![]() | |
China | Singapore |
|---|---|
| Diplomatic mission | |
| Embassy of China, Singapore | Embassy of Singapore, Beijing |
| Envoy | |
| China Ambassador to Singapore Cao Zhongming | Singapore Ambassador to China Peter Tan Hai Chuan |
China–Singapore relations (Chinese:中国–新加坡关系;pinyin:Zhōngguó–Xīnjiāpō Guānxì), also referred to asChinese–Singaporean relations orSino–Singaporean relations, are thebilateral relations between thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) and theRepublic of Singapore. Singapore formally recognised the PRC only in 1990, later than many other countries and the last inSoutheast Asia to do so. This delay stemmed from Singapore's preference that its neighbours, particularlyIndonesia, normalise relations with the PRC first. After Indonesia and the PRC announced their decision to establish ties on 8 August 1990, Singapore and the PRC began discussions to formalise relations. Three rounds of talks were held, beginning on 27 July 1990, to finalise the establishment of diplomatic ties.[1]
Singapore and China have maintained neutral relations, with Singapore recognising China's growing regional importance while ensuring its own national interests are upheld. Singapore supports constructive Chinese engagement in theAsia-Pacific, but does so on the basis of mutual respect and regional stability. Its co-operation with China, including on security and counterterrorism efforts throughASEAN, reflects Singapore's proactive and independent approach to regional diplomacy.[2][3][4][5] Singapore has also participated in China's waves of industrialization by sharing experiences via state level cooperations in the establishment ofChina-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park,Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city, Sino-Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City, Singapore-Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park and the Sino-Singapore Jilin Food Zone.[6]
While the relationship between the two countries remains strong, it has been strained during numerous high-profile events, especially during the 2010s and 2020s, including Singapore's stance against China regarding theSouth China Sea dispute, Singapore's support for theUnited States' military presence andalliance system in Asia and the seizing ofSingapore Armed Forces' (SAF) vehicles byHong Kong authorities in 2016.[7] Singapore also often engages withTaiwan through unofficial channels, with relations shaped by shared economic and military priorities and limited political alignment especially during theCold War. Singapore's delayed recognition of the PRC stemmed largely from its sustained ties with Taiwan throughout the latter part of the 20th century.[8]: 117 Even after recognising the PRC, Singapore has continued informal cooperation with Taiwan in areas such as trade, education and cultural exchanges. While this has occasionally attracted disapproval from Beijing, it reflects Singapore's longstanding commitment to strategic independence and balanced diplomacy.
Despite occasional tensions, Singapore and China have sustained steady cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including defence, trade, education and infrastructure development. While both sides regularly reaffirm strong bilateral ties, Singapore has pursued these relations from a position of mutual benefit rather than deference. Its participation in initiatives such as theBelt and Road Initiative reflects a pragmatic approach focused on national interest rather than alignment with China's geopolitical goals. Singapore has also consistently advocated forASEAN centrality and has sought to mediate between Beijing and the organisation, making clear that its support for regional cooperation does not equate to uncritical endorsement of China's policies.[9][10][11]
The historic connections between the peoples of Singapore and China date back well before the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Many early Chinese migrants came to the region known asNanyang seeking to escape poverty and conflict during theQing dynasty. A significant portion of ethnic Chinese Singaporeans trace their ancestral origins to southern Chinese provinces such asFujian,Guangdong andHainan.[12]
During theSecond Sino-Japanese War, which later became part of the largerWorld War II, many ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Singapore strongly supported China. This included providing aid to both theKuomintang (KMT) and theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in their fight against Japanese forces. After Japan's conquest in theMalayan campaign and theFall of Singapore, the Japanese retaliated with harsh reprisals against the ethnic Chinese population through operations such asSook Ching, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. TheMalayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), initially a resistance group, later evolved into the communist-alignedMalayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). During the subsequentMalayan Emergency andSecond Malayan Emergency, the communist insurgency under theMalayan Communist Party (MCP) was viewed as an extension of China's revolutionary influence in Southeast Asia.[13] However, China ended its support for the MCP following the establishment ofdiplomatic ties between Malaysia and China in 1974.
