Chinese Communist Party (CCP)chairmanMao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as apaper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.^[22]: 44 Four days after theatomic bombing of Nagasaki, Mao first argued against overstating the military significance of nuclear weapons, writing "Why didn't Japan surrender when the two atom bombs were dropped on her and why did she surrender as soon asthe Soviet Union sent troops?".^[23][24] In 1946 comments to American journalistAnne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the USreactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is aweapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."^{[25]: 9–10}

During theKorean War, theEisenhower administration pursued theNew Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force.^[25]: 11United States nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam in 1951,Japan in 1954,the Philippines in 1957, andSouth Korea andTaiwan in 1958. In 1962,United Kingdom nuclear weapons weredeployed to Singapore.^[26] Some scholars write that the Eisenhower administration's threats during theFirst Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets inFujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.^{[27]: 89–90} Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."^{[22]: 44–45}

Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that:^[25]: 11

The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though it might be a major event for the solar system.

From the inception, China's central government gave the nuclear program the highest priority in materials, finances, and manpower.^[28]: 216

In July 1954, one Soviet expert began working with the Chinese onuranium ore exploration.^[29]

On 15 January 1955, China began its nuclear weapons program.^[28]: 17

In 1955, the Soviet Union began the granting of student visas fornuclear physics courses to Chinese students.Qian Sanqiang,Jiang Nanxiang, and Yu Wen selected 350 students to study in the USSR and otherWarsaw Pact countries, in benefit of Chinese nuclear research. From 1955, the two countries began signing nuclear-related treaties.^[29]

In November 1956, China established the Third Ministry of Machine Building (which was in February 1958 renamed theSecond Ministry of Machine Building) to oversee its nuclear program.^[28]: 17

Construction of a uranium refinement plant inBaotou andenrichment plant in Lanzhou began in 1958, and aplutonium production facility inJiuquan and theLop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production. In return, China exported raw uranium ore to the USSR.^[31][32][33]

ScholarJeffrey Lewis noted in China's 1958 nuclear program guidelines its explicit rejection oftactical nuclear weapons and view of nuclear weapons as primarily political tools influencing the decision towards a small strategic arsenal.^[34]

In 1958, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) was established withNie Rongzhen as its director to oversee the Second Ministry of Machine Building, the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, and the Fifth Academy of the Defense Ministry (which focused on missile programs).^[28]: 30 In July 1958, along with Nie,Chen Yun andBo Yibo were assigned to a "three persons" group to oversee nuclear development.^[28]: 217

In July 1958, three Soviet experts visited Beijing to share limited technical details on an atomic weapon.^[28]: 20 Intended as an introductory lecture, the Soviet experts did not share any information more recent than 1951.^{[28]: 20–21} It was the only meeting of its kind before the Soviet Union reneged on the New Defense Technical Accord.^[28]: 20

In 1958, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discussarms control with the United States and Britain.^[35] China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy ofpeaceful coexistence.^[35] Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Sovietnuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emergingSino-Soviet split.^[35] The Soviet Union failed to comply with the New Technical Accord and in June 1959 sent a letter formally stating that it would not provide a nuclear bomb prototype.^[28]: 18 That same month, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation,^[35] and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.^{[36]: 12, 53, 61} As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.^[32]

Chinese researchers viewed June 1959 as the rebirth of the nuclear program, with the Second Ministry and the Ninth Bureau commemorating the date of Soviet withdrawal of support in the codename for China's first atomic bomb, "596" (i.e., the sixth month of 1959).^[28]: 18

In spring 1960, the Ninth Institutereverse engineered the 1951 model presented by Soviet experts in 1958.^[28]: 22 The Chinese model used a core ofuranium-235 instead of the plutonium in the Soviet model.^[28]: 22

In July 1960, all Soviet advisers were withdrawn from the Lanzhou enrichment plant, at the time China's only active project for a fissile material production.^[36]: 121

