| Battle of Taranto | |||||||
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| Part of theBattle of the Mediterranean ofWorld War II | |||||||
 The Italian battleshipConte Di Cavour with hull largely underwater after being torpedoed during the Taranto raid. | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom |  Italy | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Inigo Campioni | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
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  Taranto | |||||||
TheBattle of Taranto took place on the night of 11/12 November 1940 during theSecond World War between British naval forces (AdmiralAndrew Cunningham) and Italian naval forces (AdmiralInigo Campioni). TheRoyal Navy launched the first all-aircraft ship-to-ship naval attack in history, employing 21Fairey Swordfish biplanetorpedo bombers from theaircraft carrierHMS Illustrious in theMediterranean Sea.
The attack struck the battle fleet of theRegia Marina at anchor in the harbour ofTaranto, usingaerial torpedoes, despite the shallowness of the water. The success of this attack augured the ascendancy ofnaval aviation over big-gunbattleships. According to Cunningham, "Taranto, and the night of 11/12 November 1940, should be remembered forever as having shown once and for all that in theFleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon".[1]
Since long before theFirst World War, the ItalianRegia Marina's First Squadron had been based atTaranto, a port city on Italy's south-east coast. In the inter-war period, the BritishRoyal Navy developed plans to counter the Italian navy in the event of a war in the Mediterranean. Plans for the capture of the port at Taranto were considered as early as the Italian invasion ofAbyssinia in 1935.[2]
After Italy's entry into World War II in 1940, British and Italian forces in North Africa engaged each other in theWestern Desert Campaign. Italian troops based in Libya required a supply line from Italy. British troops, based in Egypt, suffered from much greater supply difficulties. Before Italy entered the war, Britishconvoys had travelled across the Mediterranean, fromGibraltar viaMalta to Egypt. However, the threat from the Italian navy and air force made this very difficult. Instead, British ships steamed around theCape of Good Hope, up the east coast of Africa, and then through theSuez Canal to reachAlexandria.
Following the concept of afleet in being, the Italians usually kept their warships in harbour and were unwilling to seek battle with the Royal Navy on their own, also because any ship lost larger than a destroyer could not be replaced. The Italian fleet at Taranto was powerful: sixbattleships (of which one was not yet battleworthy,Andrea Doria having her crew still in training after her reconstruction), sevenheavy cruisers, twolight cruisers and eightdestroyers. This made the threat of asortie against British shipping a serious problem.
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During theMunich Crisis of 1938,Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the commander of the BritishMediterranean Fleet, was concerned about the survival of theaircraft carrierHMS Glorious in the face of Italian opposition in the Mediterranean, and ordered his staff to re-examine all plans for attacking Taranto.[2] He was advised byLumley Lyster, thecaptain ofGlorious, that hisFairey Swordfish biplanetorpedo bombers were capable of a night attack. Indeed, theFleet Air Arm was then the onlynaval aviation arm with such a capability.[2] Pound took Lyster's advice and ordered training to begin. Security was kept so tight there were no written records.[2] Just a month before the war began, Pound advised his replacement,Admiral Andrew Cunningham, to consider the possibility. This came to be known as Operation Judgment.[3]
Thefall of France and the consequent loss of theFrench fleet in the Mediterranean (even beforeOperation Catapult) made redress essential. The older carrier,HMS Eagle, on Cunningham's strength, was ideal, possessing a very experienced air group comprised entirely of the obsolescent Swordfish aircraft. ThreeSea Gladiator fighters were added for the operation.[2] Firm plans were drawn up after the Italian Army halted atSidi Barrani, which freed up the British Mediterranean Fleet.[2]
Operation Judgement was a small part ofOperation MB8.[2] It was originally scheduled to take place on 21 October 1940,Trafalgar Day, but a fire in an auxiliary fuel tank of one Swordfish led to a delay. 60 imp gal (270 L) auxiliary tanks were fitted in the observer's position on torpedo bombers - the observer taking the air gunner's position - to extend the operating range of the aircraft enough to reach Taranto. This minor fire spread into something more serious that destroyed two Swordfish.[2]Eagle then suffered a breakdown in her fuel system,[2] so was removed from the operation.