Ethnic Chinese in Singapore (and also in Malaya) were early supporters of MCP, which led to suspicion from the British colonial authorities and later from the rulingPeople's Action Party (PAP). Chinese-language secondary schools andNanyang University were viewed as hotbeds of communist activity. The government's efforts to curb communist influence included major events such as theChinese middle schools riots andOperation Cold Store. Nanyang University was eventually reorganised and merged with theUniversity of Singapore to form theNational University of Singapore (NUS).[14][15]
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's firstPrime Minister of Singapore, was careful to avoid any perception amongSoutheast Asian nations that Singapore, with its predominantly ethnic Chinese population, was a "Third China" alongside theRepublic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and thePeople's Republic of China (PRC). This caution stemmed from Singapore's experiences withcommunism, the ongoingVietnam War and domestic political factors. Consequently, Singapore delayed establishing diplomatic relations with China until other Southeast Asian countries had done so in order to avoid appearing biased towards China.[16][13] Lee's official visits to China from 1976 onwards were conducted inEnglish to reaffirm that he represented Singapore, not a "Third China".[17]
During this era, Lee firmly believed inresisting communism in line with thedomino theory.[18] Having witnessed the British failure to defend Singapore inWorld War II and doubting the United States’ willingness to defend Singapore against communism, Lee welcomed the American presence in the region as a necessary counterbalance to theSoviet Union and China.[16] In the 1970s, Singapore and China began unofficial relations,[19] which led to the exchange of Trade Offices in September 1981.[20] Commercial air services between Singapore and mainland China commenced in 1985.[21] Formal diplomatic relations were finally established on 3 October 1990,[22] making Singapore the last Southeast Asian country to officially recognise the PRC.[23]
Despite maintaining strong relations with China, Singapore continues to uphold unofficial ties withTaiwan, including a military training and facilities agreement dating back to 1975,[24] with annual official exercises known as Exercise Starlight (星光計畫).[25] This arrangement exists due to Singapore's limited land area.[24] During the 2000s, China tried to offer Singapore the option to move its training facilities toHainan.[26][27] In 2004, prior toPrime MinisterLee Hsien Loong assuming office, he visited Taiwan to understand recent developments there.[28] China objected strongly to the visit because of Taiwan's sensitive political status.[29] Later that year, China put bilateral relations on hold.[30] In his firstNational Day Rally speech, Lee expressed concern that Taiwanese leaders and citizens might have overestimated the level of support they would receive from the international community if they were to declare independence, reflecting Singapore's cautious approach towards maintaining regional stability.[31]
China has its embassy onTanglin Road in Singapore, while Singapore's embassy inBeijing onJianguomen Wai Avenue,Chaoyang District was established in 1990,[32] and it has Consulates-General inChengdu,Guangzhou,Shanghai, andXiamen, as well asHong Kong, known during the era ofBritish rule as the Singapore Commission.[33]
While Singapore is not a party to theterritorial disputes in the South China Sea, it has an interest in the outcome of these disputes since they have implications for international law, freedom of navigation, and ASEAN unity.[34] In 2016,Chinese Communist Party tabloidGlobal Times accused Singapore of supporting thePhilippines v. China ruling in favour of the Philippines during theNon-Aligned Movement meeting in Venezuela, based on unnamed sources.[35] TheGlobal Times' account was disputed by Singapore's ambassador to China, Stanley Loh.[36] The same year, Yin Jinnan of thePLA National Defence University commented that "Beijing should make Singapore pay the price for seriously damaging China's interests" with sanctions.[37]