In mid-1961, a heightened factional debate threatened the termination of the nuclear program. The debate was influenced by theGreat Leap Forward'sGreat Chinese Famine, the withdrawal of Soviet advisers,Sino-Indian border tensions, and increased American forces in theVietnam War. Against the nuclear weapons establishment, a group representing the defense establishment, led byHe Long andLuo Ruiqing, pushed for its termination, to redirect its large expenses towards conventional weapons. A key issue was theMaoist military doctrine ofpeople's war. TheCentral Military Commission reaffirmed Mao's statements that "weapons are important elements of war, but they are not decisive", and that "the physical atomic bomb is important, but the spiritual atomic bomb is more important."^{[36]: 128-130}

At a series of senior leadership meetings, the nuclear weapons establishment emerged on top, with a resolution to accelerate its work ahead of schedule. Nie Rongzhen presented existing achievements of the nuclear program, and Minister of Foreign AffairsChen Yi added "at present I still do not have adequate backup. If you succeed in producing the atomic bomb and guided missiles, then I can straighten my back."^{[36]: 128-130}

In 1961, PremierZhou Enlai articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons."^[37]: 74

In 1962, PresidentLiu Shaoqi announced the creation of the Central Special Committee (also referred to as The Fifteen-Member Special Commission) to coordinate the departments with the overlapping authority related to nuclear weapons.^[28]: 28 Zhou Enlai was appointed director of the group, which became the most body with overall oversight of China's nuclear weapon's program, including nuclear weapons development.^[28]: 28

According toArms Control and Disarmament Agency directorWilliam Foster, the American government, under theKennedy andJohnson administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid ofTaiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested.^[38] In 1964 as China prepared for its first nuclear weapon test, Chinese leadership received intelligence which increased its concerns that the United States would commit asurgical strike on its nuclear program.^[28]: 32 These concerns prompted consideration of whether China should delay its first test, on the theory that a test would alert the United States and the Soviet Union to the progress of China's nuclear capabilities, but China would not yet be able to deploy nuclear devices to deter or counter an attack.^[28]: 32 In September 1964, Mao decided that the planned test should proceed, stating, "[T]he atomic bomb is to frighten others. It [does] not necessarily [need to be] utilized. Since it is for frightening, it is better to expose it early."^{[28]: 32–33} The test preparations proceeded with additional air defenses and security against sabotage.^[28]: 33

China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named596, on 16 October 1964.^[33] It was animplosion design, with a spherical core ofhighly enriched uranium,^[32] produced by the Lanzhou plant.^[39]

On 20 March 1965, Zhou Enlai explained China's testing philosophy as: "We oppose nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats, and we do not advocate hundreds of nuclear tests. Therefore, our nuclear tests must take place based on the needs of the military, science, and technology. All tests must be conducted as 'one test to achieve multiple results.'"^[28]: 51

In 1966, Chinese leadership established a new branch of the People's Liberation Army, theSecond Artillery, to operate nuclear missiles.^[37]: 75

In late 1965, Chinese physicists developed aTeller-Ulam design equivalent forthermonuclear weapons. On 9 May 1966, China carried out the596L nuclear test, of alayer cake design, a type ofboosted fission weapon. China's first multi-stage thermonuclear weapon test, "629", occurred with a tower shot on 28 December 1966, at a demonstrationyield of 120 kt.^[32] This was the shortest time that any of the five nuclear powers of the period had progressed from fission bomb to hydrogen bomb.^[28]: 71 Mao had urged the importance of a quick progression from fission bomb to hydrogen bomb, instructingLiu Jie, "If we have hydrogen bombs and missiles, wars may not be fought, and peace will be more secure. We make the atomic bombs but will not make too many. It will be used to scare the enemies and embolden ourselves."^[28]: 74

A more powerful hydrogen bomb was air-drop tested at 3.3 Mt in theProject 639 test on 17 June 1967.^[32][40] This was the test announced by thePeople's Daily and interpreted internationally as China's first hydrogen bomb test.^[41][42] The test was planned for 1 October 1967, but was moved after project leaderPeng Huanwu speculated France may test a hydrogen bomb before then. The mentality of outpacing France's program influenced the assembly of the 639 device amid the fervor of theCultural Revolution.^[41]

