| Chae Chan Ping v. United States | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued March 28–29, 1889 Decided May 13, 1889 | |
| Full case name | Chae Chan Ping v. United States |
| Citations | 130U.S.581 (more) 9 S. Ct. 623; 32L. Ed. 1068; 1889U.S. LEXIS 1778 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Appeal from theCircuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California |
| Holding | |
| TheScott Act of 1888 is valid; immigration and nationality laws can abrogate conflicting treaties, are within federal power, and are owed judicial deference. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinion | |
| Majority | Field, joined byunanimous |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. Art. III andScott Act of 1888 | |
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), orThe Chinese Exclusion Case, is alandmark decision of theSupreme Court of the United States that upheld the constitutionality of theScott Act of 1888, a follow-up to theChinese Exclusion Act. The Scott Act barred Chinese laborers from reentry to the United States.[1]
The case arose concerning Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer who moved to the United States in 1875, legally resided inSan Francisco for over a decade, and whose return voyage from a trip toBritish Hong Kong was pending when the Scott Act became effective.[2] Ping's legal challenge to the prohibition on reentry was aided by Chinese immigrant groups and advocated on his behalf by an elite "dream team" of lawyers.[3]
The case is viewed as "the grandfather ofimmigration law cases" and is significant in the broadjudicial deference given to theexecutive and legislative branches of the federal government, as well as precedent for theplenary power andconsular nonreviewability doctrines inimmigration and nationality law.[4][5]
Beginning with the 1849 discovery of gold atSutter's Mill, many people emigrated from China to the United States to take part in theCalifornia Gold Rush. In 1850, there were around 800 Chinese immigrants living in California, yet by 1852, that population had increased to roughly 20,000.[6] Between 1865 and 1869, theCentral Pacific Railroad Company brought many more Chinese immigrants to California to construct thefirst transcontinental railroad.[7] Chinese immigrants in California during this period were subject to widespread prejudice and discrimination.[8] In 1852, the California legislature levied a discriminatory tax on Chinese miners, the second such tax levied within two years, and in 1854, theSupreme Court of California ruled that the testimony of Chinese people wasinadmissible in court.[9]
In 1868, the United States and China negotiated theBurlingame Treaty. The terms of this treaty declared formalcomity between the two nations, granted Chinamost-favored-nation trade status, incentivized Chinese immigration to the United States, and conferred somebilateral immigration benefits to nationals of either nation.[1] In response to anti-immigrant hostility, theAngell Treaty of 1880 was later negotiated to limit the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States.[10][11][12]
Primarily motivated by economic anxiety, Congress passed theChinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which was "widely popular across political parties" at the time of its enactment.[14] It was the first piece of legislation in thehistory of immigration and nationality law in the United States to broadly limit entry by a particular class of foreigners, signaling the end of otherwise largely unrestricted immigration to the United States.[15]
At first, enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Act proved cumbersome, and federal court rulings narrowed its scope. The act initially barred entry only on the basis of Chinese nationality andgrandfathered previously admitted Chinese immigrants, which led some new immigrants to forge evidence of prior lawful entry. In 1884, Congress amended the act to apply on the basis of Chinese ethnicity rather than nationality, require evidence of lawful admission from anAmerican consulate, and mandate that Chinese immigrants departing the United States obtain reentry permits if they wished to return.[16]
Following instances of violent attacks in the United States against Chinese immigrants between 1885 and 1887, such as theRock Springs Massacre andHells Canyon Massacre, the Chinese government sought to limit the emigration of laborers from China. While the Chinese government was in the midst of new treaty negotiations, the United States Congress passed theScott Act of 1888, which barred reentry of such immigrants to the United States and voided all prior reentry permits.[17][18]
On June 2, 1887, Chae Chan Ping (simplified Chinese:柴禅平;traditional Chinese:柴禪平;pinyin:Chái Chánpíng), a Chinese laborer who had resided inSan Francisco since 1875, departed forBritish Hong Kong aboard theSS Belgic. Prior to leaving the United States, he obtained a reentry permit under the provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act, as amended in 1884, which required such documentation to secure reentry for outbound Chinese immigrants. At the time he departed, his return to the United States would have been lawful.[2] During his absence, on October 1, 1888, Congress passed the Scott Act, which voided all reentry permits and barred the reentry of Chinese laborers abroad. Unaware of the change, Ping arrived six days later on October 7, 1888. He attempted to reenter the United States at theport of San Francisco but was detained by theUnited States Customs Service.[19]
