Central African Republic–China refer to thebilateral relations of theCentral African Republic and thePeople's Republic of China. Diplomatic relations between China and the Central African Republic were established on September 29, 1964, when the CAR's government severed diplomatic relations with theRepublic of China (Taiwan).[1] The Central African Republic has an embassy inBeijing whilst China has an embassy inBangui.
Following establishment of relations in 1964, whenJean-Bédel Bokassa came to power in 1966, he immediately switched the nation's recognition back to Taiwan and severed diplomatic ties with the government inBeijing, "accusing Chinese Communists of conspiring against his nation's interests".[3] However, he again normalized relations with the People's Republic and visitedBeijing in 1976.[3][4] The Central African Republic switched its recognition back to Taiwan in 1991 underPresidentAndré-Dieudonné Kolingba. Kolingba's successor,Ange-Félix Patassé, would switch the CAR's recognition back to the People's Republic of China in 1998, which remained the status quo in the following decades. Since 1998, China has delivered muchforeign aid to the CAR, including doctors andcivil engineers. Trade between China and the CAR has increased in the 2000s, and CAR PresidentFrançois Bozizé called for more Chinese investment in the country in 2009.[5]
The Chinese embassy in Bangui temporarily suspended its operations in 2013 after the fall of President Bozizé and the subsequentcivil war, but as of 2016 it was reopened.[6]
The Central African Republic was one of 53 countries that backed theHong Kong national security law at theUnited Nations in June 2020.[7] The Central African Republic follows theone China principle. It recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China andTaiwan as an integral part of China's territory, and supports all efforts by the PRC to "achievenational reunification".[8] The Central African Republic considersHong Kong,Xinjiang andTibet to be China's internal affairs.[8]
China is active ingold mining in the CAR. Over the years, multiple killings have occurred in or around Chinese-run mines. Two Chinese nationals were killed by residents who attacked a Chinese-operated mine inSosso-Nakombo in 2020.[10] On 19 March 2023, theChimbolo massacre took place, killing 9 Chinese workers at agold mine. China stated it didn't know for certain who was responsible for the killings.[11] Shortly after the massacre, Chinarepatriated 80 nationals.[12] In July 2023,Wagner Group fighters reportedly came to the rescue of another group of Chinese miners under attack from militias nearDimbi.[13] In May 2024, four workers were killed by rebels who attacked the Chinese-run gold mining town ofGaga.[10][14]
In June 2024, Central African authorities revoked the Chinese mining company Daqing SARL's license to carry out activities inMingala over alleged collusion with rebel groups. Daqing was accused of "[sharing] intelligence with armed groups, illegal exploitation, illegal introduction of foreign subjects into mining areas, non-payment of taxes and lack of activity reports".[14][15]
Adocumentary from 2023,Eat Bitter, explores the relationship between Chineseexpats and Central African workers in the mining sector.[16]
Since the firstForum on China Africa Cooperation in 2000, the Chinese government has delivered $152 million in development assistance to the Central Africa Republic.[17] Several major Chinese aid projects in the Central African Republic include:
A $67.4 million loan from theExim Bank of China to install fix and mobile networks in the country.[18]
Construction of the 20,000-seatBarthélemy Boganda Stadium in Bangui financed by the Chinese government, carried out between 2003 and 2007.[19]
The cancellation of $11.4 million in debt owed to China.[20]
Construction of the SakaïSolar Power Plant, located 10 kilometers from Bangui, with Chinese financial and technical aid. The plant is intended to deal with the widespreadpower cuts in the CAR. It became operational in April 2023 after three years of construction.[21]
^Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.[1]
^Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development."AidData | Supply and installation for mobile and fixed networks". Archived fromthe original on 2013-06-24. Retrieved2013-06-21.
^Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development."AidData | Stadium". Archived fromthe original on 2013-06-24. Retrieved2013-06-21.
^Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development."AidData | Debt Cancellation". Archived fromthe original on 2013-06-24. Retrieved2013-06-21.