When the new carrierHMS Illustrious, based at Alexandria, became available in the Mediterranean, she took on board five Swordfish fromEagle and launched the strike alone.[4]
The complete force, commanded by now-Rear Admiral Lyster,[2] Flag Officer, Mediterranean Aircraft Carriers, who had originated the plan of attack on Taranto—consisted ofIllustrious, the heavy cruisersHMS Berwick andYork, the light cruisersHMS Gloucester andGlasgow, and the destroyersHMS Hyperion,Ilex,Hasty andHavelock.[5] The 24[2] attack Swordfish came from813,815,819, and824 Naval Air Squadrons. The small number of attacking warplanes raised concern thatJudgement would only alert and enrage the Italian Navy without achieving any significant results.[2]Illustrious also hadFairey Fulmarfighters of806 Naval Air Squadron aboard to provide air cover for the task force, with radar and fighter control systems.[6]
Half of the Swordfish were armed with torpedoes as the primary strike aircraft, with the other half carryingaerial bombs and flares to carry out diversions.[2][7] These torpedoes were fitted with Duplex magnetic/contactexploders, which were extremely sensitive to rough seas,[2] as the attacks on theGerman battleshipBismarck later showed. There were also worries the torpedoes would bottom out in the harbour after being dropped.[2] The loss rate for the bombers was expected to be fifty per cent.[2]
Severalreconnaissance flights byMartin Marylands of 431 General Reconnaissance Flight RAF flying from Malta confirmed the location of the Italian fleet. These flights produced photos on which theintelligence officer ofIllustrious spotted unexpectedbarrage balloons; the attack plan was changed accordingly.[2] To make sure the Italian warships had not sortied, the British also sent over aShort Sunderland flying boat on the night of 11 November, just as the carrier task force was forming up off the Greek island ofCephalonia, about 170 nmi (310 km; 200 mi) from Taranto harbour. This reconnaissance flight alerted the Italian forces in southern Italy, but since they were withoutradar, they could do little but wait for whatever came along. TheRegia Marina could have gone to sea in search of any British naval force, but this was against the naval philosophy of the Italians between January 1940 and September 1943. The complexity of Operation MB8, with its various forces and convoys, succeeded in deceiving the Italians into thinking only normal convoying was under way. This contributed to the success ofJudgement.[2]
The base of Taranto was defended by 101 anti-aircraft guns and 193 machine guns and was usually protected against low-flying aircraft by barrage balloons, of which only 27 were up on 11 November, as strong winds on 6 November had blown away 60 balloons.[8] Capital ships were also supposed to be protected by anti-torpedo nets, but 12,800 m (42,000 ft) of netting was required for full protection, and only a third of that was rigged before the attack, due to a scheduled gunnery exercise. The nets did not reach the bottom of the harbour, allowing the British torpedoes to clear them by about 60 cm (2.0 ft).[9]
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The first wave of 12 aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander Kenneth "Hooch" Williamson RN of 815 Squadron, leftIllustrious just before 21:00 hours on 11 November 1940, followed by a second wave of nine about 90 minutes later. Of the second wave, one aircraft turned back as its auxiliary fuel tank detached from the aircraft ensuring the aircraft would not be able to complete the trip, and one launched 20 minutes late, after requiring emergency repairs to damage following a minor taxiing accident, so only eight made it to the target.
