| Blue House raid | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theKorean conflict,Korean DMZ Conflict and theCold War | |||||||
_Reception_Center_0688%25269-07_cropped.jpg) TheBlue House, the official residence of thePresident of South Korea, in August 2010 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 South Korea United States |  North Korea | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Park Chung HeeCharles Bonesteel | Kim Il Sung | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| 25th Infantry Division26th Infantry Division (elements)2nd Infantry Division (elements)7th Infantry Division (elements) | Unit 124 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 26 killed 4 killed | 29 killed and/or committed suicide 1 captured 1 escaped | ||||||
| Blue House raid | |
| Hangul | 1·21 사태 |
|---|---|
| Hanja | 1·21 事態 |
| RR | 1·21 satae |
| MR | 1·21 sat'ae |
TheBlue House raid, also known in South Korea as theJanuary 21 Incident (Korean: 1·21 사태), was araid launched by North Korean commandos in an attempt toassassinatePresident of South KoreaPark Chung Hee in his residence at theBlue House inSeoul, on January 21, 1968. A 31-man team of theKorean People's Army (KPA) infiltrated theDMZ but was intercepted by police near the presidential residence. In the ensuing pursuit, all but two commandos were killed; one was captured (Kim Shin-jo), and one (Pak Jae-gyong) fled back to North Korea. South Korean casualties totaled 26 killed and 66 wounded, including about 24 civilians; four Americans also were killed. Park was unharmed.
Park Chung Hee seized power in a1961 coup d'état and ruled as amilitary strongman until hiselection and inauguration as thePresident ofSouth Korea in 1963. The attack at the Blue House took place in the context of theKorean DMZ Conflict (1966–69), which in turn was influenced by theVietnam War.
Following the 1967South Korean presidential election and thelegislative election, the North Korean leadership concluded that Park's domestic opposition no longer constituted a serious challenge to his rule.
In July 1967, a special squad of the recently establishedUnit 124 of theKorean People's Army (KPA) was entrusted with the task of assassinating Park. This decision was probably facilitated by the fact that in 1967, the Vietnam War entered a new stage of escalation, and American military forces, preoccupied as they were with Vietnam, could not easily take retaliatory measures against North Korea. In 1965–1968,North Korea–North Vietnam relations were very close, and North Korea provided substantial military and economic assistance toNorth Vietnam.
North Korean propaganda sought to depict the post-1966 commando raids as a South Korean guerrilla movement akin to theViet Cong.[1]
Thirty-one men were handpicked from the elite all-officer KPA Unit 124. This special operationcommando unit trained for two years and spent their final 15 days rehearsing action on the objective in a full-scalemockup of theBlue House.[2]
These specially selected men were trained in infiltration andexfiltration techniques, weaponry, navigation, airborne operations, amphibious infiltration,hand-to-hand combat (with emphasis onknife fighting) and concealment.
Kim Shin-jo, one of only two known survivors, said "It made us fearless—no one would think to look for us in a graveyard."[3] Their training was rigorous and often in adverse conditions, such as running at a speed of 13 km/h (8 mph) with 30 kg (66 pound) rucksacks over broken and unforgiving terrain, which sometimes resulted in injuries such as lost toes and feet fromfrostbite.
On January 16, 1968, Unit 124 left their garrison atYonsan. On January 17, 1968, at 23:00, they infiltrated theDMZ by cutting through the fencing of theU.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division's sector. By 02:00 the next day they had set up camp at Morae-dong andSeokpo-ri. On January 19, at 05:00, after having crossed theImjin River, they set up camp on Simbong Mountain.
At 14:00, four brothers named Woo from Beopwon-ri were out cutting firewood and stumbled across the unit's camp. After a fierce debate over whether to kill the brothers, it was decided instead to try to indoctrinate them on the benefits ofcommunism and they were released with a stern warning not to notify the police. However, the brothers immediately reported the presence of the unit to the Changhyeon police station in Beopwon-ri.[4]
The unit broke camp and increased their pace to more than 10 km/h (6 mph), carrying 30 kg (70 lb) of equipment each, crossing Nogo Mountain and arriving at Bibong Mountain on January 20 at 07:00. Three battalions from theSouth Korean 25th Infantry Division began searching Nogo Mountain for the infiltrators, but they had already left the area. By then the commandos in the unit realized that the Park Administration had been notified of their infiltration in the South and changed their tactics accordingly. The unit enteredSeoul in two- and three-man cells on the night of January 20 and regrouped at the Seungga-sa Temple, where they made their final preparations for the attack.
Meanwhile, the ROK (Republic of Korea) High Command added the 30th Infantry Division and Airborne Corps to the search and police began searching alongHongje-dong,Jeongreung, and Bukak Mountain. Given the increased security measures that had been implemented throughout the city and realizing their original plan had little chance of success, the team leader improvised a new plan.