China tested its first air-dropped bomb in 1965.^[28]: 55 Afterwards, it stopped developing bombs that could be delivered by bombers (Chinese planes at the time had short ranges and were deemed too vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses) and began focusing on land-based missiles and warheads.^[28]: 55 China therefore maintained a limited number of aerial bombs, primarily with symbolic rather than strategic meaning in mind.^[28]: 55

China shifted from highly enriched uranium to plutonium weapons beginning with its eighth nuclear test, codenamed "524", also at 3 Mt, on 27 December1968.^[43][44] It subsequently focused on weapon miniaturization, for missile warheads, and for delivery by fighter instead of bomber.^[45][46][47]

The Sino-Soviet split prompted China to view the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, as its biggest threat and accordingly to focus on developing its nuclear capabilities to counter the Soviet Union.^[28]: 3 In 1969, following the border conflictBattle of Zhenbao Island in March, the USSRconsidered a massive nuclear attack on China, targeting cities and nuclear facilities. It made military activity in theRussian Far East, and informed its allies and the United States of this potential attack. The Chinese government and archives were evacuated from Beijing while thePeople's Liberation Army scattered from its bases. The crisis abated when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the Soviet Union that an attack on China would be met by a US nuclear attack on 130 Soviet cities.^[48][49][50] This threat of attack lead to the development of theKuangbiao-1 tactical nuclear bomb, which could be delivered against invading Soviet tank columns byNanchang Q-5 ground-attack fighters instead ofXi'an H-6 bombers.^[45][46][47]

Despite the 1963Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded by the US, UK, and USSR, China, alongsideFrance, continued atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1960s and 1970s.^[51] Before the treaty was signed, Premier Zhou Enlai requested a report from the Second Ministry of Machine Building and relevant experts to address the implications.^[28]: 141 The experts asserted that the three countries participating in the ban had already conducted enough atmospheric tests such that the ban would have little impact on their nuclear programs.^[28]: 141 The participating countries could also continue underground testing and expand their arsenals.^[28]: 141 Accordingly, the group concluded that the purpose of the treaty was not to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but for the participating countries to retain their nuclear monopoly.^[28]: 141 The report provided the background for the PRC's statement upon the signing of the treaty that it was "a big fraud to fool the people of the world" and a ploy to impede China's development of nuclear weapons.^[28]: 141 Although not a signatory, China's government nonetheless felt international pressure to pursue underground testing.^[28]: 141 China conducted its firstunderground nuclear test in 1969.^[51]

The Cultural Revolution resulted in interruption to nuclear weapons research (among other research programs), with significant changes to nuclear weapons research leadership including in 1969 when Nie Rongzhen was pressured to resign his role at the NDSTC.^[28]: 104

China tested its first boosted fission thermonuclear primary in its twelfth test in November 1971, using plutonium with a small amount of highly enriched uranium. This and the four following tests developed the three-megaton warhead for theDF-3intermediate-range ballistic missile.^[52] In July 1970, aJL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile mockup underwent water-drop tests from a crane on theNanjing Yangtze River Bridge. On 7 October 1982, the JL-1 was first tested at sea, launched from aGolf-class submarine, and experienced an attitude control failure, self-destructing.^[53] On 12 October 1982, the JL-1 was successfully test-launched from a submarine.^[54] TheChinese submarineChangzheng 6, designed as the country's firstballistic missile submarine and deployed toJianggezhuang Naval Base, is not believed to have conducted any patrols with nuclear weapons on board,^[55] but conducted its first successful test-launch of a JL-1 on 27 September 1988.^[56] From 1983 to 1988, theChangzheng 6 conducted a "five-year storage test" of JL-1 warheads and missiles, after which the weapon was approved and the first warhead batch ordered.^{[28][page needed]}

On 16 October 1980, China conductedTest 21-716, a finalization test of the515 nuclear warhead used in theDF-21 IRBM andJL-1 SLBM. The device was dropped from a H-6A bomber, with a yield of approximately 700 kilotons.^{[28]: 138, 239} As of 2026^[update], this is the most known recentatmospheric nuclear test in the world.^[57][58] The Chinese government only officially stated that it had ended atmospheric testing in 1986.^{[28][page needed]}

