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Brazilian Navy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Naval warfare branch of Brazil's military forces
Brazilian Navy
Marinha do Brasil
Logo[1]
Founded1822; 204 years ago (1822)
CountryBrazil
AllegianceMinistry of Defense
Size77,216 personnel(2026),[2] (incl. 16,000 marines)[3]

102 vessels(2017),[4] seelist

76 aircraft(2022),[5] seelist
Part ofBrazilian Armed Forces
HeadquartersBrasília[6]
PatronMarquess of Tamandaré[7]
MottosProtegendo nossas riquezas, cuidando da nossa gente
("Protecting our riches, caring for our people")[8]
MarchCisne Branco
("White Swan")Play[9]
AnniversariesJune 11 (Battle of Riachuelo)[7]
EngagementsSeeMilitary history of Brazil andHistory of the Brazilian Navy
Websitewww.marinha.mil.br
Commanders
Commander-in-chiefLula da Silva
Minister of DefenseJosé Múcio
Navy CommanderMarcos Olsen[10]
Insignia
Ensign
Jack
Flag
Emblem
Military unit

TheBrazilian Navy (Portuguese:Marinha do Brasil,IPA:[maˈɾĩj̃ɐdubɾaˈziw],MB) is the naval andcoast guard service branch ofBrazil's Armed Forces as well as its maritime authority. It has defense, management and constabulary roles inBrazilian jurisdictional waters and broader missions in theSouth Atlantic. Its naval,aviation andmarine assets are spread between a combat Fleet (theEsquadra) based atRio de Janeiro state and auxiliary and patrol assets along the coast and theAmazon andPlatine basins.

The 19th centuryImperial navy, organized from a section of thePortuguese Navy and influenced by theRoyal Navy, was key to the Brazilian state's consolidation and foreign policy in the Platine region. By 1870, it was the world's fifth largest navy. However, the late centuryRepublican coup andnaval revolts downgraded its position relative to theArmy. Its main rival was still theArgentine Navy, butGerman submarines were the enemy in both world wars. TheCold War fleet was ananti-submarine force under strong influence from theUnited States Navy until it sought greater independence and diversified capabilities. Over its history, its largest ships were theMinas Gerais-classbattleships and theaircraft carriersMinas Gerais andSão Paulo.[a]

Historical fleet composition mixes imports from theUnited States andWestern Europe with the work of local shipyards. The current fleet can be classed as agreen-water navy, with some limitedpower projection capability. It has aflagship helicopter carrier, theAtlântico (A-140),[b] frigates, diesel-electric submarines, landing ships, an expeditionary brigade of marines and aviation squadrons (mostly helicopters).[c] Long-term ambitions include anuclear submarine.[d]

Within Brazilian society, the Navy seeks attention and funding by attempting to include maritime spaces, which it calls the "Blue Amazon", within national identity.[e] Compared to the Army, it has a greater focus on external defense and a much lower dependence onconscription. Relations between officers and enlisted men were the point of two seamen's mutinies in1910 and1964. Contacts are made with the scientific community, among them thenuclear andantarctic programas,continental shelf delimitation and occupation of theTrindade andSaint Peter and Saint Paul archipelagoes to include them in theexclusive economic zone.

Role

[edit]

The Navy,Army andAir Force make up theBrazilian Armed Forces, "permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of thePresident", intended, in the words of theConstitution, for the "defense of the Fatherland, guarantee of constitutional powers and, at the initiative of any of them, of law and order".[13][14]

The Navy's particular role is the preparation of employment of naval power i.e. naval,aviation andmarine assets and their bases and command, logistical and administrative structures, along with Army and Air Force assets assigned to naval operations.[15] Naval power has four basic tasks under Braziliandoctrine:sea control,sea denial,power projection over land anddeterrence.[16] Sea control and power projection over land are the prevailing tasks in Brazilian naval history. The 2008 National Defense Strategy proposed a novel priority in sea denial.[17] Naval power is the military component of maritime power, which includes the merchant marine, port infrastructure, shipbuilding, resource extraction and other national activities at sea.[18][15] The Brazilian merchant marine serves as a reserve to the Navy and may be mobilized in wartime.[19]

Mentions to constitutional powers and law and order have echoes in almost all previous constitutions and roots in the military's history of involvement in politics and internal conflicts. In the current legal order, political authorities may call on the Armed Forces for law and order operations.[20] The Navy's first widely reported participation in these missions was in the 2010 operations inRio de Janeiro's favelas.[21] However, compared to the Army it is more concerned with external defense than internal security.[f] The image it seeks is that of a more professional service branch,[25] which fights on internal military conflicts, when it fights, on the government's side.[g]

Subsidiary roles

[edit]

Brazilian legislation also provides subsidiary roles for the military: to contribute towards national development and civil defense and prevent and repress crimes in the land border and at sea. TheNavy's Commander is designated as the country's "Maritime Authority" to exert the service's particular subsidiary roles:[29][30]

  1. Oversee and control the Merchant Marine and related activities in what concerns to national defense;
  2. Provide safety in waterway navigation;
  3. Contribute in the writing and implementation of national policies concerning the sea;
  4. Implement and police laws and regulations at sea and inner waters, in coordination with other bodies of the executive power, federal or state, when necessary, given specific competences;
  5. Cooperate with federal bodies, when necessary, in the repression of crimes of national or international repercussion on the use of the sea, inner waters and prot areas, in the form of logistical support, intelligence, communications and instruction.
Destruction of dredges found in an operation against illegal mining inAmazonas

The Navy's role is management and not just defense of Brazilian waters. Its commander presides the Interministerial Commission on Marine Resources (CIRM), the coordenating body in the Brazilian government's maritime development strategy.[31] The Maritime Authority Regulations and Normative Rulings enacted by the Navy are competent to fill gaps in Brazilian maritime legislation.[32] This legal framework is enforced by the Navy acrossBrazilian jurisdictional waters i.e. waterways and inner waters, theterritorial sea,exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and waters overlying theextended continental shelf.[33]

For this purpose, naval assets are used in patrol and inspection operations, not to be confused with sea control, a distinctly military operation. Naval patrol wields limited force against smuggling, arms or drug trafficking, unauthorized fishing, terrorism, piracy and other crimes. Naval inspection refrains from the use of force and seeks to safeguard human life and navigation safety and prevent pollution. In these activities, the Navy's opponents may include bad fishermen, drunk recreational boaters and owners of boats which do not comply with security norms.[34] Crewmen board vessels to check documents, mandatory equipment, repairs and damages. Foreign ships are subject toport state control to verify their compliance with international conventions.[35]

This opens some overlap in tasks with theFederal Police, which has a maritime service for port zones, waterways and maritime accesses to critical points of the coast.[36] On environmental enforcement, tasks may possibly overlap with those of theInstitute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA).[8] Execution of subsidiary roles demands contact with the Federal Police, IBAMA, National Water Transport Agency (ANTAQ),Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) andDepartment of Federal Revenue.[37] Regulations enacted by the Navy are related to regulations by other government agencies in fields such as transport, infrastructure and the environment, as well as those of international agencies such as theInternational Maritime Organization.[35] And as the Maritime Authority, the Commander of the Navy represents Brazil in international fora addressing issues covered by the service's subsidiary roles.[38]

Aeromedical evacuation on a merchant ship in Brazilian waters

In its role in waterway safety, the Navy operates buoys, beacons, lighthouses, weather stations and communications centers, conducts hydrographic surveys and enforces the Waterway Traffic Safety Law through its patrols and inspections.[36][38] Out of 206 lighthouses present on the Brazilian coast in 2022, 199 were operated by the Navy.[39] Navigation incidents are reported to the Admiralty Court (Tribunal Marítimo).[35] The Navy is also a port authority,[40] controls professional maritime and port education[41][42] and runs the merchant marine officer academy.[43]

To comply with Brazil's commitments in theInternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the Navy and Air Force have asearch and rescue role in an area extending as far as the 10th parallel west, over more than 14 million square kilometers of the Atlantic.[44][35] And there are other humanitarian roles andcivic-social actions, such as medical aid to riverine populations in theAmazon andPantanal.[45]

Coast guard

[edit]
Marines in a law and order operation at a port area

Patrol and inspection, sea rescue and waterway safety are typical roles for acoast guard.[46] Brazil has no such agency and the Navy assumes the roles it would have.[37] It describes itself as a "dual navy", fit for both warfare and coastal and riverine policing. There have been proposals for a separate Brazilian coast guard, of which the latest effort of note was attempted by Minister of the Navy Maximiano da Fonseca in 1983.[47] A bill would create a federal autonomous agency linked to the Navy and controlled in wartime as a reserve force. It would assume all subsidiary roles and the personnel and materiel inventory of the Directorate of Ports and Coasts, which would then be disbanded. The proposal was highly unpopular in the Navy and none of his successors revisited the idea.[48]Congress shelved the bill.[47] In the early 2000s, the Federal Police's intelligence sector also recommended the creation of a coast guard.[49]

A coast guard would relieve the Navy of its long list of non-military roles to focus on naval warfare[42] and potentially reduce crime in coastal regions, which the Navy has not managed to fully contain.[50] This has already pressed severalstate police forces to create maritime security companies.[47] On the other hand, its opponents argue the new agency would have enormous disputes with the Navy over the split of its properties, areas, resources and roles. Combat and patrol assets and their human and logistical inventories are currently shared and their separation would be more costlier than the current model. The new agency would in time be fully removed from the Navy's control, fight over its scarce resources and achieve a higher priority, as its services would be closer to society. According to Admiral Armando Vidigal, "theUS Navy need not fear competition from aCoast Guard, which wouldn't be the case in Brazil".[42] There are institutional interests at play: without its coast guard roles, the Navy would lose revenue from fares and port services and a reason for its existence.[36]

Science and technology

[edit]
Polar shipAlmirante Maximiano (H-41) in the Antarctic Program

Wide contact is kept with the scientific community in areas such asnuclear energy,Antarctic exploration and, historically, the computer industry.[51] Continental shelf extension claims are based on the Brazilian Continental Shelf Survey Plan (LEPLAC), a joint effort between the Navy,Petrobras and the scientific community, created in 1989.[52][53] Uranium enrichment ultracentrifuges at theResende Nuclear Fuel Factory are provided by theNavy's nuclear program.[54]

