over values like tolerance of LGBTIQ rights, all amid the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
  29. ^Thevenin, Elodie (2025). "From Division towards Convergence? Comparing Crises Discourses on Migration in the Polish Parliament". In Jozef Bátora; John Erik Fossum (eds.).Differentiation and Dominance in Europe's Poly-Crises. New York:Routledge. p. 261.doi:10.4324/9781003291190.ISBN 978-1-003-29119-0.This is the case of the Civic Coalition, which has members in both the centre-right family (PO, Nowoczesna, and iPL) and in the left (PZ).
  30. ^Żuk, Piotr; Pacześniak, Anna (2022)."Is it possible to defeat right-wing populist authorities by winning elections? The erosion of democracy and the system of the triple-masters class in Poland".Frontiers in Political Science.4 (1): 7.doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.1040616.This center-right party formed in 2001 combines economic neoliberalism with social conservatism. Most of all, PO wants to appear as a champion of pragmatism, modernization and European integration.
  31. ^Mix, Derek E. (10 July 2025).Poland: Background and U.S. Relations(PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. p. 2.Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party has led a coalition government in Poland since 2023.
  32. ^Clifton-Sprigg, Joanna; Homburg, Ines; Vujić, Sunčica (2025)."Refugee Exposure and Political Backlash: Poland During the Russia-Ukraine War"(PDF).IZA DP Discussion Paper Series (18157). Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics: 11.ISSN 2365-9793.The main opposition party is the centre-right liberal Civic Platform.
  33. ^Sørensen, Ditte Brasso; Nielsen, Emmanuel Molding; Wentzer, Anna.The Green State of the Nation(s): Poland(PDF) (Report). Think Europa. p. 3.In December 2023, Donald Tusk returned to power as Prime Minister in Poland leading a coalition of parties – the Civic Coalition – comprising his own centre-right party, Civic Platform, Modern, a broadly liberal party, and The Left, itself a coalition of left-wing parties.
  34. ^ab"Polish parties running in the European parliamentary elections - the essentials".Telewizja Polska. 1 June 2024.The Civic Coalition is the largest political alliance in the current ruling coalition, led by the right-to-center-right, economically and socially liberal Civic Platform party.
  35. ^abMaatsch, Aleksandra (2023). "Explaining democratic backsliding in Poland: The interplay of party-specific and contextual factors". In Ben Crum; Alvaro Oleart (eds.).Populist Parties and Democratic Resilience: A Cross-National Analysis of Populist Parties' Impact on Democratic Pluralism in Europe. New York: Routledge. p. 44.doi:10.4324/9781003271321.ISBN 978-1-003-27132-1.The major opposition party represented in the parliament, the Civic Platform, represents moderate conservative values (centre-right). The party is clearly pro-European. On the socio-economic dimension it has pursued de-regulatory practices combined with moderate redistribution.
  36. ^abPaweł Kamiński; Patrycja Rozbicka (2016)."Political Parties and Trade Unions in the Post-Communist Poland: Class Politics that Have Never a Chance to Happen".Polish Political Science Yearbook.45 (1): 198.doi:10.15804/ppsy2016015.ISSN 0208-7375.Interestingly, though, more of them have supported the neoliberal centre-right Civil Platform, which in power with its coalition partner PSL (Polish Peasants' Party) since 2008 until 2015.
  37. ^abPiotr Żuk; Anna Pacześniak (15 December 2022)."Is it possible to defeat right-wing populist authorities by winning elections? The erosion of democracy and the system of the triple-masters class in Poland".Frontiers in Political Science.4 (1): 7.doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.1040616.KO is made up of several parties, the largest of which is Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska—PO). PO was in power twice: from 2007 until 2011 and later, between 2011 and 2015, acting as a senior partner in a coalition with the Polish People's Party (PSL) and occupied the office of the Prime Minister for two full terms. This center-right party formed in 2001 combines economic neoliberalism with social conservatism.