Changing intoRepublic of Korea Army (ROKA) uniforms of the local 26th Infantry Division, complete with the correct unit insignia (which they had brought with them), they formed up and prepared to march the last kilometre (1094 yards) to the Blue House, posing as ROKA soldiers returning from a counter-infiltration patrol. The unit marched along Segeomjeong Road nearJahamun toward the Blue House, passing several National Police and ROKA units en route.
At 22:00 on January 21, 1968, the unit approached the Segeomjeong–Jahamun checkpoint less than 100 meters from the Blue House, whereJongro police chief Choi Gyushik approached the unit and began to question them. When he grew suspicious of their answers, he drew his pistol and was shot by members of the unit who started firing and throwing grenades at the checkpoint. After several minutes of shooting, the unit dispersed, with some heading off to the mountainInwangsan, the mountain Bibongsan, and the city ofUijeongbu. Choi and Assistant Inspector Jung Jong-su were killed in the firefight; one commando was captured but managed to commit suicide.[5]
On January 22, 1968, the ROK Army's 6th Corps began a massive sweep operation to capture or kill any members of the unit. Soldiers from the 92nd Regiment, 30th Infantry Division capturedKim Shin-jo, who had been hiding in a civilian's house near Inwang Mountain. The 30th Battalion, Capital Defense Command, killed four commandos inBuam-dong and on Bukak Mountain.
On January 23, the 26th Infantry Division's Engineer Battalion killed one commando onDobongsan. On January 24, 1968, the 26th Infantry Division and1st Infantry Division soldiers killed 12 commandos nearSeongu-ri. On January 25, three commandos were killed nearSongchu. On January 29, six commandos were killed nearPapyeong Mountain.
During the course of this assassination attempt, South Korean casualties totaled 26 killed and 66 wounded, including about 24 civilians. Four Americans also were killed in attempts to block the escaping infiltrators from crossing the DMZ.[6] Of the 31 members of Unit 124, 29 were killed or committed suicide; one,Kim Shin-jo, was captured,[7] and the other one,Pak Jae-gyong managed to escape back to North Korea.[8] The bodies of the members of Unit 124 killed in the raid were later buried in theCemetery for North Korean and Chinese Soldiers.[9]
On January 22, theUnited Nations Command (UNC) requested that aMilitary Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting be held to discuss the raid. The UNC requested the meeting for January 23, but the North Koreans asked for a day's delay. On January 23, theUSS Pueblo, a technical research ship of theUnited States Navy, was captured by North Korea. Consequently, the MAC meeting held on January 24 had to deal not only with the raid but also with thePueblo's capture. To a considerable extent, the seizure of thePueblo diverted U.S. and international attention from the Blue House raid.[10]
The Blue House raid occurred on the same day when theBattle of Khe Sanh started in Vietnam and on January 31 theTet Offensive broke out across South Vietnam, making any U.S. support for South Korean retaliation unlikely. In Saigon, Viet Cong guerrillas attempted to assassinate PresidentNguyễn Văn Thiệu at theIndependence Palace but were quickly beaten back. Some writers have suggested that due to the similarities of both attacks by a similar number of commandos (31 in Seoul and 34 in Saigon, respectively) that the North Korean leaders had a certain insight into Vietnamese Communist military operations, and wanted to take advantage of the Vietnam War.[1] PresidentLyndon Johnson regarded the seizure of thePueblo and the timing of the Tet Offensive to have been coordinated to divert U.S. resources away from Vietnam and to force the South Koreans to withdraw their two Divisions and Marine Brigade from South Vietnam. Unlike Johnson, UNC commander, GeneralCharles H. Bonesteel III saw no such connection. He regarded the Blue House Raid as having been planned at the highest levels in North Korea, while the seizure of thePueblo seemed merely opportunistic and the timing of the Tet Offensive as helpful but coincidental.[11]
In response to the assassination attempt, the South Korean government organized the ill-fatedUnit 684. This group was intended to assassinate the leader of North Korea,Kim Il Sung. However, following an improvement in intra-Korean relations, the unit's assassination mission was cancelled and in 1971 the unit revolted and most of its members were killed.
In May 1972, Kim Il Sung expressed regret and claimed that the Blue House raid "was entirely plotted by extreme leftists and did not reflect my intent or that of the Party" to the head of theKorean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)Lee Hu-rak during their meeting in Pyongyang.[12]
Kim Shin-jo was later released after receiving a pardon for not opening fire during the raid. He settled in South Korea and started a family. He also became a critic of communism and said that his parents were later executed. He was ordained as a pastor in 1997 and died in 2025.[13]