On October 10, 1888, a petition for awrit of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Ping, challenging both the legality of his detention and theconstitutionality of the Scott Act.[3] Prior to theImmigration and Nationality Act of 1952, habeas corpus was the only means to challenge immigration-related legal orders.[20] The case was heard two days later before Circuit JudgesOgden Hoffman Jr. andLorenzo Sawyer. The pair were well-versed in immigration and nationality law, presiding over a large 19th-century "habeas corpus mill" in California that entertained thousands of such cases, mainly concerning Chinese immigrants.[21] The cases of Chinese immigrants had an impact on judges Hoffman and Sawyer, who often showed sympathy toward Chinese immigrants.[22] Nonetheless, when required to apply the Scott Act on October 15, 1888, both agreed that the act barred the reentry of Ping, and "Sawyer went out of his way to explain that the decision he and Hoffman reached did not represent a capitulation to popular prejudice."[21]
Chae Chan Ping was represented by prominent lawyers of the 1800s, includingGeorge Hoadly,James C. Carter, and Thomas S. Riordan, all of whom had previously won cases before the federal judiciary which resulted in outcomes favorable to Chinese immigrants.[3] Despite his lower socioeconomic status as a day laborer, Ping's high-quality "dream team" legal counsel was made possible through Chinese American benevolent societies which sought to use him as atest case to challenge Chinese exclusion.[2] Lawyers for Ping argued that the Scott Act violated the guarantees set forth in theBurlingame Treaty.[3] Further, they argued that Ping's reentry permit hadvested him with aproperty right that could not be "taken away by mere legislation", so the act had deprived Ping of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" in violation of theFifth Amendment.[23]
Arguing on behalf of the United States wasSolicitor GeneralGeorge Jenks. TheState of California submitted anamicus curiae brief in favor of the federal government. The amicus brief was written byJohn Franklin Swift, who nine years earlier had negotiated theAngell Treaty of 1880.[3] Lawyers for the United States framed the case in the context of the law of nations and as part of a larger foreign affairs dispute with the Chinese government. They argued that the federal government had the complete power to bar admission of Ping and any other foreigner or class of foreigners, regardless of background. It was further argued that power over foreign affairs was an exclusively federal matter.[24]
In a unanimous decision delivered on May 13, 1889,Associate JusticeStephen Johnson Field held that theScott Act of 1888 was constitutional; thus, Chae Chan Ping was barred from reentry to the United States and removed to China.[2] Justice Field had once ruled, sitting by designation upon afederal district court, against the discriminatory, anti-ChinesePigtail Ordinance, but he later shifted his views, employinganti-immigration rhetoric in the majority opinion.[25] First, Field addressed whether there was a conflict of laws with the act, holding that Congress had properly abrogated any conflicting treaties.[26]
Next, Field addressed the power of government over immigration and nationality law, holding thatonly the federal government had such power.[27] Field drew heavily upon accounts of thelaw of nations to hold that the power to exclude foreigners is "[a]n incident of sovereignty...part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution."[28] These accounts were not unique to American law and had been drawn upon earlier by other nations.[29] Field also noted thatforeign affairs powers, under thecommerce,naturalization,define and punish, andwar clauses of theConstitution, permitted immigration restrictions by the federal government.[30][31]
After addressing bothquestions concerningconflict of laws andseparation of powers, Field recognized broadjudicial deference on the matter of immigration and nationality law, holding that such laws were "conclusive upon the judiciary."[32] In effect, Field left this area of law topopular sovereignty throughCongress and thePresidency.[33] This deference traces back to theRoman Empire and was embraced byFounding Fathers such asGouverneur Morris during the debates over the Constitution. Theprecedent of this case was subsequently developed into theplenary power andconsular nonreviewability doctrines of immigration and nationality law.[34]
The decision inChae Chan Ping is a foundational legal precedent for theplenary power doctrine. This doctrine holds that Congress and the President have exclusive power over immigration and nationality law, so judicial review is limited.[35] The result is "a domain where ordinary constitutional rules have never applied".[36]Consular nonreviewability is a related doctrine that limits judicial review ofconsular action.[37]
The doctrinal foundation set forth inChae Chan Ping was further developed by Supreme Court decisions in the 1890s, includingNishimura Ekiu v. United States (1892) andFong Yue Ting v. United States (1893). The decision inNishimura Ekiu built uponChae Chan Ping both by reaffirming the federal government's power to restrict immigration and by establishing that in judicial review of immigration and nationality law, the "decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law".[38][39]Fong Yue Ting held that removal isrepatriation, not a punishment, and limited the constitutional applicability ofjury trial rights,protections from unreasonable searches and seizures, andprotections from cruel and unusual punishments in removal proceedings.[40]