China began itsneutron bomb development in September 1977.^[28]: 155 Tests between 1982 and 1988 developed a neutron bomb, which was ultimately not deployed.^[59] In 1992, atwo-point implosion aspherical primary was first tested. China was accused usingespionage, most notably in theCox Report, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to acquire the USW88 nuclear warhead design as well asguidedballistic missile technology.^{[60][61][62][63]} Details of US intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons were released in the press surrounding the Cox Report and abortive trial ofWen Ho Lee.^[52]

In 1982,Deng Xiaoping initiated transfer ofnuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, including the design of the simple "548" codenamed highly enriched uranium implosion bomb. This design was first tested by China in its fourth nuclear test in 1966, mated to aDongfeng 2 missile. A Pakistani derivative of the device was tested in China in 1990. China is also believed to have conducted "hydronuclear" possiblysubcritical testing for France in the 1990s.^[64]

On 8 June 1996, China announced that it would conduct one more test to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons and then cease testing.^[28]: 202 China's last nuclear test was on 29 July 1996.^[65] According to Chinese nuclear scientists, the date was chosen the memorialize the tenth anniversary ofDeng Jiaxian's death.^[28]: 202 In September 1996, China signed but did not ratify theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet toenter into force.^[66]

During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability.^[37]: 113 Beginning in 1996, China has increasingly relied on the mobility of its land-based nuclear forces as a means of survivability.^[37]: 113

Following the 2001 US decision to withdraw from itsAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, China addedmultiple independently targetable reentry vehicle to theDF-5B missiles in 2001.^{[28][page needed]}

On 1 January 2016, the Second Artillery Corps was renamed to thePeople's Liberation Army Rocket Force.^[67][68] Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation ofPeople's Liberation Army Navy ballistic-missile submarines came under PLARF control.^[69][70]

In November 2024, China conducted its first joint patrol with its nuclear-capableXi'an H-6N bomber and a RussianTupolev Tu-95MS over theSea of Japan.^[71] China had previously conducted eight joint flights of itsXi'an H-6K non-nuclear-capable strategic bombers with Russian Tu-95s.^[72][73]

Between 2020 and 2021, China began construction of three large intercontinental ballisticmissile silo fields nearYumen City inGansu,Hami inXinjiang, andOrdos City inInner Mongolia.^[74] By 2025 these were assessed to total 320 silos forsolid-propellant missiles and 30 silos for liquid-fuelDF-5 missiles.^[75] They are China's first silos for solid-propellant missiles,^[74] which are considered faster than liquid-fueled missiles for response.^[76]

On 25 September 2024, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force test launched aDong Feng-31intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile was launched fromHainan island over 11,700 km to just west ofFrench Polynesia, reaching an estimated apogee of 1,200 km. It was the first test of an ICBM into the Pacific for China in over 40 years, typically testing ICBMs at very high apogees within its own borders.^[77] China alerted the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand ahead of the test, and was criticized by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Fiji, and Kiribati.^[78]

In December 2024, the United States updated its assessment of China's nuclear weapon stockpile, assessing that China had 600 nuclear warheads and would have 1,000 by 2030.^[79]

In March 2025, theFederation of American Scientists assessed that China no longer maintained a small stockpilenuclear gravity bombs for contingency use by H-6 bombers.^[75]

On 16 August 2025, China transported an uncovered verylarge unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV) via road inBeijing ahead of the2025 China Victory Day Parade. It had designation number "AJX002" and was analyzed as similar to Russia'sPoseidon UUV, which is a nuclear-powered nuclear weapon used for strategic attacks against coastal cities, however it is not known whether it is nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.^[80] The parade also marked the first public display of the road-mobile solid-fuelDF-61 ICBM, potentially a modification of theDF-41 ICBM, as well as the silo-based liquid-fuelDF-5C ICBM variant, believed by the US Department of Defense to be assigned a multi-megaton warhead.^[81]

