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General secretaryship of Xi Jinping

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected fromChina under Xi Jinping)
Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party since 2012
"Xi Jinping administration" redirects here. Not to be confused withXi Jinping–Li Keqiang Administration.
General secretaryship of Xi Jinping
以习近平同志为核心的党中央

5th generation Communist leadership of
the People's Republic of China
Incumbent
Xi Jinping in 2025
Date formed15 November 2012
People and organisations
Head of stateXi Jinping
Head of governmentLi Keqiang
Li Qiang
No. of ministers31
Member partyChinese Communist Party
Eight minor parties
History
Elections18th Congress in November 2012
19th Congress in October 2017
20th Congress in October 2022
Legislature terms12th National People's Congress
13th National People's Congress
14th National People's Congress
PredecessorHu Jintao Administration/
Xi–Li Administration
General secretaryship of Xi Jinping
Simplified Chinese习近平体制
Traditional Chinese習近平體制
Literal meaningXi Jinping System
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXí Jìnpíng tǐzhì
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingzaap6 gan6ping4 tai2zai3
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为核心的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為核心的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi héxīn de dǎng zhōngyāng
Second alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为总书记的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為總書記的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi zǒngshūjì de dǎng zhōngyāng
This article is part of
a series about
Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping succeededHu Jintao asGeneral Secretary of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's 4thleadership core, followingMao Zedong,Deng Xiaoping, andJiang Zemin.[1][2][3] Xi secured an unprecedented third term as CCP general secretary after the20th CCP National Congress in 2022.[4][5]

Xi's political ideas and principles, known asXi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into theparty andnational constitutions. As the central figure of thefifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and theCCP Central Committee passed ahistorical resolution in November 2021.

His rule is often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, while his tenure has included an increase ofcensorship andmass surveillance, alleged deterioration inhuman rights, including theinternment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, acult of personality developing around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018.

In economic policy, Xi has prioritized poverty alleviation and creatingcommon prosperity to reduce disparities in wealth. Xi's administration seeks to implement common prosperity in part through its education policy, including through drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Xi continues to emphasize the need for global development, including through theBelt and Road Initiative.

In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes theCommunity of Common Destiny. He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers") like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak."

Economic policies

[edit]
See also:Economic history of China (1949–present) andTargeted Poverty Alleviation

Xi Jinping has set three overarching goals for China's economy.[6]: 10  First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules.[6]: 10  Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market.[6]: 10  Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor.[6]: 10 

During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to usestate-owned enterprises (SOEs) to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased[7]: 138  while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs.[7]: 141  Although China has promotedits national champion companies since the Jiang Zemin administration,[8]: 158  it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector.[9]: 91 

Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development.[10]: 135  These industrial plans includeMade in China 2025, the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry".[10]: 135  China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development.[10]: 135 

During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy ofdual circulation.[11]: 170  First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers.[11]: 160  Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology.[11]: 160 

By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.[12]: 228  At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries.[9]: 259  As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010.[11]: 88 

China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%.[9] In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion.[9]

Education reform

[edit]
See also:Education in China

Xi has implemented a number of education reforms.[6]: 155  Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours).[6]: 155  Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term.[6]: 155  Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned.[6]: 156 

As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children.[6]: 156  In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector.[6]: 156 

The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals ofcommon prosperity.[12]: 67  Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor.[13]: 5  Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits.[6]: 156  Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital."[6]: 156  They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays.[6]: 156 

Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals.[6]: 57  Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors.[6]: 157 

Foreign policy

[edit]
Main articles:Foreign policy of Xi Jinping,Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, andBelt and Road Initiative

During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.[6]: 188  Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.[6]: 188 

In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created theNational Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.[14]: 180  The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.[14]: 180  Xi introduced theholistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[15]: 3 

During the Xi Jinping era, theCommunity of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.[15]: 6  In hisforeign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreignfriends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to theSecond Sino-Japanese war.[16]: 42  For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people likeClaire Lee Chennault,Norman Bethune,Dawarkanath Kotnis, and Soviet pilots.[16]: 42 

Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak".[17]: 103 

During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa.[18]: 87 

Political thought

[edit]
Main article:Xi Jinping Thought

"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party having gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[6]: 21–26 

In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes.[16]: 32  He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook".[16]: 32  Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence".[16]: 32  Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlightingits five thousand years of history.[16]: 33  He often cites theFour Great Inventions as a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity.[16]: 33  In his discourse for foreign audiences regardingChina's peaceful rise, Xi quotes theConfucian saying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others."[16]: 64  In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholarChen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients."[16]: 64 

Anti-corruption

[edit]
This section is an excerpt fromAnti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping.[edit]
An unprecedented anti-corruption campaign began after the conclusion of the18th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party held in Beijing in November 2012.
History
Military organ
flagChina portal

A far-reachinganti-corruption campaign was launched inChina following the conclusion of the18th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012. Initiated under the Xi Jinping administration, the campaign became the most extensive and systematic anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP governance.

Upon assuming office,CCP general secretaryXi Jinping pledged to crack down on both "tigers and flies", referring respectively to high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants.[19] Most of the officials investigated were dismissed from office and faced charges of bribery andabuse of power, though the severity and nature of the alleged misconduct varied considerably. The campaign eventually targetedmore than 120 senior officials, including about a dozen senior military officers, several executives ofstate-owned enterprises, and five national leaders.[20][21] As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials had beenprosecuted.[22]: 129  The campaign formed a central component of a broader initiative aimed at curbing corruption within the CCP and reinforcing internal unity. It has since become one of the defining features of Xi's political legacy.