The first wave, which consisted of six Swordfish armed with torpedoes, two with flares and four 250 lb (110 kg) bombs, and four with six bombs, was split into two sections when three of the bombers and one torpedo bomber strayed from the main force while flying through thin clouds. The smaller group continued to Taranto independently. The main group approached the harbour atMar Grande at 22:58. Sixteen flares were dropped east of the harbour, then the flare dropper and another aircraft made adive bombing attack to set fire to oil tanks. The next three aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander K Williamson RN of 815 Squadron, attacked over San Pietro Island, and struck the battleshipConte di Cavour with a torpedo that blasted a 27 ft (8.2 m) hole in her side below her waterline. Williamson's plane was immediately shot down by the Italian battleship'santi-aircraft guns.[10] The two remaining aircraft in this sub-flight continued, dodging barrage balloons and receiving heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Italian warships and shore batteries, to press home an unsuccessful attack on the battleshipAndrea Doria. The next sub-flight of three attacked from a more northerly direction, attacking the battleshipLittorio, hitting it with two torpedoes and launching one torpedo at the flagship, the battleshipVittorio Veneto, which missed. The bomber force, led by Captain O. Patch RM, attacked next. They found the targets difficult to identify, but attacked and hit two cruisers moored atMar Piccolo hitting both with a single bomb each from 1,500 ft (460 m), followed by another aircraft that straddled four destroyers.[4]
The second wave of eight aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander J. D. Hale of 819 Squadron, was now approaching from a northerly direction towards theMar Grande harbour, with two of the four bombers also carrying flares, the remaining five carrying torpedoes. Flares were dropped shortly before midnight. Two aircraft aimed their torpedoes atLittorio, one of which hit. One aircraft, despite having been hit twice by anti-aircraft fire, aimed a torpedo atVittorio Veneto but the torpedo missed. Another aircraft hit the battleshipDuilio with a torpedo, blowing a large hole in her hull and flooding both of her forwardmagazines. The aircraft flown by Lieutenant G. Bayley RN was shot down by antiaircraft fire from the heavy cruiserGorizia[10] following the successful attack onLittorio, the only aircraft lost from the second wave. The final aircraft to arrive on the scene 15 minutes behind the others made an unsuccessfuldive-bombing attack on one of the Italian cruisers despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, then safely returned toIllustrious, landing at 02:39.[4]
Of the two aircraft shot down, the pilot and observer of the first (L4A), Lieutenant Commander K. Williamson, and Lieutenant N. J. 'Blood' Scarlett respectively, were taken prisoner. The pilot and observer of the second aircraft (E4H), Lieutenant G. Bayley and Lieutenant H. Slaughter, were both killed.[11]
The Italian battleships suffered significant damage:
Italian defences fired 13,489 shells from the land batteries, while several thousand were fired from the ships. The anti-aircraft barrage was formidable, having 101 guns and 193 machine guns. There were also 87 balloons, but strong winds caused the loss of 60 of them. Only 4.2 km (2.3 nmi; 2.6 mi) of anti-torpedo nets were actually fielded around the ships, up to 10 m (33 ft) in-depth, while the need was for 12.8 km (6.9 nmi; 8.0 mi). There were also 13aerophonic stations and 22 searchlights (the ships had two searchlights each).[13] Denis Boyd, Commanding Officer HMSIllustrious, stated in his after-action report, "It is notable that the enemy did not use the searchlights at all during either of the attacks".[a]
Littorio was repaired with all available resources and was fully operational again within four months, while restoration of the older battleships proceeded at a much slower pace (repairs took seven months forDuilio, and the repairs forConte di Cavour were never completed). In all, the Swordfish attack was made with just 20 aircraft. Two Italian aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the bombing, and two unexploded bombs hit the cruiserTrento and the destroyerLibeccio. Near misses damaged the destroyerPessagno.[13]
Meanwhile, X-Force cruisers attacked an Italian convoy (Battle of the Strait of Otranto). This force had three cruisers (HMS Ajax,Orion andHMAS Sydney) and twoTribal-class destroyers (HMS Nubian andMohawk). Just past midnight, they met and destroyed four Italian merchantmen (Capo Vado,Catalani,Locatelli andPremuda), damaging the torpedo-boatNicola Fabrizi, while the heavily out-gunnedauxiliary cruiserRamb III fled.[13]
Cunningham and Lyster wanted to strike Taranto again the next night with Swordfish (six torpedo-bombers, seven bombers, and two flare-dispensers) – one wag in the pilots' room remarked, "They only asked theLight Brigade to do it once!"[14] – but bad weather prevented the action.[13]
The Italian fleet lost half of its capital ships in one night; the next day, theRegia Marina transferred its undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples to protect them from similar attacks,[4] until the defences at Taranto (mainly the anti-torpedo nets) were brought up to adequate levels to protect them from further attacks of the same kind (which happened between March and May 1941).[15] Repairs toLittorio took about four months, toDuilio seven months;Conte di Cavour required extensive salvage work and her repairs were incomplete when Italy surrendered in 1943.[16] Cunningham wrote after the attack: "The Taranto show has freed up our hands considerably & I hope now to shake these damnedEyeties up a bit. I don't think their remaining three battleships will face us and if they do I'm quite prepared to take them on with only two." Indeed, the balance of power had swung to the British Mediterranean Fleet which now enjoyed more operational freedom: when previously forced to operate as one unit to match Italian capital ships, they could now split into two battlegroups; each built around one aircraft carrier and two battleships.[17]