Naval logistics supply scientific bases on the remote archipelagoes ofTrindade andSaint Peter and Saint Paul for the explicit purpose of having them count as "inhabited islands" with an outlying EEZ. The latter archipelago is a barely livable outpost. Four-person crews are rotated in half-month intervals, with a ship always on standby for an emergency.[55][56] TheComandante Ferraz Antarctic Station and theBrazilian Antarctic Program's logistics are also run by the Navy.[57] The earliest naval expeditions to the continent enabled Brazil to receive consultative status in theAntarctic Treaty System in 1983.[58]

Area of operations

[edit]
Research station and offshore patrol vesselAraguari (P-122) at the Saint Peter and Saint Paul Archipelago

The Brazilian Navy is traditionally considered a coastal force, with a significant presence also in rivers ("brown" waters). Long-term aims would make it ablue-water navy, capable of distant overseas expeditions. In its current state, which falls short of this level, can be classed as that of agreen-water navy, focused on the defense of its jurisdictional waters.[59][60][24] Most of its naval assets, particularly larger ships, are concentrated in the state ofRio de Janeiro,[4][8] the "backbone" of the Navy,[61] where the fleet is headquartered. There is a proposal for a 2nd Fleet based in theNorth orNortheast of the country.[62] Aside from this main component, patrol and auxiliary craft are based at several points in the coast andAmazonas andParaguay rivers.[37][63]

The Brazilian government's National Defense Strategy prioritizes sea control in the stretch of coastline betweenSantos andVitória and in theAmazon Delta.[64] The 2023 Maritime Defense Strategy also mentioned as "maritime areas of interest" theRio Grande Rise, the surroundings of oceanic islands and theCampos andSantos oil and gas basins.[65] "The strategic maritime areas of greatest priority and importance for Brazil", according to the 2012 National Defense White Paper, are the jurisdictional waters, "as well as the region between the 16th parallel north, the west coast ofAfrica,Antarctica, easternSouth America and the easternLesser Antilles."[66] This is what military thinkers have called the "Brazilian strategic contour" (entorno estratégico brasileiro),[67] where interventions on behalf of national interests may be needed.[68]United Nations peacekeeping operations may demand power projection even further away from the coast.[69]

International relations

[edit]
Brazilian frigateBosísio (F-48) (centered) between an Argentine destroyer and aUnited States Coast Guard cutter

Brazil's historical rival in the 19th and 20th centuries wasArgentina.[70][71] The balance of naval power in South America centered on theABC powers (Argentina, Brazil andChile).[72] The chief external influence in doctrine and traditions, from the earliest years, was the BritishRoyal Navy.[73] American influence began to take over once an advisory mission was hired in 1922.[74][75]Germany was the opponent in bothworld wars;[76] thesecond war confirmed American influence throughLend-Lease transfers and joint operations. The postwar military assistance treaty with theUnited States raised this influence to its all-time high.[77][h] The United States assumed leadership of a collective defense system for the Western Hemisphere, formalized in theOrganization of American States andInter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, against an implicit enemy: theSoviet Union.[79][80] Joint operations (Unitas, Veritas and Springboard) promoted American tactical patterns in Latin American navies.[81]

1970s naval planning reappraised threats. The greatest concern was now a regional, not global war.[82] Brazil withdrew from its military treaty with the United States and dismissed the advisory mission.[82][i]Relations with Argentina were pacified,[82][84] and in time evolved into regular bilateral exercises such as Operation Fraterno.[85] Influence was sought in Africa and most notably achieved inNamibia in the 1990s.[j] After the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union's disappearance, Brazilian naval thought replaced its "conflict hypotheses" with "strategic vulnerabilities" for an unpredictable world.[22] Nonstate threats such as terrorism emerge.[88] Brazil's official defense strategy names no specific enemy which must be deterred or resisted against,[89] and it is precisely the lack of a perceived threat which disinterests the public in naval investments.[90]

The ambition is to be perceived as the leading naval power in the South Atlantic, if not the Southern Hemisphere.[60][91] Expensive projects for nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers may stand out in early 21st century South America, a mostly stable region on interstate relations.[92] But they are easier to understand when factoring in ambitions of global power: a power projection capability would bolster the bid for a permanent seat in theUnited Nations Security Council.[93] On the other hand, the 1988 Constitution establishes non-intervention as a guideline of Brazil's foreign policy, which does not favor the idea of a strong navy.[94]

For coastal states in the South Atlantic, what the Brazilian government proposes is a common identity and agenda and a rejection of extraregional military presence.[95] This presence does exist, such as the string of British overseas territories fromAscension Island to theFalkland Islands.[96][97] Brazilian representatives have criticizedNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the South Atlantic at the same time as the Brazilian military maintains partnerships with NATO countries. Relations between the Brazilian and US navies are still colored by their long history together.[98] The 21st century Brazilian Navy remains a westernized institution in the sourcing of its ships and its tactics, procedures and uniforms.[99]

"Maritime mentality"

[edit]
Grajaú-class patrol boat next to an offshore oil platform

ThePortuguese Empire's conquest and colonization of what would come to be Brazil began from the sea.[100][101] As a result, independent Brazil in the 19th century was an "archipelagic" state, with its population concentrated along the coast and navigable rivers, as inMato Grosso.[102][103] The merchant marine and shipbuilding were significant economic sectors and the population's geographic imagination was centered on the sea — everything converged to make naval power relevant.[101] In the 20th century, on the contrary, policies and the collective consciousness faced the continental interior, as can be seen in the transfer of the capital from Rio de Janeiro toBrasília, theMarch to the West and the replacement of coastal navigation by the highway network as the primary mode of transportation.[104][105]

And yet the sea has not ceased to be relevant. Around 80% of theBrazilian population still lived at less than 200 kilometers from the coast, in data from 2020, and 95% of external trade crossed the sea.[106]Economic activities andenergy resources concentrate near the coast:[107] offshore oil extraction exceeded production on land in 1982 and made up 95% of total production in 2018. The numbers are similar for natural gas.[108] In 2024, Brazil was the world's 9th largest oil producer.[109] As of 2015, an estimated 18.93% of thegross domestic product (GDP) was directly or indirectly tied to the sea.[110]

Brazilian naval thinkers deplore the loss of "maritime mentality" among the population.[111][112] Opinion polls evidence the Brazilian public is largely ignorant of the sea's economic and legal aspects, and in 2014, although 60% agreed the Navy was relevant to the nation, 90% could not cite examples of what it did. The CIRM coordinates the Maritime Mentality Promotion Program (Promar), which seeks to create a maritime identity within the Brazilian collective consciousness.[113]

Blue Amazon

[edit]
Main article:Brazilian Blue Amazon
Map of Brazil outlining the territorial sea (dotted line), EEZ (dark blue line) and continental shelf (darker, unmarked blue)

As a party to theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Brazil is entitled to an EEZ at distance of up to 200nautical miles (370kilometres) from its coastline, replacing earlier claims (1970–1993) of a 200-nautical mile territorial sea.[114] Three archipelagoes,Fernando de Noronha,Trindade andSaint Peter and Saint Paul, andRocas Atoll also radiate an EEZ from their contour.[44][115] Trindade and Fernando de Noronha are potentially useful in a forward defense of the Brazilian coast, but currently have no defensive installations.[116] UNCLOS also provided the basis for an extended continental shelf claim in 2004. The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has yet to approve the entire Brazilian claim.[52][53] Adding together the EEZ and all continental shelf proposals, Brazil would have rights over a maritime area of 5.7 million square kilometers.[117]

In 2004 the Navy created an overarching name for all maritime areas under any kind of Brazilian jurisdiction: "Blue Amazon".[118] Since then, this term is ubiquitous in its external and internal communication and its very identity. Naval investments are explained in terms of the defense of the Blue Amazon,[119] through which attention and public support for greater funding are sought.[120] The name is a semantic device to appropriate a loaded word: the "green" Amazon is strongly tied in the Brazilian imagination to natural resources,biodiversity and environmental and national sovereignty issues.[121][122] In this sense, the two Amazons are vast, rich and potentially threatened spaces.[123][124]

Beyond trade and energy, the Brazilian maritime space has untapped potentials for several living and non-living resources and is of interest to scientific research and environmental conservation.[125] Discourse on the Blue Amazon traces a direct logical connection between the existence of resources and the need for military presence in an area.[120] Fears of foreign greed and calls for military investments, therefore, increased after the announcement of large oil reserves discovered in the South Atlantic'spre-salt layer in 2007. But regardless of what could cause a conflict, Brazil has geographic reasons, an eight-thousand kilometer coastline where its population and economy reside, to desire a forward naval defense.[126] And the Navy has roles on international waters, which the concept of the Blue Amazon glosses over, which can unintentionally create an image of a constabulary navy with no sea power.[127]

Internal waters

[edit]
Mato Grosso Flotilla in the Paraguay River

The definitions of Blue Amazon and Brazilian jurisdictional waters include inner waterways.[123][44] The National Defense Strategy called for greater investments in the Amazon and Paraguay-Paraná basins, to which the Navy traditionally assigns secondary importance.[63] The service cares less abour the ("green") Amazon than the Army,[128][91] but its most famous battles happened on rivers in the Platine basin in the 19th century.[91]

Brazil's riverine spaces are vast.[91] From the Atlantic, ships can reachPeru through the Amazon River,[129] andMato Grosso through theParaguay River.[102] In the Amazon, rivers are the primary mode of transportation in the absence of a comprehensive road network. Even the Army has a riverine logistics unit, theAmazon Military Command Boat Center.[130] Brazil cooperates withColombia and Peru, in the Amazon, andBolivia,Paraguay,Argentina andUruguay, in the Platine basin, against the drug trade and environmental crime.[60]