In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense'sChina Military Power Report stated that China had loaded more than 100DF-31 ICBMs with solid propellant in silos near its border with Mongolia.^[82]

In 2020, theUnited States Department of State alleged that excavation and "explosive containment chambers" at Lop Nur could allow China to return to low-yield nuclear testing, violating the zero-yield standard of the CTBT.^[83][84] China denied the accusations.^[66] Nuclear proliferation expertJeffrey Lewis stated that satellite and seismic signatures of such low-yield tests are "indistinguishable" from CTBT-compliant subcritical testing.^[66]

In December 2023, satelliteopen-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.^[84] Satellite imagery provided evidence of these preparations, revealing the presence of adrilling rig that had created a deep vertical shaft. This shaft was believed to be designed to contain thedestructive power of radiation resulting from largenuclear explosions.^[84] Some analysts believe that China has been conducting "supercritical tests that create a self-sustained chain reaction in an underground containment vessel but stop well short of a full yield."^[85] In January 2025, analysts detected newly excavated soil in the northern rim of the Lop Nur complex, believed to be from horizontal tunnels used for lower-yield nuclear weapons tests.^[86]

On 6 February 2026, theUnder Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Thomas G. DiNanno, expanded US allegations that China had conducted covert underground tests, stating that one such test occurred on 22 June 2020.^[87][88][89] DiNanno stated that China had prepared for tests with nuclear yields of "hundreds of tons" using a "decoupling" technique, carrying out nuclear explosions in existing underground cavities to reduce theirseismic signature.^[90]

In 2022,United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to theNew START treaty).^[91] In October 2024, theDefense Intelligence Agency reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.^[92] In December 2024, theUnited States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads.^[93]

In March 2025, theBulletin of the Atomic Scientists and theFederation of American Scientists estimated that China has approximately 600 nuclear warheads.^[75][94] In June 2025, theStockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated the country operates at least 600 nuclear warheads, growing by approximately 100 new warheads per year.^[95]

China'snuclear command and control requires the agreement of both the CCP'sPolitburo and Central Military Commission for alerting and use of weapons.^[37]: 119 As a contingency if communications are disrupted, arrangements exist for teams dispatched from central command to personally deliver launch orders.^[37]: 120 Academic Fiona Cunningham writes that because such arrangements are difficult to replicate for sea-based nuclear deterrents, the possibility forpre-delegation of nuclear launch authority "cannot be ruled out" and if such arrangements exist, "they are likely to be one of the most closely held secrets of China's nuclear posture."^[37]: 120

China's nuclear weapons have historically been kept at a low readiness, with its warheads in a central storage location, physically separated from their launch vehicles. This has assuaged leadership fears of an unauthorized or accidental use. Nonetheless, sometime between 1995 and 2019, China is believed to have equipped its nuclear warheads with a technical control mechanism, similar to the USpermissive action link. In 2020, the United States assessed that someDF-31A units have warheads physically available to them, representing a higher readiness level than central storage.^{[37]: 120–121}

China has historically had a separate chain of command for nuclear and conventional forces, with nuclear missile brigades undergoing separate training, exclusively for retaliatory attacks. This has changed since the introduction of theDF-26 dual-capable missile, for which brigades are trained in the use of its swappable nuclear and conventional warheads.^[37]: 114

In November 2024,Joe Biden andXi Jinping affirmed the need to maintain human control over the use of nuclear weapons as opposed toartificial intelligence.^[96][97]

China's policy has been one ofno first use while maintaining a securesecond-strike capability.^[98] In 1957, Zhou Enlai stated, "We are developing nuclear weapons mainly to resolve the issues of deterrence. The scale does not need to be large. We are forced to build missiles and nuclear weapons, not for a race with the nuclear powers, but for breaking their nuclear monopoly and preventing their use of nuclear weapons."^{[28]: 36–37} Following its first test in 1964, China stated that:^{[99][100][28]: 35-36}