Lem Moon Sing v. United States (1895) andWong Wing v. United States (1896) reinforcedNishimura Ekiu andFong Yue Ting.Lem Moon Sing upheld legislation codifying the finality established inNishimura Ekiu.[41]Wong Wing reaffirmedFong Yue Ting, but the court held that an otherwise "infamous" punishment imposed alongside removal was still bound bycriminal procedure.[42]
At the start of the 20th century, the Supreme Court began moderating its interpretation of the plenary power doctrine, though it did not entirely abandon the doctrine. This shift appeared inYamataya v. Fisher (1903), or theJapanese Immigrant Case, where the court reaffirmed earlier rulings while providing the first instance of judicial review ofprocedural due process challenges to removal proceedings.[43][44]
The court expanded on this reasoning inUnited States ex rel. Turner v. Williams (1904), whereJohn Turner challenged his exclusion under theAnarchist Exclusion Act. While the court entertained his procedural due process claim, it declinedFirst Amendment review, relying on the plenary power doctrine.[45] By the time ofOceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan (1909), the doctrine had become firmly entrenched, with the court holding: "[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete."[46][47]
The doctrine reached its fullest scope during the 1950s, through a series of three decisions espousing near-total deference to the political branches. First, the Supreme Court held inUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy (1950) that immigration was a privilege, and reaffirmedNishimura Ekiu, stating:
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."[48]
— United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 544
Second,Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952) upheld the removal of nine people over theirCommunist Party USA membership by applying a highly deferentialstandard of review, stating that immigration and nationality law is "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."[49][50] Third, inShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei (1953), the Supreme Court delivered its strongest statement of the plenary power doctrine, upheld a prolonged detention onEllis Island, and reaffirmedChae Chan Ping.[51]
The court continued to apply the plenary power doctrine throughout the latter half of the 20th century. InGalvan v. Press (1954), it rejected asubstantive due process challenge to the removal of a Mexican national who had lived in the United States for over thirty years, holding that "the slate is not clean" and that "there is not merely a page of history, but a whole volume."[52][53] InBoutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1967), the court upheld the removal of a gay man, citingChae Chan Ping in stating that "Congress has plenary power."[54][55] InKleindienst v. Mandel (1972), the court upheld the denial of a visa to a Marxist journalist, stating that sinceChae Chan Ping, "the general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion."[56][57] InFiallo v. Bell (1977), the court relied on the plenary power doctrine established byChae Chan Ping to reject anequal protection challenge to an immigration and nationality law favoring mothers over fathers of illegitimate children in visa sponsorship.[58]
WhileChae Chan Ping has been criticized for its discriminatory outcome, judicial deference in immigration and nationality law has continued into the 21st century.[60] InTrump v. Hawaii (2018),Margo Schlanger called on the Supreme Court to "jettison" the doctrine.[61] Contrary to that call, the court relied on the doctrine to upholdPresidential Proclamation 9645, issued byPresident Trump to bar admission from several Muslim-majority countries.[62]
InDepartment of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam (2020), the court recited precedents from the 1891 to 1952 "finality era" to uphold thejurisdiction stripping provisions of theexpedited removal system against aSuspension Clause challenge.[63] InDepartment of State v. Muñoz (2024), the court upheld the denial of a spousal visa against asubstantive due process challenge and reaffirmed plenary power doctrine precedents, includingKnauff.[64]
Signed on November 17, 1880, the [Angell] treaty sought to regulate rather than completely prohibit Chinese immigration, reflecting a period of heightened tension regarding labor and cultural assimilation.
The third brief for the government includes a section on international law, which seems to be included in support of the structural argument about the national powers being granted to Congress: 'The whole tenor of the Constitution is that the United States is a nation, and, as to foreign nations and their subjects, is endowed with full sovereign powers.' The following section is entitled 'The law of nations.' Its conclusion, not surprisingly, is that '[i]ntemational law fully establishes the right of a nation to exclude foreigners from its domain." For authority, it cites Chief Justice Marshall inThe Schooner Exchange ('The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute') and Vattel's Law of Nations ('the lord of the territory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being entered').