Administered primarily by theCentral Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and itsSecretary from 2012 to 2017,Wang Qishan, alongside the relevant military and judicial bodies, the campaign notably investigated both sitting and former national-level leaders. These included formerPolitburo Standing Committee (PSC) memberZhou Yongkang and formerCentral Military Commission (CMC)vice-chairmenXu Caihou andGuo Boxiong. Such high-profile cases broke the long-standing convention of "PSCcriminal immunity" (Chinese:刑不上常委) that had persisted since the end of theCultural Revolution.[23]

Military reform

[edit]
This section is an excerpt fromDeepening National Defense and Military Reform § History.[edit]

Reform of China's defense and military structure began afterXi Jinping became theGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and theChairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012. UnderXi's administration, China created theCCP National Security Commission and established anair defense identification zone in theEast China Sea in 2013.[24] In 2014, Xi told theCCP Politburo that the PLA should operate by integrating multiple services.[24]

The "deepening national defense and military reform" was announced in November 2015 at aplenary session of theCentral Military Commission (CMC)'sCentral Leading Group for Military Reform.[25] They were expected to be long and extensive that aimed at turning the PLA into a modern military on par with international standards.[25] Before the reforms were announced, Xi said the CMC should directly control the military and new regional commands be created.[24]

In January 2014, Chinese senior military officers[who?] said that thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) was planning to reduce the number ofmilitary regions from seven to fiveTheater Commands to have joint command with the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This is planned to change their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented defense tomobile andcoordinated movements of all services and to enhance offensive air and naval capabilities. The coastal areas would be turned into three military regions, each with a joint operations command (Jinan,Nanjing andGuangzhou) for projecting power into theYellow Sea,East China Sea andSouth China Sea. The four other inland military regions (Shenyang,Beijing,Chengdu andLanzhou) will be streamlined into two military areas mainly for organizing forces for operations. The change was projected to occur through 2019.[26]

Human rights abuses

[edit]
See also:Human rights in China

According toHuman Rights Watch (HRW),Xi Jinping has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012.[27] Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained.[28] He presided over the709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.[29][30] HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the1989 Tiananmen Square massacre."[31]

On 6 October 2020, 39United Nations member countries expressed deep concerns over China's human rights violations inXinjiang,Hong Kong, andTibet. The call was made by Germany, supported by Britain, Canada, the United States, many European Union member states, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Honduras, Palau, and the Marshall Islands.[32]

The World report 2022 byHuman Rights Watch stated that theChinese Communist Party under the leadership of Xi Jinping celebrated its100th anniversary in 2021 amid crimes against humanity inXinjiang and the devastation of civil liberties inHong Kong. In 2021 the Chinese Communist Party tightened ideological control and increasingly cracked down on free speech. The CCP also moved quickly to offer support toAfghanistan's abusiveTaliban-controlled government.[33]

Current members

[edit]

Standing Committee

[edit]
These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[34]
R.Officeholder19thBirthPMBirthplaceAcademic featsPositionsRef.
1Xi JinpingXi Jinping习近平Old19531974Beijing[35]
2Li QiangLi Qiang李强New19591983Zhejiang
Fifteen
[36]
3Zhao LejiZhao Leji赵乐际Old19571975Qinghai[37]
4Wang HuningWang Huning王沪宁Old19551984Shanghai[38]
5Cai QiCai Qi蔡奇New19551975Fujian
Fifteen
[39]
6Ding XuexiangDing Xuexiang丁薛祥New19621984Jiangsu
Thirteen
[40]
7Li XiLi Xi李希New19561982Gansu[41]

Politburo

[edit]
These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[42]
Officeholder19thBirthPMBirthplaceEducationOffices heldRef.
Cai QiCai Qi蔡奇Old19551975FujianGraduate[43]
Chen Jining陈吉宁New19641984LiaoningGraduate
One
[44]
Chen Min'er陈敏尔Old19601982ZhejiangGraduate
One
[45]
Chen Wenqing陈文清New19601983SichuanGraduate[46]
Ding XuexiangDing Xuexiang丁薛祥Old19621984JiangsuGraduate
One
[47]
He Lifeng何立峰New19551981GuangdongGraduate[48]
Huang Kunming黄坤明Old19561976FujianGraduate
One
[49]
Li Ganjie李干杰New19641984HunanGraduate
One
[50]
Li Hongzhong李鸿忠Old19561976ShenyangGraduate[51]
Li QiangLi Qiang李强Old19591983ZhejiangGraduate[52]
Li Shulei李书磊New19641986HenanGraduate
One
[53]
Li XiLi Xi李希Old19561982GansuGraduate[54]
Liu Guozhong刘国中New19621986HeilongjiangGraduate
One
[55]
Ma Xingrui马兴瑞New19591988HeilongjiangGraduate
One
[56]
Shi Taifeng石泰峰New19561982ShanxiGraduate[57]
Wang HuningWang Huning王沪宁Old19551984ShanghaiGraduate[58]
Wang Yi王毅New19531981BeijingGraduate[59]
Xi JinpingXi Jinping习近平Old19531974BeijingGraduate
Eleven
[60]
Yin Li尹力New19621980ShandongGraduate
One
[61]
Yuan Jiajun袁家军New19621992JilinGraduate
One
[62]
Zhang Guoqing张国清New19641984HenanGraduate
One
[63]
Zhang Youxia张又侠Old19501969BeijingGraduate[64]
Zhao LejiZhao Leji赵乐际Old19571975ShandongGraduate[65]

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[edit]
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