The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Had this been realized, China would not have needed to develop the nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any tune and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai generally considered nuclear weapons as strategic and political tools rather than tactical weapons.^[28]: 222 Mao also signaled that China's interest in nuclear weapons was to maintainminimal deterrence.^[28]: 3 As director of the NDSTC, which oversaw coordination of departments with authority in nuclear weapons issues, Nie Rongzhen made China's minimal deterrence doctrine explicit, stating, "To free ourselves of the frequent bullying and oppression of the imperialists for over one century, we must develop advanced weapons, missiles and atomic bombs, so that we have the minimum means of reprisal when we are attacked by the imperialists nuclear weapons."^[28]: 37 China also implemented centralized command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons so that they could not be used without orders from top leadership.^[37]: 75 The 1975General Combat Regulations for a Combined Army stated, "at any time, under any circumstances, we will absolutely not use nuclear weapons first, only when the enemy uses them first, will we, according to the order of the supreme command, then use this kind of weapon to resolutely counterattack."^[37]: 75 China maintains a no-first-use policy as of 2025^[update].^{[101][37]: 108–109}

In its 1964 statement, China called for international treaties prohibiting first use and nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear countries. In 1994, China submitted a "Draft Treaty on No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the other four NPT nuclear-weapon states.^[102] In 2024, China submitted to the NPT review conference a "No-first-use of Nuclear Weapons Initiative", repeating calls for an NFU treaty between theP5 states and a separate treaty which prohibits nuclear use and threats against non-nuclear states andnuclear-weapon-free zones.^[103]

At Central Special Committee meetings in 1978 and 1979, Nie proposed to cancel the Hurricane-1 tactical nuclear bomb for use byNanchang Q-5 ground-attack aircraft, deeming it as inconsistent with China's policy focus on self-defense and its principle of no-first use.^{[28]: 106, 222} The proposal was accepted.^[28]: 222

During the Cold War, China developed aneutron bomb but refrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons on delivery systems such asgravity bombs ornuclear artillery.^[37]: 76 It has traditionally stored the vast majority of nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems.^[75][104]

From 1986 to 1993, debates among the political leadership in China addressed the role of China's nuclear forces in potential local wars.^[37]: 66 Chinese leadership doubted that a first-use posture was credible.^[37]: 66 Leadership debates continued until 2005 on whether first use was feasible under certain circumstances.^[37]: 66 After these debates, China decided to remain in a no first use posture.^[37]: 76Jiang Zemin reaffirmed the country's retaliatory nuclear posture, saying "We develop strategic nuclear weapons, not in order to attack, but in order to defend. If people don't attack us, we won't attack them, but if people attack us, we must attack them."^{[37]: 86–87}

From 2000 to 2006, in the wake of the 1999United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, PLA strategists and civilian strategists debated whether China should add conditions to its no first use policy.^[37]: 73 China has not publicly clarified whether U.S. allies covered by U.S. nuclear guarantees are exempt from Chinese nuclear use.^[105] Some Chinese proponents of conditioning the no-first use policy pointed to the Bush administration'sNuclear Posture Review, which discussed US nuclear weapons in the context of a "Taiwan contingency".^{[37]: 98–99} Proponents of adding conditions contended that doing so would make China's nuclear deterrence more effective if a "Taiwan contingency" occurred.^[37]: 99 Ultimately, Chinese leadership rejected the idea of conditioning its no first use policy.^[37]: 73

The 2023 U.S. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission assessed that China would likely use nuclear weapons if non-nuclear attacks threaten its nuclear forces or command system.^[106]

Academic Hui Zhang wrote in 2025 that so far there was little evidence to suggest China had changed its nuclear strategy and doctrine, but it has deviated from a minimal deterrence policy.^[28]: 215 Others observers also stated that a policy of minimal deterrence no longer applies to China.^[98]: 8

In the early 2020s, some of China's nuclear forces were reported to have moved toward alaunch on warning (LOW) posture.^[107][108] A key PLA doctrinal text,The Science of Military Strategy, implied in 2013, 2015, and 2017, that it viewed launch-on-warning as consistent with no-first-use.^{[37]: 117–118} In 2024, theUnited States Department of State described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous".^[109] The U.S. Department of Defense's 2024China Military Power Report stated that China was shifting toward a LOW posture for early-warningsecond strike capabilities.^[110][111] Defense analysts have contended that China's shift away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a LOW posture would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first.^[108][110] In November 2025, theDefense Threat Reduction Agency reported that China had already developed infrastructure and command structures to support a LOW posture.^[112] In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense's 2025China Military Power Report reiterated China's move toward a LOW posture.^[110]