  38. ^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe".Party Politics.14 (4): 436.doi:10.1177/1354068808090253.ISSN 1426-8876.S2CID 16727049.This argument also seems broadly confirmed taking into account more recent developments in Poland where both large newer centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, have developed more complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation.
  39. ^Anna Pacześniak; Michał Jacuński; Jean-Michel De Waele (2012)."Ideological Identification of Medium–Level Party Cadres in Poland".Polish Political Science Yearbook.41 (1): 383.doi:10.15804/ppsy2012019.ISSN 0208-7375.Since 2005 the main political competitors have been two parties with Solidarity roots enjoying the highest electoral support: the right–wing Law and Justice (PiS) and the centre–right Civic Platform (PO).
  40. ^PO has often been described as centre-right:
  41. ^Szczerbiak, Aleks (30 November 2016)."An anti-establishment backlash that shook up the party system? The October 2015 Polish parliamentary election"(PDF).European Politics and Society.18 (4):404–427.doi:10.1080/23745118.2016.1256027.S2CID 157951515.As discussed below, under Mr Tusk's leadership, Civic Platform turned from being a centre-right liberal-conservative party into an ideologically eclectic centrist grouping...
  42. ^Some sources have described PO as having shifted from the centre-right to the centre.[41]
  43. ^[28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][42]
  44. ^PO has often been described as centrist:
  45. ^PO has often been described as centre-left:
  46. ^Staniszewski, Bartek; Prescott, William; Harrison, Joe; Shorthouse, Ryan (June 2025)."The right road: The future of the European centre-right"(PDF).Bright Blue. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: 206.ISBN 978-1-911128-80-9.PO's shift back towards the centre-right, 2023-2025: As it stands, Tusk's grand coalition, despite Tusk having campaigned on a centre-left platform, is proving surprisingly centre-right. Trzecia Droga controls 12 of the 38 ministries in Tusk's cabinet as well as the important position of Speaker – despite representing only a quarter of the coalition's voters – while Tusk himself has embraced increasingly right-leaning policy after his electoral victory.
  47. ^Schindler, Frederik (21 November 2025)."Dieser AfD-Mann verärgert den polnischen Ministerpräsidenten".Die Welt (in German).Am Donnerstag reagierte nun der polnische Ministerpräsident Tusk von der liberalkonservativen Bürgerplattform (PO) auf die Äußerungen des jungen AfD-Mitglieds. [On Thursday, Polish Prime Minister Tusk of the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) responded to the comments made by the young AfD member.]
  48. ^Lepiarz, Jacek (27 October 2025)."Polen: Oppositionschef erklärt EU und Deutschland zum Gegner".Deutsche Welle (in German). Warsaw.Zwei Jahre vor der Parlamentswahl in Polen haben die beiden Hauptrivalen, die liberalkonservative Regierungspartei Bürgerplattform (PO) von Premier Donald Tusk und die größte Oppositionspartei, die rechtskonservative Recht und Gerechtigkeit (PiS) unter ihrem Chef Jaroslaw Kaczynski, die ersten Vorbereitungen für den Wahlkampf begonnen. [Two years before the parliamentary elections in Poland, the two main rivals, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's liberal-conservative ruling party, Civic Platform (PO), and the largest opposition party, the right-wing conservative Law and Justice (PiS) under its leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, have begun their initial preparations for the election campaign.]
  49. ^Malmgren, Agnes (2024)."Grandmother Memories for the Future. Solidaric Practices and (Slow) Memory in Contemporary Oppositional Struggles in Poland"(PDF).Slovenský národopis: Slovak Ethnology.72 (4). Slovak Academy of Sciences: 522.doi:10.31577/SN.2024.4.40.Koalicja Obywatelska (The Citizen's Coalition, KO), with roots in the liberal-conservative party Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, PO) and headed by former prime minister Donald Tusk.