History

[edit]
Main article:History of the Brazilian Navy

The Brazilian Navy is the oldest service branch in the Armed Forces, and as such, has formal precedence in official texts and ceremonies.[131] Officially, it derives from the PortugueseSecretariat of State of the Navy and of the Overseas Affairs, created on July 28, 1736.[132] UponBrazilian independence in 1822, some of the institutions, ships and personnel of thePortuguese Navy in the Americas defected to the new state. The commanding body for this new institution was the Navy Ministry, whose first commander was appointed on October 28, 1822.[133] In 1999 the Navy Ministry was downgraded to Navy Command, subordinate to the newly createdMinistry of Defense.[134][135]

The fleet's evolution over the 19th and 20th centuries followed cycles of roughly four decades of expansion and contraction. High points were achieved in 1830, 1870,1910,1945 and 1980.[136] The 20th century Navy was a regional trend-setter as the first in Latin America to acquiredreadnought battleships,submarines andaircraft carriers.[137]

19th century

[edit]
Main article:Imperial Brazilian Navy
Battle of Riachuelo, decisive naval engagement of the War of the Triple Alliance in 1865

The Navy was actively used by theBrazilian Empire (1822–1889),[101] transporting and supplying thearmy, cutting off enemylines of communication throughblockades and defending its own lines from enemycommerce raiding.[103][138] The expulsion of remaining Portuguese forces from South America in theBrazilian War of Independence and quelling of internal revolts in theRegency period (1831–1840) conserved the integrity of the new state. Although only one rebellion had a naval force (theRiograndense Republic), naval logistics were decisive.[102][26] The 1822 fleet was modest and had to be complemented with foreign mercenaries, such as the British veteranThomas Cochrane, and ships bought in a national subscription.[139] There was a local industry for wooden ships since thecolonial period, although the artillery came from Europe.[100] Rifled barrels andsteamships were adopted in the 1830s and 1840s.[140]

On interstate wars in the Platine basin (Cisplatine, 1825–1828,Platine, 1851–1852, andTriple Alliance, 1864–1870), successful naval campaigns were the foundation of Imperial foreign policy.[141][142] The longest campaign, in 1860s Paraguay, was a slow ascent of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers in coordination with the Army, facing enemy artillery and boarding parties, diseases killing more than combat and maintenance difficulties. Notable engagements took place inRiachuelo,Curupayty andHumaitá.[143][144] In 1870 the Brazilian Navy had grown to the world's fifth largest in ship numbers, although they were mostly wooden vessels for riverine warfare.[145]

This cycle of conventional warfare ended in 1870, reducing political interest in naval power, at the same time as technological advancements no longer allowed an unindustrialized state to sustain a modern fleet on its own resources.[146] By the end of the century, shipbuilding had all but ceased and Brazil was an importer of ships.[147] The 1889Proclamation of the Republic was the Army's initiative, having diverged in the social composition and ideological influences of its officer corps.[k] Parts of the Navy launched twonaval revolts against the first two presidents, in 1891 and 1893–1895.[149] Their defeat left Brazilian naval power in profound decay by the turn of the century, while the Army grew in political strength and budget share.[150][151][l] What was left of the fleet in 1899, twobattleships, twocoastal defense ships, fourarmored cruisers, five gunboats and thirteentorpedo boats, was inferior to the Argentine and Chilean navies.[152][153]

World Wars

[edit]
Further information:Brazilian Navy in World War II
The dreadnoughtSão Paulo, one of the two stars of the 1910 fleet, overflied by a Naval Aviation seaplane

Brazil entered the two world wars, in1917–1918 and1942–1945, with essentially the same navy:[154][155][m] the "1910 Fleet", composed of twoMinas Gerais-class dreadnought battleships, twoBahia-class cruisers, tenPará-class destroyers, threeFoca-class submersibles and auxiliary vessels.[157][158] It was ordered at British shipyards at the heights of thecoffee andrubber booms,[159] with the endorsement of theMinister of Foreign Affairs, theBaron of Rio Branco.[160][161] Brazil never managed to make full use of the dreadnoughts' potential. It depended on foreign industry for their maintenance and the Navy's human resources were insufficiently professionalized.[162][163] The latter came to light when seamen mutinied against the enduring practice ofcorporal punishment in the 1910Revolt of the Lash.[163][164] The order set off anaval arms race with Argentina and Chile and the 1910 fleet was quickly outmatched.[162]

Investment was minimal in theinterwar period,[76] but there was a gradual professionalization.[165] ANaval Aviation branch, created in 1916, was disbanded in 1941 upon the creation of theBrazilian Air Force.[166] A modest naval program in 1932 revived shipbuilding, matching the wider industrializing policy of theGetúlio Vargas government.[167][168] The Navy fought on the government's side during internal conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s, such as in the blockade of thePort of Santos during theConstitutionalist Revolution of 1932. On the other hand, parts of the Navy joined thetenentist andintegralist insurrections.[n] Naval tenentism was weaker than its counterpart in the Army, as the Navy had a better relationship with the civilian political elite.[171] An admiral's participation in the 1930 military junta was a novelty, with the Navy and Army now taking power together.[172]

In both world wars, the cause of Brazilian entry was the sinking of civilian shipping byGerman submarines.[76] In both cases Brazil found itself unprepared foranti-submarine warfare[173] and accepted operational subordination to a stronger power for a shipping defense campaign.[174] In World War I, a naval division was prepared for operations in the West African coast at the orders of the British admiralty.[174][154] In World War II, the Navy entered a jointAllied command headed by American forces based off Northeastern Brazil. Its task was to escort convoys between South America and theCaribbean. A total of 3,164 merchant ships were escorted,[76] at the cost of three warships and 486 men lost at sea.[175] American assistance through theLend-Lease program, including eightdestroyer escorts and 16submarine chasers, created a modern anti-submarine force. With these small but radar- and sonar-equipped vessels, and larger ships under construction at theNavy Arsenal, Brazil approached parity with Argentina.[176][177]

Cold War

[edit]
The cruiserTamandaré (C-12) with fourFletcher-class destroyers, all veterans of the World War II US Navy, in Brazilian service in 1961

In the first decades of theCold War, Brazil's admirals prepared for a repeat of the past war: an anti-submarine campaign in an auxiliary role to the US Navy.[174][79][80] Surplus Americandestroyers were now the backbone of the fleet.[178][o] TwoBrooklyn-class light cruisers replaced the battleships.[180][p] Second-hand ships were harmful for domestic military shipbuilding,[76] but they gave a properamphibious capability to theMarine Corps[q] and restored theNaval Aviation service through the light aircraft carrierMinas Gerais (A-11) (ex-Royal NavyHMSVengeance (R-71)), both in the 1950s. The Air Forceinsisted on its rights over embarked aviation and ultimately managed to put its own fixed-wing aircraft in the carrier's air wing. Only the helicopters would belong to the Navy.[183][r] This was an anti-submarine air wing without any attack aircraft.[185] Argentina had no such limitations on its own carrier and regained its naval advantage over Brazil.[137]

In the polarized "Populist Republic" (1945–1964), the naval officer corps leaned towards the anti-Vargas or "udenist" side",[s] whereas enlisted personnel organized in the 1960s in favor of class demands andJoão Goulart's reforms. This split in the ranks culminated in the1964 Sailors' Revolt, an immediate factor behind themilitary coup in the same year.[187] Admirals governed as part of the 1961, 1964 and1969 military juntas.[188] The 1964 coup installed amilitary dictatorship which would last until 1985. The new regime purged military personnel aligned with the previous government, and the Navy was most affected.[189]Civic-social actions to riverine populations were now understood as an insurgency prevention method. Amphibious doctrine envisioned landings against insurgent-held territories or rebel troops. The Marine Corps and naval intelligence service were engaged in political repression.[190]

The 1963 "Lobster War", a mobilization against theFrench Navy without a direct confrontation, laid bare the fleet's low state of readiness.[t] To renew the stock of vessels, the 1967 naval program, implemented during theBrazilian Miracle, ordered modern ships in European shipyards. The highlight of this program was the six British-designedNiterói-class frigates,[192] through which the Brazilian Navy entered the missile age. Two of them were assembled in Brazil,[193] where industrialization was now a consensus in the officer corps.[194] In 1980, the fleet had in service theMinas Gerais, twelve destroyers, sixfrigates, eight submarines, twotank landing ships and twelve thousand marines. 87% of ships had been built in other states and 57% dated to the 1940s and 1950s.[195] The 1977 program sought to continue this process, introducing, amongst other items, the local construction of submarines and anuclear program, but the late 20th centuryeconomic crisis and transition dragged the projects into the 21st century.[196][197]

Post-Cold War

[edit]
TheSão Paulo (A-12), successor to theMinas Gerais, leading the fleet in 2004

The end of the Cold War completed another shift in naval thought: the priority given to anti-submarine warfare was dropped, along with its geopolitical premises.[u] The prevailing idea was a balanced fleet with diverse capabilities.[194][198] The Argentine Navy declined in the 1990s, shifting the balance of power.[199] but the Brazilian Navy was now having to rely once again on second-hand ships, with its naval industry in crisis.[200] Among them was the aircraft carrierSão Paulo (A-12), formerly the French Navy'sFoch, purchased in 2000 to replace theMinas Gerais. Brazil retained the prestigious title of "carrier power", but couldn't extract much value out of the ship due to its severe maintenance difficulties and obsolete fixed-wingA-4 Skyhawk aircraft in its air wing.[201][202]

Brazil's international commitments inUnited Nations peacekeeping missions included deployments of marines toMINUSTAH inHaiti (2004–2017) and a ship toUNIFIL inLebanon (2011–2020).[203][204] The fleet shrank: from 2000 to 2022, decommissionings exceeded commissionings, and there were plans to put another 40% of the fleet out of service until 2028.[v] By 2007 the Navy's commander already spoke of a "critical state of material and technological obsolescence".[206] The National Defense Strategy, published in the following year, contained a political promise to raise the military to match Brazil's desired status as a first-rank power. The Navy responded with an ambitious expansion plan which would double the fleet in size until the 2030s and commission expensive vessels such as two aircraft carriers and six nuclear submarines.[207][208] Equipment targets would be supplied, as much as possible, by national industry.[209]