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Nevertheless, Cunningham's estimate that Italians would be unwilling to risk their remaining heavy units was quickly proven wrong. Only five days after Taranto, Campioni sortied with two battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers to successfully disrupta mission to deliver aircraft to Malta. The follow-up to this operation led to theBattle of Cape Spartivento on 27 November 1940, which was an indecisive battle although the convoy the British warships were escorting did reach Malta; and without the attack on Taranto, the Italians could potentially have had three more battleships at this action. Two of the three damaged battleships were repaired by mid-1941, although the third never returned to active service. Control of the Mediterranean continued to swing back and forth for the next two years.[18]
Measured against the objective of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the Taranto attack had very little effect. Italian shipping to Libya increased between October 1940 and January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month, up from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months.[19] Rather than change the balance of power in the central Mediterranean, British naval authorities had "failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed the context within which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought."[20]
The Battle of Taranto was also one of three major events in November and December 1940 that had a serious negative impact on the alliance between Italy and Germany. The attack on Taranto was followed by the Greek counter-offensive in theGreco-Italian War, which began on 14 November 1940, then Britain'sOperation Compass in Egypt, commencing 9 December 1940. All three battles ended with embarrassing defeats for the Italian military, and raised eyebrows in the Third Reich. According to Gooch, "Taranto convinced the German navy that any possibility the Italians might achieve mastery of the Mediterranean had disappeared and with it any chance of a successful Italian offensive in Egypt."[21] The view now in Berlin was that success in the Mediterranean, Balkans and North Africa required heavy German involvement, with Italy as the subordinate partner. Also, attitudes towards their Italian allies hardened in the Reich. Goeschel wrote, "...German military and political officials now adopted an officious tone in their dealings with Italians, whichBadoglio was made to feel in his meeting withKeitel in Innsbruck on 14 and 15 November 1940, the first wartime meeting of the chief of the Wehrmacht's Supreme Command and his Italian counterpart..."[22] After these defeats for Italy in late 1940, the Italian military attaché in Berlin, GeneralLuigi Efisio Marras, was no longer given the special treatment afforded to the representative of an ally. Henceforth, the alliance between Italy and Nazi Germany never saw the same level of co-operation, trust and mutual respect that occurred between the USA and Britain in World War Two.[23]
A major consequence of the Battle of Taranto was many harbours that were previously considered too shallow for air-dropped torpedo attacks were now vulnerable. Prior to Taranto, most navies thought torpedo attacks against ships must be in water at least 75 ft (23 m) deep.[24] Taranto harbour had a depth of only about 39 ft (12 m) but the Royal Navy had developed a new method of preventing torpedoes from diving too deep. A drum was attached beneath the nose of the aircraft, from which a roll of wire led to the nose of the torpedo. As it dropped, the tension from the wire pulled up the nose of the torpedo, producing a belly-flop rather than a nose dive.[25]
TheImperial Japanese Navy's staff carefully studied the Taranto raid during planning for theattack on Pearl Harbor, as both attacks faced similar issues attacking a shallow harbour. Japanese Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval attaché to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack firsthand. Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with CommanderMitsuo Fuchida about his observations in October 1941.[26] Fuchida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941. A group of IJN officers visited Taranto in May 1941 and had lengthy discussions with their Italian Navy opposite numbers.[27] However, the Japanese had been working on shallow-water solutions since early 1939, with various shallow ports as the notional targets, includingManila,Singapore,Vladivostok, and Pearl Harbor.[28] In the early 1930s, as theirType 91 aerial torpedo entered service, the Japanese used a breakaway wooden nose to soften its impact with the water. As early as 1936, they perfected breakaway wooden fins for added aerial stability.[28][29]
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a considerably larger operation than Taranto. All sixImperial Japanesefleet carriers, each one equipped with an air wing having over twice the number of planes of any British carrier, took part; seven American battleships were sunk or disabled, and several other warships were destroyed or damaged. The U.S. Navy thereafter designed its fleet operations in thePacific Ocean around its carriers instead of itsbattleships ascapital ships. Battleships were found to be less useful in the expanses of the Pacific than in the confines of the Mediterranean; the older ships were too slow to escort the carriers and were chiefly used as fire support for amphibious operations.[30]