  50. ^Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe".Party Politics.14 (4): 417.doi:10.1177/1354068808090253.ISSN 1426-8876.S2CID 16727049.Instead, three new centre-right and right-wing parliamentary parties emerged: the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), the national-social conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR).
  51. ^Tim Bale; Aleks Szczerbiak (2008)."Why Is There No Christian Democracy in Poland — and Why Should We Care?".Party Politics.14 (4): 491.doi:10.1177/1354068808090256.ISSN 1460-3683.S2CID 143595310.At root, Civic Platform is a right-wing liberal or liberal-conservative, rather than an archetypal Christian Democratic, party.
  52. ^
  53. ^Magdalena M. Molendowska (2017)."Christian Democracy in Poland (19th–21st Century)".Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio K – Politologia.24 (1):180–196.doi:10.17951/k.2017.24.1.179.S2CID 158351234.
  54. ^Kowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii".Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish).15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 250.ISSN 2353-9747.When it was established in 2001, the Civic Platform (PO) referred to liberal and conservative values. In its ideological declaration, Christian values were recognised as one of the canons.
  55. ^José Magone (2010).Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Routledge. p. 457.ISBN 978-0-203-84639-1. Retrieved19 July 2013.
  56. ^"Poland's PiS smashes opposition in European election vote".POLITICO. 26 May 2019. Retrieved27 December 2021.
  57. ^Marjorie Castle (2015)."Poland". In M. Donald Hancock; Christopher J. Carman; Marjorie Castle; David P. Conradt; Raffaella Y. Nanetti; Robert Leonardi; William Safran; Stephen White (eds.).Politics in Europe. CQ Press. p. 636.ISBN 978-1-4833-2305-3.
  58. ^"Tusk Vs Kaczyński: Explaining the Conflict".Political Critique. 4 May 2017. Retrieved21 February 2023.It was actually a conservative liberal party, with a moderate conservative agenda, and moderately anti-communist.
  59. ^
  60. ^Alan G. Smith (2016).A Comparative Introduction to Political Science: Contention and Cooperation. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 207.ISBN 9781442252608.
  61. ^
  62. ^"Explainer: Whatever happened to Polish liberal conservatives?".Polandin.
  63. ^Szczepański, Jarosław (2015).Raport z badania : trójkąt ideologiczny. Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW.ISBN 978-83-63183-98-1.OCLC 939904795.
  64. ^"Is Poland's Civic Platform a serious threat to the ruling party?".EUROPP. 4 May 2017. Retrieved27 December 2021.
  65. ^Riishøj, Søren (2011)."The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011"(PDF). University of Southern Denmark.ISSN 1399-7319.Archived(PDF) from the original on 27 December 2021.
  66. ^Szczerbiak, Aleks (18 January 2016)."What Are The Prospects For Poland's Opposition?".Social Europe. Retrieved27 December 2021.
  67. ^Ingo Peters (2011).20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany. BWV Verlag. p. 280.ISBN 978-3-8305-1975-1. Retrieved6 February 2013.
  68. ^"Platforma Obywatelska przedstawia nowe stanowisko w sprawie aborcji".Onet Wiadomości (in Polish). 18 February 2021. Retrieved9 March 2021.
  69. ^"Premier na Kongresie Kobiet: przeciw radykalnym rozwiązaniom".PolskieRadio24.pl. Retrieved9 March 2021.
  70. ^"Poland coal phase out pledged for 2040 by opposition government". 15 July 2019. Retrieved12 October 2019.
  71. ^Stuart Shield (2012)."Opposing Neoliberalism? Poland's Renewed Populism and Post-Communist Transition".Third World Quarterly.33 (2): 367.doi:10.15804/ppsy2016015.JSTOR 41507174.Despite this, the two centre-right parties, the neoliberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska - PO) and Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc - PIS), failed to offer any serious credible alternative.