This plan found adeteriorating economic outlook and was shelved in its original form, but several projects survived,[208][210] while second-hand ships covered other gaps in the inventory.[211] For the Navy's greatest ambition since the 1970s, the nuclear submarine,[197] technical assistance fromFrance was sought for the large-scale and ongoingSubmarine Development Program (ProSub).[212] TheSão Paulo was replaced by the helicopter carrierAtlântico (A-140), formerly the Royal Navy's HMSOcean (L-12), in 2018.[211]

Ongoing programs

[edit]
Boeing ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle launched from theAtlântico

The Navy's main ongoing efforts are organized under seven strategic programs, among them theNavy Nuclear Program (PNM), Modernization of Naval Power and Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz). The Modernization of Naval Power program includes the procurement and construction programs for submarines (ProSub),Tamandaré-class frigates (PFCT), hydrographic and oceanographic ships (Prohidro) and Marine Corps equipment (Proadsumus).[213]

ProSub began in 2009 with a seven billion euro contract with France'sNaval Group. It comprises ashipyard and naval base inItaguaí, Rio de Janeiro, four diesel-electric submarines of theRiachuelo class, which is based on the FrenchScorpène class, and a nuclear submarine, to be calledÁlvaro Alberto (SN-10). The original plan was for 21 submarines, but no additional order has been placed since then.[212] Under delayed schedules, as of 2024 the final conventional boat was expected to enter service in 2026, and the nuclear submarine in 2036. French technology transfer does not extend to nuclear components, which are under development by the PNM. This is an older program, devised in the 1970s, and has already masteredfuel production. Areactor is under development.[213] The Navy describes ProSub in grandiose terms, with theÁlvaro Alberto becoming "our country's maximal strategic deterrence force".[214] Controversial points in the ProSub and PNM are Brazil's true strategic objective,[107][91] the cost-benefit ratio of their massive investments[215][216] and ensuing neglect towards other sectors,[217][218] and Brazil's relationship with internationalnon-proliferation agencies.[219][220]

Marine CorpsAstros IImultiple rocket launcher adapted to fire the MANSUP anti-ship missile

The PFCT comprises the construction of four frigates inItajaí,Santa Catarina, by a consortium betweenEmbraer, Atech andThyssenKrupp. The first frigate waslaunched in 2024, and the conclusion was scheduled for 2029.[221][222] The Antarctic support shipAlmirante Saldanha is under construction at the Jurong Shipyard inAracruz,Espírito Santo.[223] Progress on SisGAAz has slowed down and the program is likely to be fragmented for investment into priority maritime areas.[224] SisGAAz will connect existing systems with satellites,unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), radars and underwater sensors to establishmaritime domain awareness over much of the South Atlantic.[225]

SIATT, a domestic company with an Emirati stake, was contracted for industrial-scale production ofMANSUP, ananti-ship missile of domestic design,[226] and to developsurface-to-air andair-to-surface versions.[227] MANSUP has been adapted for Marine Corps artillery,[228] and the marines seek a coastal defense capability.[229] Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps have UAV programs,[230] and anunmanned surface vehicle (USV) was tested for the first time in 2023.[231]

Planning

[edit]
Main article:Future of the Brazilian Armed Forces § Navy
Launching of the submarineTonelero (S-42) at the Itaguaí Naval Complex

The Strategic Navy Plan 2040, published in 2020, discloses procurement aims for the next twenty years after publishing.[232] Another document, the 2023 Maritime Defense Strategy, established intended capabilities for the next twenty years after 2024. It plans for a fleet with the following components:[65]

  • Maritime Intervention Force: eight escorts, a fixed-wing-capable aircraft carrier, 16 reconnaissance, attack and anti-submarine aircraft in the carrier, eight reconnaissance and attack aircraft in the escorts and 40 UAVs.
  • Projection Force: the same aircraft carrier, three landing ships, nine landing craft, a battalion of marines, eight transport helicopters and six attack helicopters.
  • Maritime Protection Force: ten offshore patrol vehicles, 20 500-ton patrol boats and yet undefined patrol aircraft.
  • Attrition Force: four conventional submarines and a nuclear submarine.
  • Combat Logistics Force: two replenishment oilers, a submarine tender, four seagoing tugs and acasualty treatment ship.
  • Mine Warfare Force: three minesweepers, tenminelayers, a mine warfare-capablesubmarine rescue ship and undefined unmanned systems.
  • Hydroceanographic Services Force: six hydrographic ships, a hydrographic research ship, five buoy tender ships, eight buoy tender avisos, eleven hydrographic motor boats, a riverine hydrographic ship, five riverine hydrographic avisos and eight riverine buoy tender motor boats.
  • C5VIR Force: the SisGAAz and command and control elements.
  • Antarctic Research Support Force: two antarctic research support ships, three aircraft and an antarctic station.

Organization

[edit]
Further information:List of active Brazilian Navy ships
The Fleet in formation in 2023:Atlântico escorted by fiveNiterói-class frigates, anInhaúma-class corvette and aGreenhalgh-class frigate

The Navy is under the authority of the President of the Republic, mediated by the Ministry of Defense. The Navy Command is headed by an admiral[233] and headquartered in theMinistries Esplanade inBrasília.[6] He commands a general management body, theNavy General Staff (EMA), direct and immediate assistance bodies,[w] collegiate boards,[x] linked entities,[y] an autonomous linked body[z] and sectoral management bodies.[aa] The EMA conducts strategic studies and devises Brazilian naval thought. To reach consensus, the Navy Commander may call of the collegiate boards, the Admiralty, which is a council of the highest-ranking admirals.[235]

This structure comprise over 300 organizations in 2011, some operational, others for administration and support: training and research institutions, hospitals, bases, depots, pharmaceutical laboratory, ammunitions center, naval attachés and theNavy Arsenal.[236] The bulk of the operational Navy, with its main combat units, is in one of the sectoral management bodies, the Naval Operations Command (Comando de Operações Navais, ComOpNav).[37][4] As of 2017, ComOpNav controlled 89 out of 102 vessels in service. Most of the remainder were in the Grouping of Hydroceanographic Ships.[ab] Completa-se assim a divisão dos navios em três categorias: meios de Esquadra, meios distritais e meios de pesquisa.[237]

ComOpNav comprises the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet (Comando em chefe da Esquadra, ComemCh), who commands the "blue-water" fleet and naval aviation; the Fleet Marine Force Command, which is the seagoing component of the Marine Corps; the Naval Districts (DNs), which are the Navy's "coast guard" operational component;[37][4] the Naval Special Operations Command; the Maritime Operations and Blue Amazon Protection Command (COMPAAz), which oversees maritime traffic monitoring; and the Naval Warfare Doctrine Development Center.[37][234]

Fleet

[edit]
LPDBahia (G-40) with threeNiterói-class frigates

The Fleet (Esquadra) is the core of Brazilian naval power. It is divided between Commands for the Surface Force (ComForSup),Submarine Force (ComForSub) andAeronaval Force (ComForAerNav). Its home port is in Mocanguê Island,Niterói, Rio de Janeiro.[238] The Submarine Force is based at theMadeira Island Submarine Base, inItaguaí,[239] and the air arm inSão Pedro da Aldeia, both also in Rio de Janeiro state.[240]

The Brazilian Navy is held to be a more modern and technological force than the Army and Air Force, but occasionally and relatively inferior to other South American navies.[241] By the early 2020s, most of its fleet dates back to 1970s and 1980s programs and approaches the end of its service life.[242] In aggregatedisplacement, it was the world's 22nd largest navy in 2025, with 135,737 tonnes. In this position it was ahead of theArgentine Navy (122,128 tonnes) and behind thePeruvian Navy (170,344 tonnes) andChilean Navy (176,065 tonnes).[243]

As of 2025, the Fleet had two landing ships with significant aerial capability, the helicopter carrierAtlântico, formerly HMSOcean, and thelanding platform dock (LPD)Bahia (G-40), formerly the French Navy'sFoudre.[244] Another LPD is set to be commissioned, theOiapoque (G-350), formerly HMSBulwark.[245] The landing fleet also includes a tank landing ship, theAlmirante Saboia (G-25), and 16 landing craft.[244]

There are eight escorts: fiveNiterói-class frigates, aGreenhalgh-class frigate (formerly Royal Navy Type 22), anInhaúma class corvette and aBarroso-class corvette.[ac][244][234] All escorts have surface-to-surface missiles (MM40 Exocet Block 2) and hangars. The frigates also have surface-to-air missiles (Sea Wolf andAspide).[244] Other armaments in the escorts includeMk 46 light torpedoes,Boroc anti-submarine rockets and 115 milimeter guns.[244]

The Submarine Force has aTupi-class (German Type 209), aTikuna-class (modifiedTupi-class) and threeRiachuelo-class submarines and a submarine rescue ship. Submarines are armed with SM39 Exocet missiles (only in theRiachuelo class) andMk 48 andMk 24 Tigerfish torpedoes.[246][244][234] For logistical support, the fleet has the replenishment oilerAlmirante Gastão Motta (G-23).[244] Thetraining shipBrasil (U-27) and sail-training yachtCisne Branco (U-20) are administratively part of the Fleet.[234]

Naval Districts

[edit]
Offshore patrol vesselMacaé (P-70) in thePort of Santos

The Naval Districts divide national territory in nine areas. From the first to the ninth, they are respectively headquartered inRio de Janeiro,Salvador,Natal,Belém,Rio Grande,Corumbá,Brasília,São Paulo andManaus.[247] For search and rescue operations under COMPAAz coordination, national territory and the South Atlantic under Brazilian responsibility are divided in Salvamar areas. Salvamar Southeast matches the 1st DN, Salvamar East, the 2nd DN, and so on: Northeast (3rd DN), North (4th DN), South (5th DN), West (6th DN), Midwest (7th DN), South-Southeast (8th DN) and Northwest (9th DN).[248]