The move to LOW was seen as a response to progress made in U.S. missile defense systems (such as theAegis Ballistic Missile Defense System andTerminal High Altitude Area Defense) and long-range precision strike abilities (such asConventional Prompt Strike), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nuclear weapons to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture.^[107] Some analysts contend that because a LOW posture empowers the PLA to a greater degree due to compressed decision-making timelines, it could potentially degrade theCCP's absolute control of the military.^[113]

China's nuclear weapons program was originally initiated in 1955 to counter nuclear weapons threats from the United States. Accordingly, by 1965 its first series of missiles was intended to target US assets: theDF-2A for US bases in South Korea and Taiwan, theDF-3 for US bases in Japan and the Philippines, theDF-4 for theB-52 Stratofortress bomber base onGuam, and theDF-5 for the entirecontiguous United States. However, in 1969, due to theSino-Soviet border conflict, China began aligning with the United States, resulting in the1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China.^[28]: 210

China first gained the ability to strike the contiguous US with the 1995 upgrade to the DF-5A. Following thedissolution of the Soviet Union, strategic relationsbetween China and the United States were strained by events including the 1995–1996Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and Cox Report, and 2001Hainan Island incident military aircraft collision.^[28]: 210 China especially began to perceive a nuclear threat from US missile defense following the 2001 US decision to withdraw from itsAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia.^[28]: 210 China's feared the weakness of its only nuclear leverage against the US, as US policy permitted first use, and its DF-5s were vulnerable to afirst strike being large, based in silos, requiring slowliquid fuelling before launch, and carrying a single-warhead missiles.^{[28]: 210–211} China first responded by addingmultiple independently targetable reentry vehicle to theDF-5B missiles in 2001.^[28]: 213 According to scholar Hui Zhang, China lacked a crediblesecond strike capability against the US as recently as 2010, as its twenty silo-based DF-5As were unlikely to survive, and its approximately thirteen remaining deployed road-mobileDF-31 missiles would struggle to penetrate theGround-Based Midcourse Defense.^[28]: 214

As the Sino-Soviet split intensified, the Soviet Union began to represent a larger nuclear threat to China. By the mid-1960s, Chinese planners targeted both US and Soviet assets, and by the Sino-Soviet border conflict it had become China's primary adversary. Early Chinese missiles were also intended to target the USSR's cities and industrial centers: the DF-2A for theSoviet Far East, the DF-3 for the eastern and central Soviet regions, and the DF-4 forMoscow and the Soviet west, and the DF-5 also for the Soviet west. To scramble against the Soviet threat, the warheads for DF-3 missiles were mass-produced from 1969 before their first proof test in 1973. By 1972, the "506" warhead for the DF-5 was designed specifically to penetrate theABM-1 Galoshanti-ballistic missile system surrounding Moscow, by hardening the warhead primary against the system'sneutron radiation. The DF-5 missile was thus completed with a 9,000 km range, only enough to cover the USSR but not reach the contiguous US.^{[28][page needed]}

China's development of a neutron bomb was influenced by perceptions of a Soviet threat on China's border.^{[28]: 155–156} A neutron bomb was conceived as a mechanism for blocking or stopping Soviet tank routes over the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders in the event of invasion.^[28]: 156 In 1980, during a US delegation visit to Shanghai, GeneralZhang Aiping toldLos Alamos National Laboratory Physics Division headGeorge A. Keyworth II that "For you the neutron bomb has no use. But for us ... We need to bowl neutron bombs over the Soviet border." By the late 1980s, China considered the Soviet threat to be significantly reduced.^[28]: 163

Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China acceded to the NPT in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.^[114] China also received stolen technology thatAbdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant atHanzhong (250km south-west ofXi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."^[115]

Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms for Western powers (particularly the US) to restrain China.^{[116]: 266–267} The Chinese government believed that the NPT "[served] the interests of some States" and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons.^[117] China considered the NPT an attempt to constrain China, which had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the United States or the Soviet Union, which at the time had at least 100 times more nuclear weapons.^[118]

Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping.^[117] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT;^[119] China acceded to the treaty in 1992.^[120]

China joined theNuclear Suppliers Group in 2004,^[121] but continued to build nuclear reactors for Pakistan. The NSG Guidelines prohibit new nuclear exports to countries like Pakistan that do not have full-scopeIAEA safeguards, but China claimed its exports to Pakistan were "grandfathered" under prior supply arrangements.^[122]

China was active in thesix-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.^[116]: 71 The six-party talks ultimately failed,^[116]: 75 and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.^[116]: 237

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful US-China cooperation.^[123] In 2009,CCP general secretaryHu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States PresidentBarack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.^[116]: 237 Precipitated by a2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the United States launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria.^[123] In 2017, they converted the GHARR-1research reactor inAccra, Ghana, a China-supplied Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), from highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium, thus no longer directly weapons-usable.^[124] China-supplied MNSRs with highly enriched uranium cores remain in Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria.^[125]

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members ofNATO, decided not to sign the UNtreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination ofnuclear weapons.^[126]

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the United States and Russia on extending their bilateralNew START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as theTrump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the US and Russian arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both US and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.^[127][128]

The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by presidentJoe Biden in March 2024, reported to refocus US nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China.^[129]

In April 2025, theChina Institute of Atomic Energy announced adeep learning algorithm for differentiating genuine nuclear weapons from decoys, without revealing design details such as geometry, for arms control inspection purposes.^[130] The system analyses weaponneutron flux obscured by a wall, and compares it against a generated data set of nuclear components includinghighly enriched uranium,low enriched uranium, andlead.^[130]

On 27 August 2025, China declined US President Donald Trump's proposal to join nuclear disarmament talks with the United States and Russia, calling the idea "neither reasonable nor realistic." While Beijing said it is in favor of disarmament in principle, it has regularly rejected invitations from Washington to join talks with Moscow regarding reducing these countries' nuclear arsenals, arguing that the two nations with the largest stockpiles should take primary responsibility for reductions.^[131]

Indian sources cite China's development of nuclear weapons as a factor in the decision to initiateIndia's nuclear weapons program.^[132][133]

PresidentChiang Kai-shek of theRepublic of China (Taiwan) believed, prior to China's first nuclear test in 1964, that such a capability would only be possible from 1967. The shock prompted Taiwan to accelerate development ofits nuclear weapons infrastructure.^{[134]: 9–10}

ThePeople's Republic of China (PRC) was reported to have operated abiological weapons program during theCold War.^[140]: 147 TheUnited States Department of State stated that two facilities inBeijing andLingbao City, from the 1950s to 1987, weaponized large quantities ofricin,botulinum toxin,anthrax,plague,cholera, andtularemia.^[141][142] Some security analysts believe the program remains covertly active,^[143][144] and involvesdual-use technology.^[145] The PRC ratified theBiological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chinese officials have claimed that the country has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. Members of theUS intelligence community strongly suspect that the PRC has, as of 2015, at least 42 facilities that may be involved in research, development, production, or testing of biological agents.^[146][143]

The Empire of Japan's use of biological weapons in theSecond Sino-Japanese War is estimated to have killed between 200,000^[147] and 500,000 people, almost entirely in China.^{[148][149][150]} Following research and production atits biological warfare units led byUnit 731, Japanese forces dispersedanthrax,cholera,dysentry,glanders,typhoid, andplague via airplane-dropped bombs containing infected fleas, a form ofentomological warfare.Shirō Ishii, the leader of Unit 731, carried out two major anti-civilian campaigns. The first from 1940 to 1942 dispersed plague-infected fleas in port cities in northern China. The second in 1943 used anthrax and glanders against villages southwest ofShanghai.^[151]