Clearly the statute [Scott Act of 1888] did violate the treaty, but Field, in his first reference to sovereignty, wrote that treaties and statutes are of equal rank, and in the case of a conflict, 'the last expression of the sovereign will must control.'
Justice Field's opinion for theChae Chan Ping Court invoked sovereignty not to trump rights claims but to solve a federalism problem–structural reasoning that locates the immigration control power squarely in the federal government rather than the states...
In classic international law accounts, sovereignty was the unlimited, unaccountable, and undivided power of the nation state within its territory and over its nationals...[S]overeignty and the law of nations was everywhere in the Court's decision.
The authority to exclude aliens, the Court found inChae Chan Ping, is 'an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence.' The Court did not invent the rationale that deportation was a power inherent in sovereignty, nor did it claim the power was uniquely American…
Notably, the Constitution does not expressly grant the federal government wholesale foreign affairs power. The foreign affairs power, rather, appears to be an amalgamation of Congress's powers to 'regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define offenses against the law of nations, and to declare war'…One more provision rounds out constitutional support for federal immigration powers: the naturalization provision that grants the federal government the power to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,' or a law for granting naturalized citizenship.
[Founding era authorities on the law of nations, such as] Pufendorf, Barbeyac, Vattel, Martens, Blackstone, and—more obliquely, Grotius and Burlamaqui— all addressed limits on immigration when writing on the law of nations. These authors consistently recognized the prerogative of governments to impose immigration restrictions. That prerogative was qualified in cases of necessity (for example, a ship being driven by storm onto a foreign shore), and in the cases of exiles and fugitives. As to voluntary immigrants, however, all but Grotius—the earliest of the writers— recognized that the power to restrict was nearly absolute.
The Court's opinion referenced the California legislature's resolution to Congress, which described an 'Oriental invasion' that 'was a menace to our civilization.' Justice Field downplayed the relevance of these racist intentions, emphasizing that 'This Court is not a censor of the morals of other departments of the government.' He wrote on behalf of a unanimous bench that if Congress 'considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security … its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.'
However, the plenary power doctrine is firmly rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition. It should be emphasized that the determination to expel or exclude foreigners, whether they have already lawfully settled or even begun the process of naturalization, is a political question and not a vested right absent congressional statutory acquiescence...It is an issue that can only be placed into this nation's political discourse, where it has always and rightfully been.
Stemming from 'ancient principles of the international law of nation-states,' '[t]he power to admit or exclude is a sovereign prerogative.' Indeed, the ability to 'regulate the flow of non-citizens entering the country . . . is an inherent power of any sovereign nation.' This idea traces as far back as the Roman Empire and 'received recognition during the Constitutional Convention.'
Nishimura also established the idea that the judiciary could not overrule decisions rightfully made by the legislative and executive branches or their rightfully designated actors in regards to immigration on due process grounds.
Most importantly, by the turn of the century, administrative decisions concerning the Chinese were no longer open to judicial review. AfterLem Moon Sing v. United States (1895), the courts concurred with legislation decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.
In addition to the somewhat malleable due process protections that apply to non-citizens in removal proceedings, the Court has also acknowledged the application of more clearly defined procedural protections for non-citizens in criminal proceedings. The Court's 1896 decision inWong Wing rested on the premise that non-citizens are entitled to the same procedural rights as citizens where the imposition of 'infamous' punishment is concerned.
[I]nYamataya v. Fisher, the Court acknowledged plenary power over deportation but found that this did not place Congress beyond judicial due process review.
Justice Fuller cites government 'power of self preservation' in expelling anarchist.
Clark's majority opinion stands as the Court's strongest statement of the plenary power doctrine and the entry fiction. CitingChae Chan Ping andKnauff, the opinion states that the power to exclude aliens is a 'fundamental sovereign attribute' that is 'largely immune from judicial control.'
Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, from 1889 to the present, maintained the principle that congressional control over aliens was much broader than congressional power over citizens. In the opinion of the Court, the family situation raised by complainants did not warrant 'review [of] the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied inKleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.'
The section of the opinion [inTrump v. Hawaii] rejecting the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim began with an explanation about why the entry-ban case differs from other First Amendment challenges. The difference, the court said, is that 'the admission and exclusion of foreign nations is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.' The court quoted a passage from a prior case [Mezei] that relied on both theChinese Exclusion Case andFong Yue Ting to justify the idea that immigration is insulated from judicial review.