Naval Districts operate the two most relevant naval bases outside of Rio de Janeiro, in Aratu,Bahia (2nd DN), and Val-de-Cães,Pará (4th DN), the latter in the Amazon Delta region. Smaller bases exist in Natal,Rio Grande do Norte (3rd DN), Rio Grande,Rio Grande do Sul (5th DN), Ladário,Mato Grosso do Sul (6th DN) and Rio Negro,Amazonas (9th DN). The latter two are riverine bases.[249] The DNs command patrol vessels, buoy tenders, hydrographic survey vessels and regional units of marines and aviation. The 2nd DN commands the mine warfare force. Ladário and Rio Negro are headquarters for the Mato Grosso and Amazonas riverine flotillas.[37][4] Numerically, most of the Navy is in the Naval Districts, which held 63 out of a total of 102 vessels in 2017.[4] As of 2025 there were 44 patrol vessels of various sizes and three minesweepers in service.[ad] The smallest distributions of patrol vessels as of 2020 were in the 8th and 5th DNs, which cover the coast ofSão Paulo and theSouth.[250]

Naval Aviation

[edit]
Main article:Brazilian Naval Aviation
Super Cougar helicopter on the flight deck ofAtlântico

The air service is composed of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and UAVs.[5] As with the ships, it is split between the Fleet and the Naval Districts. The Fleet's Aeronaval Force Command is based at São Pedro da Aldeia Naval Air Station. The 4th, 5t, 6th and 9th Naval Districts each have their own utility helicopter squadron.[234][251] Theaircraft inventory had a total of 76 units in 2022.[5]

São Pedro da Aldeia bases squadrons ofinterceptor and attack aircraft (Skyhawk), utility helicopters (two squadrons withÉcureuil,H-135 andSuper Cougar aircraft), reconnaissance and attack helicopters (Super Lynx), anti-submarine helicopters (Seahawk), training helicopters[3][234] (Jet Ranger and AS350B3 Écureuil)[252] and UAVs (ScanEagle).[230] Their armament includes AM39 Exocet andAGM-119 Penguin anti-ship missiles. The Super Cougar fleet has variants configured for heavy transport, multi-role (transport, reconnaissance and combat) andcombat search and rescue missions.[3]

The fixed-wing squadron has six aircraft still in service. Brazil's Skyhawks have modernized sensors, but lack the armament for modern air-to-air or anti-ship combat.[253] There is uncertainty between the Navy and Air Force over which service should operate maritime patrol aviation, which is currently under the latter. Negotiations for the transfer of the Air Force'sP-3 Orion aircraft were dropped by the Navy in 2018.[254][65]

Marine Corps

[edit]
Main article:Brazilian Marine Corps
Assault Amphibious Vehicles and marine infantry in an amphibious landing exercise

The naval infantry service is theCorpo de Fuzileiros Navais (CFN),lit.'Corps of Naval Fusiliers'. It is split between the Fleet Marine Force (FFE) under the ComOpNav, several units under the Naval Districts and a management, doctrinal and technical-administrative body, the Marine Corps General Command (CGCFN).[255][256] The FFE is based at Flores Island andGovernador Island in Rio de Janeiro.[234][256] It is a light brigade-sized force[257] with three infantry battalions and command and control, artillery, armor, amphibious armor,special operations, logistics, engineering, anti-air, CBRN defense, medical support and military police components. Naval Districts have coastal and riverine operations battalions.[234][256] Total strength stood at 16,000 marines in 2025.[3]

Power projection over land, if needed through an amphibious assault to conquer a hostile shore, is the CFN'sraison d'être.[256] The Fleet does have landing ships for such operations — theAtlântico, for instance, can carry 830 marines — but its limitations in air defense and escorts would be visible in wartime.[201] Aside from amphibious warfare, its procurement of equipment forurban operations suggests an interest in operations against irregular forces in major urban centers.[258] The National Defense Strategy emphasized the CFN'sexpeditionary character.[259] The FFE is comparable to the Army'sairborne andair assault brigades: as quick reaction forces, they must have a higher state of readiness, tactical and strategic mobility and modern equipment.[260]

The CFN'sequipment inventory as of 2025 included 60armored personnel carriers (M-113,Piranha III andJLTV), 46Assault Amphibious Vehicles,SK-105Kürassier light tanks,L118 105-milimeter howitzers,Astros IImultiple rocket launchers andK6A3 120-milimeter mortars.[261][262]

Special operations

[edit]
Combat divers in an oil platform

Two elite units in the Navy conduct special operations, theMarine Special Operations Battalion ("amphibious commandos"), which is part of the Fleet Marine Force, and theCombat Divers Group (GRUMEC), part of the Submarine Force. Their main distinction is their operational environment: amphibious commandos on land and combat divers at sea, including boarding operations on ships and oil platforms.[234][263]

Directorate-General of Navigation

[edit]

Two specialized directorates are under the Directorate-General of Navigation (DGN), the Directorate of Ports and Coasts (DPC) and the Directorate of Hydrography and Navigation (DHN). The DPC handles the merchant marine, national maritime policy and waterway safety and policing. The DHN handles hydrography, oceanography, cartography, meteorology, navigation and navigational aids. Its Grouping of Hydroceanographic Ships, with nine vessels as of 2025, commands hydrographic, oceanographic, buoy tender and polar ships.[264][234]

Historical heritage

[edit]
Fiscal Island, the Navy Arsenal and the Navy Cultural Space in central Rio de Janeiro

The Secretariat-General of the Navy commands the Directorate of Navy Historical Heritage and Documentation (DPHDM), tasked with the preservation and promotion of historical and cultural heritage. It aims to conserve institutional memory and develop Brazil's maritime consciousness. The DPHDM runs the Naval Museum, Navy Archive, History Department, SDM Publishing House, Navy Library, Navy Cultural Space andFiscal Island, all of them in Rio de Janeiro.[265] The Navy Archive has thirty million written documents on paper, dated to the 18th century, as well as audiovisual and sound archives in its custody.[266] Smaller archives concerning the Navy are held at theNational Archives andHistoric and Geographic Institute.[267] The DPHDM publishes the Brazilian Maritime Magazine and theNavigator periodical.[268]

The Navy Cultural Space showcasesmuseum ships, theRiachuelo (S-22), the destroyer escortBauru (D-18), and tugboatLaurindo Pitta, and other equipment: anEE-9 Cascavel armored car and Skyhawk andSea King aircraft.[269] There are other museums across the country, such as the Nautical Museum of Bahia, the Ary Parreiras Museum in Natal, and specialized museums such as the Naval School Museum, the Flores Island Museum, Naval Aviation Museum and Marine Corps Museum.[270]

Industrial base

[edit]
Rio de Janeiro Navy Arsenal at Cobras Island, Rio de Janeiro. Anchored in the back, theSão Paulo (left) andAtlântico (right)

Shipyards in the United States and Western Europe are the Brazilian Navy's main foreign suppliers.[99] But Brazil also has a long history of bi-national shipbuilding agreements and efforts to develop its own naval industry,[137] even if reliant on foreign designs and components.[271] It is the only state in Latin America to assemble its own submarines and has progressed in autonomy in small surface combatants.[272]

As a rule, naval ships were built by the Navy's own shipyard, theRio de Janeiro Navy Arsenal (AMRJ) at Cobras Island, with exceptions at private shipyards such as Verolme, Ishikawajima andIndústria Naval do Ceará.[273] At present, frigates are built at ThyssenKrupp's Brasil Sul Shipyard in Itajaí,[221] and submarines at the Itaguaí Naval Complex.[212] The AMRJ is the Navy's largest industrial complex, with threedry docks, among them the Almirante Régis Dock, the largest in Latin America and large enough for aircraft carriers. Larger maintenance cycles are conducted at AMRJ, and other major repairs in Val-de-Cães, Belém. Other bases do minor repairs. Naval stations in Rio Grande and Rio Negro (Manaus) have the smallest capabilities. Val-de-Cães has a 225-meter long dry dock, Aratu, 220 meters, and Ladário, 80 meters.[274]

The naval military complex extends to support, training, education and research organizations, such as the Naval Systems Analysis Center (Casnav), the Navy Technological Center in São Paulo (CTMSP), which develops the nuclear program, the Naval Projects Management Company (EMGEPRON) and the Navy Ammunition Factory (FMM).[275] In the private sector, as of 2016 there were 353 Brazilian companies with any participation in the Navy's military equipment demand. Their main activities were in the construction, repair and maintenance of vessels. 76% of these companies were in theSoutheast.[276] Brazil also had one of the world's largest civilian shipbuilding industries, peaking at 5.6% of global displacement produced in 1980. In the 21st century, growth in this sector has been driven by the oil industry. There were 26 shipyards in 2010, over half of them in the state of Rio de Janeiro.[277]

Personnel

[edit]
Sergeants and corporals aboard theAtlântico

The Navy Command oversaw 77,216 federal employees in 2026.[2] Officer strength was fixed at 12,980 in 2026, including 86admirals and 3,831 temporary officers.[278] Enlisted strength stood at 61,100 for 2025, including 7,094 temporary personnel.[279]

Naval life is distinguished by long periods of confinement and distance from relatives ashore.[280] Direct contact with the population, and interest from sociological studies, is lower than in the Army.[281] On the other hand, contact with other states is greater and the Navy is the most cosmopolitan service branch.[241] A distinction must be made with marines, who are more active on land and have a separate identity within the service.[282]

For those who serve at sea, workloads are large and each crewman has more than one task.[283] A ship is a machine laden with volatile materials and failure-prone components.[284] Its unnatural environment exacts physiological adaptations on crews.[280] Service aboard can mean an exposition to weights, fuel gases, solvents and noise and cause diseases such ashearing loss,disc herniation and musculoskeletal disorders. Some sailors give in to alcoholism.Ship motions inducemotion sickness anddisembarkment syndrome.[285] Conditions are worse in some ships. The crew of a small minesweeper, for instance, must face strong motions and water rationing.[286] The most extreme environment is found in a submarine, with its cramped spaces and total absence of natural light.[287] Nevertheless, some studies with Brazilian submariners suggest crews can handle the stress, which the authors have credited toesprit de corps and the personnel selection, training and management processes.[288][289][290] Military psychology remains an understudied field in Brazil.[291]