  72. ^Korycki, Kate (2023). "Theory Localized, or Dramatis Personae of Polish Politics".Weaponizing The Past: Collective Memory and Jews, Poles, and Communists in Twenty-First-Century Poland. Berghahn Books. p. 45.doi:10.3167/9781805390503.ISBN 978-1-80539-051-0.The PO may be characterized as neoliberal. It seeks to limit the state and promote market solutions to economic and social problems (PO Program 2015). It is mildly less friendly to the church than the PiS, and mildly less socially conservative (Szczerbiak 2008, 2013). It paints itself as progressive (and contrasts this progressivism with the PiS's conservatism), but this is mostly declarative. While in offi ce, the PO made few moves to limit the church's infl uence on policy and/or expand civil liberties. For example, the PO has not challenged religious instruction in schools or the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe (Grzymała-Busse 2014, 2015; Stan and Turcescu 2011). Its latest electoral platform includes limits on state financing for the church, but this is a recent development (PO Program 2015: 84). It declared support for same-sex partnerships, only to vote against them. In keeping with its image of openness, the party is staunchly pro-EU, at the level of both declarations and actions (PO Program 2015).
  73. ^PO has often been described as neoliberal:
  74. ^"Zur Lage der Bürgerplattform (PO) in Polen".Konrad Adenauer Foundation (in German). 25 April 2008. Retrieved1 April 2023.
  75. ^Czarzasty, Jan; Mrozowicki, Adam (2022). "Unilateral crisis prevention and crumbling social partnership in Poland". In Bernhard Ebbinghaus; J. Timo Weishaupt (eds.).The Role of Social Partners in Managing Europes Great Recession: Crisis Corporatism or Corporatism in Crisis?. Routledge. p. 147.ISBN 978-1-003-18614-4.Based on our analysis of policy documents, opinion polls, and expert interviews with social partners and policymakers, we explore the development of social dialogue during the successive cabinets of Donald Tusk and the government led by Ewa Kopacz, all three representing the coalition of right-wing liberal Civic Platform (PO; Platforma Obywatelska) and the agrarian (christian democratic) Polish People's Party (PSL; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
  76. ^"Polish nurses set to strike over low pay".Politico. 10 September 2015. Retrieved1 April 2023.
  77. ^"We Know Who the Deregulation Experts Are. This Initiative May Not Be as "Apolitical" as Promised".Poland Daily 24. 18 February 2025.
  78. ^Ptak, Alicja (4 April 2025)."Poland's Sejm approves bill to cut health contributions for business owners".Notes from Poland.
  79. ^Ojewska, Natalia; Bujnicki, Piotr (26 May 2025)."Polish presidential hopefuls rally supporters ahead of election".
  80. ^Łobodziński, Wojciech Albert (28 May 2025)."Failing government, rising far right, and fragmentation of the Polish duopoly".Cross-Border Talks.
  81. ^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011".Political Science Publications.24 (1): 30.In other words, on the policy and programme level the Civic Platform (PO) developed into a centre-right soft Thatcherite liberal, anti-communist, soft Christian nationalist and populist party.
  82. ^"Polish politicians attack migrants for electoral gain". 9 July 2023. Retrieved15 July 2023."Donald Tusk is toying with anti-migrant language to match the tone of the ruling Law and Justice party.
  83. ^"There Are Right and Wrong Ways to Fight For Democracy".The Washington Post. Retrieved15 July 2023.
  84. ^Szymon Wróbel (2011)."Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland".Polish Sociological Review.176 (1): 445, 448.JSTOR 41478893.On the other hand however, the victory of Civic Platform (CP) [Platforma Obywatelska] in the parliamentary elections in September 2007 had much to do with the promise of a new Ireland, our dream to come true. The fact that it was such a successful message and that it became a true banner of the victory allows us to see CP's success in terms of populism. (...) If we come back to Laclau's distinction one could even say that CP's populism and L&J's populism seek to attain what Laclau recognizes as unconceivable.
  85. ^"Trzaskowski: 500 plus musi być bronione".gazetaprawna.pl. 2 July 2020.