In November 2016, nineSingapore ArmyTerrex ICV armoured personnel carriers and associated equipment were seized by theHong Kong Customs and Excise Department at theKwai Tsing Container Terminal (formerly Kwai Chung Container Terminal).[38] The vehicles and equipment were being shipped back to Singapore from Taiwan after a military exercise in Taiwan.[39]: 56–57 The shipment was allegedly seized becauseAmerican President Lines (APL), the private shipping company engaged by the Singapore military to handle the shipment, did not have the appropriate permits for the vehicles equipment,[40] though it has been alleged that China manufactured the incident to protest against the Singaporean Army's use of Taiwan for training against the backdrop of worsening ties between both states then.[41] The shipment was later moved to the Hong Kong Customs depot at Hong KongRiver Trade Terminal and kept indoors since 6 December 2016. This was Hong Kong's biggest seizure of such equipment in the past twenty years.[42][43] On 24 January 2017, Hong Kong Customs announced that the military vehicles would be returned to Singapore.[39]: 56 Commissioner of theCustoms and Excise Department, Roy Tang Yun-kwong, said that shipping companyAmerican President Lines would likely face criminal charges over the incident for suspected breach of the Hong Kong Law.[44] In 2019, American President Lines and the captain of the involved ship was charged with violating the Import and Export (Strategic Commodities) Regulations, which they both pleaded not guilty to. In April 2019, they were found guilty,[45] with American President Lines sentenced to 90,000 HKD in fines (10,000 HKD for each vehicle), and the captain sentenced to 9,000 HKD in fines (1,000 HKD for each vehicle) and 3 months of jail time (suspended for 1.5 years).[46]
Since 1975, Singapore has conducted regular military training exercises with theRepublic of China Armed Forces, a longstanding defence arrangement that continues despite objections from Beijing.[47][48] Ties between Singapore and Taiwan extend beyond the military sphere and include decades of close co-operation in trade, education and technology. In 1993, Singapore hosted the historicWang–Koo summit, the first formal meeting between Chinese and Taiwanese officials since 1949, underscoring its role as a trusted intermediary in cross-strait relations.[49]: 78 Singapore also hosted theFirst Ma–Xi meeting, which marked the first encounter between the top political leaders of both sides of theTaiwan Strait since the conclusion of theChinese Civil War in 1949. It was the first such meeting sinceChiang Kai-shek andMao Zedong held talks in Chongqing during theDouble Tenth Agreement negotiations in August 1945.[50]
Despite pressure from China,[51] Singapore has maintained its unofficial ties with Taiwan as a matter of strategic autonomy and principled engagement. Singapore has consistently emphasised the importance of peace and stability in theTaiwan Strait, while avoiding entanglement in cross-strait disputes. On 4 November 2021, Defence MinisterNg Eng Hen acknowledged Taiwan's political status as a highly sensitive issue for China, warning of the grave consequences of any military conflict and stating, "I would advise us to stay very far away from that."[52] Nonetheless, Singapore's engagement with Taiwan continues to draw criticism from Beijing, such as in January 2024 when Singapore extended formal congratulations to President-electLai Ching-te, prompting a diplomatic rebuke from China.[53] Singapore officially opposesTaiwan independence.[54]
The bilateral trade between China and Singapore developed rapidly in recent years and Singapore has maintained the first position among ASEAN countries in their trade with China.[21] China'stransformation into amajor economic power in the 21st century has led to an increase of foreign investments in thebamboo network, a network ofoverseas Chinese businesses operating in the markets of Southeast Asia that share common family and cultural ties.[55][56]
In 1998, volume of trade was US$8.154 billion[21] In 1999, the trade value has increased to US$8.56 billion.[21] In 2000, the amount increased to US$10.821 billion.[21] In 2009, the total trade volume was SGD 75.1 billion (US$58.4 billion).[57]
Singapore is China's 9th largest trading partner,[58] while China is Singapore's 3rd largest trading partner which consisted of 10.1 percent of Singapore's total external trade from the previous year.[citation needed]
China's exports to Singapore were textiles, clothing, agriculture produce, petrochemical, metals, electromechanical equipment, feed, coking coal, shipping, machinery supplier, communication equipment and electronic components.[21]
Companies such asCapitaland andBreadtalk have made substantial inroads into China's domestic economy.[59][60][61] Others such asTemasek Holdings,Singapore Airlines have each invested inChina Eastern Airlines.