Hierarchy

[edit]
Main article:Military ranks of Brazil

As an institution cemented on hierarchy and discipline, naval personnel are scaled according to circles, ranks and seniority.[292][293][294] Generically, those in the circle ofgeneral officers are called "admirals", senior officers are called "commanders" and intermediary and junior officers are called "lieutenants".[295][ae] Marines use the same ranks as the rest of the Navy, with the exception of the lowest rank, "soldado" (private,lit.'soldier'), instead of "marinheiro" (seaman,lit.'sailor').[296] Each circle is a division of social life in work stations, mess halls, restrooms and accommodations.[297]

Rank groupGeneral / flag officersSenior officersJunior officers
 Brazilian Navy[294]
Almirante[af]Almirante de esquadraVice-almiranteContra-almiranteCapitão de mar e guerraCapitão de fragataCapitão de corvetaCapitão-tenentePrimeiro-tenenteSegundo-tenente
Rank groupSenior NCOsJunior NCOsEnlisted
 Brazilian Navy[294]
SuboficialPrimeiro-sargentoSegundo-sargentoTerceiro-sargentoCaboMarinheiro

Corps and Cadres

[edit]
Hydrographer third sergeant abord the hospital shipDoutor Montenegro (U-16)

To manage a high functional complexity,[300] the Navy's personnel are divided in Corps and those in Cadres.[301] Three of the Corps — Fleet (Armada), Marines and Quartermasters — draw a main officer cadre from theNaval School (Escola Naval, EN) and a complementary officer cadre from a competitive examination for entrees with their own higher education.[302][301] The Fleet Corps draws the most attention, as it is responsible for the force's basic activity, navigation.[303] The Marine Corps is charged with ground combat,[282] and the Quartermaster Corps, with logistics, economics, finance, property, administration and internal control.[297]

Main commands are held by EN officers.[304] Prestige and career prospects scale according to the Corps and Cadre's closeness to war. EN Fleet and Marine officers reach the maximum peacetime rank (almirante de esquadra). Quartermasters, Medical and Engineering officers are at a second degree, potentially rising tovice-almirante, as they are responsible for the proper functioning of human and material resources. The Auxiliary Corps, which is responsible for technical-administrative services, only reaches the post ofcapitão de mar e guerra; enlisted men promoted to officers are placed in this Corps. Complementary cadres for the Fleet, Marines and Quartermasters can only reach the rank ofcapitão-tenente.[305][306] Enlisted personnel have a simpler division: only the Enlisted Fleet Corps, Enlisted Marine Corps, Enlisted Auxiliary Corps and Enlisted Navy Reserve Corps.[307] The Enlisted Fleet Corps mans ships and shore establishments.[308]

Education

[edit]
Graduation of midshipmen at the Naval School

Career officers are drawn from two institutions: the Naval School, for the Fleet, Marines and Quartermaster Corps, and the Admiral Wandenkolk Instruction Center (CIAW) for complementary cadres of those three Corps and the Engineering, Medical and Auxiliary Corps.[309] Enlisted personnel enter the Fleet Corps through the Apprentice-Seamen Schools (Escolas de Aprendizes-Marinheiros),[310] and in the Marine Corps, through the Admiral Milcíades Portela Alves Instruction Center (CIAMPA) and Brasília Instruction and Training Center (CIAB).[256]Conscription provides a very small percentage of total strength in the Navy as a whole, and none in the Marine Corps, which is composed exclusively of professional soldiers, an important distinction from the Army.[23] The Navy also runs the merchant marine officer academy, with centers in Rio de Janeiro and Belém.[311][43]

As of 2012, over half of the annual officer cohort was drawn from CIAW. Those are professionals with civilian academic backgrounds: physicians, pharmacists, engineers, social workers, lawyers, statisticians and others. The Naval School, on the other hand, is a military academy,[312] which offers a bachelor's degree.[313] Most of itsmidshipmen (aspirantes) come from theColégio Naval, a high school ran by the Navy.[314] At the end of their second year, aboard the fleet in the "Aspirantex" exercise, midshipmen choose their Corps and Qualification (Electronics, Weapons Systems or Mechanics, for the Fleet and Marines, and Administration, for Quartermasters). Higher ratings are needed to enter the Marine and Quartermaster Corps, as they have less vacancies:[315] in 2002, 60% were reserved for the Fleet, 20% for Marines and 20% for Quartermasters.[316] The option of Corps is definitive for the rest of an officer's career.[317] At the end of the fourth year, midshipmen are declaredguardas-marinha and follow a training voyage, the "golden voyage", aboard a training ship.[318]

Officers are promoted by seniority, merit, and for admirals, choice.[319] An officer's education spans his entire career:[320] there are specialized instruction centers for hydrography and oceanography, aviation, submarines and diving, amphibious warfare, nuclear technology and so on,[321] and a postgraduate staff college with courses in command, policy and strategy, the Naval War College (EGN). The EGN enables an officer for posts in the upper naval administration.[322][323] As of 2007, a combatant officer's career plan comprised eleven years in the junior and intermediary officer ranks and eighteen years in the senior officer ranks, achieving a transfer to the paid reserve with a minimum of thirty years in service.[324]

The Enlisted Fleet Corps receives 18 to 22-year old candidates in entrance exams for the four Apprentice-Seamen Schools inVila Velha,Olinda,Florianópolis andFortaleza.[325] Specialization courses for corporals and sergeants are held at the Admiral Alexandrino Instruction Center (CIAA).[310] The trajectory from seaman tosuboficial takes an average of thirty years.[326]

Social profile

[edit]
Seamen at the 2019Independence Day parade

The Navy has been described as "the most aristocratic and conservative of the services". Its officer corps is historically held to represent thewhite middle and upper classes.[327][281] The Imperial Navy was described as an "island of whites" and "well-kept display" by historian and Army officerNelson Werneck Sodré.[328]

This image has become less true since the late 20th century, with a growing number of lower class, lower middle class and nonwhite midshipmen at the Naval School.[329] Among the cohort of 2013, 31% had parents with full higher education and 20–25% had parents in the military, of which 69% were from the enlisted ranks. 82% were from the state of Rio de Janeiro.[330] This confirms other studies which suggest a lower rate of endogenous recruitment (i.e. from military parents) in the Navy and Air Force. Out of a sample of 94 officers at the EGN in 1998, family professions were highly varied, with "middle sectors" most common,[331] with the caveat that this sample was not statistically relevant.[332]

At the other end of the hierarchy, enlisted cadres were formed in the 19th century with foreign mercenaries, thenimpressment[ag] of criminals, vagabonds, minors,natives,slaves and merchant crewmen[333] and ultimately through the Companies (and later, Schools) of Apprentice-Seamen, which received poor youths and orphans, younger than the current recruits.[334] Racial composition was mostlyblack andmulatto. Indiscipline abounded and officers enforced their authority with corporal punishment,[335] a practice lasting until the 1910Revolt of the Lash.[336][164] The level of technical knowledge was low.[337]

After 1910 the Apprentice-Seamen Schools became the primary source of enlisted men. Recruitment criteria were tightened, avoiding orphans and excessively uneducated candidates.[338] Over time, professional education adapted to the demands of the industrial age.[339] After World War II, the "artisan-seaman" had become the "technical specialist-seaman".[340] However, in the 1960s a seaman was still seen as an individual of "dubious morality, regularly in brothels and violent, addicted and alcoholic".[341] Social support was insignificant and the right to marry was restricted.[342] TheConstitution denied the right to vote. This was the background toanother mutiny in 1964.[343] A study of the 1964 revolt concluded conditions (food, leisure, health and citizenship) have since then improved and the early 21st century Navy is a more transparent institution, but Brazilian society is unconcerned with seamen and marine soldiers.[344]

Women

[edit]

Service in some roles in the Navy was opened to women in 1980, in the former Navy Reserve Auxiliary Feminine Corps (CAFRM), and broadened in the following decades. As of 2025, women can enter the Quartermaster, Engineering, Medical and part of the Auxiliary Corps and the Musician Cadre of the Enlisted Marine Corps. Female officers, depending on their cadre, may rise to the post ofvice-almirante. In 2025 there were 6,922 women in active service, of which 3,197 were officers and 3,725, enlisted personnel.[345]

Traditions

[edit]
Monument to Admiral Tamandaré inSão Luís

As a seafaring institution, the Navy has a distinct language, traditions, ceremonies and customs, many of them shared between navies in the whole world.[346] And as a military institution, it reveres civic values and historic traditions and values itsesprit de corps.[347] Ship names commemorate Brazilian locations, historical figures and species, often repeating old names. The motto "Tudo pela pátria" ("Everything for the fatherland") is written on every vessel.[347] Thenational flag is hoisted from the stern, and the 21-starnaval jack from the bow.[348] A 21-starpennant atop the mast shows the ship is commanded by a naval officer. If any higher authority in the chain of command is aboard, the pennant is replaced by the appropriate rank flag.[349] The commander of naval operations in the War of the Triple Alliance,Joaquim Marques Lisboa, the Marquess of Tamandaré, became the Navy's patron. 11 June, the anniversary of the Battle of Riachuelo, is Navy Day,[7] and 13 December, Tamandaré's birthday, is Sailors' Day.[350]