  86. ^"Program Partii Platforma Obywatelska". 4 April 2017.
  87. ^"Partie i kandydaci".
  88. ^
    |""A powerful shot from a cannon." Tusk announces suspension of right to asylum".oko.press. 12 October 2024."There is no surprise, but Prime Minister Tusk went further than expected: he announced the suspension of the right to asylum. He said: "One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand recognition in Europe for this decision.
  89. ^abcdefBiskup, Bartłomiej (2020)."Portret wyborców AD 2019. Zmiany w preferencjach elektoratów partyjnych w Polsce"(PDF).Studia Politologiczne (in Polish).55 (1). Warsaw University:306–307.doi:10.33896/SPolit.2020.55.13.S2CID 238178401.
  90. ^Zagała, Zbigniew (2020)."Partie polityczne i ich elektoraty. Od sympatii do antagonizmu. Na przykładzie Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości".Przegląd Politologiczny (in Polish).2 (2). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM: 198.doi:10.14746/pp.2020.25.2.14.hdl:10593/25726.ISSN 1426-8876.S2CID 225679632.
  91. ^abcdSecler, Bartłomiej (2016).Religia i Religijność a Poziom Frekwencji Wyborczej(PDF) (in Polish). Wydawnictwo Morpho. p. 109.ISBN 978-83-62352-35-7.
  92. ^abKowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii".Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish).15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 168.ISSN 2353-9747.
  93. ^abcZagała, Zbigniew (2020)."Partie polityczne i ich elektoraty. Od sympatii do antagonizmu. Na przykładzie Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości".Przegląd Politologiczny (in Polish).2 (2). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM:193–205.doi:10.14746/pp.2020.25.2.14.hdl:10593/25726.ISSN 1426-8876.S2CID 225679632.
  94. ^Koczanowicz, Leszek (December 2016). "The Polish Case: Community and Democracy under the PiS".New Left Review.102 (1): 78.
  95. ^Jartyś, Janusz (2016)."Kwestie obyczajowe w programie i działalności Platformy Obywatelskiej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej".Acta Politica Polonica (in Polish).35 (1). Uniwersytet Szczeciński:59–66.doi:10.18276/ap.2016.35-05.
  96. ^Søren Riishøj[in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011".Political Science Publications.24 (1): 15.
  97. ^abcdeRoguska, Beata (August 2021). "Elektoraty o istotnych kwestiach społeczno-politycznych".Komunikat z Badań (in Polish).91 (1). Centre for Public Opinion Research:9–10.ISSN 2353-5822.
  98. ^Jedlecki, Przemysław (8 August 2019)."Śląscy autonomiści dołączają do Koalicji Obywatelskiej" (in Polish). Wyborcza.
  99. ^Pawlik, Paweł (9 August 2019)."Ruch Autonomii Śląska na listach Koalicji Obywatelskiej" (in Polish). Onet.
  100. ^"Śląskie Porozumienie Wyborcze nawiązuje współpracę z Koalicją Obywatelską. Śląski wyborca musi mieć pewność, że głos na regionalistów nie będzie głosem zmarnowanym".autonomia.pl (in Polish). 8 August 2019.
  101. ^Noch, Jakub (6 October 2015).""Zemsta za Tuska i brak poparcia PiS". Jak i dlaczego Kaszubi jednoczą się przeciw PiS, który chce ich "rozbioru"" (in Polish). NaTemat.
  102. ^Tusk, Donald (June 1992)."Regionalizm jako samodzielna siła polityczna"(PDF).Pomerania (in Polish). Gdańsk.
  103. ^ab"Tusk: Śląski będzie językiem regionalnym, też na poziomie ustawowym" (in Polish).Bankier. 19 March 2023.
  104. ^Konopka, Krzysztof; Mikowski, Mateusz (19 March 2023)."Tusk: język śląski będzie uznany za język regionalny".Polish Press Agency.

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