Singapore is a significant destination for Chinese outboundforeign direct investment.[8]: 49 Singaporean investment in China became particularly important to Singapore during the 1990s, as Singapore sought to adjust its economic model.[49]: 79–80
Suzhou Industrial Park developed as a result of high-level intergovernmental cooperation between China and Singapore.[49]: 78 In the late 1980s, Singapore's export-driven economic model required adjustment for further growth and Singapore's government viewed investment in China as part of its policy adjustment.[49]: 79 Through its Regional Industrial Parks program, Singapore proposed to develop industrial manufacturing locations in other Asian countries, modeled after its ownJurong Industrial Estate.[49]: 80 In 1993, Prime Minister of SingaporeLee Kuan Yew contacted Vice PremierZhu Rongji and proposed a government-to-government cooperation program to develop an industrial estate on an unbuilt site inSuzhou.[49]: 83 The next year, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Joint Development of Suzhou Industrial Park.[49]: 83
In 2007, China and Singapore began the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City project.[49]: 209
AConfucius Institute in Singapore was established in 2005 as a collaboration withNanyang Technological University (NTU), the successor to the former Chinese-languageNanyang University. Its stated mission is to provide Singapore with a platform for learning the Chinese language and culture and to enhance communication with other Chinese communities.[62] In November 2015, China opened theChina Cultural Centre in Singapore to facilitate exchanges in arts and culture.[63] Current difficulties notwithstanding, Singapore's economically successfuldominant party system has led its political system to be studied and cited as a potential model for China's government.[64][65] Such a viewpoint has been institutionalised: Nanyang Technological University offers master's degree programs that are well-attended by Chinese public officials.[66]
Singapore's attractiveness to Chinese students largely stems from its high-quality education system, safe urban environment and regional proximity. While some are drawn by perceived shared language and traditions, others explicitly cite Singapore's meritocratic environment as a key distinction from the mainland'sguanxi-oriented norms.[67] A 2016 study on Chinese students' integration showed generally positive interactions between them and the Singaporeans surveyed, although only about 26% of students were active in local events and activities.[68] Singapore's Chinese-languageLianhe Zaobao has also long served as an outlet of Singapore's regionalsoft power.[69] While it is read by Chinese audiences and officials, its periodic censorship inside China, including blackouts in 2009 and 2019 for critical reporting on issues such asinternet controls and the2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, further highlights Singapore's independence in managing its media and public discourse.[70][71]

Chinese people have immigrated to what is known as Singapore sinceZheng He's voyages in the 15th century; those early immigrants integrated into the host societies, and their descendants are now known asPeranakans.[72]
While the majority ofSingaporeans are of ethnic Chinese descent at around 70 to 75%, this demographic fact is often misinterpreted by some in China, who assume that Singapore is culturally aligned and ideologically sympathetic to Chinese interests.[73][74][75] In reality, the Chinese community in Singapore has diverged significantly from that in China, having been shaped by centuries of migration, multiculturalism, colonial legacy and independent nation-building.[76] This misconception was evident in early bilateral exchanges, where Chinese officials referred to visiting Singaporeans as "kinsmen". While Prime MinisterLee Kuan Yew acknowledged a "special relationship", he firmly rejected the notion of ideological or emotional kinship, stating, "We are different like theNew Zealanders and theAustralians are different from theBritish... I have no ideological empathy."[16] His response underscored Singapore's distinct national identity and independent worldview, particularly in economic and political matters.[77]
In 2012, some Chinese netizens began referring to Singapore as "Po County" (坡县), a label that many Singaporeans found deeply offensive.[78] While a few Chinese commenters viewed it as a harmless or affectionate nickname, the implication that Singapore is merely a minor appendage of China was widely condemned.[78] Many Singaporeans, regardless of ethnicity, saw the term as a patronising and dismissive attempt to diminish the country's sovereignty and independence.[79]
The Singaporean Chinese today are overwhelmingly locally born and raised, with only a small minority comprising first-generation immigrants from China. They possess no allegiance to either thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) or theRepublic of China (Taiwan), and instead identify firmly with Singapore's national identity and multicultural society.[80] Singapore's historical experience with racial riots has made social harmony a top national priority,[81] and the government has invested decades of effort in cultivating a cohesive, inclusive identity that places Singapore first, above all ethnic and foreign affiliations.[82]