Notes and references

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^For the Navy's history, seePaula 2004 for the Empire,Cascardo 2005 for tenentism,Alves 2005,Martins 2009,Martins 2010,Moura 2015,Val 2013 andWaldmann 2019, for the fleet's evolution over the 20th century,Assis 2013 andBonalume 2021 for World War II,Almeida 2010 for the 1964 revolt,Martins 2006,Moura 2014 andPivatto 2024 for post-Cold War strategy andCabral 2022,Salles & Galante 2023 andVidigal 1983 for an overview.
  2. ^Brazilian naval vocabulary calls aircraft carriersnavios-aeródromo (NAe),lit.'aerodrome ships'.[11] TheAtlântico was originally designated a multipurpose helicopter carrier and later a multipurposenavio-aeródromo to emphasize its ability to receive not just helicopters but also unmanned aerial vehicles and turboprop vertical landing aircraft. However, Brazil has none of the latter type of aircraft. With the name change, the Navy once again has an "aircraft carrier", but remains without any fixed-wing embarked aviation.[12]
  3. ^For an overview of the current fleet, seeIISS 2025 andSalles & Galante 2023.
  4. ^For the nuclear submarine project, seeKassenova 2014,Martins 2011 andSá 2015.
  5. ^For geopolitical thought on the South Atlantic and the organization of jurisdictional waters, seeCarvalho 2019,Costa 2017,Maia 2020,Silva 2020a,Silva 2020b andVentura 2020.
  6. ^In its definition of the "Armed Forces as a permanent instrument of national foreign policy, the Navy makes it unnecessary to justify the existence of those forces with resource to any activity other than national defense, such as internal defense or revolutionary war".[22] "While the former [the Navy] conceives of its mission as essentially related to defense proper, the latter [Army] understands its mission as transcending strictly military considerations, which implies assigning high weight to immaterial values such as the diffusion of civic sentiment and national presence".[23] "Given its "blue-water" bias, the navy is even less inclined to become involved in counterdrug operations than the army or air force".[24]
  7. ^Under the Empire, the Navy "came to play an important role in the process of internal control of political violence",[26] as a "key instrument to ensure the establishment and integrity of the complex machinery of state".[27] The 1985 edition of the official Brazilian naval History stresses that the participation in 1920s and 1930s military revolts, which were mostly led by the Army, "was always overwhelmingly loyalist, in accordance with the conservative spirit peculiar to navies".[28]
  8. ^Likewise, the Brazilian Marine Corps, traditionally modelled after the Brazilian Army, sought inspiration in theUnited States Marine Corps.[78]
  9. ^This did not meant a disruption in relations between the US and Brazilian navies. The end of the treaty was a foreign policy decision byErnesto Geisel's government.[83]
  10. ^From the 1980s onwards, Brazilian warships visited ports in the African Atlantic coast and officers from African navies were invited to Brazilian academies. Newly-independent Namibia sought a Brazilian advisory mission for itsNavy in 1992.[86][87]
  11. ^The Army's newer generation was drawn from the lower middle class, while the Navy represented the upper middle class and aristocracy, lived a more sheltered existence and was not influenced by positivism.[74][148]
  12. ^"[T]he Army made the Republic and conquered political power, while the Navy remained basically monarchist and assumed a position of inferiority. The 1893 Naval Revolt [...] ends symbolically and inexorably the Navy's period of political hegemony".[74]
  13. ^Only half of thePará class was still in service and seaworthy in 1939, but there was one newer destroyer, theMaranhão. The firstFoca-class submersibles had already been replaced.[156]
  14. ^The fleet shelledFort Copacabana in its1922 revolt and landed in Santos during the 1924São Paulo Revolt, but the battleshipSão Paulo and the Amazonas Flotilla joined revolts in 1924.[169] In theRevolution of 1930, naval operations in the South and Northeast were insufficient to prevent the collapse of the government. In 1932, besides the coastal blockade, there were riverine and marine operations. Thecommunist uprising of 1935 was of little relevance to the Navy, but a number of officers and enlisted men were arrested after the 1938 integralist uprising.[170]
  15. ^SevenFletcher-class, fiveAllen M. Sumner and twoGearing-class ships received between 1959 and 1973.[179]
  16. ^The cruisersBarroso (C-11) andTamandaré (C-12) served until the 1970s.[181]
  17. ^The Corps was until then a mere guard infantry with some artillery. Four Japanese troopships and several landing craft enabled the first amphibious landing exercises in 1958.[182]
  18. ^From 1965 to 1998, the Navy was forbidden by presidential decree from flying fixed-wing aircraft.[184]
  19. ^In one consequence of this political dispute, in 1955 the Armyoccupied the capital, presidentCarlos Luz escaped aboard the cruiserTamandaré and returned upon hearing of his impeachment by Congress.[186]
  20. ^The French Navy was escorting unauthorized lobster fishing in the Brazilian continental shelf. When the Brazilian Navy had to react, mobilization was difficult and spare parts and ammunition were in short supply. The dispute was resolved diplomatically.[191]
  21. ^I.e. subordination to a collective hemispheric defense system under American leadership.[80]
  22. ^Two aircraft carriers, areplenishment oiler, threetank landing ships, three submarines, threeminesweepers and eleven escorts were decommissioned. In the same period the fleet received a helicopter carrier, an amphibious ship, an escort and two submarines. A further four escorts and three submarines were on order.[205]
  23. ^Navy Strategic Communication Center (CCEM), Navy Internal Control Center (CCIMar), Navy Intelligence Center (CIM), Navy Intelligence School (EsIMar), Office of the Commander of the Navy (GCM), Navy Special Prosecutor's Office (PEM), Secretariat of the Interministerial Commission on Marine Resources (SECIRM) and Naval Secretariat of Nuclear Safety and Quality (SecNSNQ).[234]
  24. ^Council of Admirals (CAL), Commission on Studies on Navy Uniforms (CEUM), Navy Financial and Administrative Council (COFAMAR), Navy Science and Technology Council (CONCITEM), Personnel Planning Council (COPLAPE), Master Plan Council (COPLAN), Navy Information Technology Council (COTIM) and Officer Promotion Commission (CPO).[234]
  25. ^Amazônia Azul Tecnologias de Defesa (Amazul) andEmpresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais (EMGEPRON).[234]
  26. ^The Admiralty Court.[234]
  27. ^Naval Operations Command (ComOpNav), Marine Corps General Command (CGCFN), Directorate-General of Navy Materiel (DGMM), Directorate-General of Navy Personnel (DGPM), Directorate-General of Navigation (DGN), Directorate-General of Navy Nuclear and Technological Development (DGDNTM) and Secretariat-General of the Navy (SGM).[234]
  28. ^The Grouping is part of the structure of the Directorate-General of Navigation. Three avisos served theNaval School, within the Directorate-General of Navy Personnel, and one ship was operated by the Admiral Paulo Moreira Institute of Sea Studies, within the Directorate-General of Navy Nuclear and Technological Development.[4]
  29. ^TheInternational Institute for Strategic Studies classes theBarroso-class as a frigate and counts a total of eight principal surface combatants (frigates). TheInhaúma-class corvette is counted among the patrol and coastal combatants.[244]
  30. ^The International Institute for Strategic Studies counted 45 " patrol and coastal combatants", including theInhaúma-class corvette,[244] which is administratively part of the Fleet.[234]
  31. ^The post ofcapitão-tenente comprises the circle of intermediary officers.[294]
  32. ^Only used in wartime[298] or in honor of figures such asBarroso andTamandaré.[299]
  33. ^Seeblood tax.

Citations

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  2. ^abCGU 2026.
  3. ^abcdIISS 2025, p. 403.
  4. ^abcdefgMartini 2017.
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  6. ^abPortella & Isquierdo 2023.
  7. ^abcCPPR 2019.
  8. ^abcVentura 2020, p. 263.
  9. ^UOL 2021.
  10. ^Comandante 2025.
  11. ^LBDN 2012, p. 98, 267.
  12. ^Alves 2020.
  13. ^Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, art. 142.
  14. ^LBDN 2012, p. 56.
  15. ^abLBDN 2012, p. 82-83, 264-265.
  16. ^Cabral 2022, p. 474-475.
  17. ^Moura 2014, p. 285.
  18. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 27.
  19. ^SSPM, Marinha Mercante (n.d.).
  20. ^Oliveira 2022, p. 644-648.
  21. ^Soares 2015, p. 31-32, 48-49.
  22. ^abMartins 2006, p. 100.
  23. ^abAlsina 2010, p. 482.
  24. ^abHudson 1998, p. 383.
  25. ^Silveira 2002, p. 135.
  26. ^abHalpern & Leite 2014, p. 166.
  27. ^Halpern & Leite 2014, p. 169.
  28. ^Mancuso 2008, p. 230.
  29. ^LBDN 2012, p. 56, 174.
  30. ^Complementary law n. 97, arts. 16, 16-A and 17.
  31. ^Ventura 2020, p. 262-263.
  32. ^Silva 2020a, p. 305.
  33. ^Silva 2020a, p. 299.
  34. ^Soares 2015, p. 55-56.
  35. ^abcdAMN 2024.
  36. ^abcSoares 2015, p. 56.
  37. ^abcdefgSalles & Galante 2023, "Brazilian Navy organization".
  38. ^abCarvalho 2019, p. 102.
  39. ^Carlôto 2022.
  40. ^Carvalho 2019, p. 87.
  41. ^LBDN 2012, p. 172.
  42. ^abcVidigal 2002, p. 38-39.
  43. ^abLyra 1999, p. 16.
  44. ^abcCEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 30.
  45. ^LBDN 2012, p. 172-173.
  46. ^Soares 2015, p. 55.
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  48. ^Vidigal 2002, p. 36-37.
  49. ^Lopes 2014, p. 363.
  50. ^Galante & Lopes 2014.
  51. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 136.
  52. ^abCEMBRA,cap. 1 [2024], 20-21, 26-28.
  53. ^abVentura 2020, p. 272, 275-276.
  54. ^Kassenova 2014, p. 29.
  55. ^AMN 2023.
  56. ^Silva 2020b, p. 12-13.
  57. ^Salles & Galante 2023, "Antarctic Support Ship".
  58. ^LBDN 2012, p. 45.
  59. ^Pryce 2015.
  60. ^abcOrbaiceta 2023.
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  62. ^Ferreira, Montenegro & Nobre 2020, p. 91-94.
  63. ^abLopes 2014, p. 136.
  64. ^LBDN 2012, p. 100.
  65. ^abcFerreira 2024.
  66. ^LBDN 2012, p. 35.
  67. ^Lima et al. 2017, p. 52.
  68. ^Salles & Galante 2023, "Current and future mission priorities".
  69. ^Lima et al. 2017, Prefácio.
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  71. ^Connors 2005, p. 23-24.
  72. ^Garcia 2003, p. 174-175.
  73. ^Vidigal 1983, p. 32.
  74. ^abcVidigal 1983, p. 36.
  75. ^McCann 2017, p. 83-84.
  76. ^abcdeSalles & Galante 2023, "Historical background".
  77. ^Vidigal 1983, p. 37.
  78. ^Cantídio 1993, p. 44.
  79. ^abAlves 2005, p. 17.
  80. ^abcVidigal 1983, p. 38.
  81. ^Cabral 2022, p. 469.
  82. ^abcMartins 2006, p. 82-83.
  83. ^Vidigal 2002, p. 14.
  84. ^Moura 2014, p. 94.
  85. ^Lima et al. 2017, p. 52-53.
  86. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 257-259.
  87. ^Lopes 2014, p. 385-389.
  88. ^Moura 2014, p. 107.
  89. ^Herz, Dawood & Lage 2017, p. 343.
  90. ^Lopes 2014, p. 111.
  91. ^abcdeMcCann 2017, p. 83.
  92. ^Connors 2005, p. 1, 4-5.
  93. ^Connors 2005, p. 25, 29-30, 36.
  94. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 293.
  95. ^Herz, Dawood & Lage 2017, p. 334-335.
  96. ^Maia 2020, p. 90, 97-104.
  97. ^Lima et al. 2017, p. 56.
  98. ^McCann 2017, p. 84.
  99. ^abConnors 2005, p. 50.
  100. ^abPaula 2004, p. 303.
  101. ^abcMarreiro 2021, p. 125.
  102. ^abcVidigal 1983, p. 33.
  103. ^abCabral 2022, p. 456-457.
  104. ^Ventura 2020, p. 277.
  105. ^Marreiro 2021, p. 126-127.
  106. ^Marreiro 2021, p. 127.
  107. ^abKassenova 2014, p. 31.
  108. ^Maia 2020, p. 122, 124-127.
  109. ^Crude oil 2024.
  110. ^Carvalho 2018, p. 93.
  111. ^Ventura 2020, p. 277-278.
  112. ^Marreiro 2021, p. 127-128.
  113. ^Marreiro 2021, p. 127-131.
  114. ^CEMBRA,cap. 1 [2024], p. 2-3, 12-16.
  115. ^Silva 2020b, p. 17.
  116. ^Maia 2020, p. 96-97.
  117. ^Silva 2020a, p. 302.
  118. ^Ventura 2020, p. 278-279.
  119. ^Carvalho 2019, p. 94.
  120. ^abCosta 2017, p. 40.
  121. ^Carvalho 2019, p. 93.
  122. ^Ventura 2020, p. 280.
  123. ^abMarreiro 2021, p. 132.
  124. ^Costa 2017, p. 39-40.
  125. ^Ventura 2020, p. 284, 286-287.
  126. ^Kassenova 2014, p. 30-31.
  127. ^Carvalho 2019, p. 106-107.
  128. ^Alsina 2010, p. 482, 484.
  129. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 301-302.
  130. ^Bastos 2020.
  131. ^Silveira 2002, p. 134.
  132. ^LBDN 2012, p. 78.
  133. ^Paula 2004, p. 303-305.
  134. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 312-316.
  135. ^LBDN 2012, p. 54-55.
  136. ^Pesce 2013, p. 438.
  137. ^abcGardiner, Chumbley & Budzbon 1995, p. 29.
  138. ^Paula 2004, p. 309, 318.
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  141. ^Alves 2005, p. 2-3.
  142. ^Vidigal 1983, p. 33-34.
  143. ^História Naval (n.d.).
  144. ^Cabral 2022, p. 458.
  145. ^Vidigal 1983, p. 34.
  146. ^Vidigal 1983, p. 35.
  147. ^Waldmann 2014, p. 72.
  148. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 26-27.
  149. ^Martins 2010, p. 33-34.
  150. ^Martins 2010, p. 45.
  151. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 53, 56-57.
  152. ^Martins 2010, p. 46, 50-51.
  153. ^Cabral 2022, p. 459-460.
  154. ^abBonalume 2021, p. 66-67.
  155. ^Assis 2013, p. 114.
  156. ^Assis 2013, p. 119.
  157. ^Bonalume 2021, p. 64-66.
  158. ^Waldmann 2019, p. 52.
  159. ^Martins 2009, p. 110.
  160. ^Moura 2015, p. 114.
  161. ^Cabral 2022, p. 460.
  162. ^abAlves 2005, p. 4-5.
  163. ^abWaldmann 2019, p. 51.
  164. ^abCarvalho 2006, p. 53.
  165. ^Bonalume 2021, p. 67.
  166. ^Val 2013, p. 32, 37.
  167. ^Waldmann 2019, p. 58–60.
  168. ^Val 2013, p. 29–30.
  169. ^Cascardo 2005, p. 22–23, 242, 379.
  170. ^Mancuso 2008, p. 233-234.
  171. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 52.
  172. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 51, 54.
  173. ^Waldmann 2019, p. 61.
  174. ^abcMoura 2014, p. 286.
  175. ^Assis 2013, p. 131-133.
  176. ^Alves 2005, p. 11.
  177. ^Waldmann 2019, p. 61-62.
  178. ^Martins 2009, p. 106.
  179. ^Gardiner, Chumbley & Budzbon 1995, p. 32.
  180. ^Alves 2005, p. 19-20.
  181. ^Gardiner, Chumbley & Budzbon 1995, p. 31.
  182. ^Cantídio 1993, p. 40, 42.
  183. ^Poggio 2020.
  184. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 36, 247-248.
  185. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 248.
  186. ^CPDOC FGV 2001,Movimento do 11 de novembro.
  187. ^Carvalho 2006, p. 115-116, 162.
  188. ^CPDOC FGV 2001,Juntas Militares.
  189. ^BNM 1985, p. 118, 120.
  190. ^Marques 2001, p. 58-60.
  191. ^Lopes 2014, p. 241-251.
  192. ^Moura 2015, p. 117-118.
  193. ^Martins 2009, p. 114-115.
  194. ^abMartins 2006, p. 81.
  195. ^Jenkins 1991, p. 52.
  196. ^Moura 2015, p. 118-119.
  197. ^abMartins 2009, p. 116.
  198. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 351-352.
  199. ^Connors 2005, p. 23.
  200. ^Cabral 2022, p. 475.
  201. ^abMilitary Watch 2018.
  202. ^Caiafa 2017.
  203. ^Uziel & Marcondes 2021, p. 764-765, 774.
  204. ^Lima et al. 2017, p. 36.
  205. ^Maia 2023.
  206. ^Lopes 2014, p. 121.
  207. ^Moura 2014, p. 26, 125, 149.
  208. ^abSalles & Galante 2023, The 'PAEMB' dream fleet.
  209. ^Lopes 2014, p. 203.
  210. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 38.
  211. ^abSalles & Galante 2023, Other recent acquisitions.
  212. ^abcSalles & Galante 2023, PROSUB submarines.
  213. ^abCEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 34-36.
  214. ^Agência Brasil 2020.
  215. ^Sá 2015, p. 15.
  216. ^The Economist 2021.
  217. ^Martins 2011, p. 294-295.
  218. ^Motta 2014.
  219. ^Sá 2015, p. 3.
  220. ^Kassenova 2014, p. 29-30.
  221. ^abSalles & Galante 2023,Tamandaré class frigates.
  222. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 38-39.
  223. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 39-40.
  224. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 37-38.
  225. ^Moura 2014, p. 149.
  226. ^Bastos 2024.
  227. ^Wiltgen 2025.
  228. ^SIATT 2024.
  229. ^Barreira 2025.
  230. ^abCaiafa 2025b.
  231. ^Moralez 2023.
  232. ^CEMBRA,ch. 2 [2024], p. 26.
  233. ^LBDN 2012, p. 54-55, 80-81.
  234. ^abcdefghijklmnopEstrutura 2025.
  235. ^Pivatto 2024, p. 35, 83-85.
  236. ^Conceição 2012, p. 22.
  237. ^Maia 2020, p. 145.
  238. ^LBDN 2012, p. 82.
  239. ^ComForSub 2021.
  240. ^LBDN 2012, p. 85.
  241. ^abSilveira 2002, p. 18.
  242. ^Salles & Galante 2023, "Origins of the current fleet".
  243. ^GFP 2025.
  244. ^abcdefghiIISS 2025, p. 402.
  245. ^Maia 2025.
  246. ^Godoy 2025.
  247. ^LBDN 2012, p. 87.
  248. ^Estrutura SAR (n.d.).
  249. ^Waters 2016.
  250. ^Maia 2020, p. 146.
  251. ^LBDN 2012, p. 85, 92.
  252. ^Moralez 2025.
  253. ^Caiafa 2025a.
  254. ^Lopes 2018a.
  255. ^LBDN 2012, p. 93-94.
  256. ^abcdeAraújo, Oliveira & Stilben 2024.
  257. ^Lopes 2014, p. 371.
  258. ^Rodrigues 2023.
  259. ^Lopes 2014, p. 378.
  260. ^Pinheiro 2012, p. 24.
  261. ^IISS 2025, p. 43.
  262. ^Meios Navais 2025.
  263. ^Pinheiro 2012, p. 69-72.
  264. ^LBDN 2012, p. 96-98.
  265. ^DPHDM 2022.
  266. ^Rodrigues & Silva 2022, p. 544-545.
  267. ^Rodrigues & Silva 2022, p. 542-543.
  268. ^DPHDM 2022, p. 38-39.
  269. ^DPHDM 2022, p. 14-16.
  270. ^Outros museus (n.d.).
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  272. ^Connors 2005, p. 4.
  273. ^Negrete 2016, p. 178.
  274. ^Negrete 2016, p. 192-194.
  275. ^Negrete 2016, p. 193-194.
  276. ^Negrete 2016, p. 194, 199-200.
  277. ^CEMBRA,ch. 10 [2021], p. 2, 18.
  278. ^Decree n. 12.812, January 9 2026.
  279. ^Ordinance n. 82/MB/MD, April 8 2025.
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  293. ^Conceição 2012, p. 22-25.
  294. ^abcdPostos 2024.
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  306. ^Lei n.º 9.519, de 26 de novembro de 1997.
  307. ^Ordinance n. 41 MB/MD, July 21 2022.
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  350. ^Almeida 2010, p. 16.

Bibliography

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