Despite this, misalignment between Singapore's national identity and the attitudes of some newcomers from mainland China has resulted in tension. Incidents such as the curry dispute,[83] the2012 Singapore bus drivers' strike,[84] and an infamous fatal speeding accident caused by a wealthy Chinese national,[85] have stoked public frustration. These cases are viewed by many locals as emblematic of certain Chinese immigrants' failure to respect or integrate into Singapore's multicultural society.[86]
Singaporeans' firm sense of national identity is reflected in how they respond to perceived foreign encroachments, even in symbolic domains like sport.Olympic medals won by China-born athletes who had only recently obtainedSingaporean citizenship were not widely celebrated by the local population compared to native-born winners, who saw them as "mercenaries" rather than true Singaporean champions.[87][88] This reflects the fact that Singapore's national identity is grounded in historical experience and a state-building process developed independently of China. Efforts to assert cultural affinity or political alignment based solely on ethnic similarity are considered inaccurate and inappropriate by Singaporeans, including by its leadership.[77][88]
In 2002, it was revealed that China had officially proposed relocating Singapore's military training operations from Taiwan toHainan. However, Singapore declined the offer, choosing to maintain its long-standing defence arrangements with Taiwan.[26][27] In 2008, both countries signed the Agreement on Defense Exchanges and Security Cooperation, facilitating limited interactions such as official visits, port calls and professional exchanges.[citation needed] In 2009,Exercise Cooperation, the first bilateral army exercise, was held inGuilin, China, followed by a jointcounterterrorism exercise in 2010 and 2014.[89][39]: 159 : 164
In 2019,Exercise Cooperation was held in Singapore and involved theSingapore Army's 3rd Singapore Division and 1st Commando Battalion alongside thePeople's Liberation Army’s 74th Army Group.[89] An enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation was signed in 2019.[90] Military activities were paused during theCOVID-19 pandemic, and resumed in 2022 with agreements on defence education and exchanges.[90]
In July 2025,K. Shanmugam, Singapore'sCoordinating Minister for National Security, stated that the country's critical infrastructure was attacked byUNC3886, acyber-espionage group previously linked to the Chinese government.[91] Singapore'sCyber Security Agency was deployed in the response to the attacks.[92]
In July 2020, Singaporean journalist Maria Siow reported that many mainland Chinese, echoing official narratives, tend to view Singapore as a model for China.[93] This perception stems from Singapore's status as aone-party dominant state, which is often characterised by political stability, limited dissent andlow corruption. Singapore is also credited with having contributed to China's development during the period ofChinese economic reform, andLee Kuan Yew is widely regarded by Chinese observers as an exemplary leader.[94]
Singapore enjoys generally favourable views among Chinese respondents, as shown by multiple surveys conducted over recent years. A November 2020 study by scholars from theLee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and theUniversity of British Columbia found that 69% of Chinese participants held positive opinions of Singapore.[95] Similarly, a March 2022 survey funded by theEuropean Regional Development Fund and conducted by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies reported that most mainland Chinese respondents viewed Singapore positively and regarded Singaporeans as friendly to Chinese travellers.[96] Furthermore, according to a 2022 survey byRenmin University of China and the Global Times Research Center on Chinese views ofASEAN, Singapore was identified as the most appealing ASEAN member to Chinese respondents.[97]
From the Singaporean perspective, favourable views of China remain strong but nuanced. Polling data fromPew Research Center in 2022 and 2024 showed that 67% of Singaporeans expressed a positive view of China.[98][99] A separate 2022 survey by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies similarly showed most Singaporean respondents holding positive views of China.[100] According toJamestown Foundation analyst Russell Hsiao, support for China in Singapore is generationally divided, with older Chinese Singaporeans generally expressing stronger affinity, while younger generations tend to feel less connected to China.[101]
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)由于文化背景差异, 一些网民认为"坡县"完全是对新加坡的昵称,"坡县"一词有修辞上的审美,不仅没有贬义,使用这词的人往往是跟新加坡较亲密的中国人或新移民。另一些人则认为"坡县"一词含有贬义,不应使用。
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)